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     This doctoral thesis aims to examine how certain sexual images and 
motifs commonly deemed “obscene” are represented as a unique aesthetic 
phenomenon in the works of English Romantic poets, William Blake, Percy 
Bysshe Shelley, and John Keats. It can be observed that sexual desire 
becomes an emblem that the Romantics use to rebel against political and 
religious oppression and to establish individual subjectivity free from the 
restraint of scientific rationalism, further accessing a transcendental state of 
the “Poetic Genius.” Departing from the long-established readings of sexual 
desire in the Romantic poetry, this thesis first situates the idea of obscenity in 
the historical contexts of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to 
reconceptualise it as an alternative form of aesthetics of self-annihilation 
correlated with the sublime. In the main chapters, by exploring the oft-ignored 
dark and violent aspects of eroticism in Blake’s Visions of the Daughters of 
Albion and Milton, Shelley’s The Cenci and Laon and Cythna, and Keats’s 
“Isabella” and “The Eve of St. Agnes,” I argue that “obscenity” emerge in 
English Romanticism as a unique aesthetic phenomenon of self-annihilation, 
particularly empowered in the experiences of sex, religious ecstasy, and 
poetic creation itself. The research results of this thesis delineate that in the 
works of these poets, religion, art, and eroticism form an essential trinity in 
the human psyche that constantly seeks to build, reshape, escape from, and 
eventually destroy existing identities. It also epitomises the desire to go 
beyond the status quo and the ordinary experience of limited selfhood. An 
examination of this heterogeneous trinity provides an alternative angle to 
approach other canonised literary works of English Romanticism and explore 
within them the elements that are “less canonised” and “obscene.” 
Furthermore, it resonates with the recent studies that have highlighted the 
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ROMANTIC IDEOLOGIES OF SEXUAL DESIRE 
 
     In his 1982 essay “Dangerous Blake,” W. J. T. Mitchell names 
“obscenity” as one of three problems in Blake’s works that awaits critical 
attention. He argues that “Blake was not a nice man: he was filthy with work 
and visionary conviction” (414).1 By using the words “obscenity” and “filthy,” 
Mitchell seems to imply that what Blake presents sexually in his poetry is 
unpleasant, offensive, and tasteless, signifying certain representations that 
will degrade the aesthetic value of Blake’s works. Mitchell, however, does not 
offer any further explanation or textual analysis. The example of Blake’s 
“obscenity” Mitchell refers to is only the last two lines of “I saw a chapel all of 
gold,” a short poem collected in Blake’s Notebook: 
          I saw a chapel all of gold 
          That none did dare to enter in 
          And many weeping stood without 
          Weeping mourning worshipping 
 
          I saw a serpent rise between 
          The white pillars of the door 
          And he forcd & forcd & forcd 
          Down the golden hinges tore 
 
          And along the pavement sweet 
          Set with pearls & rubies bright 
          All his slimy length he drew, 
          Till upon the altar white 
    
          Vomiting his poison out 
          On the bread & on the wine 
          So I turnd into a sty 
          And laid me down among the swine  
                          (CPPB 467-468) 
The sexual images are far from explicit in this poem, compared to passages 
such as “I’ll lie beside thee on a bank & view their wanton play / in lovely 
copulation” in Visions of the Daughters of Albion (7.25-26, CPPB 50) or the 
obvious sexual intercourse in America: a Prophecy, “when Orc assay’d his 
                                                
1 The other two problems are madness and incoherence. 
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fierce embrace” upon his sister the “Shadowy Female” (1.10, CPPB 51), or 
again the outright championing of sexual desire that men and women 
mutually seek “The lineaments of Gratified Desire” (CPPB 474). One must 
read the serpent as the Christian archetype of Satan who lures Eve into the 
Fall indicative of sexual knowledge, or undergo a process of graphic 
imagination to picture the serpent as an ejaculating phallic image and the 
white altar as a receptive vulvar one. It requires certain metaphorical and 
metaphysical considerations to deem the poem sexual, yet it is a direct 
example of Mitchell’s argument about Blake’s obscenity. Obscenity, therefore, 
stands out from mere graphic depictions of sexual intercourse. In “I saw a 
chapel all of gold,” certain qualities drive Mitchell’s labelling of the poem as 
obscene: violence (“And he forcd & forcd & forcd”), sacrilege, excrement 
(“Vomiting his poison out / On the bread & on the wine”), and dehumanisation 
(“So I turnd into a sty / And laid me down among the swine”). The influx of 
sexual desire, embedded allusively in these images of obscenity, runs 
counter to the notion that in English Romanticism, sexual interaction is 
presented as a form of liberation from religious and political oppression and 
an access to individual subjectivity. Obscenity, as unconventional 
manifestations of sexual desire, can be observed and explored in a wider 
range of Romantic works, in addition to “I saw a chapel all of gold.”  
     Therefore, this doctoral thesis aims to examine how certain sexual 
images and motifs commonly deemed “obscene” are represented as a 
unique aesthetic phenomenon in the works of the English Romantic poets, 
William Blake, Percy Bysshe Shelley, and John Keats. It can be observed 
that sexual desire becomes an emblem that the Romantics use to rebel 
against political and religious oppression and to establish individual 
subjectivity free from the restraint of scientific rationalism, further accessing a 
transcendental state of the “Poetic Genius.”2 In Blake’s poetry, sexual desire 
is termed “free love” and “fiery joy,” in order to counter the Christian tradition 
                                                
2 As Anne K. Mellor points out, however, the metaphorical function of sexual desire in 
Romantic poetry is by large male-centred. Female characters and voices are often silenced, 
absorbed, and assimilated into the poetic enterprise (no matter with aesthetic, religious, or 
political ends) of male poets, especially the Big Six. See Mellor’s Romanticism and Gender, 
pp. 17-29.    
 3 
of asceticism. In his America: a Prophecy, Orc, a mythical character 
embodying sexual desire and the America Revolution in Blake’s system, rises 
against Urizen, the avatar of Jehovah and the conservative European 
powers. For Blake, sex is also the divine source of “Poetic Genius” that 
emancipates humanity from rigid rationalist and scientific abstraction. For 
Byron and Shelley, sexual love, especially incestuous attachment between 
siblings, signifies the perfect and purest affection that opposes paternal 
oppression, as we can observe in the former’s The Bride of Abydos and the 
latter’s Laon and Cythna (later revised as The Revolt of Islam). In Keats’s 
“Lamia,” the erotic love between serpent and man is thwarted by the old 
sage, Apollonius. Such a conflict can be read as the Romantic antithesis 
between sexual passion and cold rationalist regulation. Also, sexual love 
conflicts with capitalist calculation and paternal cruelty in “Isabella.” 
Departing from the long-established readings of sexual desire in the 
Romantic poetry as “the energy for critical activity, for the autonomy of 
individuality” (Robinson 8), this thesis does not focus on its positive 
symbolism of self-sufficiency and political/religious/social liberties, but seeks 
to excavate the oft-ignored dark and violent aspects of eroticism in the works 
of Blake, Shelley, and Keats.  
     Before examining the sexual aspects of English Romanticism and their 
critical interpretations in existing studies, it is necessary to survey the overall 
trend of scholarship in Romantic studies, which, as Jerome J. McGann 
observes, is often “dominated by a Romantic Ideology” and “an uncritical 
absorption in Romanticism’s own self-representation” (The Romantic 
Ideology 1). McGann perceives an ontological division in the readings of 
English Romantic poetry, a division between two critical trends led by René 
Wellek and Arthur Lovejoy. The former promotes an intrinsic unity in the 
apparent diversity of Romantic works, while the latter emphasises the 
“discrimination of Romanticisms” (The Romanic Ideology 17). M. H. Abrams 
highlights the literary heritage of the Bible and Milton in Romantic poetry, and 
points out that these Romantic poets represent a unitary, although revised, 
framework of biblical design, in order to pursue “alternative ways to the 
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Millennium” (56). Abrams’s understanding of English Romanticism 
demonstrates a progressive cosmological order based on Judeo-Christian 
tradition, from a primary innocence, a fall, a catastrophic but also purifying 
apocalypse, to a final reestablishment of an earthly paradise. Abrams’s 
framework of secularised Christianity, however, as McGann observes, cannot 
accommodate Shelley’s scepticism, Byron’s pessimism and misanthropy, or 
Keats’s indulgence in excessive and sometimes morbid melancholy. Thus, 
there exists a crucial deficiency in Romantic studies that follow Abrams’s 
formulation. Mario Praz’s 1933 The Romantic Agony and Anne K. Mellor’s 
1980 English Romantic Irony are the two studies that supplement such a 
deficiency in Abrams’s scheme. Praz explores the darker sides of English 
Romanticism. He proposes that “[t]he essence of Romanticism consequently 
comes to consist in that which cannot be described” (14), adding that “the 
Romantic beauty was enhanced by exactly those qualities which seem to 
deny it, by those objects which produce horror; the sadder, the more painful it 
was, the more intensely they relished it” (27).  
     While Praz highlights the negative aspects of Romantic sensitivity, 
Mellor proposes that such negativity reflects on the Romantic poets and their 
own works. Evoking Friedrich Schlegel’s theories of poetry and its relation to 
the world, Mellor argues that “irony” is a pervasive phenomenon in English 
Romanticism.3 This phenomenon is based on the poets’ understanding of 
the world as an ever-changing chaos, in which any orders—political, 
religious, and moral—fail to operate, and their self-understanding of the limits 
of their poetic work in representing such a cosmological order (or non-order). 
Romantic poetry, therefore, is a crystallisation of scepticism and what 
Nietzsche would term “pessimism of strength.” As Mellor observes, “even as 
he [the Romantic poet] denies the absolute validity of his own perceptions 
and structuring conceptions of the universe, even as he consciously 
                                                
3 The works of Schlegel in Mellor’s discussion include “On Incomprehensibility,” Dialogue on 
Poetry, and “On the Limits of the Beautiful.” The most crucial ideas Mellor evokes, in order to 
support her argument of “Romantic irony,” is Schlegel’s perception of the world as 
“constructed by the understanding out of incomprehensibility or chaos” and how such an 
amoral chaos becomes the most fertile source for poetry, the exuberance of Fülle, the 
“abundance” of life and energy (Romantic Irony 7).  
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deconstructs his mystifications of the self and the world, he must affirm and 
celebrate the process of life by creating new images and ideas” (Romantic 
Irony 5). In the Romantic poets’ artistic efforts, despite the keen awareness of 
their own limitations, Mellor further discovers a tendency towards self-
destruction: “many central romantic works exhibit a structure that is 
deliberately open-ended and inconclusive” and “present a simultaneously 
creative and de-creative form” (6). Poetic creation, therefore, consists of the 
conflicting drives to create and to destroy, to establish and to annihilate self 
and subjectivity. In short, Praz’s and Mellor’s approaches supplement the 
unified readings of Romantic poetry led by Wellek and Abrams. Apart from 
acknowledging a linear progressive process toward a lost innocence and 
divinity, Praz and Mellor recognise certain points of disruption and derailment 
in this “Romantic progression.” The representation of sexual desire in 
Romantic poetry is also incorporated by scholars into their interpretations, as 
the form of a “Romantic ideology” to support their specific readings, in 
Wellek’s unified model, Abrams’s alternative Christian cycle, Praz’s negative 
perception, and Mellor’s “Romantic irony.” My thesis on the erotic subject and 
self-annihilation in Romantic poetry departs from these ideologies in the 
existing scholarship on English Romanticism. Through the re-
conceptualisation of the idea of “obscenity,” I explore how sexual desire is 
represented in the works of Blake, Shelley, and Keats, and demonstrate the 
aesthetic phenomenon of eroticism that decentralises self and dissolves 
subjectivity in Romantic poetry. 
     The Romantic tendency to employ sexual desire as a form of positive 
affect reflects the drastic shift of cosmic thinking at the end of eighteenth 
century. Such a shift of metaphysical consideration of the world, according to 
Lovejoy, centres on the detachment from “an absolutely rigid and static 
scheme of things,” an immovable God-based moral ideology, and the affinity 
to what Morse Peckham terms an ever-changing and ever-growing “dynamic 
organism,” “philosophy of becoming,” and a “universe of emergents” (Enscoe 
1-9). Sexual passion and the body from which it flows had been discredited 
for its corporeality and mortality, which contrasts with the spirituality of 
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Christianity in pre-Romantic literature. Such a phenomenon can be noticed 
in, for example, The Faerie Queene, in which people who are allured by the 
enchantress Acrasia into the “Bower of Bliss” are transformed into beasts. 
Edmund Spenser’s literary design here indicates that the overflowing of 
sexual desire degrades humanity to the level of bestiality, a state even more 
remote from the realm of God. That emphasis on the virtue of chastity in The 
Faerie Queene also celebrates Queen Elizabeth’s enterprise as a virgin ruler, 
insinuating the synthesis of divinity and politics and the superiority of spiritual 
love over corporeal desire. For pre-Romantic writers, indulgence in sexual 
love not only prevents human beings from entering Heaven and denies them 
final salvation, but also hinders them from achieving secular enterprise. 
Furthermore, the influx of sexual desire, as a form of unbridled “passion,” 
poses a threat to the belief in self-sufficiency centring around reason, the 
ideal means to construct an epistemological order for eighteenth-century 
intellectuals, as Alexander Pope asserts in one of his epistles: “when his own 
great work is but begun, / What Reason weaves, by Passion is undone” (7). 
To transcend the corporeal-spiritual dichotomy and rigid rationalism, the 
Romantics, as Gerald Enscoe points out, see sexual passion “not as an 
inherently evil force pulling man away from salvation, but as a force which 
has the possibility of leading him to psychic regeneration” (22).  
     The pursuit and fulfilment of sexual desire in Romantic poetics thus 
represent a form of liberation from despotic authorities and a symbol of self-
sufficiency. While interpreting the erotic images and motifs in Romanticism, 
early critics tended to execute a sort of “catharsis” upon sexuality, 
accentuating the positive effects of sexual love and its metaphorical functions 
for political and religious purposes. This critical phenomenon is mostly 
perceivable in Blake studies. Critics whose works have already been 
“institutionalised” as standard readings, such as Northrop Frye and Harold 
Bloom, maintain a belief in literature as an alternative sphere above the 
mundane world. The sphere of literature is constructed self-sufficiently and 
independently, with literary works exerting mutual influences, in the form of 
Frye’s archetypal modes or Bloom’s anxiety of influence. That is, their studies 
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of Romantic poetry entail a sense of detachment from the contemporary 
historical and cultural contexts, “a deep fear of the actual world, a distaste for 
history itself,” as Terry Eagleton remarks (Literary Theory 81). This sense of 
detachment from history is one of the features of “Romantic ideologies” that 
McGann observes in the unified readings of Romantic poetry. Regarding 
poetry as an independent, elevated and transcendent state of mind or, as 
Abrams’s Judeo-Christian model demonstrates, an apocalyptic aspiration of 
a harmonious new world, undoubtedly reflects certain aspects of English 
Romanticism. But these “ideologies” risk the possibility of metaphorical 
deflection of the darker sides of Romantic sexuality. Under this somewhat 
limited scope, the extreme eroticism in the Romantic works is either ignored 
or sublimated as one of the elements of Romantic “Poetic Genius.”  
     Perceiving such a deficiency, later researchers have begun to 
challenge fixed “Romantic ideologies,” in pursuit of more anti-idealist and 
multilateral interpretations. Alan Richardson, in his 2003 essay “Romanticism 
and the Body,” notes a critical tendency in late-twentieth century to cast 
doubts on the established idealist readings of Romantic poetry. As he points 
out, modern Romantic scholarship has started to approach Romantic 
sensibility “with a renewed attention to the insistent presence of the body” 
(4). With the emphasis on more somatic and materialist aspects, recent 
studies have come to recognise the manifold nature of sexual desire as 
presented in Romantic poetry, which is part of the critical trend to 
problematise and reconsider “Romantic ideologies” that have long been 
established and taken for granted. As mentioned earlier, Mitchell raises the 
problematic issue of obscenity in Blake’s works, pointing out that it “has been 
domesticated and sanitized in the name of higher sublimations” by critics like 
Frye (414). In Bacchus in Romantic England: Writers and Drink, 1780-1830, 
Anya Taylor examines the culture of drinking and intoxication during the 
Romantic period, arguing for a form of sensual subjectivity that borders on 
transgression and dissolution. In Romanticism, Enthusiasm and Regulation: 
Poetics and the Policing of Culture in the Romantic Period, Jon Mee focuses 
on the concept of enthusiasm in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and 
 8 
shows that rather than the commonly known “spontaneous overflow of 
powerful feelings,” emotional sensitivity is actually subtly regulated in 
Romantic poetry. In Bloody Romanticism: Spectacular Violence and the 
Politics of Representation, 1776-1832, Ian Haywood excavates the artistic 
portrayals of violence in the nineteenth century. He challenges the widely 
accepted notion that the Romantics turn away from the disillusioning 
barbarity of post-Revolution France and seek salvation and novel subjectivity 
in nature after abandoning political radicalism. In his 2009 monograph 
Perverse Romanticism: Aesthetics and Sexuality in Britain, 1750-1832, 
Richard Sha approaches Romantic poetry by looking into the contemporary 
biological and scientific contexts, in order to argue that the so-called 
“perverse” sexual orientations in English Romanticism actually embody 
mutual affection and liberation from the purpose of reproduction. The 2010 
essay collection Romanticism and Pleasure, edited by Thomas H. Schmid 
and Michelle Faubert, approaches “Romantic pleasure” with “an interest in its 
somatic and psychological aspects and in its cultural implications and effects” 
(2). More recently, the two essay collections Queer Blake (2010) and Sexy 
Blake (2015) both edited by Helen P. Bruder and Tristanne Connolly, serve 
as an initial attempt to tackle Blake’s sexual perversity. Espousing a similar 
critical perspective, this thesis will reconsider violent eroticism and erotic 
violence, embodied by extreme sexual images and motifs that are commonly 
dismissed as “obscene,” but which emerge as a unique aesthetic 
phenomenon of self-annihilation in English Romantic poetry. 
      
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXTS OF “THE OBSCENE” 
      
     Scholars have addressed the historical and cultural construction of the 
idea of obscenity in the early modern age, mostly through the inspection of 
publications in written or graphic forms that depict explicit sexual activities. 
What constitutes the labelling of certain books as “obscene” is intrinsically 
associated with the legal practice of censorship, which, is in turn connected 
with the political contexts in the periods in question. Before the 1857 
Obscene Publication Act, whose promoter John Campbell defined the 
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obscene publications as “works written for the single purpose of corrupting 
the morals of youth, and of a nature calculated to shock the common feelings 
of decency in any well-regulated mind” (Kendrick 117), censorship was less 
concerned with sexual depravity than political subversiveness. In the view of 
cultural historians such as Walter Kendrick and Lynn Hunt, during the 
Enlightenment and pre-French Revolution era, “the obscene” is a form of 
representation of sexuality that gives birth to printed works labelled as 
“pornography,” whose purpose is to “criticize religious and political 
authorities” (Hunt, “Introduction,” The Invention of Pornography 10) and to 
undermine “the legitimacy of the ancien régime as a social and political 
system” (Hunt, “Pornography and the French Revolution” 301). Moreover, as 
Kendrick points out, in this period “[t]he policing of obscenity, meanwhile, 
began in haphazardness and developed into chaos” (100). That is, from the 
legal perspective of censorship, there was no clear definition of what kind of 
sexual depictions could be regarded as obscene; the so-called “lewd” books 
and prints were prohibited only because they were “in tandem with abusive 
polemics” (Kendrick 97). The 1728 case against Edmund Curll perhaps 
exemplifies this cultural phenomenon. Curll, who stood accused of “printing 
bawdy stuff” in the Court of King’s Bench was finally acquitted because the 
“bawdy stuff” lacked the very subversive quality and it was not “against some 
particular person or persons, or against the government” (Hunt, 
“Pornography and the French Revolution” 303).      
     By examining eighteenth-century French pornography, Lucienne 
Frappier-Mazur explores the effects of the “obscene word” on its readers. 
She proposes that “the obscene word belongs to a specific lexical category, a 
vulgar linguistic register associated with the naming of sexual acts and 
anatomical parts” (205). And the obscene word does not function on its own, 
but is in need of certain contexualisation to generate its pornographic power. 
Frappier-Mazur detects three forms of contexualisation necessary for the 
obscene word: first, the contrast between crudeness and elegance, which is 
best displayed when lewd words are articulated by aristocracy, especially 
noble women; second, the location of the obscene word in narration, in 
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stories; third, the “respective genders of narrators and narratees, of which 
there are several possible combinations” (207-208). Also, the obscene word 
claims for “the function of truth,” according to Frappier-Mazur, and “relates to 
the body and to its drives, and calls up corporeal representations” (213). In 
other words, with its directness the obscene word penetrates the ordinary 
language of repression and reveals the truth about human nature and the 
body. Similarly, Karen Harvey emphasises the very directness of the obscene 
in her study of eighteenth-century erotica, which she distinguishes from 
pornography. In her discussion, Harvey points out the two key elements of 
early-modern pornography: “the explicit depiction of sexual action” (21). 
While erotica employs metaphoric and suggestive languages and often 
continuously defers depictions of actual sex, pornography “negated metaphor 
and abandoned the figurative in order to achieve a closer mimetic relation to 
real bodies” (21) and to remove “illusion to reveal the truth” (22). Harvey 
further notes that the differentiation between suggestiveness and explicitness 
is a significant indicator for censorship; pornographic prints that explode “any 
illusion of metaphor” were more likely to face legal action from the 
government. Echoing Kendrick and Hunt, however, Harvey also highlights 
that obscene publications were not extensively restricted by censorship, and 
publishers of “lewd books” were not likely to be formally prosecuted unless 
they were politically or religiously offensive.   
     From the perspective of cultural history and censorship, we can notice 
that “the obscene” is generally associated with pornographic publications, as 
opposed to the more suggestive and subtle erotica. The nature of 
pornography is also highly political with the tendency to attack governmental 
and regal authorities. On the other hand, “the obscene” is merely a form of 
representation of sexual activities that accentuates explicitness and 
directness, and has to be situated in specific lexical and narrative contexts to 
achieve pornographic effects. If obscenity is only a method of representation 
that constitutes the label of pornography without its own meaning, the case of 
“the obscene Blake” in Mitchell’s essay remains unsolved. The obscene in 
Blake’s works, including Mitchell’s example “I saw a chapel all of gold,” as I 
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observe, concerns the poet’s fundamental ideas of sexuality and erotic 
experience, and how they coexist with other unsecular human activities such 
as religion and poetic creation. This understanding can be extended to 
Shelley’s and Keats’s works and thus sheds light on how “the obscene” 
exists as an aesthetic phenomenon of self-annihilation in the Romantic texts 
analysed in this thesis. Thus, I depart from the inspection of pornographic 
publications and censorship and approach “the obscene” by examining the 
theological, philosophical and artistic documents in the eighteenth century. I 
will then engage the idea of the sublime formulated by Edmund Burke and 
later philosophers and critical theorists in the discussion, in order to 
reconceptualise the obscene as an aesthetic phenomenon of self-
annihilation.        
     To begin with, “obscene” is a word frequently used in religious texts to 
describe non-Christian religions. Edward Herbert of Cherbury, in his 1663 
The Antient Religion of the Gentiles republished in 1711, refers to Juno 
Lucinas’s account of the cult of Venus in ancient Greece: “that obscene Rite 
of Venus” which is “so very sordid and filthy, that I am ashamed to repeat his 
words” (67). In his 1740 treatise Discourses Concerning the Being and 
Natural Perfection of God, John Abernethy discusses the pantheism that he 
regards as heresy. Condemning the pantheist worship of natural objects and 
creatures as a misconceived elevating of creation to the level of divine 
creator, Abernethy chastises the pagan ritual as “monstrous absurdity,” “so 
foul, barbarous and obscene, as to be a disgrace to the human nature” (170). 
In The History of the American Indians, a 1775 study showing the difference 
between the religion of native Indians and traditional pagan religions, 
including those of Babylonians, Greeks, Romans, and Jews, James Adair 
praises the American Indians for the purity of their religion, in contrast to the 
“impure and obscene religious ceremonies of the ancient heathens” (21). In 
his examination of heretic figures excavated by Bernard de Montfaucon, 
theologian Nathaniel Lardner describes the figures in question as “obscene 
and idolatrous” (106). Edward Ryan, an Irish clergyman, remarks in his The 
History of the Effects of Religion on Mankind that “The gods of the Gentiles 
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were so impure, obscene and detestable” (51). In another religious treatise in 
1797 by an anonymous “A. M.,” Remarks on Revelation & Infidelity, 
“obscene” is again used to criticise non-Christian beliefs: “The rites of 
Bacchus were obscene, ridiculous, and extravagant, in the highest degree; 
and those of Baal were shocking and unnatural” (186). This treatise also 
targets Greek philosophers, such as Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Zeno, and 
Diogenes, in the later part of this treatise. The author lists the “filthy and 
obscene” conducts defended by these philosophers, including suicide, incest, 
patricide, cannibalism, and public sex. Benjamin Holloway, in his 1751 
Originals Physical and Theological Sacred and Profane, similarly denounces 
heathen deities and the ancient practice of animal worship. In his view, this 
kind of religion is based on the false veneration for “unclean mechanic 
Nature” and “obscene anti-sacramental beasts” (259).  
     From the above account of how “obscene” is employed in religious 
treatises, several significant connotations of the word emerge. Theologians 
and clergymen often use the word to undermine the divinity of non-Christian 
religions that usually espouse sexual desire as a symbol of vitality and 
fertility. However, the “obscene” has a significance beyond the sexual. 
Herbert’s strong reaction to the rite of Venus suggests that “the obscene” is 
something beyond human sensibility, reason, and God-centred morality. This 
quality of obscenity, reinforced by Abernethy’s definition as “a disgrace to 
human nature,” corresponds to the etymological source of the word from the 
Latin obscenus, which means “ill-omened, filthy, disgusting, indecent, lewd,” 
and also the “ob-scena/off-scene” denotation suggested by Roman scholar 
Marcus Terentius Varro.4 In other words, it denotes something unbearable to 
normal human sensibility, something that should not be seen and named. 
                                                
4 Though the Oxford English Dictionary indicates that Varro’s explanation of obscenus as 
ob-scena is probably a “folk etymology” (“obscene, adj”), the obscene certainly contains this 
cultural meaning of being unpresentable: something that should be “off-scene.” In 1763, 
when John Wilkes faced indictment of obscenity for writing An Essay on Woman, a 
pornographic parody of Alexander Pope’s An Essay on Man, his defence was that he 
intended not to publish it and that “the public was never to see” this obscene work (Kendrick 
98). His defence was not successful because a few printed copies of An Essay on Woman 
did appear and were circulated; that is, the obscene fails to remain “off-scene”—the 
misplacement constitutes the offense.   
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Mere depictions of sex are not powerful enough to draw the uneasy feelings 
associated with the obscene that manifest themselves paradoxically with its 
unpresentability. Other theologians’ usages of the word indicate more 
elements that contribute to this quality. Adair’s unusual praise of the 
American Indian religion highlights the concept of “purity” that is the opposite 
of other pagan religions’ obscenity. He particularly refers to the Babylonian 
temples “where young women prostituted themselves in honour of the 
goddess,” in contrast to American Indian rites in which even “a man known to 
have gone in to his own wife” was strictly excluded (20-21). The connection 
between impurity or uncleanness and sex has long been part of the Christian 
tradition. One of the Church Fathers even laments that inter faeces et urinam 
nascimur.5 Adair praises the American Indian religion because it appears to 
share a similar dichotomy of continence/cleanness-sex/impurity with 
Christianity. The religious ceremony of a community excludes its “filthy” 
members “polluted” by sex, in order to maintain the wholeness of its divinity. 
This movement is analogous to the human body’s expulsion of filthy 
excrements to sustain its healthy self. Human beings must strive to salvage 
themselves from the wretched state of birth and infancy that is inter faeces et 
urinam; in other words, they must keep themselves away from “filthy” objects 
to establish their subjectivity. In this sense, the process corresponds to Julia 
Kristeva’s conceptualisation of “abjection.”6 Hence, the word “obscene” Adair 
adopts to describe the very opposite of religious purity means more than 
mere sexual intercourse. What constitutes the conceptualisation of “the 
obscene” includes the notion of human beings meddling with things that 
                                                
5 “We are born between urine and feces.” Sigmund Freud famously mentions this quote in 
his Dora, attributing it to a Church Father. It is also commonly misattributed to St. Augustine. 
See Ritchie Robertson’s note in the Oxford World’s Classics edition of Dora, p. 107. 
6 Kristeva’s concept of abjection, featured in her Powers of Horror, illustrates the process of 
excluding “the abject” in the way of establishing subjectivity. The abject is represented by 
things other than the “objects” in normal projection of desire: “The abject is not an ob-ject 
facing me, which I name or imagine. Nor is it an ob-jest, an otherness ceaselessly fleeing in 
a systematic quest of desire” (1). The abject, similar to the obscene, suggests things that 
ought to be shunned in order to maintain a healthy self and stable identity in society, things 
that “disturbs identity, system, order” and do not “respect borders, positions, rules” (4). But 
there is also a latent human tendency to constantly revisit the abject and to experience the 
unnameable pleasure in it. The pleasure of a “fascinated victim” that witnesses the 
dissolution of self and subjectivity echoes the thrilling delight generated by the sublime, 
which will be discussed in detail in the later part of this introduction. 
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ought to be separated, in particular anything unclean that is emitted from the 
human body.  
      In Remarks on Revelation and Infidelity, while using “lewdness” to 
relate the rite devoted to Venus, the author reserves “obscene” for Bacchus’s 
rite alongside adjectives such as “ridiculous” and “extravagant.” How does 
the figure of Bacchus, or Dionysus, reflect the unique propensity of 
obscenity? Another word associated with Bacchus/Dionysus in and before 
the eighteenth century is “orgy,” defined in the glossary of a 1767 edition of 
Paradise Lost as “mad rite of Bacchus, frantic revels” (Milton, The Poetical 
Works 329). In his essay “Of Poetry” republished in 1720, Francis Bacon 
uses “the Orgies of Bacchus” to exemplify madness, which is “affection in the 
excess,” and “short-liv’d distraction” of superstition. In other words, “the 
Orgies of Bacchus” deprive human beings of the ability to conduct the 
“curious Enquiry” of rationalism (185). A much later account is also helpful in 
illustrating the significance of “the orgies of Bacchus” in relation to the 
obscene. In The Birth of Tragedy, Friedrich Nietzsche discusses the 
formation of Greek tragedy as an outcome of the endless battle between two 
artistic forces represented by two deities, Apollo and Dionysus: “the 
continuous development of art is bound up with the Apollinian and the 
Dionysian duality” (Basic Writings 33). The art form that best represents 
Apollo is sculpture, the “art of the image-maker,” which conveys the ideas of 
measurement, boundary, and limitation; in contrast, music, “the nonimagistic” 
art, epitomises the Dionysian, indicating distortion, transgression, and 
excess. In Nietzsche’s view, these two artistic forces also represent two 
realms of human mentality: dreams and intoxication. Dreams stand for an 
ideal sphere of perfect images, which human beings aspire to attain in order 
to establish subjectivity in reality. Dionysian intoxication, however, reified by 
the chorus in the Greek tragedy, is a state where the “collapse of the 
principium individuationis occurs,” causing “subjectivity to vanish to the point 
of complete self-forgetting” (Basic Writings 36). According to Arthur 
Schopenhauer, the principium individuationis (“principle of individuation”) is 
the human faculty based on reason to distinguish empirical objects; in this 
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instance, the ability to distinguish self from others. Thus, in Dionysian 
intoxication, human subjects immerse themselves in “the blissful ecstasy that 
wells from the innermost depths” (Basic Writings 36), dissolving the boundary 
between self and others, subject and objects. In the rites of Dionysus, all 
identities, social or biological, are annihilated, when the flux of inner drives 
runs uncontrolled in an excessive manner. 
     With an eye on Nietzsche’s discourse, we can return to Remarks on 
Revelation and Infidelity, where “obscene” is employed to describe the rites 
of Bacchus/Dionysus. It is now possible to extract another unique quality of 
obscenity. The cult of Bacchus is “obscene,” “ridiculous,” and “extravagant,” 
not only because it features sexual rituals, but also because its worshippers 
sink into the oblivion of their social identities, or even the biological identity as 
human beings. Euripides’s description of “Bacchic worship” in The Bacchae 
duly demonstrates this Dionysian self-shattering oblivion; it is “the maddening 
trance of Dionysus” (195), in which “women go creeping off / This way and 
that to lonely places and give themselves / To lecherous men (198) and “the 
sufferings of our unhappy race / Are banished, each day’s troubles are 
forgotten in sleep” (200). Moreover, Holloway dismisses the heathen animal-
worshipping religion as “obscene anti-sacramental” because such a religion 
forsakes the boundary between humanity and bestiality.  
     To sum up, what Christian theologians and intellectuals abhor most in 
“obscene” paganism such as the cult of Bacchus is not infidelity against God, 
but the indulgence in sexual drives to the extent of self-annihilation. This is 
intolerable to a Western epistemology centred on reason and self-sufficiency, 
as Adam Smith observes in The Theory of Moral Sentiments that “Of all the 
calamities to which the condition of mortality exposes mankind, the loss of 
reason appears, to those who have the lease spark of humanity, by far the 
most dreadful” (15). The phenomenon of self-annihilation triggered by erotic 
experience, as this thesis will demonstrate, can be explored in the works of 
Blake, Shelley, and Keats. In Blake’s major poems and Keats’s “The Eve of 
St. Agnes,” particularly, the erotic experience of self-annihilation is also 
intricately associated with Christian images and motifs; the sacred and the 
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erotic are fused and reinforce each other, as Chapter 1 and Chapter 3 will 
show.   
     The concept of obscenity can also be found in other contemporary 
texts, in addition to religious documents. In the sphere of literature and art, 
obscenity is often employed to describe representations that affront 
contemporary aesthetics. As Terry Eagleton remarks in his The Ideology of 
the Aesthetic, aesthetics was synthesised harmoniously with ethics and 
politics in the eighteenth century. In this period, there was an extraordinary 
cultural phenomenon: “Moral standards . . . may thus to some extent diffused 
into the textures of personal sensibility; taste, affect and opinion testify more 
eloquently to one’s participation in a universal common sense than either 
moral strenuousness or ideological doctrine” (The Ideology of the Aesthetic 
32). That is, in the eighteenth century, morality and aesthetics were united; 
what is morally good must be aesthetically agreeable, and what is 
aesthetically agreeable must be morally good. Obscenity, to be viewed 
against this fixed ideology, was thus presented as a unique “anti-aesthetics” 
that might threaten the solid connection between morality and good art.  
     In his 1745 An Essay upon Poetry and Painting, Charles Lamotte 
regards obscenity as a “kind of liberty which painters and poets have too 
often taken, and which may be called licentious in the highest sense of the 
word” (184). One of his examples is Parrhasius of Ephesus, an established 
painter in ancient Greece. Despite his praise of Parrhaisus’s “exact 
observation of the symmetry and proportion of bodies” and “an elevated 
Genius of sublime fancy,” Lamotte is disappointed that the painter 
“sometimes debased and degraded his noble pencil with loose and lascivious 
pieces” (186). Lamotte emphasises obscenity’s negative effect of “corrupting 
and debauching mankind,” but more significantly, he positions obscenity as 
the opposite of the aesthetic concept of the “sublime.” In his 1698 anti-
theatre treatise A Short View of the Profaneness and Immorality of the 
English Stage, which was reprinted in 1730, Jeremy Collier maintains that 
“obscenity has not the air of majesty, nor any alliance with the sublime” (121). 
Furthermore, in the later part of the Short View, Collier equalises obscenity 
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with blasphemy, asking readers about the proper reaction to it: “are you in 
any rapture about it?” a question that he himself answers, “I doubt not but 
your blood grows chill, and your ears are stopt at the presumption” (176). 
These documents suggest that in art and drama, obscenity is a sort of 
representation that assaults proper human perception. In other words, there 
is a sense of aggressiveness in the “obscene,” which denies 
spectators/readers the pleasure that is supposed to be invoked by artistic 
works.  
     If Eagleton’s account of the “British eighteenth-century moral sense” is 
correct, we can see that aesthetic sense of pleasure for the contemporary 
thinkers is highly moralised. Aesthetics becomes an internal force that 
contributes to the establishment of an ideology shared by personal feelings 
and social/political orders: 
          The aesthetic is in this sense no more than a name  
          for the political unconscious: it is simply the way social  
          harmony registers itself on our senses, imprints itself  
          on our sensibilities. The beautiful is just political order  
          lived out on the body, the way it strikes the eye and  
          stirs the heart.  
                         (The Ideology of the Aesthetic 37) 
Thus, what is formed in the pre-Romantic period is the internalisation of a set 
of criteria that regulates the human reaction to artistic representations. From 
this perspective, a question might be raised: does obscenity truly give its 
spectator no real pleasure, or does the spectator construe that feeling 
pleasure is not a proper reaction in the situation, even though to some extent 
he/she is truly pleased by the depictions of, for instance, suicide, incest, 
patricide, cannibalism, or public sex, which are listed in Remarks on 
Revelation & Infidelity as obscene? I would argue that the secret pleasure 
generated by obscenity—religious impurity, orgiastic ecstasy, and 
dehumanisation, all representations considered obscene in eighteenth-
century moral sensitivity and religious ideology—does share a subtle 
similarity with the delight evoked by “the sublime,” an aesthetic phenomenon 




AESTHETIC CONNECTION BETWEEN “THE OBSCENE” AND “THE SUBLIME” 
 
     Before Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of 
the Sublime and Beautiful published in 1757, what was more widely known 
about the sublime in the eighteenth century was Longinus’s On the Sublime, 
translated into English by Leonard Welsted and William Smith respectively in 
1712 and 1739, or the reference to Longinus in John Dennis’s 1701 
Advancement and Reformation of Poetry and 1704 Grounds of Criticism in 
Poetry (Fyfe 155). In On the Sublime, Longinus lists five elements that 
constitute the feelings of the sublime: “Boldness and Grandeur in the 
Thoughts,” “the Pathetic,” “a skilful Application of Figures,” “a noble and 
graceful Expression,” and “the Structure or Composition of the Periods in all 
possible Dignity and Grandeur” (Longinus 11).7 Among these five elements, 
“the Pathetic,” which is equivalent to “the Power of raising the Passions to a 
violent and even enthusiastic degree,” is the most significant one concerning 
the relationship between the sublime and the obscene. Longinus has clear 
differentiation between the “high” and “low” passions, the latter including 
“Lamentation, Sorrow, and Fear,” which are “vastly different from grandeur, 
and are in themselves of a low degree” (Longinus 13). Longinus’s discourse 
on the natural sense of the sublime lingers on such a division between high 
and low passions. While discussing these low passions incurred by natural 
violence, Longinus highlights the poetic method that transforms and elevates 
them to the higher passions. For example, he praises Homer’s method of 
elevating the lower passions in a description of a ship trapped on a stormy 
sea: 
          But instead of increasing the Terror, he only lessens  
          and refines it away; and besides, he sets a bound to  
          the impending Danger, by saying, a Plank preserves  
          them, thus banishing their Despair. (Longinus 23) 
For Longinus, the sublime of natural power does generate the low passions 
of fear and affliction. It is necessary, however, that they are well contained 
and prevented from degenerating into despair, an ill-proportioned, 
                                                
7 Longinus’s text is cited from the 1740 edition of Dionysus Longinus on the Sublime 
translated by William Smith.  
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uncontrolled, and chaotic state. Further, it is crucial that such low passions 
should be replaced by hope and joy: the high passions of pleasure and 
agreeableness. Eighteenth-century writers, while referring to the sublime in 
discussions about art, literature, or theatre, are generally concerned with the 
particular passions incited in the reader/spectator. The antithesis between the 
sublime and the obscene that Lamotte and Collier raise in their works is 
based on this division of high and low passions, for in their view the obscene 
can only produce the low passions, which are altogether unpleasant and 
offensive to common sensibility, and therefore inartistic and immoral. The 
negative feelings generated by obscenity are considered “socially disruptive” 
to eighteenth-century aesthetics, according to Eagleton, “as instantly 
offensive as a foul smell” (The Ideology of the Aesthetic 38). However, those 
same feelings come to be recognised by later writers as significant elements 
in the sublime, especially in Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry.  
     Prior to Burke, William Smith discusses “Images of Terror” in the notes 
to his English translation of Longinus’s On the Sublime. Smith refers to the 
“foul and nauseous Representations” in poetry and painting that should be 
properly obscured so that they will not “offend the Sight.” He argues that 
“What is terrible cannot be described too well; what is disagreeable should 
not be described at all” (Longinus 95). This statement conforms to Longinus’s 
excluding of the “low” passions from the sublime. In On the Sublime, 
Longinus generally associates images of terror with natural landscapes, such 
as ferocious tempests, howling storms, and fathomless deeps. But Smith 
enlarges the scope of terror by including human suffering caused by human 
violence in his notes: “When Apelles drew the Pourtrait of Antigonus, who 
had lost an Eye, he judiciously took his Face in profile, that he might hide the 
Blemish” (Longinus 95). Both the terror of nature and the terror imposed 
upon humans by other humans bring forth the sense of fear and pain. The 
difference between these two kinds of representation lies in the moral 
obligation implanted in the collective consciousness of the eighteenth-century 
sensibility. The pleasure generated by viewing a sea savaged by a fierce 
storm would not be considered improper, but it would be offensive if someone 
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said that he took pleasure in viewing people tortured on the rack. The scene 
of extreme violence that “offends the sight” and attacks common feelings of 
morality, as Smith argues, ought to be concealed properly in narratives and 
on stage. Thus, it reflects the off-stage/unpresentable propensity of 
obscenity. However, Smith also admits that “[t]here is a serious turn, an 
inborn sedateness in the Mind, which renders Images of Terror grateful and 
engaging” (Longinus 95). The phrase “an inborn sedateness in the Mind” is 
significant. The word “inborn” indicates that a part of human nature is 
attached to terror, in this case the images of violence and suffering. The 
phrase “sedateness in the Mind” suggests that human beings are capable of 
surveying and relishing terror in a calm and disinterested manner. This 
capability of purely artistic appreciation of terror is beyond the restraint of 
morality and sensibility. Smith’s statement signifies an initial breakdown of 
the antithesis between the sublime and the obscene in the eighteenth 
century. It also dissolves the eighteenth-century synthesis of aesthetics and 
morality, indicating that pain is no longer the downright and taken-for-granted 
opposite of pleasure. To further explicate the intriguing affinity between the 
obscene and the sublime, the following section will focus on Burke’s later 
elaboration of the sublime, greatly influenced by Smith’s translation and 
notes on Longinus (Boulton xvii). It will also explicate how obscenity is 
associated with the sublime as a unique aesthetic phenomenon that is worth 
exploring in the literary works of the Romantic period.  
     In Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the 
Sublime and Beautiful, the source of the sublime is “[w]hatever is fitted in any 
sort to excite the ideas of pain, and danger . . . whatever is in any sort 
terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects” (39). Pain, because of its 
association with the human will for preservation, generates the strongest 
emotion, and therefore presents itself as a more profound feeling than 
pleasure. In Burke’s view, the emotional reaction one can have to pain and 
danger is even more intense than sexual attraction. In this case, he refers to 
Robert Francis Damien’s brutal torture and execution for attempting to 
assassinate Louis XV. Damien’s torture appears to support Burke’s argument 
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that pain is more powerful than pleasure. Notably, Damien’s case is a sheer 
display of cruelty; there is no characteristic of nobleness, elegance, or 
loftiness—elements that are accentuated in the earlier discourse on the 
sublime. By evoking this incident, Burke implies that viewing pure violence 
imposed upon human bodies generates “delight,” which represents sensual 
gratification that differs from “positive pleasure.” But such “delight” can only 
be maintained in the condition of a proper distance: 
          When danger or pain press too nearly, they are incapable 
          of giving any delight, and are simply terrible; but at certain 
          distances, and with certain modifications, they may be, 
          and they are delightful. (Enquiry 40)                                
The spectacle of direct degradation and maiming of human bodies brings 
forth delight only as long as the spectator feels certain about his own safety. 
Once the spectator acknowledges that he will never suffer the same fate as 
the wretch on the rack, he can relish with strong delight the sensation of pain 
and danger, which to himself are only imaginary and fictional as artistic or 
literary works. In the face of terror such as Damien’s corporeal plight, the 
spectator first feels pain, which is produced by his own imagination, then fear 
that he may be in the same misery someday in the future, and finally delight 
once he confirms his security.  
     However, the feeling of security serves merely as a condition of delight 
generated by viewing terrible brutality; it is never the cause per se of such 
delight that might be deemed perverse or obscene: “it is absolutely 
necessary my life should be out of any imminent hazard before I can take a 
delight in the sufferings of others . . . But it is a sophism to argue from 
thence, that this immunity is the cause of my delight either on these or on 
any occasions” (48). Burke has no empirical answer to why people enjoy 
watching sights that are disagreeable and ought to be shunned. He can only 
attribute it to divine Providence: “as our Creator has designed we should be 
united by the bond of sympathy, he has strengthened that bond by a 
proportionable delight” (46). In God’s design, human beings must be bound 
together by “love and social affection,” so he grants considerable pleasure in 
viewing others’ suffering to ensure that people don’t shun the misery that 
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they witness. Such a mechanism is the source of sympathy in Burke’s view. 
While Burke recognises the intense delight produced by terror, he refuses to 
admit that it is human nature to take great pleasure in viewing others’ misery. 
By linking such delight to sympathy, he elevates it to the level of religious 
decree and pragmatic social function, in order to conform to the 
contemporary moral sensibility and social ideologies. Despite this elevation, 
Burke explores the sublime as the representation of terror, which includes the 
degradation and maiming of the human body. This marks a breakdown of the 
eighteenth-century combination of morality and aesthetics. From this 
perspective, the obscene as the images of heretic blasphemy, orgiastic 
ecstasy and brutality—the utter antithesis of the sublime in eighteenth-
century writers’ view—in fact has much similarity with Burke’s idea of the 
sublime. Both the obscene and the sublime stimulate a powerful aesthetic 
sensation through the representations of violence and bodily pain. 
      The concept of power in Burke’s formulation of the sublime reflects the 
mechanism of desire. Burke maintains that power invokes the feeling of the 
sublime because it represents a superior force that overwhelms the 
spectator, posing a potential threat to his well-being. This power subdues the 
spectator’s “will,” forcing him to submit to its dominance. Consequently, a 
unique sort of delight, different from normal pleasures, emerges in the 
spectator’s mentality. The “will” Burke refers to here signifies the basic 
biological needs of human beings and the conditions that enable them to stay 
properly in society. In other words, it is the “will” to neutralise conflicts and 
construct order that is necessary for social harmony. The aesthetic delight 
from the sublime, in this sense, insinuates an alternative dark “will” to 
challenge this “will of necessity.” Burke further illustrates this “will against the 
will” in the face of a beast of enormous power: 
          Is it that this strength will be subservient to you, to your  
          ease, to your pleasure, to your interest in any sense?  
          No; the emotion you feel is, lest this enormous strength  
          should be employed to the purpose of rapine and destruction.  
                                                   (Enquiry 65) 
Power contributes to the feeling of the sublime because it endangers the 
spectator’s normal self, whose physical health and mental subjectivity must 
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be sustained in society. The delight brought out here is strongest when the 
spectator imagines his normal self being destroyed by such power. Burke’s 
comparison between the powers of ox and bull elicits another crucial factor of 
the aesthetic experience of the sublime that can be linked to eroticism and 
obscenity: uselessness, or anti-pragmatism. Both beasts possess great 
strength. However, an ox cannot generate the awesome power that a bull 
does, because the former “is an innocent creature, extremely serviceable” 
while the latter is “very destructive, seldom of any use in our business” (65). 
That is, the artistic delight generated by power is weakened by practical 
functions and their purposiveness. Such a delight, in contrast, reflects an 
alternative desire to see things destroyed by the powerful in a violent and 
unproductive way. Hence, Burke’s conceptualisation of the sublime presents 
a new aesthetics that runs against the eighteenth-century synthesis of 
politics, ethics, and art. From this perspective, the contemporary concept of 
obscenity actually reflects a similar artistic spirit of uselessness and anti-
pragmatism, as in Remarks on Revelation and Infidelity the obscene rite of 
Bacchus is called “extravagant.” This word properly describes the ritual orgy 
featured in the Dionysian rite, where bodily energy is consumed excessively 
without the justifying function of procreation. The aesthetics of the sublime 
resonates with the obscene; both point to the transcendence of the mundane 
world of function and necessity. Such a mechanism also anticipates the later 
anthropological and philosophical division between the secular and the 
sacred initiated by Émile Durkheim and illustrated by Georges Bataille.8 I will 
engage Bataille’s theory extensively with the discussion of obscenity in 
Blake’s poetry in Chapter 1.  
     Burke’s account of power as the major source of the sublime further 
evokes some aspects associated with sexuality, making the sublime more 
                                                
8 In his The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, Émile Durkheim defines religion as “a 
unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set 
apart and surrounded by prohibitions—beliefs and practices that unite its adherents in a 
single moral community called a church” (46). This concept provides the basis for Georges 
Bataille’s philosophy. The divine domain of religion in Bataille becomes also the realm of art, 
literature, and eroticism that goes beyond the secular world controlled by “the order of 
things,” the order of working and production.  
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allied with the obscene, even though the two are opposed to each other in 
other contemporary documents concerning art and morality. Burke directly 
refers to sexual desire in A Philosophical Enquiry while discussing the 
concept of beauty, an aesthetic phenomenon that is antithetical to the 
sublime. After defining beauty as “that quality or those qualities in bodies by 
which they cause love, or some passion similar to it” (91), he urgently 
distinguishes love from “desire or lust; which is an energy of the mind, that 
hurries us on to the possession of certain objects, that do not affect us as 
they are beautiful, but by means altogether different” (91). Burke’s efforts to 
separate love from sexual desire, as Tom Furniss points out, are hardly 
successful, because Burke’s account of the beautiful is highly attached to 
bodily appetite, and is therefore highly erotic (Furniss 34). As Anne K. 
Mellor’s discussion in Romanticism and Gender shows, Burke elucidates the 
idea of the beautiful by analysing the female body, especially neck and 
breasts, parts that are iconic of femininity (107-109). Isaac Kramnick also 
suggests that Burke models the sublime on his stern and unloving father, and 
the beautiful on his gentle and delicate mother (Romanticism and Gender 
87). The dualism of the sublime/masculine and the beautiful/feminine in the 
Enquiry brings forth prominent aspects of obscenity, as the following 
discussion will demonstrate. 
     For Burke, the contrast between pleasure and delight is essential in this 
dualism. The former is generated by the beautiful and the latter by the 
sublime. These two sorts of sensual enjoyment indicate the contrary 
positions of subjectivity and objectivity. In the face of the beautiful, which is 
presented by the images of smallness, smoothness, gradual variation, and 
delicacy, the spectator is in the superior position of active desiring as a 
controlling subject. The pleasure given to the spectator in this situation is 
self-centred and self-empowered, solidifying his subjectivity. In this case, the 
spectacle submits to the spectator, as Burke puts it: “we submit to what we 
admire, we love what submits to us” (Enquiry 113). In light of Mellor’s 
interpretation, the term “love” here suggests the power relationship between 
a dominant masculinity and a submissive femininity. In contrast, the 
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emotional reaction to that which we “admire” in the sublime is essentially 
different from “love.” While viewing images of the sublime, the “admiring” 
spectator moves from the active position to the passive one. By doing so, he 
exposes his inferiority and submits to the power and terror that threaten to 
destroy his well-being. In this case, the spectator departs from the controlling 
position, in which he “loves” the beautiful. Instead, he forsakes his original 
masculinity and takes on the role of passive femininity—conventional trait of 
the beautiful. In this passive position, the spectator’s subjectivity is 
weakened, belittled, and eventually annihilated. The delight in this process is 
self-obliterating and self-annihilating, as the spectator forsakes his masculine 
identity constructed firmly in the reason-based eighteenth-century ideology of 
civic gentry. Moreover, the spectator of the sublime indulges in the feminine 
ecstasy of self-oblivion that resembles the obscene rite of Bacchus/Dionysus: 
“we shrink into the minuteness of our own nature, and are, in a manner, 
annihilated” (Enquiry 68). Therefore, in the operation of the sublime, there is 
a process of potential transsexuality, the subversion of traditional gender 
roles. The spectator’s drastic shift of position from active subjectivity to 
passive objectivity associates the aesthetic experiences of the beautiful and 
the sublime with sadomasochism, which is a form of eroticism based on 
mental and physical violence in the power relationship between the dominant 
and the dominated. The subtle dynamics between the sublime, 
transsexuality, and sadomasochism will be discussed in detail in Chapter 1, 
where Blake’s epic poem Milton is examined from this perspective.   
     A few decades later, the violence of the French Revolution became the 
epitome of Burke’s aesthetics of sublime terror. As Ian Haywood remarks, the 
plebeian attack on Marie Antoinette’s palace “shows the masculine sublime 
terrorizing feminine beauty” (66). Burke is perhaps aware of the potential 
danger that the aesthetics of the sublime might pose against his social and 
political conservatism. In his Reflections on the Revolution in France, Burke 
laments that in France “the age of chivalry is gone.” He embarks on 
moderating the sublime with the beautiful and softening the masculine with 
certain feminine propensities, propounding positive (but somewhat 
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paradoxical) terms such as “proud submission” and “dignified obedience” that 
“kept alive, even in servitude itself, the spirit of an exalted freedom” 
(Reflections 76). In A Philosophical Enquiry, Burke clearly considers the 
sublime aesthetically superior to the beautiful. However, in Reflections, he 
mitigates the sublime to conform to his reactionary conservatism and to 
espouse social stability. This transition underscores the disparity between 
aesthetic experiences and eighteenth-century moral sentiments.  
     In Immanuel Kant’s later analysis of the sublime, the danger of self-
annihilation in the Burkean sublime is a problem that awaits a solution, as he 
deems Burke’s Enquiry “a merely empirical exposition of the sublime and 
beautiful” (107). In Kant’s view, Burke’s discourse of the sublime is limited by 
sensual perception and bodily reaction. This limitation results in the failure to 
strengthen human subjectivity and denies spiritual elevation. Consequently, 
the human subject is unable to obtain the phenomenon-transcending Ding an 
sich: the “Thing-in-itself.” In Critique of Judgment, Kant acknowledges the 
sublime as the source of a “negative pleasure” with which the spectator feels 
that his life is being threatened, a pleasure “brought about by feeling of a 
momentary check to the vital forces” (76). Espousing morality and rationalism 
as the highest human faculties, Kant maintains that human perception of the 
sublime is still subject to the power of reason: “For the sublime, in the strict 
sense of the word, cannot be contained in any sensuous form, but rather 
concerns ideas of reason” (76). Kant seeks to restore lost human subjectivity 
in the face of the Burkean sublime. In order to accomplish this, he first 
confines the sublime to the scope of natural grandeur, excluding human 
violence and suffering. Such a manoeuvre enables the spectator to 
rediscover his subjectivity in nature, with an ensuing pleasure that conforms 
to the Kantian moral and rational aesthetics. In contrast to Burke’s and other 
previous concepts, Kant proposes that the sublime is a unique spiritual 
propensity that has already existed in the human heart, “evoked by a 
particular representation engaging the attention of reflective judgment, and 
not the object, that is to be called sublime” (81). It is reason, not imagination, 
that constitutes the human capacity to perceive the sublime. Rather than 
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admitting the submissive and potentially self-annihilating position of the 
spectator who encounters the sublime, Kant stresses the process of 
“subreption”—“substitution of a respect for the object in place of one for the 
idea of humanity in our own self—the subject” (88). Instead of succumbing to 
the obscene pleasure of self-annihilation, the Kantian subject elevates 
himself and identifies with the natural grandeur. Kantian identification with 
nature is perfectly exemplified and embodied in Caspar David Friedrich’s 
painting Wanderer above the Sea of Fog, in which the human subject is not 
only equal to natural grandeur, but is even superior to it.   
     Kant’s idea of the natural sublime and his championing of human 
subjectivity evoked by it are manifested in William Wordsworth’s poetry, in 
which “the universe is not mechanical and dead, but alive and vitally 
connected with the human mind; awakened consciousness leads to an 
awakened moral sense and must lead to communion with the divine” (Gill 
xviii). Considering the relationship between the spectator and the spectacle, 
Wordsworth emphasises the former’s active role. In “The Ruined Cottage,” 
Wordsworth speaks through the Armytage’s voice:  
          . . . We die, my Friend, 
          Nor we alone, but that which each man loved 
          And prized in his peculiar nook of earth 
          Dies with him or is changed, and very soon 
          Even of the good is no memorial left. (68-72) 
Natural sublimity is only meaningful when it is perceived by human beings, 
and the spectacle ceases to be when the spectator is gone. Human 
subjectivity, as Wordsworth believes, is the controlling factor in the process of 
spectating the sublime. At the end of Book 13 of The Prelude, human 
subjectivity is elevated to the extent of surpassing the sublimity of nature: 
          Instruct them how the mind of man becomes 
          A thousand times more beautiful than the earth 
          On which he dwells, above this Frame of things 
          (Which, ‘mid all revolutions in the hopes 
          And fears of men, doth still remain unchanged) 
          In beauty exalted, as it is itself 
          Of substance and of fabric more divine. (13.446-452)9 
                                                
9 The text of The Prelude quoted here is from the 1805 thirteenth-book version in The Major 
Works edited by Stephen Gill.  
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In this passage, Wordsworth goes beyond Kantian subreption; human 
subjectivity not only identifies with the natural sublime, but also triumphs over 
it, entering a state of supreme divinity. The Kantian/Wordsworthian 
appreciation of the natural sublime is sublimated and free from the danger of 
the loss of subjectivity and self-annihilation, whereas such a danger is the 
very essence of obscenity hidden in the Burkean sublime. On the other hand, 
in the works of Blake, Shelley, and Keats, the obscene, unpresentable, and 
more somatic aspects of the sublime can be observed and further explored. 
     In his reconsideration of the Kantian sublime, Jean-François Lyotard’s 
definition of the sublime stresses its off-scene/unpresentable quality that can 
be connected with the obscene. In Lyotard’s formulation, the sublime is 
differentiated from the pleasure derived from “taste,” which demonstrates “an 
accord between the capacity to conceive and the capacity to present an 
object corresponding to the concept” (19). The sublime, however, is 
engendered when such an accord fails to function. In other words, the 
sublime represents certain ideas and phenomena of extreme power and 
immensity that can only be perceived, but cannot be presented, for any 
attempted presentations are doomed to be “sadly lacking to us” (Lyotard 20). 
The “unpresentable” ideas of the sublime thus also “prohibit the free accord 
of the faculties that produce the feeling of the beautiful” and “obstruct the 
formation and stabilization of taste” (20). As Burke proposes, “taste”—the 
capacity to appreciate artistic beauty—is constituted by “our judgement, by 
extending our knowledge, by a steady attention to our object” (Enquiry 26).  
Sublimity that deforms and destabilise taste thus operates against reason 
and knowledge, whose absence threatens the human subjectivity and 
selfhood.    
     Slavoj Žižek, in his The Sublime Object of Ideology, similarly observes 
that “the sublime object evokes pleasure in a purely negative way” (230) by 
exposing its very unrepresentability and the impossibility to attain the “Thing-
in-itself,” the Kantian metaphysical truth. The spiritual elevation in the 
sublime, for Žižek, is only a piece of negative evidence of “the non-existence 
of the transcendent Thing-in-itself as a positive entity” (233). The quest after 
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idealist transcendence and subjectivity through the sublime, such as the 
Kantian process of “subreption,” is destined to fail and to eventually “embody 
itself again in some miserable, radically contingent corporeal leftover” (234). 
The “off-stage-ness” of obscenity, to some extent, corresponds to Lyotard’s 
conceptualisation of the sublime as “unpresentable” and Žižek’s construal of 
the sublime as a negative phenomenon of spiritual void and abject bodily 
remnant. Specific erotic images are considered obscene, because once they 
are presented, brought back “onto the stage,” they affront and assault human 
perception and sensibility, and further suspend the accord between faculties 
and annihilate human subjectivity, as the “unpresentable” sublime works. 
From a post-Lacanian psychoanalytical view, the “obscene” in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries anticipates the “abject,” which, as Kristeva reasons, 
signifies pre-lingual and pre-paternal desires expelled from the symbolic 
order, and “ejected beyond the scope of the possible, the tolerable, the 
thinkable” (1), in order for a human individual to solidify self as a subject, and 
establish a socially acceptable identity.  
     Leo Bersani’s reconsideration of the Freudian model of sexuality 
perhaps serves as a final theoretical foundation for my definition of the 
obscene as an aesthetic phenomenon of self-annihilation. Bersani notes the 
unresolved condition in Freud’s theorisation of erotogenic pleasure, which 
contains a sense of “tension” that necessarily involves pain. This feeling of 
tension emerges with a drive to alter the psychological state of the human 
subject. In Bersani’s view, Freud finds it difficult to reconcile the lingering 
“tension” of pain with the final “pleasure of discharge” of genital sexuality 
(The Freud Body 33). In sexual experience, the former somehow outweighs 
the latter, and “the mysterious repetition (and even intensification) of 
something unpleasurable is explicitly seen as inherent in sexuality” (34). 
Freud’s struggle here, as Bersani observes, leads to his uncertain definition 
and placement of sadomasochism in his model. To resolve this problem, 
Bersani expands and elucidates Freud’s idea that sexual excitement is a 
“byproduct” of extreme bodily and mental conditions even in pain or distress 
by proposing that “the pleasurable unpleasurable tension of sexual 
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excitement occurs when the body’s ‘normal’ range of sensation is exceeded, 
and when the organization of the self is momentarily disturbed” (38). For 
Bersani, what is truly crucial in sexuality is the idea that erotic experience “is 
intolerable to the structured self” and “could be thought of as a tautology for 
masochism” (39). He adds that “sexuality would not be originally an 
exchange of intensities between individuals, but rather a condition of broken 
negotiations with the world, a condition in which others merely set off the self-
shattering mechanisms of masochist jouissance” (41). Bersani’s formulation 
of sexuality as “self-shattering” processes corresponds to the meaning of 
obscenity elicited from eighteen-century documents as the breakdown of 
existing identities, social and biological. It also foregrounds the idea that 
sexual desire is not always based on positive mutual affections between 
individuals, but rather on the tendency to self-annihilation, a phenomenon 
that can be explored in the works of Blake, Shelley, and Keats. In his later Is 
The Rectum a Grave, Bersani again stresses the inherence of violence in 
sexuality that is directed at human subjectivity and selfhood with a strong 
tendency to become powerless and to lose control: “a more radical 
disintegration and humiliation of the self” (24). This is exactly the mental 
condition of the spectator of the Burkean sublime: “we shrink into the 
minuteness of our own nature, and are, in a manner, annihilated” (Enquiry 
68). Once again, the mechanisms of the obscene and the sublime overlaps 
in this particular aspect of self-annihilation, which indicates the intimacy 
between eroticism and artistic creation, an idea that will be postulated in the 
main chapters on Blake, Shelley, and Keats.   
     With the historical tracing of eighteen-century texts and the involvement 
of later philosophical and theoretical works on the sublime and sexuality, it is 
now possible to provide a specific definition of “the obscene.” It denotes a 
kind of human experience of extreme bodily and mental conditions, which 
triggers the drastic dislocation of subject and object, the violent alteration of 
human subjectivity that disintegrates the existing identities. The very extreme 
conditions consist of religious ecstasy, as the eighteen-century theological 
documents suggest, the encounter with the sublime that not only includes 
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natural grandeur but the “unpresentable” violence upon the human body and 
the potential transsexual, self-destructive complex, and erotic activities that 
are, in Bersani’s words, intrinsically masochist and self-shattering. This 
“obscene” experience is represented in the works of Blake, Shelley, and 
Keats as a heterogeneous aesthetic phenomenon of self-annihilation.10 As 
the three poets approach the “extreme conditions” of blasphemy, defilement, 
rape, transsexuality, incest, murder, cannibalism, and necrophilia, the specific 
works discussed in this thesis represent an alternative aspect of Romantic 
sexuality that empowers poetic creation not through positive affection, but 
violence and self-destruction.  
 
“THE OBSCENE” IN ROMANTIC POETRY: BLAKE, SHELLEY, AND KEATS 
 
     This thesis has chosen the three male poets not only because their 
works focus on the motifs that can be deemed obscene, but also because 
they all assume a socially positive role as a poet, a downright masculine 
identity. Blake aspires to become a prophet-poet in biblical tradition, the Bard 
“Who present, past, & future sees” (“introduction,” The Songs of Experience, 
CPPB 18). Shelley sets his heart on a poet who is “the unacknowledged 
legislators of the World” (A Defence of Poetry, MW 698) that can reform the 
world in constant amelioration. Keats, though often attacked for his 
effeminacy, sees the image of a poet as “a sage; / A humanist, physician to 
all men” who “pours out a balm upon the world” (The Fall of Hyperion 1.189-
190, 201 PJK 483). However, while endeavouring to establish these socially 
positive roles of the poet as prophet, legislator, and physician, they 
disintegrate these masculine identities in their representation of the obscene 
motifs and images. The “obscene” as the aesthetic phenomenon of self-
                                                
10 My usage of the term “heterogeneous” derives from Bataille’s distinction between 
homogeneity and heterogeneity. The homogeneous world is based on ordinary and secular 
activities that aim to accumulate resources and sustain living. The heterogeneous is a 
mystical realm only accessed through human experience that serves no useful purpose: 
religious ritual, erotic interaction without the aim of reproduction, and artistic creation. These 
heterogeneous activities all signify plethora, the violent consumption of effervescent energy 
that dissolves the boundary between individuals, between subject and object, with a 
tendency of self-annihilation: “Life is essentially extravagant, drawing on its forces and its 
reserves unchecked; unchecked it annihilates what it has created . . . in the end we 
resolutely desire that which imperils our life” (Erotism 86).  
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annihilation gains its highest impetus when the poets and their male heroes 
forsake the masculine identities they originally aspire to, and undergo the 
process of transsexuality, which can be explored especially in Blake’s Milton, 
Shelley’s Laon and Cythna, and Keats’s interaction with his contemporary 
critics. 
     Chapter 1 focuses on Blake’s poetry and design. Blake’s own 
mythological system is a sexualised revision of the Christian narrative based 
on the Bible. It is commonly argued, as mentioned in the beginning of this 
introduction, that Blake re-includes sexual desire into Christianity. That is, he 
rejects the virtue of virginity and ascetic tradition, which are promoted by 
Christian doctrines, as the “perversion” of Jesus Christ’s true words. While 
championing sexual desire as a positive drive to individual, religious, and 
political liberation, Blake also presents sex as a form of violence that results 
in defilement and sacrilege, rape, sadomasochism, autoeroticism, and 
transsexuality. In the first section, I will first examine “I saw a chapel all of 
gold” to redefine Blake’s obscenity—a problematic aspect that cannot be 
resolved according to Mitchell—as an essential theological and psychological 
synthesis of eroticism and sacredness, by involving Georges Bataille’s idea 
of l’érotisme sacré. In the second section of Chapter 1, I will then consider 
Visions of the Daughters of Albion. My reading departs from the existing 
studies of the poem that generally focus on its criticism of plantation slavery, 
its allegorical rebellion against religious continence and moral conservatism, 
and Blake’s possible sexism and misogyny. Instead, I inspect Blake’s designs 
of “obscene” and “abnormal” sexual pleasures, which are imbedded in 
Oothoon’s and Theotormon’s voice and imagination. By highlighting the 
possible influences from Erasmus Darwin’s botanic poetics in The Loves of 
the Plants, Samuel-Auguste Tissot’s On Onanism and Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau’s The Confessions, I propose that Blake engages with these 
contemporaries to present an “obscene” picture of highly heterogeneous 
erotic images, including promiscuity, autoeroticism, and sadomasochism. The 
final section of Chapter 1 focuses on Blake’s later epic poem Milton, as well 
as several plates in his illustration of the Book of Job. Blake’s poetic and 
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pictorial designs display a deliberate degradation of the contemporary idea of 
English masculinity. Through the “obscene” feminisation of traditional 
masculine protagonists, such as Satan, Job, and even Blake himself as a 
national bard, Blake exposes the subversive dimensions of the sublime, 
which annihilate established identities, social and biological. The images and 
motifs in these works— “I saw a chapel all of gold,” Visions of the Daughters 
of Albion, and Milton—correspond to my conceptualisation of the obscene as 
an aesthetic phenomenon of self-annihilation.       
     Chapter 2 focuses on Percy Bysshe Shelley’s tragedy The Cenci and 
epic poem Laon and Cythna, introduced with an analysis of A Defence of 
Poetry. In the Defence, I first identify Shelley’s struggle toward the 
reconciliation between two aspects in poetry: one is based on love and 
sympathy to envision a better state of the material world; the other is 
empowered by madness, ecstasy, anti-knowledge, and unconsciousness. In 
the Defence, Shelley endeavours to contain the latter with the former, in 
order to justify poetry’s necessity for human happiness and the poet’s status 
as “the unacknowledged legislators of the World” (MW 698). However, it is 
questionable whether such a goal is reached and such a “socially positive” 
unilateral generalisation of poetry is really displayed in Shelley’s artistic 
creation. To address this question, I explore Shelley’s composition of The 
Cenci in relation to his source materials and other literary works. In the 
characterisation of the Count, Shelley draws from Mozart’s Don Giovanni and 
the Byronic hero, thus granting him considerable charisma as Milton’s Satan. 
With his innovations concerning the Count’s atrocities, Shelley suggestively 
brings forth the “obscene/off-stage” father-daughter incest as an essential 
literary and aesthetic motif of evil assimilation and incorporation. Shelley’s 
frequent allusions to Macbeth testify to the effect of the Count’s dark conceit 
and Beatrice’s unconscious identification with her villainous father. In the 
climactic trial scene, Shelley further degrades the character of Beatrice in her 
confrontation with Marzio, rendering her both morally and aesthetically 
problematic. Shelley’s innovation of Count Cenci’s other atrocities reinforces 
the incest motif, and attests to the poet’s latent inclination to the alternative 
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aspect of poetry. That is, the major dramatic impetus of The Cenci is based 
on the negative poetics that dissolves all social bonds/boundaries, rather 
than the positive poetics of love and sympathy Beatrice (or Shelley himself, 
consciously or not) fails to represent. In the second section of the Chapter 2, 
I focus on Shelley’s longest epic poem Laon and Cythna. I examine not only 
Shelley’s design of sibling incest, but also the protagonists’ mental 
transformations that parallel their incestuous love and the process of 
revolution. Even though the sibling incest in Laon and Cythna is a positive 
form of Romantic sexuality and one of the most powerful epitomes of 
Shelleyan sympathy, Shelley still employs the “obscene” poetics of self-
annihilation that is manifested in an erotic poetics of suffering and madness. 
Through the “obscene” experiences of bodily torture, imaginative 
cannibalism, incest, and rape, Laon and Cythna undergo chaotic processes 
of “brainless fantasy” and “sense of senselessness.” In these processes, they 
annihilate their previous identities to close in to Shelley’s ideal of individuality 
based on love and sympathy, which he believes can be extended to the 
entirety of human society. Shelley might fail to achieve the final aim with this 
epic, but his erotic poetics of suffering and madness exemplify the aesthetic 
phenomenon of self-annihilation—the obscene side of English Romantic 
works. 
     Chapter 3 focuses on John Keats’s two narrative poems: “Isabella; or, 
the Pot of Basil,” and “The Eve of St. Agnes.” As Jeffrey N. Cox points out, it 
is widely thought that “Keats created a kind of anti-romance capable of 
confronting the sorrows of life beyond the wish-fulfilling enchantments offered 
by conventional romances” in his 1820 volume Lamia, Isabella, The Eve of 
St. Agnes, and Other Poems (KPP 410). In the introduction of Chapter 3, I 
examine several key letters, including the significant “Epistle” to John 
Hamilton Reynolds, to consider Keats’s feminisation in his poetry—a 
tendency criticised and derided by his contemporaries—as a necessary 
phenomenon for Keats. Feminisation, as I propose, corresponds to Keats’s 
understanding of poetic creation as a process of transcending the poet’s 
existing identity and subjectivity. This is a pathological process of self-
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corrosion, which can be observed and explored in “Isabella” and “The Eve of 
St. Agnes,” and attest to the Romantic obscenity of self-annihilation. In my 
reading of “Isabella,” with a cross-examination of Boccaccio’s original text 
and John Florio’s English translation, I argue that Keats actually downplays 
the violent interference of the two brothers. In other words, the negativity of 
erotic love between Isabella and Lorenzo is an innate phenomenon of self-
annihilation, represented by Keats’s unique pathological poetics. In the final 
section of Chapter 3, I then survey “The Eve of St. Agnes,” which presents a 
heterogeneous phenomenon of “Keatsian sacredness”—a synthesis of the 
religious and the erotic. Paying specific attention to Keats’s design of 
religious, especially Christian, motifs and images such as sacrifice, fasting, 
and the enigmatic reference to Mary Magdalene, I dismiss the oft-assumed 
dichotomy between Porphyro/the rapist and Madeline/the rape victim, and 
highlight the mutual annihilation of self and subjectivity in the erotic ritual of 
St. Agnes This chapter on Keats will explicate Keats’s idea of poetic creation 
as a process that shares the same root with erotic love and religious 
experience. All these three dimensions of human mentality entail the 
dissolution of somatic and psychological orders, which in turn result in self-
annihilation and the collapse of subjectivity—the very essence of “the 
obscene” in English Romantic poetry.     
     Michel Foucault, in his introduction to The History of Sexuality, casts 
doubt upon the so-called “repressive hypothesis,” arguing that instead of 
repression and silence, the nineteenth-century culture witnessed a 
“dissemination and implantation of polymorphous sexualities” (12) and a 
“veritable discursive explosion” (17) of sexuality. Although I do not approach 
Romantic poetry through a Foucauldian viewpoint, which focuses on how 
power and knowledge formulate certain socially instrumental discourses on 
sexuality, I observe that in Romantic poetry, there are indeed “polymorphous” 
forms of eroticism that correspond to contemporary discourses on 
sexualities. The “obscene” aspects and erotic subject in Romantic poetry 
challenge the unilateral formulation of sex as an emblem of mutual affection 
and personal liberation. In his later works, Foucault also deals with the issue 
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of subjectivity. In his view, through the discourses of sexualities, human 
experiences are constituted for individuals to “recognize themselves as 
subjects of a ‘sexuality,’ which was accessible to very diverse fields of 
knowledge and linked to a system of rules and constraints” (The Use of 
Pleasure 4). Through this process, a sexual “desiring subject” is established 
to construct a positive relationship with the self, which allows them to 
“discover, in desire, the truth of their being” (5). This subject of sexuality, as 
Foucault proposes, executes a “hermeneutics of desire” that relies upon “arts 
of existence,” and “techniques of the self (10-11). The management of one’s 
sexual desire becomes the manifestation of wisdom and truth, and one’s 
subjectivity to exist in an aura of harmony and aesthetics in human society. 
While acknowledging Foucault’s theorisation of the “desiring subject” of 
sexuality, my discussion of the “erotic subjects” in Romantic poetry reveals 
an “obscene” disruption of such Foucauldian harmonious “care of the self.” 
As my examinations of Blake, Shelley, and Keats will lay bare, what these 
poets covertly convey is in essence “arts of anti-existence” and “techniques 
of self-annihilation,” especially when the Romantic subjects undergo the 
experiences of erotic love, religious sacredness, and poetic creation. Such 
are the scholarly positions that this thesis should present finally, which, in my 
critical estimation, could also be used to intervene in the debate over moral 
and artistic judgment concerning works of popular culture, or even the 













William Blake:  
Sacredness, Violence, and Degraded Masculinity 
 
      
INTRODUCTION: L’ÉROTISME SACRÉ IN “I SAW A CHAPEL ALL OF GOLD” 
 
     To consider sexuality in Blake’s works, one inevitably has to consider it 
in the context of religion. The dynamic between sexual desire and religion is 
pervasive in his corpus starting from the seemingly carefree Songs of 
Innocence, the allegorical continental prophecies, to the epic construction of 
Milton and Jerusalem. Blake, as an avid reader of the Bible, seeks to rectify 
the distortions and errors caused by what he calls “state religion”—the 
institutionalised Christianity—as well as Deism, or natural religion, that is 
supported by Newton’s scientific formulations.11 The re-inclusion of sexual 
desire is one of the most prominent methods that Blake adopts to accomplish 
his Christian revisionism. In the beginning of Songs of Experience, the Bard, 
“Who Present, Past, & Future sees” (CPPB 18),12 eagerly calls for the return 
of Earth—an archetype of paganist Mother Nature that represents sexual 
vitality—to accuse the “Cruel jealous selfish” father-God of repressing sexual 
delight. In America: a Prophecy, an allegory of the American Revolution, Orc 
rises from the Atlantic sea as a sexualised Jesus, declaring war against 
Urizen, the oppressive Jehovah in Blake’s system.13 In Europe: a Prophecy, 
the mythical character Enitharmon is a revised version of Virgin Mary, who 
announces “that Womans love is Sin” (CPPB 62). With this figure, Blake 
                                                
11 Although Blake shares similar political views with radicals such as Thomas Paine, he 
opposes to their adherence to Deistic belief that defies biblical prophetic tradition with 
excessive employments of reason and the Newtonian mechanism (Robert 153, Essick 199).  
12 Except where indicated otherwise, all Blake’s texts cited in this thesis are from David V. 
Erdman’s edition of The Complete Poetry & Prose of William Blake, abbreviated as CPPB. 
13 That Orc serves as Blake’s version of Jesus has been noted by critics such as A. D. 
Nuttall. Blake’s poetic rendering of Orc/Jesus suggests the influence of Gnostic texts, which 
are probably available in late eighteenth-century London, as noted by Leslie Tannenbaum 
(15). Comparing Orc’s line in America: “I am Orc, wreath’d round the accursed tree” with 
lines in “Introduction” of Songs of Experience: “The Holy Word, / That walk’d among the 
ancient tree” (CPPB 18) and Jesus’s declaration in Apocryphon of John, a significant Gnostic 
text, that he is the one who brought Adam and Eve the forbidden fruit, we can discover that 
in Blake the “serpert-form’d” Orc identifies with Jesus rather than Satan. With this 
characterisation of Orc Blake revises Jesus as a mentor who taught the first-born human 
beings sexual delight, thus accomplishing his goal of sexual revision of Christianity. 
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discloses the physical and mental sterility caused by the Christian virtue of 
chastity. Hence, for Blake, the essence of Christianity lies not in the exclusion 
of sexual desire as a sin, but in the full embrace of sex without the restraints 
of reason and morality. Sex is not the division between the spiritual and the 
corporeal; through sexual love human beings can restore the lost “spiritual 
body” and unify the split mentalities to become the divine “Universal Man.” In 
other words, sexual desire is not only a form of positive energy but also a 
metaphor of religious and political liberation. However, as recent studies 
demonstrate, sexuality in Blake’s poetry and visual designs does not always 
correspond to a consistent ideology of liberation. There are contradictions 
and disruptions. The manifold aspects of sexual embodiment that might have 
been labelled “obscene” —bizarre sexual postures, twisted sexual 
mentalities, and perverse sexual orientations—emerge in his works. Should 
all these sexual images and motifs, including homosexuality, incest, rape, 
autoeroticism, transsexuality, and sadomasochism, be valued as necessary 
components of Blake’s “Poetic Genius” and the catalysts for religious and 
political liberation that he espouses?  
     Dealing with such a question, critical work concerning Blake’s 
“obscene” sides of sexuality have only emerged in the past twenty years. 
This critical tendency is reflected in Tristanne Connolly’s William Blake and 
the Body (2002) and two essay collections edited by Connolly and Helen P. 
Bruder: Queer Blake (2010) and Sexy Blake (2015). These studies share a 
critical tenet that Blake handles the problem of sexuality with a multi-layered 
configuration. That is, aside from his much-acknowledged defence of sexual 
desire, symbolically or literally, against repression, there are some subtle and 
disturbing aspects of sexuality in Blake, which are not so easily justified.14 
Concurring to this tenet, my examination of Blake’s works centres on a 
critical formulation that Blake’s representation of obscenity presents an 
alternative trinity of art, sacredness, and sex in his system. Also, through 
                                                
14 Blake’s inconsistent attitude toward sexuality, especially its sexist and misogynist aspects, 
has been identified in some earlier criticism, such as Susan Fox’s “The Female as Metaphor 
in William Blake’s Poetry,” Anne. K. Mellor’s Romanticism and Gender, and Alicia Ostriker’s 
“Desire Gratified and Ungratified.”  
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sexual violence and violent sex, Blake sets up a dialectic engagement with 
the contemporary aesthetics of the sublime and the ideal of masculinity. 
Furthermore, he presents a sacred experience—though still in a Christian 
frame—of self-annihilation, a motif dismissed as obscene in the eighteenth-
century religious and moral ideologies. I seek to demonstrate how Blake 
employs images and motifs of obscenity to blur the conventional division 
between the holy and the secular, the pure and the unclean, self/subjectivity 
and other/objectivity. His heterogeneous aesthetics of obscenity implies the 
danger of championing sex as a positive force of liberation, pointing to an 
erotic/religious experience in which identity and subjectivity are threatened, 
twisted, inverted, and annihilated. In the two major poems of Blake that are 
analysed in this chapter—Visions of the Daughters of Albion and Milton: a 
Poem—the “obscene” Blake can be extensively explored. 
      To begin my examination of Visions and Milton, I will first revisit the 
poem “I saw a chapel all of gold” in which Mitchell identifies the issue of 
obscenity. Mitchell only cites the final two lines of the poem— “So I turnd into 
a sty / And laid me down among the swine”—to accentuate the issue in 
question. In the brief discussion on Blake’s obscenity that follows, Mitchell 
does not further elaborate his reading of the poem. In fact, “I saw a chapel all 
of gold” contains some of the key elements of Blake’s representation of the 
concept of obscenity in the eighteenth century, formulated in the introduction. 
The ideas generated from a close reading of this poem can be developed 
and extended to Blake’s other major works. Generally, the poem “I saw a 
chapel all of gold” has not drawn much critical attention in Blake studies. In 
early critical discussions, Northrop Frye and David V. Erdman spend not a 
single page on the poem in their prominent works, Fearful Symmetry and 
Prophet against Empire. Harold Bloom, while providing commentary for 
Erdman’s edition of The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, does 
not remark on this poem. S. Foster Damon comments briefly on the poem, 
arguing that in it “a forced and unwanted act of sex (the Serpent) is a 
pollution of the sacrament of real love” (366). Apart from Damon’s 
interpretation, other comprehensive readings of the poem can only be found 
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in the two short essays by Robert F. Gleckner (1979) and Nicholas Warner 
(1983).      
     Gleckner’s essay focuses on the influences of Blake’s precursors—
Spenser and Milton—on this poem. Drawing on Spenser’s The Ruines of 
Time and The Faerie Queene, Blake depicts the chapel as “an image of 
false, idolatrous religion which, in its forbidding power and above all in its 
secrecy, deters even mistaken worship except from afar and without” 
(Gleckner 38-39). Underlining Blake’s hidden references to Milton’s Samson 
Agonistes and Paradise Lost, Gleckner reads the vomiting serpent as “the 
spirit of wrathful revolution against all forms of repression,” who is, however, 
“unilluminated by imaginative vision” (40). This uninspired form of revolution 
will lead to “the promulgation of new tyranny to replace the old” (40). 
Similarly, Warner regards the chapel as an institutionalised barrier that blocks 
people from the true spirit of Christianity. The serpent first appears as a 
rebellious hero who forces open the church. As soon as it is “upon the altar 
white,” where the Eucharist is set, the serpent degenerates into another form 
of priesthood, perverting Christ’s spirit with defilement. The interpretations of 
Gleckner and Warner highlight the Romantic sentiment of hope and 
disillusionment for political revolution, which replaced monarchy with a new 
reign of terror. Reading “I saw a chapel all of gold” as an allegory of historical 
events conforms to the canonised interpretations of Blake that early critics, 
such as M. H. Abrams and Erdman, propose. However, the images and 
motifs in the poem that constitute this allegorisation have heterogeneous 
qualities that are overlooked in the standard reading. These qualities propel 
later critics such as Mitchell to consider Blake “filthy” and obscene. 
Combining later critical theories and a textual analysis of Blake’s manuscript, 
my reading will provide an alternative interpretation of the serpent and the 
sacrament in this poem. By doing so, I will explicate Blake’s obscenity and 
extend it to the examination of his other important works in later sections.  
     In William Blake and the Body, Tristanne Connolly turns to Mary 
Douglas’s anthropological discussion of the discrimination between the 
sacred and the unclean in Purity and Danger. Connolly pays specific 
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attention to how transgressions of bodily boundary endanger the wholeness 
of religion and the stableness of society. She refers to Douglas’s conclusion 
that holiness requires the preservation of classes and categories, which are 
epitomised by the human body as “a model which can stand for any bounded 
system” (Douglas 115). Its orifices, from which fluids are issued, are thus the 
“vulnerable points” that “traversed the boundary of the body” and other 
systems that the body signifies (Douglas 121). With Douglas’s ideas, 
Connolly argues that “Blake’s illuminated books are preoccupied with the 
orifices of the body,” adding that in these works, the constantly 
“metamorphosing and splitting” body transgresses “the limits of the system” 
(Connolly, William Blake and the Body 4). In addition to Douglas, Connolly 
draws on Julia Kristeva’s exploration of the semiotic and the symbolic, in 
order to see Blake’s texts as an ever-changing process that disturbs and 
disrupts the fixity of meaning. She also refers to Kristeva’s conceptualisation 
of the abject, which threatens the established identities that are constructed 
by the distinction between subject and object. Such “powers of horror” 
engendered by the abject, as Connolly observes, can be discovered in 
Blake’s works, where he “faces the abject reality of the body” and “displays 
the horrors of physical existence in order to recognize them” (William Blake 
and the Body 8). The issue of obscenity in Blake certainly includes his 
refashioning of the human body, which is often eerily stretched, curled, 
distorted, and afflicted, as well as issuing bodily fluids that ought not to be 
present for their uncleanness. Accompanied by Douglas’s and Kristeva’s 
theories, Connolly provides anthropological and psychoanalytical angles to 
decipher Blake’s often esoteric and unconventional poetics, especially in 
terms of sexual desire. However, while referring to Douglas’s idea of bodily 
boundary and Kristeva’s idea of the abject, Connolly does not elaborate how 
Blake’s transgression of this boundary functions in his ideal of Christianity, 
which contains both sacred and erotic experiences. Hence, it is helpful to 
turn to Georges Bataille, a French thinker renowned for his philosophie de 
l’excès et la transgression. In Bataille’s view, religious and erotic experiences 
are both constituted by exuberant energy and excessive consumption 
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(exemplified by sexual activities without the purpose of reproduction). This 
conceptualisation can be juxtaposed with “I saw a chapel all of gold,” in order 
to illuminate the obscene images that Blake situates in the Christian context.  
     To begin with, Bataille’s conceptualisation of eroticism distinguishes 
itself from common notions of the term in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries and even in our time.15 In fact, Bataillean eroticism is much aligned 
with the idea of obscenity in the periods in question, particularly concerning 
the pagan rituals and the aesthetics of the sublime. Addressing the idea of 
religion as a division between the secular and the sacred, Bataille and 
Douglas share a same precursor, the French sociologist Émile Durkheim. In 
his The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, Durkheim points out that  
          All known religious beliefs, whether simple or complex,  
          present a common quality: they presuppose a classification  
          of things . . . into two classes, two opposite kinds, generally  
          designated by two distinct terms effectively translated by  
          the words profane and sacred. The division of the world  
          into two comprehensive domains, one sacred, the other  
          profane, is the hallmark of religious thought” (36).  
Both under Durkheim’s influence, Bataille’s division of the profane and the 
sacred and Douglas’s division between the unclean and the sacred seem 
similar. There is, however, a subtle disparity between Bataille and Douglas, 
which makes Bataille a thinker more akin to Blake.16 For Douglas, 
sacredness is maintained by excluding the unclean objects and any 
                                                
15 In the eighteenth century, the term “erotic” often indicates the indulgence in bodily appetite 
and sexual intercourses based on mutual affection. In modern usage, “erotica” suggests a 
more refined and artistic literary or visual representations of sex. In contrast, “pornography” 
is produced for mass consumption by featuring violence and exploitation of (for most of the 
time) women. The division between the erotic and the pornographic is actually irrelevant for 
Bataille. For him, eroticism—an act of drastic consumption of energy that parallels religious 
festivals of excessive expenditure—necessarily contains violence.  
16 Blake is one of the seven authors (including Baudelaire and Sade) that Bataille discusses 
extensively in his Literature and Evil. Bataille raises Blake as a figure to prove that literature 
exists without being confined by a high moral ground, adding that literature’s value lies in its 
“sovereignty”: its heterogeneous qualities that cannot be assimilated into moral systems. 
Also, Bataille seems to recapitulate Blake’s ideal of “Poetic Genius” as “the true Man” from 
whom “all sects of Philosophy” and “The Religions of all Nations” (All Religions are One, 
CPPB 1) are derived, by proposing that “identification of man and poetry” can “turn religions 
into the work of man” (84). Also, Bataille’s argument that “all that is sacred is poetic and all 
that is poetic is sacred” (84) echoes Blake’s belief that through poetry “God becomes as we 
are, that we may be as he is” (There is No Natural Religion, CPPB 3). Hence, it can be 
speculated that Bataille’s ideas of religion and literature share the same root in human 
mentality, as well as the involvement of eroticism, are under certain influences of Blake. 
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behaviours that might produce them; in other words, the boundary must be 
protected in order to secure religious wholeness. In the last chapter of Purity 
and Danger, she does relate to an occasion in which “religions often 
sacralise the very unclean things which have been rejected with abhorrence” 
(196). In this exceptional situation, the unclean is present only to undergo a 
process of “pulverising, dissolving, and rotting” to annihilate its identity as an 
impure object. Douglas further argues that the danger posed by the unclean 
“represent[s] the powers inheriting in the cosmos” because it exposes “Those 
vulnerable margins” and threatens “to destroy good order” (199). The 
unclean that is brought into and destroyed in the sphere of sacredness is 
meant to demonstrate the capacity of religion to control natural powers. 
Bataille, however, approaches the division between the profane and the 
sacred from a different angle. The unclean that ought to be purged in 
Douglas’s view actually plays a significant role in Bataillean sacredness.  
     In Theory of Religion, Bataille proposes that the profane life of human 
beings is confined in the “world of things” (43).17 In this secular sphere, 
human activities are regulated according to the principle of work. In Literature 
and Evil, Bataille argues that the profane world is a “prosaic, unseductive 
world of work,” where people “see no poetry in exteriority” (84). The order of 
things and the principle of work are embodied in the human use of tools: 
“Insofar as tools are developed with their end in view, consciousness posits 
them as objects, as interruptions in the indistinct continuity” (Theory of 
Religion 27). The “indistinct continuity” is a key concept in Bataille’s thinking, 
denoting an “inner experience” of intimacy that human beings perceive in 
religious epiphany, artistic appreciation, and sexual ecstasy. That working 
through the usage of tools runs counter to the sacred, aesthetic, and sexual 
continuity resounds with Burke’s idea that a higher level of sublime feelings is 
generated by powerful animals that do not submit to human production. 
Though possessing enormous strength, an ox is not as sublime as other 
                                                
17 In Bataille’s philosophy, the “things” are objects that human beings employ as tools and 
materials for (re)production. These objects have “no value in itself” and are “only in relation 
to an anticipated result” (Theory of Religion 28). For Bataille, therefore, the “things” signify all 
human activities of working that are inert, unimaginative, and unartistic.  
 44 
beasts because it is “extremely serviceable” in human activities of work 
(Enquiry 65). That is, usefulness undermines aesthetic appreciation. This is 
the idea shared by Bataille, Burke, and Blake. In The Accursed Share, 
Bataille takes his argument further by approaching the profane world from 
the perspective of economics: the profane world is where human beings 
commit themselves to production and accumulation of resources. 
Accordingly, sexual intercourse that aims for reproduction is contained in the 
profane world.  
     As for the sacred world, the very opposite of the profane, Bataille 
postulates that: 
          man feels a kind of impotent horror in the sense of the  
          sacred. This horror is ambiguous. Undoubtedly, what is  
          sacred attracts and possesses an incomparable value,  
          but at the same time it appears vertiginously dangerous  
          for that clear and profane world where mankind situates  
          its privileged domain.  
                                      (Theory of Religion 36)                                                                           
In Bataillean sacredness consists of certain propensities of the Burkean 
sublime. Both experiences invoke the spectator’s fear by threatening his well-
being in the secular world. Also, in contrast to Douglas’s division of the 
unclean and the sacred, Bataille regards the sacred as something that 
disturbs the social order, rather than maintaining it. It is disruption, not 
completeness, that empowers Bataillean sacredness. In other words, the 
sacred is not an experience of stability and health, but of ecstasy, oblivion, 
and violence. As Michael Richardson correctly observes, Bataillean 
sacredness “is revealed in bodily exhalations; extreme emotions; socially 
useless activity, all of which take the form of heterology that homogenous 
society would like to definitively expel” (45). Furthermore, from the 
perspective of economics, Bataille holds that the sacred signifies a moment 
that is free from “order of thing” and principle of work. It is a moment in which 
all the accumulated resources are subject to “the violence of an unconditional 
consumption” (Theory of Religion 49), and to the “desire to consume, to 
annihilate, to make a bonfire of our resources,” as “the fire and the ruin are 
what seem to us divine, sacred” (Erotism 185). By disregarding the purpose 
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of reproduction with exuberant consumption of bodily energy, eroticism aligns 
itself with the religious ritual of sacrifice. Sex and sacrifice embody the 
unique phenomenon of the sacred, as both activities “reveal the flesh”: 
“Sacrifice replaces the ordered life of the animal with a blind convulsion of its 
organs. So also with the erotic convulsion; it gives free rein to extravagant 
organs whose blind activity goes on beyond the considered will of the lovers” 
(Erotism 92).  
     Aligning sex with religious sacrifice as an act of expenditure regardless 
of reproductive purpose, Bataille corresponds to Blake’s notion of erotic 
pleasure that “the youth shut up from / The lustful joy. shall forget to 
generate” in Visions of the Daughters of Albion (7.5-6 CPPB 50). It can also 
be juxtaposed with the cult of Bacchus/Dionysus in the eighteenth-century 
religious treatises and Nietzsche’s idea of Dionysian intoxication. In such a 
ritual, sex and violence are combined to the extent of mental blindness that 
transcends consciousness. It also presents the disclosure of the human body 
and even the unseen and “obscene” interior of the body, as what 
Bacchus/Dionysus’s maenads do to Orpheus in Greek mythology. With the 
simulation of death, the revelation of convulsive bodies, overflowing blood, 
and interior organs, the sacred ritual brings forth a sensation of plethora, the 
abundance and effusion of life in an excessive manner, resonating with 
Blake’s passionate declaration against restraints in There is No Natural 
Religion “More! More! is the cry of a mistaken soul, less than All cannot 
satisfy Man” (CPPB 2) and “Exuberance is Beauty” in the Proverbs of Hell 
(CPPB 38). It also forms an extreme spectacle of violence resembling 
Burke’s sublime description of Damien’s execution that should be 
unpresentable, and is therefore, obscene. Erotic/sacred experience, as 
Bataille concludes, “is the feeling of something bursting, of the violence 
accompanying an explosion” (Erotism 93). Thus, what is dismissed in 
Douglas’s holiness as disrupting elements are crucial in Bataillean 
sacredness. Concerned with the dynamic between bodily sex and religion, 
the theories of Douglas and Bataille provide a novel angle to understand the 
issue of obscenity in Blake’s works, in which he constantly eroticises 
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Christian images and motifs. With this approach, the following section will 
provide an analysis of the defilement in “I saw a chapel all of gold.”  
     The poem opens with the speaker’s witness of a boundary that is 
strictly drawn between two spheres: within the chapel and without the chapel. 
The division is absolute and the two domains are mutually exclusive. It 
reflects what Douglas maintains in Purity and Danger that “Holiness requires 
that individuals shall conform to the class to which they belong” and “holiness 
requires that different classes of things shall not be confused” (53). The 
boundary between the closed chapel of gold and those “weeping mourning 
worshipping” outside can be seen as the division between the sacred and the 
profane worlds constructed by prohibition—the “Thou shalt not” inscription on 
the chapel’s door in “The Garden of Love.” It also represents the traditional 
dichotomy between spirit and body, the transcendental and the material. 
From the second stanza, Blake initiates the transgression of this boundary, 
which is embodied by the image of a serpent that rises between “The white 
pillars of the door.” 
     For Blake, the act of gazing implies a process of identification, as he 
reiterates the line “they became what they beheld” (CPPB 178) to describe 
the murder of Albion and the violent disintegration of the Universal Man in 
Chapter 2 of Jerusalem. The speaker, who sees the violent spectacle of 
forcing and tearing the golden hinges, unconsciously identifies with the 
serpent. This point is relevant in determining the speaker’s attitude and 
action in the last stanza. Following the serpent into the chapel, the speaker 
sees “the pavement sweet,” and “pearls & rubies bright.” Blake discloses the 
very interior of the seemingly sacred world, which is decorated with material 
luxuries. Moreover, the bread and the wine on the white altar are the 
materialisation of Jesus’s spirit of self-sacrifice. Here the dichotomy of the 
spiritual and the material is dissolved. In the following climax of defilement, 
the vomiting serpent, as a phallic image, penetrates through the vulva-like 
white pillars and ejaculates its semen-poison on the spiritual body/bodily 
spirit of Jesus, in order to perform what Damon calls “a forced and unwanted 
act of sex” (366). Recalling James Adair’s 1775 treatise, in which the purity of 
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American Indian rites contrasts with the “impure and obscene religious 
ceremonies of the ancient heathens,” we can observe that the serpent’s 
violation of the sacrament embodies the eighteenth-century notion of 
religious obscenity by meddling the sexual/unclean with the sacred. The 
holiness in Douglas’s definition is breached by breaking the classes. In this 
moment, Blake’s representation of the scene is more akin to Bataillean 
sacredness, where religious and erotic experiences are synthesised. In this 
scene, the bread and the wine do not represent the sacred sphere that is 
defiled by the serpent. Instead, the entire action of the serpent vomiting its 
poison upon the bread and the wine is essentially a sacred experience. Such 
a critical position not only gains support from Bataille’s theorisation of the 
sacred. A synoptic reading that involves Blake’s other poems can also 
provide a further explication.   
     It is crucial, therefore, to determine Blake’s evaluation of the serpent’s 
action and the sacrament in the chapel. According to Warner, the serpent 
represents a revolutionary hero who becomes a tyrant himself and violates 
the sacrament after he overthrows the church. Such a reading, however, 
avails little in regard of the enigmatic last two lines (“So I turnd into a sty / 
And laid me down among the swine”), which Mitchell cites to support his 
argument of Blake’s obscenity. To obtain a valid reading of the poem and 
elicit Blake’s poetic design of obscenity that can be explored in his other 
major works, I first relocate the poem into its textual context. “I saw a chapel 
all of gold” is found in Blake’s Notebook, which is referred to as “The Rossetti 
Manuscript.”18 The poem “I saw a chapel all of gold” was written on a page 
among other five poems, three of which are included in the Songs of 
Innocence and of Experience: “My Pretty Rose Tree,” “The Clod and Pebble,” 
and “The Garden of Love.” The page is divided into two columns: “I saw a 
chapel all of gold” is placed at the bottom of the right column, beneath “I laid 
me down upon a bank” and the draft of “The Garden of Love.” The three 
poems in the left column present a unified theme: love, or more specifically, 
                                                
18 Dante Gabriel Rossetti purchased it from William Palmer (brother of Samuel Palmer, one 
of Blake’s close friends) in 1847 and produced his own transcript of it. See Erdman’s 
introduction to The Notebook of William Blake.  
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the mechanism of desire. In the right column, where “I saw a chapel all of 
gold” belongs, “I laid me down upon a bank” shares the same theme with 
“The Garden of Love,” both attacking the virtue of chastity and ascetic 
tradition of Christianity. Accordingly, it is highly possible that the image of 
serpent and the motif of sacrilege in “I saw a chapel all of gold” serve the 
same purpose as the other two poems in the right column.  
     Thus, the two chapels in “The Garden of Love” and “I saw a chapel all 
of gold” both represent the religious repression of sexual desire. In the 
former, the speaker escapes from the oppressive chapel, but only to find that 
the garden of love is already intruded by “graves” and “tomb-stones” (CPPB 
26). In the latter, the speaker does not escape, but follows the serpent that 
intrudes the very centre of prohibition by trespassing the religious boundary. 
As a symbol of female sexuality and fertility of nurturing function, the garden 
of love that is violated by tomb-stones can be read as “the punishment of the 
speaker’s sexual desire for his mother” (George 79)—a punishment 
implemented by the patriarchal/paternal chapel. In such a context, the 
serpent and the speaker in “I saw a chapel all of gold” breaking into the 
chapel all of gold can be interpreted as a counterattack on the oppressive 
religious institution.  
     The sacrament defiled by the serpent’s vomited poison, according to 
Warner, is something should be “available to the Weeping, mourning, 
worshipping people outside” (24). That is, Warner sees the bread and the 
wine on the altar white as the symbol of true Christianity that Blake promotes. 
But are the bread and wine in this poem truly so? The question about Blake’s 
real attitude toward the Eucharist emerges. Biographically, we might trace the 
works of Joseph Priestley, a renowned religious dissent whose works were 
published by Joseph Johnson, one of Blake’s employers in his career as an 
engraver. In his An History of the Corruptions of Christianity, Priestley 
denounces the rite because it “opened a door to endless superstition,” 
because common objects are elevated to possess “a real virtue,” and 
consequently Christians might “put these merely external rites in the place of 
moral virtue” (7). As Jon Mee points out, many of Blake’s works share 
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Priestley’s political and religious ideas, including the support of the American 
and French Revolutions and the idea against soul-body dualism (“Blake’s 
Politics in History” 137).19 In light of this, it is highly possible that Blake 
shares with Priestley a negative view of the ritual. Examining Blake’s 
references to the Eucharist in other poems, we can elicit two different views 
of this ritual. For example, in the Notebook, there is a poem which starts with 
the line “My Spectre around me night & day” and ends with this stanza: 
         & Throughout all Eternity 
         I forgive you you forgive me 
         As our dear Redeemer said 
         This the Wine & this the Bread.  
                       (CPPB 477)                                              
This poem opens with the affliction caused by the erroneous separation of 
the speaker’s masculine aspect “Spectre” that “Like a Wild beast guards my 
way” and his feminine aspect “Emanation,” which “Weeps incessantly for my 
Sin.” The separation results in “Pride & scorn” and “jealousies & fear,” until 
the speaker renounces it and “root up the infernal grove / Then shall we 
return & see / The worlds of happy Eternity.” In the context of this poem, the 
wine and the bread are not material objects set in a ritual as in “I saw a 
chapel all of gold.” They represent the realisation of Christ’s spirit of 
forgiveness and sacrifice free from the confinement of the “chapel.” 
Furthermore, the capitalised “Wine” and “Bread” are crucial, as capitalisation 
is one of the most frequent methods used by Blake’s to highlight images of 
significant symbolic meanings. The capitalisation of wine and bread also 
appears in A Vision of the Last Judgment, in which the direct identification 
with Jesus is established: “He is the Bread & the Wine he is the Water of 
Life” (CPPB 561). In another poem “The Mental Traveller,” on the contrary, 
the lower-case “bread & wine” are presented as beguiling material 
enjoyments of “wayward love” (CPPB 484) in a vicious cycle of struggles 
between the young and the old. Hence, there is an obvious disparity in 
Blake’s presentations of the images of wine and bread in his works. In “My 
                                                
19 For the denial of body-soul dichotomy shared by Blake and Priestley, also see Morton D. 
Paley’s discussion in Energy and the Imagination: A Study of the Development of Blake’s 
Thought, p. 8-10.  
 50 
Spectre around me night & day” and A Vision of the Last Judgment, the 
images with capitalised letters exemplify the reunion of split human 
mentalities as a path to restore true Christian belief. On the contrary, the 
lower-case “bread and wine” in “The Mental Traveller” and “I saw a chapel all 
of gold” are negative objects that ensnare human beings and is falsely 
sanctified in a ritual of institutionalised religion. Thus, it is possible to dismiss 
Damon’s and Warner’s conclusion that the Eucharist in “I saw a chapel all of 
gold” represents “the sacrament of real love” or something should be 
“available to the ‘Weeping, mourning, worshipping’ people outside.” If the 
bread and the wine in the poem represent false objectification of Christ’s 
spirit, the critical question will be: what is the point to defile the already-fallen 
things with vomited poison? As I have argued, for Blake, the bread and the 
wine do not represent the Christian sacredness defiled by the serpent. 
Rather, the entire scene of defilement in the last stanza is the representation 
of the sacred.  
     In Douglas’s formulation, most religions are constituted by laws and 
taboos and holiness is based on the strict principle of classification and 
separation between the sacred and the profane, the pure and the unclean. 
The serpent’s action in the chapel, following its intrusion into the chapel, is 
another transgression of the boundary. Blake’s emphasis on the serpent’s 
“slimy length” intensifies a sense of viscosity. Both Douglas and Kristeva 
discuss this unstable and dangerous state. Viscosity, or sliminess, according 
to Douglas, is “a half way between solid and liquid” and “a cross section in a 
process of change” that “attacks the boundary between myself and it” (47). 
Unlike touching water, by which the subject is able to secure his own solid 
subjectivity, the sensation of touching something slimy generates a sense of 
ambiguity, which disturbs classification and blurs the line of separation. In 
Kristeva’s introduction to the abject, the unstable state of sliminess is 
exemplified by the skin on the surface of milk that triggers a strong reaction 
of repugnance. Sliminess, for Kristeva, reminds a human subject of his/her 
still-tangling bound with “the mother,” “the feminine,” a bound that has to be 
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severed in order to establish subjectivity and social identity (3).20 In other 
words, the serpent’s sliminess further disturbs the religious wholeness in the 
patriarchal chapel with a power of the feminine that threatens subjectivity and 
selfhood.   
     As Damon maintains, the defilement is a symbolic rape, “a forced and 
unwanted act of sex” (366). Blake seems to present a negative portrayal of 
male sexuality, as the word “poison” implies the potentially destructive nature 
in sex. The action of “vomiting his poison out” is another transgression of 
boundary concerning the body. Blake’s direct presentation of ejected bodily 
fluid, which resembles other “abjected” objects such as saliva, feces, urine, 
and menstrual blood, bring what are unpresentable back into display. 
“Vomiting his poison out” is the blurring of the borderline between the visible 
exterior body and the concealed interior body. The bodily fluid that is violently 
thrown out from the body unto the sacrament destabilises the division 
between the sacred and the profane.21 However, as I have showed in the 
tracing of the Eucharist in Blake’s other poems, the sacrament here is not 
something truly sacred, but only profane objects that are already 
degenerative.  
     Blake’s choice of the word “vomit,” rather than the more frequent 
“issue” or “issue forth,” indicates a propensity of pathology and unstableness 
that echoes the serpent’s sliminess.22 By using the word “vomiting,” Blake 
enhance the “abject” quality of the issued fluid, the serpent’s poison. “Poison” 
is a word that Blake often chooses to describe repressed negative emotions, 
                                                
20 Blake predates such a psychoanalytic interpretation of familial relationship Sigmund Freud 
later elaborates. That is, a male must withdraw his infant love for his mother and project it to 
another woman. Only by doing so can he complete a positive Oedipus process and 
construct his subjectivity in society. In “To Tirzah” in the Songs of Experience, the speaker 
repeats Jesus’s famous dismissal of his mother, who “Didst bind my Nostrils Eyes & Ears” 
and “close my Tongue in senseless clay,” by saying relentlessly: “Then what have I to do with 
thee?” (CPPB 30). The poem suggests that only by severing the earthly bond with the 
mother can Jesus establish his subjectivity as the saviour for the entire humanity. It is difficult 
to determine Blake’s attitude toward the archetype of mother in Christianity though, which 
usually represents corporeality and mortality.   
21 It is also an inversion of what Jesus says in the Gospel of Matthew: “Take, eat; this is my 
body . . . Drink ye all of it; For it is my blood” (Mat 26: 26). 
22 According to A Concordance to the Writings of William Blake edited by Erdman, Blake 
uses the word “issue” and its variants for thirty-five times, while “vomit” is used only for three 
times. 
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such as anger and jealousy in “The Poison Tree” of the Songs of Experience 
and Visions of the Daughter of Albion: “poison from the desart wilds, from the 
eyes of the envier” (4.11 CPPB 48). The serpent throws out his poison—the 
abject material with the connotation of destructive human mentality—in a 
convulsive manner that approximates to sexual ecstasy. Such an inclusion of 
violence and eroticism into religious ritual is what Bataille deems the essence 
of the sacred. In this scene, Blake presents a convulsive, “forcd & forcd & 
forcd,” ejaculation of abject fluid, which ought to be contained inside the 
body, upon religious objects. With this image, Blake insinuates the mutually 
inclusive ideas of the sacred and the erotic. As Bataille also observes, both 
sex and religious sacrifice “reveal the flesh” and the interior of the body: 
“Sacrifice replaces the ordered life of the animal with a blind convulsion of its 
organs. So also with the erotic convulsion; it gives free rein to extravagant 
organs whose blind activity goes on beyond the considered will of the lovers” 
(Erotism 92). Moreover, Bataille proposes that the transgression of 
prohibitions illumines sexual acts “with a religious glow” (The Tears of Eros 
66). From this perspective, Blake’s violation of the Eucharist also underlines 
the significance of violently transgressing bodily boundary in order to achieve 
an essential sacred/erotic experience. 
     Witnessing this ritual spectacle, the speaker “turnd into a sty / And laid 
me down among the swine.” This action is commonly interpreted as a 
disgusted reaction to the defilement—the pollution of the bread and the wine. 
However, if the speaker’s reaction is of sheer disgust and repugnance, why 
does he take the specific action of lying down among the swine, instead of 
simply showing his opposition to or attempting to stop the serpent’s 
defilement? The speaker’s final action—lying down among the swine—is an 
action of bestiality and dehumanisation, which are considered obscene in 
eighteenth-century religious treatises on heathen cults especially Dionysus’s 
orgiastic ritual. Also, one of the definitions of “sty” in the Oxford English 
Dictionary is an “abode of bestial lust, or of moral pollution generally” (“sty, 
n3”). “Sty” in such a meaning has been adopted by writers, including 
Shakespeare, Milton, and Burke, to describe the indulgence in excessive 
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sensual pleasure. Blake’s word choice of “sty” not only serves the rhyming, 
but also reflects this specific metaphorical usage. The speaker forsakes his 
identity as a human being, positioning himself with animals in “a sty,” a realm 
of obscene sexuality. If the speaker is abhorred by the serpent’s defilement, it 
will be difficult to explicate his action in the last two lines. In other words, the 
speaker does not turn away because he is disgusted or disillusioned by the 
serpent’s action. On the contrary, the causal conjunction “So” suggests that 
he is “propelled” by the serpent’s defilement of the religious objects, which 
“enlightens” the speaker that the access into sacredness requires the 
transgression of boundaries.23 He turns to a sty and lie down with the swine 
in an attempt to emulate the transgression, in order to enter the sphere of the 
sacred.  
     A crossing from the profane world to the sacred world is not impossible. 
But it requires a transformation: a becoming that entails abandoning a 
subject’s previous identity. According Durkheim, this is the process of a “true 
metamorphosis,” when the previous identity “ceases to exist and is 
instantaneously replaced by another” and is eventually “reborn in a new 
form” (39). What Blake presents in the last stanza, is therefore the speaker’s 
drastic alteration of his subjectivity by transgressing the boundary between 
men and beasts and by forsaking his self as a human being. This action of 
self-annihilation is inspired by the serpent’s alternative ritual of defilement: 
the transgression of bodily boundary and the borderline between the sacred 
and the erotic. The entire “I saw a chapel all of gold” is a series of 
transgressions of boundaries and prohibition, which develop into a climax of 
self-annihilation in the final stanza, signifying the access to sacredness 
through self-shattering eroticism. 
     From the above analysis of “I saw a chapel all of gold,” we can elicit an 
understanding of Blake’s unconventional view of religious sacredness, whose 
inclusion of highly heterogeneous aspects of sexuality—uncleanness, 
violence, excrement, and dehumanisation—forms a unique aesthetic 
                                                
23 Gleckner is therefore partially right by arguing that “[r]ather than ‘disgust’ or 
‘disillusionment,’ the speaker experiences a revelation, an enlightenment” (46). 
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phenomenon. For Blake, if there is a true Christian belief that human beings 
should be in pursuit of, it must involve sexual desires of even the most 
“obscene” kinds, which run counter to the eighteenth-century moral 
sensitivity. For Blake, “Poetic Genius” is “Universal Man,” from which 
religious belief is derived (All Religions are One, CPPB 3); it is the “spiritual 
body” and “Human form divine” walking “Amidst the lustful fires” (America, 
CPPB 54) that Blake aspires to. Such a trinity of art, sacredness, and 
eroticism predates Bataille’s idea of “religious eroticism” —l’érotisme sacré—
in which human beings “take God’s place, to become God oneself” 
(Richardson 32).24 By approaching the textual context of the poem and 
involving the theorisations of eroticism, uncleanness, the abject, and 
sacredness by Durkheim, Douglas, Kristeva, and Bataille, this section has 
offered a more refined set of interpretations than Mitchell’s sensational and 
oversimplified comments on Blake’s obscenity that he “was filthy with work 
and visionary conviction” and “could wipe his ass on the poem of a 
competitor and compare the shadows in Ruben’s paintings to excrement” 
(414). Blake’s obscenity, as demonstrated in “I saw a chapel all of gold,” is 
not only a deliberate degradation of institutionalised Christianity. It is also a 
subtle and complex exploration of the essence of religion based on 
scared/erotic experience. As my reading of this poem in the Notebook has 
settled a critical basis for Blake’s obscenity, I will move forward to examine 
Blake’s major works that is subject to the issue. The following sections will 
focus on Visions of the Daughters of Albion and Milton: a Poem. By paying 
specific attention to the motifs of autoeroticism and transsexuality, I will 
further explicate the “obscene” erotic subject in Blake’s poetry.  
 
 
                                                
24 The concept of “inner experience,” which contains religious sacredness and sexual 
ecstasy, is significant in Bataille’s philosophy. The book with the same title of the concept 
Inner Experience written in 1943 is one of the three books included in a volume that Bataille 
names La Somme athéologique. As Leslie Anne Boldt points out, Bataille devises such a title 
to contrast it with Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae because “Inner Experience is a 
treatise which resonates with the absence of God” (ix). It is interesting to juxtapose Blake’s 
concept of “human form divine” and “God becomes as we are, that we may be as he is” with 
Bataille’s idea that in the sacred experience the human subject is freed from his/her profane 
identity and becomes a god him/herself, because in fact there is no God.  
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DEATH, VIOLENCE, AND AUTUEROTICISM  
IN VISIONS OF THE DAUGHTERS OF ALBION 
      
     Written and engraved in 1793, Visions of the Daughters of Albion has 
generated some of the fiercest debates in Blake studies. Oothoon—“the soft 
soul of America” (1.3)—is raped by Bromion during the journey to her lover, 
Theotormon. After the assault, Theotormon chains “the adulterate pair / 
Bound back to back” (2.4-5) and immerses himself in jealousy and despair.25 
A number of passages continuously incite critical disputes about sexuality in 
Blake’s works: Bromion’s presumptuous boast about his possession of 
Oothoon as a property and his condemnation of the rape victim as a harlot, 
Oothoon’s self-punishment in a desperate attempt to regain Theotormon’s 
love, and her aspiration to capture “girls of mild silver” for her lover’s 
promiscuous pleasure. The poem is not only an allegorical account of 
plantation slavery, but also a psychological observation of the consequences 
of rape. These consequences make a great impact on the male violator, the 
female victim, and the victim’s male partner.  
     Early criticism of Visions includes Erdman’s historical interpretation in 
Prophet against Empire and Frye’s archetypal study in Fearful Symmetry. 
Erdman’s study, as Jon Mee puts it, “offered the first thoroughgoing account 
of Blake’s deep involvement with his own time” (Dangerous Enthusiasm 1), 
and the later historical criticism is more or less under his influence. Erdman’s 
reading of Visions generally concerns Blake’s allusions to the contemporary 
abolitionist movements; in the interrelationship between Oothoon, 
Theotormon, and Bromion, he discerns the institution of plantation slavery 
and the English response to it. From this perspective, Bromion represents 
contemporary slave owners, who usually raped and impregnated slaves to 
enhance their commodity value, as Mary Lynn Johnson and John E. Grant 
note (BPD 59). Also, the character alludes to the Antijacobin politicians such 
as Burke and Lord Abingdon, who disapproved the abolition bill in 
Parliament. Theotormon, the powerless husband of the violated Oothoon, 
                                                
25 From Erdman’s edition (abbreviated as CPPB), the text of Visions is indicated by plate 
and line numbers in parenthesis. 
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stands for the weak-minded English abolitionists, who were constantly 
frustrated by the domestic conservatism. Within this historical scope, the 
issue of Oothoon’s sexuality and her mental state as a rape victim are 
overlooked. Her subsequent imagined self-punishment (of calling 
Theotormon’s eagle to rent her breast) and her vision of Theotormon’s 
promiscuous sex with multiple women are sublimated as “sparks of 
Promethean fire or winged thoughts calculated to widen his [Theotormon] 
brow” (Erdman 241).  
     Different from Erdman’s approach, Frye regards Visions as a 
continuation of The Book of Thel. The poem, as he proposes, “illustrates the 
failure to unite the state of experience with that of innocence” (Fearful 
Symmetry 238). This failure is actualised in marriage system that is regulated 
by morality and religion. In this limited state such as the union between 
Theotormon and Oothoon, innocent love “so easily turns into a jealous 
possessiveness rationalized by a priggish morality” (241). In Frye’s 
archetypal analysis, the triangular relationship between the three characters 
in Visions is a variant of the adulterous love between Lancelot and Guinevere 
and their conflict with King Arthur. This pattern, as Frye argues, is 
recapitulated later in Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter. While recognising 
Oothoon as “a fully developed imagination,” Frye does not elaborate how 
Oothoon achieves this state through her trial in terms of sexuality. Damon 
echoes Frye’s point that Oothoon “denounces the loveless marriage…also 
the selfish and envious husband” and “reaches the stage of spiritual 
rebellion” (438). For him, the heroine’s final vision of promiscuity is “the 
sanctity of the individual” and “the freedom of true love” (438). We can 
perceive that early critics tend to sublimate Blake’s rendering of sexuality in 
Visions. They generally focus on the poem’s reflection of historical events 
and its resonance with other literary archetypes and patterns. The possible 
images and motifs of obscenity in this poem, such as masturbation, 
masochism, and promiscuity, and Blake’s complicated treatments of them, 
are left unnoticed or deliberately shunned in earlier critical work.  
     Later critics have cast doubts upon Frye’s assertion that Blake’s corpus 
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“not only belongs to a unified scheme but is in accord with a permanent 
structure of ideas” (Fearful Symmetry 14). Such doubts are often related to 
the issue of sexuality. Alicia Ostriker identifies four different Blakes of 
different attitudes toward sexuality: the Blake as an advocate of sexual desire 
against religious and moral repression, the Blake “who depicts sexual life as 
a complex web of gender complementarities and interdependencies,” the 
Blake who deems sex a dangerous trap of seduction and degeneration, and 
the sexist and misogynist Blake who sees “female principle as subordinate to 
the male” (560). Although Ostriker argues against Frye’s unilateral reading by 
showing Blake’s inconsistency, her discussion of Visions still conforms to the 
early critics’ interpretations. That is, she takes Visions as an example of the 
first Blake—the defender of free love—arguing that Oothoon “defines and 
defends her sexuality,” “attacks patriarchal ideology,” and “outflanks everyone 
in her poem for intellectuality and spirituality” (564). Ostriker’s reading still 
shows the tendency to sublimate sexuality in Blake’s works—a tendency that 
is pervasive in early critical discussions by Erdman, Frye and Damon.  
     Anne K. Mellor’s essay “Sex, Violence, and Slavery: Blake and 
Wollstonecraft” re-examines Blake’s attitude toward contemporary slavery 
institution. In the essay, she elicits the poet’s controversial perception of 
gender equality proposed in Wollstonecraft’s works. Mellor first discusses 
John Gabriel Stedman’s The Narrative of a Five Years Expedition against the 
Revolted Negroes of Surinam, whose relation to Visions has been 
recognised by Erdman and David Bindman. Mellor refutes the two scholars’ 
notion that Stedman was a downright advocate of the abolition as he claims 
in The Narrative. She then doubts Blake’s (as one of the illustrators of The 
Narrative) attitude toward plantation slavery and female subjugation to men. 
Stedman’s condescending sympathy for the black slaves insinuates his white 
and Christian superiority. Similarly, Blake in Visions assimilates female 
liberation of sexual intuition into the gratification of male desire. For Mellor, 
Oothoon’s problematic self-punishment and her vision of promiscuous 
enjoyment for Theotormon are representations “condoning the continuation 
of female slavery under a benevolent master” (“Sex, Violence, and Slavery” 
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369). These representations identify “the female as a procurer of love and 
sexual gratification” that is exclusive for men (369). Mellor’s analysis of 
Visions continues her critical position in her earlier Romanticism and Gender. 
In this monograph, she maintains that even though Blake advocates sexual 
liberation for both men and women, he “shared his culture’s denigration of 
the feminine gender” and “consistently portrayed the female—as a poetic 
metaphor, as a set of human activities, and as a visual image—as secondary 
to the male” (Romanticism and Gender 22). Mellor exposes the negative 
aspects of Blake’s sexual ideology. Early critics tend to neglect this negativity, 
as they often uncritically incorporate sexual desire into Blake’s unified 
poetic/mythical system and neutralise it as a part of his symbolism of political 
and religious liberations. Nevertheless, even though Mellor has pointed out 
the crucial deficit about sexuality in early Blake studies, the obscene images 
and motifs in Visions remain marginalised and unaccounted for.   
     Diana Hume George’s 1980 Blake and Freud is perhaps the first study 
that regards sexuality as a primary issue in Visions. Referring to Freud’s 
theorisation of infantile sexuality and the familial/cultural interferences, 
George argues that both Freud and Blake are aware of the conflict between 
human sexual instinct and the establishment of social norms. This conflict 
results in the tragic marriage of Theotomon and Oothoon in Visions—a 
relationship afflicted by “[j]ealousy and aggression in the male, resentment 
and frigidity in the female” (George 131). She then compares the different 
approaches that Blake and Freud take to address the situation in which 
sexual desire encounters social and cultural configurations. For Freud, 
sexual drives must undergo proper sublimation to prevent them from 
threatening social stability. Unlike the psychoanalyst, Blake does not consider 
sex “antagonistic to the intellect” (George 144). Furthermore, he values sex 
as a key to “build genuinely human cities and create fully realized 
relationships” (144). George’s analysis of Visions pays specific attention to 
Blake’s treatments of sexual activities that are excluded from normal 
heterosexual and phallic-centred mechanism, such as masturbation and 
fetishism that focus on bodily parts other than reproductive organs. Her 
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critical approach with Freud’s psychoanalytical theories offers a way to 
explore heterogeneous forms of sexual desire that is often concealed in the 
unconscious.  
     In more recent studies of Visions, the two articles by Bethan Stevens 
and Caroline Jackson-Houlston collected in Queer Blake (2010) tackle the 
unconventional sexual orientations in this poem. Focusing on Theotormon’s 
status as a victim, Stevens proposes that the Daughters of Albion are the 
spectators of a potential male-on-male rape. Blake’s treatment of the 
wronged husband “transforms the conventional image of imperialism from a 
tired trope of heterosexual conquest, to a queer and challenging vision of 
omnisexual abuse” (Stevens 150). As Stevens concludes, the violation of a 
man by another man cannot be articulated in the abolition literature at the 
time, and it is the very reason of Theotormon’s impotence and 
inarticulateness in the entire incident. Jackson-Houlston focuses first on 
Oothoon’s plucking of the Marygold-nymph at the beginning of the poem. 
She argues that the episode represents “a consensual and co-sensual 
enjoyment of sexuality between two female figures” (Jackson-Houlston 154). 
The lesbian love, in her view, embodies Blake’s dismissal of male 
aggressiveness in conventional heterosexual intercourse and his embrace of 
positive “forms of female sexuality that do not involve penile penetration” 
(161). Both Stevens and Jackson-Houlston approach the poem by adopting 
“queering” – an analytical method with which “the paradigms of 
heteronormativity are resisted/undermined” (Mills 2). Indeed, this “queering” 
critical position sheds light on the unexplored aspects of sexuality in Visions, 
demonstrating that Blake is open to sexual possibilities that were excluded 
by social norms and marital institution.   
     Though the queer reading of Visions unveils certain “abnormal” 
sexualities in Blake’s time, it still conforms to Richard Sha’s viewpoint that 
Romantic sexual perversions aesthetically envision an ideal erotic love based 
on mutual affection and pleasure. My examination of Visions contrasts with 
this positive evaluation of sex, as well as the sublimation in the earlier critical 
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work. Focusing on the more “negative” aspects of sexuality,26 I would argue 
that in Visions, Blake’s treatment of the relationship between Oothoon, 
Bromion, and Theotormon presents both textually and visually the aesthetics 
of violence. This heterogeneous aesthetics reflects the concept of obscenity 
in the eighteenth century as an alternative sacred/erotic experience of self-
annihilation.27 Under the cover of more justifiable symbolism of sex that calls 
for liberation, Blake introduces his fascination with the obscene. To achieve 
this Blake first draws upon Erasmus Darwin’s scientific poetics of plants to 
design Oothoon’s plucking of the Marygold as a potentially violent sexual 
experience that approximates to death. Second, with the possible influences 
from Samuel-Augueste Tissot and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, he presents 
Theotormon’s and Oothoon’s autoerotic fantasy after the rape that 
disintegrates their identities and generates self-shattering masochist 
pleasure. All these representations of erotic subjects attest to the 
conceptualisation of obscenity as a unique aesthetic phenomenon of self-
annihilation.28  
                                                
26 My position here is partly inspire by Bataille’s idea that poetry and eroticism are both the 
negative energy in human mentality. Bataille once claims, “It seems to me true poetry was 
reached only by hatred. Poetry had no powerful meaning except in the violence of revolt” 
(The Impossible 10). Furthermore, Bataille proposes that poetry, eroticism, and religion all 
share the same quality: a “relentless pursuit of the self-dissolving negative experience of 
ecstasy” (Biles and Brintnall 1). 
27 Marcus Wood also pays attention to the violent artistic representations in Visions. In 
Slavery, Empathy, and Pornography, he discusses Stedman’s The Narrative and Blake’s 
illustrations of it and argues that “late eighteenth-century English culture was producing 
mainstream publications depicting the black body in pornographic ways” (93). And the 
images of black slaves’ tortured bodies are reproduced in Visions in the similar pornographic 
manner. 
28 In Blake’s system, the Self or Selfhood denotes the Satanic/Urizenic facet of human 
psyche—an evil tendency to abstract and rationalize the outer world perceived by senses 
and an alienated masculine persona of the Spectre—that falls into self-righteousness, 
jealousy, and tyranny on the Moral Laws and the Ten Commandments. The aggrandisement 
of the Selfhood obstructs poetic imagination and disintegrates the “Universal Man,” creating 
a fallen world of oppression. Self-annihilation, therefore, is a key process that human beings 
have to undergo in order to restore the primary divinity, to “regain the Paradise,” a state that 
reintegrates both the masculine and the feminine—“sexless in the sense that it is undivided” 
(Tayler 250). In Milton, Milton, as the greatest precursor of Blake, recognizes his Selfhood as 
Satan/Urizen and strives to annihilate it with a gesture of breaking his own name on the title 
page and by descending to “Eternal Death” to reconcile with his feminine aspect, “his Sixfold 
Emanation scatter’d thro’ the deep / In torment” (2.19-20, CPPB 96). In Jerusalem, Jesus’s 
sacrifice epitomizes the concept of self-annihilation; it is a “redemption through death and 
the annihilation of the righteous selfhood” (McGann, “The Aim of Blake’s Prophecies” 10) 
and “a voluntary death of the old man and a waking of the new” (18). In short, the process of 
Blakean self-annihilation is a synthesis of religious epiphany, poetic inspiration, and a 
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     At the beginning of Visions, the motto on the title page declares: “The 
Eye sees more than the Heart knows” (CPPB 45). At first glance, this line 
reminds us of Blake’s re-evaluation of body-soul dualism in The Marriage of 
Heaven and Hell, in which body, or the material world, “is a portion of Soul 
discerned by the five Senses” (CPPB 34). The superiority of the Eye over the 
Heart indicates Blake’s emphasis on bodily sensuality, with which human 
beings can aspire to a higher level of imagination and create poetic and 
artistic visions. As Johnson and Grant point out, in Blake “the source of 
spiritual power and authority is the human imagination, nourished by the 
delights of the senses but unconfined by the world they perceive” (BPD 3). 
Eroticism – the sexual delight unrestrained by reproductive obligation and 
religious abstinence – is also based on bodily sensations. In Europe: a 
Prophecy, Blake illustrates the five senses as the “Five windows” that “light 
the carvern’d Man”: a sense to see, a sense to smell, a sense to hear, a 
sense to taste, and finally a sense to touch. With the five senses, a human 
being can relish erotic ecstasy, in which “himself pass out what time he 
please, but he will not; / For stolen joys are sweet, & bread eaten in secret 
pleasant” (iii.4-5 CPPB 60). Recapitulating the same theme, the motto of 
Visions “clearly establishes the primacy of vision over the limited awareness 
of the natural heart” according to Harold Bloom’s note (CPPB 900). It foretells 
the sexual struggles of Oothoon and Theotormon torn between bodily 
pleasure and spiritual/moral constraints in their hearts. As the plot of Visions 
unfolds, Oothoon’s and Theotormon’s attempt to free themselves from such a 
dichotomy with a series of problematic actions of obscenity—masochist 
soliciting, autoerotic fantasy, and voyeuristic promiscuity. Blake’s poetic and 
                                                
harmonious reunion between the two sexes.  
     However, in Blake’s representation of the erotic interactions between men and women, 
both textual and visual, the concept of self-annihilation does not always announce a 
unilaterally positive tenet of selfless sacrifice “that is echoed in every kindness any man 
performs for another” (Doskow 164). As this chapter will show, aside from being a central 
factor of Blake’s revisionist Christian system of the “human form divine,” self-annihilation is a 
major source of eroticism in Blake’s portrayal of unconventional sexual orientations. Self-
annihilation as an erotic phenomenon is empowered by the violent alteration of human 
subjectivity and dissolution of pre-existing identity, social and biological. Blake’s designs of 
Oothoon and Theotormon in Visions exemplify this alternative aspect of self-annihilation.  
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visual depictions of these motifs insinuate a unique form of sexual pleasure 
that combines bodily sensations and psychological manipulations.     
      At the beginning of the poem, Oothoon’s subjectivity is already 
problematic even before she is raped by Bromion. In the Argument, Oothoon 
confesses her faltering self-perception of love. Though she loves Theotormon 
and “was not ashamed,” a radical declaration in a cultural milieu that often 
prohibited female expression of sexual desire (Bruder 74). Even though she 
courageously articulates her love for Theotormon, she trembles in “virgin 
fears” and conceals herself “in Leutha’s vale” (iii.2-4). Oothoon’s nameless 
“virgin fear” soon becomes “woe,” in which she wanders “Along the vales of 
Leutha seeking flowers to comfort her” (1.3-4).29 Oothoon’s “woe,” 
corresponding to Blake’s frequent usage of the word in other poems such as 
“When early morn walks forth in sober grey” in Poetical Sketches and “The 
Angel” in the Songs of Experience, connotes the self-repression of sexual 
desire and the consequent emotions of negativity. The “woe” thus represents 
the virgin heroine’s sexual frustration—her “virgin fears”—which is due to her 
lover Theotormon’s impotence and his conservative attitude toward sex in 
marriage, deriving from the Christian ideology that even in marriage, the 
solitary purpose of sex is to procreate, not to seek pleasure—a condition 
aptly indicated in Lady Sarah Cowper’s eighteenth-century diary, in which 
she “reckon [her] Self a Mirror of Chastity, Even beyond the most intact 
virgin, for to Conceive four Children without knowing what it is to have an 
unchaste thought or Sensual pleasure” (qtd. in Kugler 313). Against the virtue 
of chastity in orthodox Christianity, Blake does not consider virginity a 
passive status quo to be protected and preserved. For him, virginity is an 
active state aspiring to embrace sexual desire in myriad forms. Thus, 
Oothoon’s “woe” represents her sexual aspiration obstructed by 
                                                
29 Bethan Stevens underlines the difference between Oothoon’s “sign” and “woe” at the end 
of the poem: “The Daughters of Albion hear her woes, & eccho back her sighs” (8.13, CPPB 
51). He argues that while “woe” is entirely negative, “sigh” denotes a positive aspiration 
despite the subject’s present misery. The division between “sign” and “woe,” according to 
Stevens, is associated with the late eighteenth-century abolition poetry, in which “woe” is 
often used to describe the desperate status of slaves, but “sigh” is used to express the 
English spectators’ sympathetic (sometime erotic) sentiments for the slaves. 
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social/religious conventions and unimaginative sexual normalcy.  
     Driven by her “virgin fear” and “woe,” Oothoon converses with and 
plucks “the bright Marygold of Leutha’s Vale” (1.5). This episode is commonly 
interpreted as her initiation to sexual love. Damon and Mellor both read the 
Marygold as Oothoon’s female genital, with which she equips herself to 
consummate with Theotormon. From another perspective, Nancy Moore 
Goslee interprets the plucking as a foretelling of the rape, because “the 
marigold seems an exuberant smaller version of [Oothoon] herself” (106). In 
Helen P. Bruder’s view, the plucking is Oothoon’s self-deflowering, a form of 
female masturbation that enables “her own potential for multiple and 
recurrent orgasm” and certifies Blake’s “validation of a woman’s right to 
pleasure herself (75). Jackson-Houlston values the plucking as Blake’s 
positive depiction of lesbian love of mutual consensus. In addition, the sexual 
dynamics in plants here is reminiscent of Erasmus Darwin’s The Loves of the 
Plants (1789). Under the cover of botanic science, Darwin employs floral 
images and their interspecific eroticism to present myriad sexual relations 
that are free from conventional institute of marriage, with “a fascination with 
hybridity” and the “illicit loves” (Connolly, “Flowery Form” 604). Early scholars 
have noted Darwin’s influences on Blake. Erdman recognises that The Book 
of Thel is “Pictorially and metaphorically . . . a counterpart” of Darwin’s The 
Loves of the Plants (qtd. in King-Hele 36). Darwin’s humanisation of plants 
and their sexuality provides a highly imaginative module for Blake to present 
his poetic and visual designs. As Desmond King-Hele points out, the 
anthropomorphic form of Blake’s Marygold resembles “Darwin’s viewing of 
the amorous antics of the plants” (45).  
     The design of Plate iii shows Oothoon kneeling down with her hands 
around her breast, touched by the arm-stretching figure of the nymph (see 
Figure 1 on page 84). The light emitted from the Marygold is delineated by 
four radiating lines that go across the shining background. In such a visual 
display, alongside with Blake’s text, we can observe striking similarities with 
Darwin’s lines from Canto 4 of The Loves of the Plants: 
          . . . the sad Nymph uplift her dewy eyes, 
          Spread her white arms, and breathe her fervent sighs; 
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          Call’d to her fair associates, Youth, and Joy, 
          And shot all-radiant through glittering sky; (4.375-378)                                                            
In these lines, Darwin describes the plants whose flowers seem to emit light, 
including marigold, garden nasturtium, orange lily, and the Indian pink. He 
speculates that the shining is caused by certain electric activities in the 
plants, especially when a pistil is impregnated. Describing tropaeolum, 
another kind of shining flower, Darwin presents an erotic interaction between 
its eight stamens and one pistil:  
          The chaste TROPAEO leaves her secret bed; 
          A saint-like glory trembles round her head; 
          Eight watchful swains along the lawns of night 
          With amorous steps pursue the virgin light; 
          O’er her fair form the electric lustre plays (4.45-49)                                                            
In line with the tropaeolum in The Loves of the Plants, the shining Marygold 
that Oothoon encounters has an inborn sexuality that generates its glorious 
light illuminating the picture of Plate iii. Furthermore, the tropaeolum’s sexual 
quality is polyandrous, as several males consummate with one female, which 
subverts the conventional institution of monogamy. Connolly proposes that 
Darwin frequently italicizes numbers in The Loves of the Planes not only 
because numbers are significant in taxonomy, but also because they produce 
erotic thrills (“Flowery Porn” 606). In Visions, Blake recreates such Darwinian 
sexual multiplicity in plants, which leads to Oothoon’s promiscuous fantasy at 
the end of the poem, where Theotormon makes love with “girls of mild silver, 
or of furious gold” in “wanton play” and “lovely copulation” (7.24-25, CPPB 
50). In Blake studies, Oothoon’s aspiration for Theotormon’s promiscuous 
pleasure is often dismissed as Blake’s sexist assimilation of the female into 
the male-centered desire—Oothoon’s “slip-sliding away” into “an 
energetically ensnaring procuress” for men’s “harem fantasy” (Bruder 82). 
Despite this negative evaluation, Saree Makdisi reads this passage as a 
manifestation of Oothoon’s freedom from being “confined, objectified, and 
turned into a productive mechanism” and from “the confines of unitary 
selfhood, the pressures of jealousy and possession” (96-97). In the 
eighteenth century, polygamy had become a widely debated issue. As 
Faramerz Dabhoiwala points out in The Origins of Sex, the discourse on 
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polygamy flourished with the fundamentalist reading of the Bible (that justifies 
concubinage), the promotion of sexual freedom as part of the “natural law,” 
and the newly developed theory on demography. Reflecting this cultural 
debate on polygamy, Blake adopts the polyandrous anatomy of the flower in 
Darwin’s work to implant unconventional sexual desire in the Marygold and 
Oothoon.30 Such a form of desire is not only free from monogamy that aims 
solely at legitimate reproduction, but also explores the possibility of a woman 
having multiple husbands, a condition that is absent in the eighteenth-century 
debate on polygamy, in which only one man taking multiple wives is 
considered. 
     From this perspective, we can further determine that the Marygold 
signifies a form of sexual love that rebels against the one confined in 
marriage. Oothoon’s “woe” in the opening lines of the poem suggests that her 
marriage with Theotormon is already an unsatisfactory one concerning sex, 
even prior to the violent interference of Bromion. Therefore, Oothoon’s initial 
“virgin fear” and “woe” are also associated with Theotormon, who symbolizes 
obstructed desire that is “filld with care” (Milton 24: 12, CPPB 119)—sexual 
impotence and conservativism necessitated by religious and moral 
repression. Oothoon’s “woe” is aligned with the complicated sentiment of 
“pensive woe,” “bitter woe,” and “pleasing woe” in the earlier Poetic 
Sketches. Her “woe” consists of sexual frustration in an unhappy marriage 
that is alienated from diverse forms of sex. This is the reason that Oothoon 
seeks inspiration from the Marygold, who, with its Darwinian polyamory, a 
particularly woman-centred sexuality, provides the heroine the “comfort” that 
Theotormon is unable to offer.   
     Oothoon’s subsequent plucking of the Marygold is often read as the 
prelude to the following rape, as the word “pluck” itself, similar to the more 
                                                
30 Critics such as Marsha Keith Schuchard and Humberto Garcia have paid attention to 
Blake’s wish to have concubines. Schuchard attributes it to his early adherence to the 
doctrines of the Moravian church (234). Garcia, on the other hand, argues for the influences 
from Emmanuel Swedenborg’s thinking and the English translation of the Qur’an (36). In 
addition to religious influences, Darwin’s botanic poetics of plants might also inspire Blake’s 
desire for concubinage and his representation of unconventional sexual orientations in 
Visions. 
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specific “deflower,” culturally indicates a woman’s loss of virginity by a male 
violator. As Jackson-Houlson argues, it also embodies a positive lesbian love 
between Oothoon and the Marygold, which contrasts with heterosexual 
violence (exemplified by the rape by Bromion). In my reading, even though 
the plucking seems to be a sexual love based on mutual consent, a potential 
danger to the Marygold after such an action is hinted by Oothoon’s 
hesitation: “I dare not pluck thee from thy dewy bed!” (1.7). The nymph’s 
reply—“pluck thou my flower Oothoon the mild / Another flower shall spring” 
(1.8-9)—indicates that the action entails the death of the flower plucked, so 
that a new flower can be born. This conversation implies that sexual love, no 
matter in what form, causes drastic alteration of the participants’ mental and 
physical states. In other words, violence is the nature of eroticism, whose 
outcome is a simulative experience of death, la petite mort, “the small death,” 
a term used to describe “the sensation of orgasm as likened to death” 
according to the Oxford English Dictionary (“petite mort, n.”). Before Visions, 
Blake has already linked sex with death in the earlier The Book of Thel. 
When Thel enquires about the Cloud’s ephemeral life: “Why thou 
complainest not when in one hour thou fade away” (3.2 CPPB 4). The Cloud 
answers: “when I pass away, / It is to tenfold life, to love, to peace, and 
raptures holy” (3.10-11 CPPB 5-6). In this line, Blake again correlates 
eroticism with sacredness as both experiences of self-annihilation that 
approximates to death. However, death also leads to the enrichment of new 
lives: the Marygold’s new flower and the Cloud’s “tenfold life.” We can again 
approach the cycle of sex, death, and life in The Book of Thel and Visions 
with Bataille’s another conceptualisation of eroticism.  
     In the introduction of Erotism, Bataille first introduces the ideas of 
discontinuity and continuity of beings. Bataille believes that there is an 
unfathomable chasm between a human individual and another: “He is born 
alone, He dies alone. Between one being and another, there is a gulf, a 
discontinuity” (Erotism 12). To overcome the state of discontinuity, “they 
unite, and consequently a continuity comes into existence between them to 
form a new entity from the death and disappearance of the separate beings” 
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(Erotism 14). Thus, eroticism signifies a process in which individual human 
beings mentally forsake their identities and physically undergo an experience 
of death, in order to remove the chasm between them—from the state of 
discontinuity to continuity. Furthermore, the pursuit of the continuity of 
existence through eroticism is essentially a religious quest; “religious 
eroticism is bound up with seeking after God’s love” (Erotism 16). For 
Bataille, as well as for Blake, Christianity should be full of violent and erotic 
passion that is dismissed as obscene in moral conventions. Such an 
erotic/sacred experience is intrinsically violent, and “The most violent thing of 
all for us is death which jerks us out of a tenacious obsession with the 
lastingness of our discontinuous being” (Erotism 16).  
     Approaching Oothoon’s plucking of the Marygold with Bataille’s 
formulation, we can observe that violence is concealed in this action that 
appears gentle and harmless, and the nymph’s reply indicates its death and 
a new life. For Blake, sex is a form of “raptures holy,” a sacred sphere 
accessed through the death of individuals and the continuity that generates 
new lives—the “tenfold life” of the Cloud in The Book of Thel and “the soul of 
sweet delight” that “Can never pass away” of the Marygold in Visions. Blake’s 
design of the plucking shows his understanding of sexual experience as a 
process of violent changes of the participants’ subjectivity. Oothoon and the 
Marygold both undergo such drastic alterations in their sexual interaction of 
seemingly mutual consent. Blake not only resonates with Darwin’s The Loves 
of the Plants with the Marygold’s unconventional sexuality, but also 
anticipates Bataille’s idea of l’érotisme sacré by recognising violence as an 
essential element in sexual desire that shows a path into the sacred—the 
“raptures holy.” The violent nature of sex that drastically alters human 
individuals and disturbs subject-object order is also significant in Oothoon’s 
rape by Bromion. The rape will activate another process of violent changes of 
Oothoon’s and Theotormon’s subjectivities, in the form of autoeroticism.    
     Blake describes the rape in only two lines: “Bromion rent her with his 
thunders. on his stormy bed / Lay the faint maid, and soon her woes appalld 
his thunders hoarse” (1.16-17). The pictorial images of Visions do not show 
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the rape at all, but only its aftermath at the bottom of Plate 1, where the 
violator and the victim lie on stormy clouds.31 Oothoon is seen lying with her 
front body upward with both arms opened, exposing her “pure transparent 
breast” (2.16). One of her legs is shown curling perpendicularly and the other 
not shown, but judging from her posture we can speculate that the two are 
separate. In a similar posture, Bromion spreads his legs in an eerily 
triangular shape, displaying his pubic area with his genital unseen (see 
Figure 2 on page 85). With this depiction of the consequence of a rape, 
Blake diminishes the distinction between Bromion the violator and Oothoon 
the victim by presenting them equally immersed in a post-orgasmic stasis of 
residual pleasure. The disappearance of Bromion’s genital reinforces the 
idea that for Blake, sexual experience exerts drastic alternations upon 
participants, to the degree of self-annihilation. In other words, Blake’s design 
here neutralises the power relationship between the violator and the victim.  
     Therefore, Blake has Oothoon, to a certain degree, take pleasure in the 
violent sex, as Bromion claims that Oothoon represents the slaves who “are 
obedient,” “resist not,” “obey the scourge,” and “worship terrors and obey the 
violent” (1.22-23). Marcus Wood perceives in this passage a common 
stereotypical fantasy in modern pornography that female rape victims enjoy 
being violated. As Anna Clark’s historical tracing of rape shows, such a 
fantasy not only appears in modern pornography, but also in the late 
eighteenth-century libertine literature, inspired by the Enlightenment thinkers’ 
espousal of sexual desire as a supreme “nature.” Thus, the victim’s 
resistance is considered “coy acquiescence”—“if a woman says no she really 
means yes” (Clark 37). Echoing Clark’s observation, Bruder notices a 
“representation of sexually acquiescent orgasmic collapse” in Oothoon’s 
image, which reflects the archetypal portrayal of sexually victimized woman 
who “adores what is above her” in the late eighteenth-century art, especially 
Henry Fuseli’s works (70). Blake’s design, to some extent, is responsive to 
                                                
31 Some critics do not regard the two figures on Plate 1 as Oothoon and Bromion. For 
instance, Philippa Simpson sees the masculine one at the right-hand side as a woman 
opening her thighs to show her vulva, “splayed in a way commonly associated with the 
hardcore pussy shot” (215). Simpson takes this figure as an example of Blake’s 
representation of “sexy amputation” that attests to the pornographic propensity of Visions.  
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this literary context, when Bromion claims his ownership of Oothoon, 
physically and mentally, by suggesting that she does take pleasure in the 
rape. As critics such as Erdman maintain, Blake intends to criticise the 
contemporary slave owners with his characterisation of Bromion. However, 
Blake’s visual arrangement of the violator and the victim sharing a similar 
post-orgasmic complicates the poet’s attitude toward rape. The design is 
even more problematic after we have recognised that Oothoon’s plucking of 
the Marygold contains the ideas of promiscuous sex and erotic violence that 
approximates to death. In other words, her rape by Bromion fits the 
unconventional sexual quality that she acquires from the flower. The textual 
and visual designs of the plucking and the post-orgasmic scene on Plate 1 
seem to indicate that Oothoon’s “virgin fear” and “woe” somehow call for 
Bromion’s action. What Blake casts here is a question too provocative to be 
addressed: apart from Bromion’s claim as a common fantasy of rapists, if 
Oothoon truly feels sexual pleasure during the rape, should she be 
condemned as an accomplice and lose her justified position as an accuser? 
And a particular notion about sexuality hidden behind this question is the 
complete disparity between body and soul; to be more specific, Blake seems 
to suggest that despite mentally afflicted, a rape victim’s body can still be 
aroused by her violator, for whom she holds no love at all.  
     After the rape, Bromion declares: “Now thou maist marry Bromions 
harlot, and protect the child / Of Bromions rage, that Oothoon shall put forth 
in nine moons time” (2.1-2). As Johnson and Grant point out, this is a boast 
about how pregnancy enhances a female slave’s commodity value (BPD 59). 
Theotormon appears and “folded his black jealous waters round the 
adulterate pair / Bound back to back in Bromions caves terrors & meekness 
dwell” (2.4-5). This entire scene is engraved on the Frontispiece. Theotormon 
recoils his body with his two arms around his head, immersing himself in 
profound grief. Bromion and Oothoon are chained back to back; the former 
squats with a facial expression of astonishment, and the latter kneels with an 
emotionless look in her drooping face. Far in the background is a glaring sun 
among clouds, resembling a human eye—the reader’s voyeuristic 
 70 
spectatorship. According to Dennis M. Welch, Blake presents Theotormon as 
a self-claimed “offended party, now stripped of an enviable possession” who 
shows “self-concernment, self-righteousness, and possessiveness” (118). 
From another perspective, Philippa Simpson argues that this portrayal in the 
Frontispiece has an effect of “violation, not only of the body shown, but of the 
eye of the viewer, as its passage over the image is interrupted and unsettled” 
(215). She also notes the gender ambiguity in the three figures. The bodies 
of the recoiling Theotormon and the bound Oothoon and Bromion, as 
Simpson remarks, are depicted as isolated sexualised objects. The design 
shows the fetishism she terms “sexy amputation” in modern pornography. 
Blake’s images can indeed be interpreted as potential pornography. 
Furthermore, there emerges another significant complex in this visual 
representation of Theotormon other than self-righteousness and 
possessiveness: autoeroticism, which exemplifies the self-annihilating 
aesthetics of obscenity. 
     Reviewing Visions with a “queering” lens, Stevens pays attention to the 
line “storms rent Theotormons limbs; he rolld his waves around” (2.3). This 
line echoes Oothoon’s rape with the words “storms” and “rent,” thus 
indicating a “eroticized male-on-male violence” (147). Stevens’s approach 
materialises and sexualises Theotormon’s suffering, which has been 
understood as mental in previous Blake studies. My observation of Blake’s 
design of Theotormon is similar to his approach. Apart from his jealousy, 
grief, and despair, there is another mental complex hidden in Blake’s design 
of Theotormon’s posture in the Frontispiece (see Figure 3 on page 86). 
Theotormon’s legs form a bizarre triangular shape, which is almost identical 
to Bromion’s in Plate 1; both spread their legs to expose their pubic areas. 
The difference between the two figures is that Bromion’s upper body and 
right arm are also stretching open with his head facing upward, while 
Theotormon’s upper body recoils downward, with his face toward his own 
unseen genital and his arms encircling his head.  
     If the triangular image of spreading legs represents a post-orgasmic 
state, Bromion’s open posture suggests that he is sexually interacting with 
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others, projecting his desire outwards. The image of Theotormon has the 
same post-orgasmic undertone, but the enclosed posture of his upper body, 
formed by the drooping head and interlocking arms, is the opposite of 
Bromion’s open one. Bromion’s openness indicates an outward projection of 
sexual desire, while Theotormon’s enclosure denotes an inward self-
projection, through which he directs his desire back to himself. Thus, 
Theotormon’s posture can be conceived as a representation of autoeroticism, 
in Freud’s words, “the libido-cathexis” retracted from the exterior world to 
focus on the subject’s own self and body (“On the Introduction of Narcissism” 
5). The withdrawal of sexual desire from others to self is caused by extreme 
mental distress, which Freud later illustrates as melancholia: “a profoundly 
painful depression, a loss of interest in the outside world, the loss of ability to 
love, the inhibition of any kind of performance and a reduction in the sense of 
self, expressed in self-recrimination and self-directed insults, intensifying into 
the delusory expectation of punishment” (“Mourning and Melancholia” 204). 
As the aftermath of his lover’s rape, Theotormon’s static image on the 
Frontispiece consists of the enclosed upper body of libido-withdrawal and the 
triangular lower body of autoerotic self-projection. The passage on Plate 2 
following the binding of “the adulterate pair” also presents Theotormon’s 
mental state of the Freudian melancholia and autoeroticism. The description 
of “Theotormon sits wearing the threshold hard” (2.6) reinforces the sense of 
his “inhibition of performance,” and the phrase “secret tears” stresses the 
unnameable nature of his distress. Furthermore, Theotormon’s imagined self-
flagellation on Plate 6 anticipates “the delusory expectation of punishment” in 
the symptoms of Freudian melancholia. 
     In his discussion, Freud distinguishes pathological melancholia from 
normal mourning. Although both mental conditions are caused by the loss of 
love-object, in mourning this sense of loss is conscious/presentable, while in 
melancholia it is unconscious/unpresentable. This distinction brings forth the 
key element of melancholia: “an extraordinary reduction in self-esteem, a 
great impoverishment of the ego” (“Mourning and Melancholia” 205). In 
Theotormon’s case, he cannot undergo the normal process of mourning and 
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regain his ability to interact with the outside world, because what he truly 
loses is not Oothoon as a love-object, but his selfhood and social identity as 
a heterosexual lover/husband. Theotormon’s impotence or refusal to have 
premarital sex in his conjugal relationship with Oothoon causes her early 
“woes” and indirectly results in her rape by Bromion. The loss of self-esteem 
and positive identity due to sexual inability is, for Theotormon, unnameable, 
and this is the reason for his immobilisation and self-enclosure. But in this 
state of withdrawal, Theotormon channels his libido, “the burning fires / Of 
lust” (2.9-10), into his own autoerotic lower body by emulating Bromion’s 
post-orgasmic posture on Plate 1. That is, after recognising Oothoon’s 
possible pleasure in the rape, he attempts to identify with Bromion’s sexual 
potency and violence, further shattering his identity as a loving husband in 
this autoerotic experience of self-annihilation.     
     Blake’s view of autoeroticism in Visions has been addressed in 
scholarly discussions. Critics generally focus on Oothoon’s latter 
denouncement of such a behaviour as an unhealthy outcome of sexual 
repression by religious doctrines—“the rewards of continence” and “The self 
enjoyings of self denial” (7.8-9). Christopher Hobson maintains that Blake 
regards masturbation as an unconventional sexual behaviour that stands for 
liberation (Blake and Homosexuality 36), while Richard Sha refutes Hobson 
by highlighting its conflict with Blake’s ideal of mutual affection in sexual 
interactions between individuals (204-205). But Blake’s autoerotic design of 
Theotormon on the Frontispiece and Plate 1 has not attracted much critical 
attention. As the above analysis with Freud’s discourse on melancholia 
shows, Theotormon’s autoeroticism is triggered by his unnameable loss of 
self-esteem and social identity as a husband due to his sexual impotence, 
which forms his enclosure and withdrawal from the external world. His lower 
body, on the other hand, emulates Bromion’s post-orgasmic posture. By 
secretly identifying the rapist’s violence, the autoerotic Theotormon 
undergoes the obscene process of self-annihilation.  
     Viewed from the perspective of contemporary discourse on 
masturbation, Blake’s design here also resonates with Samuel-August 
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Tissot’s 1760 treatise An Essay on Onanism, or a Treatise upon the 
Disorders produced by Masturbation: or the Dangerous Effects of Secret and 
Excessive Venery, whose popularity in Blake’s time has been certified in 
scholarly works (Jordanova 70). With two English translations published 
respectively in 1766 and 1772, it is highly possible that Blake knew or read 
Tissot’s notable treatise that shapes the negative view of masturbation in 
following decades. Tissot’s account of masturbation is based on a central 
idea of “animal economy” that generally consists of the processes of “waste” 
and “reparation.” These two processes are actualised by the generation, 
circulation, and consumption of humours. In Tissot’s work, there is a 
hierarchy of humours in terms of their importance in the body. After pointing 
out that milk is much more dispensable than blood, he emphasises the 
crucial status of semen: “the loss of an ounce of this humour would weaken 
more than that of forty ounces of blood” (10). If such a loss occurs in 
“unnatural” ways, the ill consequences are even more severe. For example, 
seminal issue in conjugal intercourse does less damage to the body than that 
from sexual intercourse with prostitutes; nocturnal emission is less harmful 
than masturbation, because the former happens unconsciously, while the 
latter is a deliberate behaviour of unrestrained lust. Apparently, Tissot’s 
scientific treatise is tinged with moral sensitivity. This ideology is also 
reflected in John Armstrong’s 1742 poetic essay Oeconomy of Love, where 
masturbation is dismissed as “ungenerous, selfish, solitary Joy” and 
“Unhallow’d pastime” that will “shed they Blossoms thro’ desert air, / And sow 
they perish’d Off-spring in the wind” (7-8). As one of the most “unnatural” 
ways to lose semen, masturbation not only damages the body, but also 
causes the masturbator’s mental catastrophe. In additional to physical 
symptoms such as weakened sight, pimples, underweight, and fatigue, 
masturbation will weaken “all the bodily senses and all the faculties of the 
soul” and result in 
          the loss of imagination and memory; and imbecility, contempt,    
          shame, ignominy; . . . the humiliating character of being an     
          useless load upon the earth; . . . a distaste for all decent  
          pleasures; lassitude, an aversion for others, and at  
          length for self; life appears horrible; the dread which every 
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          moment starts at suicide; anguish worse than pain; remorse, 
          which daily increases; . . . and serves as eternal punishment— 
          a fire that is never extinguished. (Tissot 126) 
                                               
Ludmilla Jordanova detects in this passage the impacts of masturbation upon 
a man’s self-recognition and social identification. In Tissot’s view, 
masturbation signifies the utter loss of one’s sense of identity as a social 
being, becoming “an useless load upon the earth.” Despite this negative 
effect, Jordanova points out that Tissot’s description “suggests an element of 
pleasure derived from the recounting of pain and misery of others” (75). In 
other words, Tissot’s style of writing about sexuality invites readers to 
imagine the masturbator’s situation—the lust he indulges himself in, and the 
dreadful consequences he has to suffer—and take pleasure in this process 
of imagination. That is, Tissot’s description renders masturbation, frequently 
called “the feats” in the treatise, not only frightening but also perversely 
attractive. The unique pleasure of masturbation is also highlighted by 
contemporary botanist Bellenden Ker, who claims that “there is more 
pleasure in frigging one’s self, considered in merely a sensual way” than 
having sex with women (qtd. in Dabhoiwala 178). 
     In Tissot’s treatise, the mental mechanism in masturbation consists of 
the self-annihilating process of forsaking one’s social identity and its 
“function” and “purposefulness.” The masturbator belittles himself in 
humiliation and shame, which are blended with the bodily pleasure, and 
obtains an obscene sensation of masochism. To sum up, despite listing 
meticulously the fearful pathological damages masturbation causes on the 
body, Tissot’s writing, perhaps unconsciously, indicates that such an 
“unnatural” and obscene behaviour grants the doer a unique pleasure that 
cannot be obtained through “natural” sexual intercourse. The potential 
autoeroticism of Theotormon in Vision certainly reflects Tissot’s description, 
as it is also set in a humiliating situation where the social identities of 
Theotormon as a husband and Oothoon as a wife are broken. Also, the 
metaphor for autoeroticism that Blake and Tissot use are quite similar: “the 
burning fires / Of lust, that belch incessant” and “a fire that is never 
extinguished.” In other words, in Visions, Blake reflects Tissot’s observation 
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in terms of the negative effects of masturbation when he has Oothoon later 
call it “The self enjoyings of self denial.” In Theotormon’s case, the autoerotic 
state is generated through the breaking of his social identity as a 
husband/lover by facing his own impotence and emulating Bromion’s sexual 
violence, a self-annihilating experience. Blake takes his idea of autoeroticism 
further in Oothoon’s calling for self-punishment. It is where Blake departs 
from Tissot’s assertion that autoeroticism results in “the loss of imagination.” 
Conversely, Blake regards autoeroticism—a passive behaviour of torpidity for 
Tissot—an active process of poetic imagination. At this point, Blake’s view of 
autoeroticism goes beyond Tissot’s discourse. As I will demonstrate, it has 
more resonances with Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s The Confessions, an 
autobiographic text that Blake is familiar with.32 
     In the Frontispiece, Oothoon’s responses to Theotormon’s autoerotic 
status with her own autoerotic fantasy of self-punishment, “calling 
Theotormon’s Eagles to prey upon her flesh”: 
          I call with holy voice! kings of the sounding air, 
          Rend away this defiled bosom that I may reflect. 
          The image of Theotormon on my pure transparent breast.  
                                                   (2.14-16)                                                                                       
Though the following line “The Eagles at her call descend & rend their 
bleeding prey” seems to tell readers that this actually happens in the poem, 
the visual design on Plate 3 suggests otherwise. The image on Plate 3 
clearly contradicts the previous scene on the Frontispiece (see Figure 4 on 
page 87). On Pate 3, Oothoon is no longer in the dark cave and is free from 
the chains that bind her with Bromion. She is seen lying on clouds with her 
limbs stretching open, exposing her breast to the descending eagle. The 
surreal air of Plate 3 indicates that this entire violent scene is in Oothoon’s 
imagination. If we take a look at the end of Visions: “Thus every morning 
wails Oothoon. but Theotormon sits / Upon the margind ocean conversing 
                                                
32 In Blake’s earlier prophetic books, Rousseau and Voltaire are depicted as the positive 
momentum of the French Revolution. But Blake does not share their deistic view of religion 
that denies prophetic visionary and poetic imagination. In Jerusalem, Rousseau, along with 
Voltaire, Gibbon, and Hume, is accused of hypocrisy, and his The Confessions is dismissed 
by Blake: “The Book written by Rousseau calld his Confessions is an apology & cloke for his 
sin & not a confession” (CPPB 201). See also Damon’s A Blake Dictionary, pp. 351-352.   
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with shadows dire. / The Daughters of Albion hear her woes, & eccho back 
her sighs” (8.11-13) in advance, it is clear that the real action in the poem 
takes place until Theotormon binds Oothoon and Bromion together. All the 
subsequent scenes engraved visually and described textually are merely 
imagination rather than actual actions. In other words, Oothoon’s torture by 
an eagle on Plate 3, Theotormon’s self-flagellation on Plate 6, and the 
ecstatic orgy on Plate 7 all belong to their erotic fantasy.  
     Oothoon’s self-mutilation as a rape victim reminds us of Oithona in 
James Macpherson’s Fingal, one of the most prominent sources of Vision. In 
this epic poem, after being raped by Dunromath, Oithona condemns herself 
in shame in front of her lover, Gaul: “why comest thou over the dark-blue 
wave, to Nuäh’s daughter? Why did I not pass away in secret?” She then 
immerses herself in despair: “I vanish in my youth; my name shall not be 
heard. Or it will be heard with grief; the tears of Nuäh must fall” (Macpherson 
108). Oithona’s reaction to her rape while facing her lover is entirely passive. 
She denies her own physical existence and social identity and wishes to be 
absent in her lover’s presence. Following Oothoon’s counterpart in Fingal, 
Blake seems to recreate the self-accusation of rape victim in Visions. As 
Welch points out, the victim’s impulse for self-punishment in a case of rape is 
not uncommon, since it was usually the violated woman rather the male 
violator that was condemned in the late eighteenth century (121). Oothoon’s 
call for self-mutilation, though more or less reflective of this women-
victimizing tradition, is a subtle manifestation of poetic imagination.  
     Oothoon, following Theotormon, is also undergoing a process of 
autoerotic fantasy by imaging herself willingly being violated again. The 
image of an eagle rending its victim’s breast apart alludes to Prometheus, 
who is a symbol of rebellion and sacrifice. Despite the possible political or 
religious appeals, Blake eroticises Oothoon’s imagined Promethean posture, 
as she arches her body in a manner that again resembles the post-orgasmic 
images on Plate 1. On Plate 3, Blake epitomises Oothoon’s fantasy of bodily 
affliction, presenting an obscene scene of erotic violence, a darker aspect of 
sex that she first acquaints herself with through the plucking of Marygold, and 
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her rape by Bromion. For Oothoon, violence and suffering are now the 
essential elements of sexual delight, as she declares: “Sweetest the fruit that 
worm feeds on. & the soul prey’d on by woe” (3.17-18). The erotic pleasure is 
“Sweetest” when it is engendered by victimisation and destruction. Therefore, 
that Oothoon calls for eagles to mutilate her body is not only a penitent 
display of shame and guilt (generated by the pleasure that she might take in 
the rape) but also an exposition of an alternative aspect of sex that entails 
violent maiming of the body and its intense pain.  
     As I propose previously, autoeroticism for Blake is not only an inactive 
and desperate resort under sexual repression, but a process of active 
imagination that enables the doer to achieve alternative pleasure. Oothoon’s 
female masturbation is identified by other scholars on Plate 7: “The moment 
of desire! the moment of desire! The virgin / That pines for man; shall awaken 
her womb to enormous joys / In the secret shadows of her chamber” (7.3-5). 
But her self-mutilating vision on Plate 3 can also be read as an autoerotic 
fantasy, in which the real object of her desire is absent. She has to conjure 
up the eagle as the sexual “other” and imagine herself again in a victimised 
position. This process suggests that the operation of such a fantasy requires 
a disintegration of her identity. As a sexual subject, Oothoon splits into two: a 
violating other and a violated self. The disintegration of self and the recasting 
of subjectivity in autoeroticism also appear in Rousseau’s The Confessions, a 
work that Blake dismisses as self-apologetic and hypocritical. Blake’s hostility 
to Rousseau is attributed to the French philosopher’s deistic ideology that 
denies Blake’s ideal of prophetic vision/Poetic Genius. However, in terms of 
sexuality, both writers work in depth to explore the mentality of autoeroticism.  
     As Karen Harvey’s study shows, with a stronger stress on 
sensual/bodily experience, eighteenth-century thinkers, especially those from 
France, aligned their philosophies “with a veritable unleashing of sexual 
desires” (200). Among them, Rousseau is particularly concerned with the 
sexual relation between men and women in larger social and political 
contexts. According to Joel Schwartz, Rousseau believes that male sexual 
desire for women constitutes the mutual dependence between the two sexes, 
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which is a positive drive to ameliorate the society and accomplish “the 
political betterment of mankind” (3). Autoeroticism—the withdrawal of sexual 
desire from the external world—is therefore a harmful hindrance of such 
social improvement, as masturbation is forbidden in Emile so that a mature 
man can “enter society . . . to find there a companion worthy of him” (qtd. 
Schwartz 105). Despite this understanding of autoeroticism as an anti-social 
complex, masturbation is still a seductive “feat”—in Tissot’s word—that 
Rousseau indulges himself in. Joel Schwartz distinguishes Rousseau’s 
romantic relationship with Thérèse Levasseur, a common and illiterate 
woman, in The Confessions from Emile’s relationship with Sophie in Emile. 
He points out that while the latter is based on mutual affection, the former is 
entirely of physical sexual desire. Rousseau’s relationship with Thérèse, as 
Schwartz highlights, is referred to as “supplement,” a word Rousseau also 
uses to describe his masturbation in The Confessions (104-105). For 
Rousseau, the sex with Thérèse and masturbation are both substitutes for 
his real love object that is absent. But the two substitutes are in essence 
different, because unlike the sex with Thérèse, masturbation is not only a 
supplement, but also “that dangerous supplement.”33 In Book 3 of The 
Confessions, Rousseau gives a personal account of his masturbation, “that 
dangerous means of cheating Nature”: 
          This vice, which shame and timidity find so convenient, has,  
          besides, great enticement for lively imaginations; that is, to  
          dispose, in a manner, at will of the whole sex, and to make the  
          beauties which tempt them serve their pleasure without the  
          necessity of obtaining their consent. (146) 
                                                                                                                                                                  
And in Book 9, in a distress of sexual longing without a real woman’s 
presence, he admits his “vice” in a suggestive way: 
 
                                                
33 This phrase inspires Jacques Derrida’s analysis of writing and speech. In Of 
Grammatology, Derrida discusses his concept of writing as a “dangerous supplement” to 
speech by examining Rousseau’s The Confessions, in which Rousseau “valorises and 
disqualifies writing at the same time” and “condemns writing as destruction of presence and 
as disease of speech” (141-142). Like Rousseau’s writing, which only offers an endless 
chain of deferrals of true meaning (Derrida’s concept of différance), his masturbation is also 
ce dangereux supplement that can never allow him to obtain the real and healthy fulfilment 
of desire: “The supplement that ‘cheats’ maternal ‘nature’ operates as writing, and as writing 
it is dangerous to life . . . so onanism announces the ruin of vitality in terms of imaginary 
seductions” (151).  
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          The impossibility of attaining the real beings threw  
          me into the regions of chimera; and seeing nothing  
          in existence worthy of my delirium I sought food for  
          it in the ideal world, which my imagination quickly  
          peopled with beings after my own heart . . . In my  
          continual extacy I intoxicated my mind with the most  
          delicious sentiments that ever entered the heart of  
          a man. (229)  
 
In the above passages (from the English translation published in 1783) that 
are possibly read by Blake, Rousseau aestheticises his experience of 
masturbation by accentuating its artistic quality of “lively imagination,” in 
order to create images that generate utmost pleasure in his mind. Also, 
because the object of desire is absent, Rousseau, in the process of 
masturbation, has to enter “the regions of chimera”—a phrase that denotes 
the splitting of subjectivity. In an autoerotic ecstasy, where the subject 
imagines his love objects, his subjectivity must be divided to put on several 
identities, like the Chimera who is at the same time a lion, a goat, and a 
serpent. It is also a process of dissolving the conventional boundary of 
gender roles, as Schwartz notes that Rousseau’s experiences in reading and 
imagination make him “both female and male, which is to say that he 
transcends the differentiation between the sexes, and is a human whole, not 
merely a sexual part” (107). This androgynous mentality of Rousseau’s 
corresponds to Blake’s ideal of the “Universal Man,” a primary state of 
humanity that reunites the separate masculine “Spectre” and feminine 
“Emanation.” Despite that Blake deems The Confessions a work of hypocrisy, 
there is subtle resonance between Blake and Rousseau, in terms of sexual 
experience, which is analogous to artistic creation.  
     Back to Visions with Rousseau’s resonance, in her autoerotic fantasy, 
Oothoon activates her “lively imagination” to splits her subjectivity and form 
an imagery scene of another erotic violence on Plate 3. This is exactly 
Rousseau’s access to the masturbatory “regions of chimera” and “ideal 
world, which my imagination quickly peopled with beings after my own heart.” 
With the active potency of imagination, Oothoon calls for Theotormon’s 
violence on herself. As both a victim and a masochist, Oothoon paradoxically 
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demonstrates the power of powerlessness and the activeness of passivity. As 
Gilles Deleuze points out in his discussion of masochism, “the masochist 
hero appears to be educated and fashioned by the authoritarian woman 
whereas basically it is he who forms her, dresses her for the part and 
prompts the harsh words she addresses to him” and “It is the victim who 
speaks through the mouth of his torturer, without sparing herself” (22).34 By 
urging Theotormon to mutilate her “defiled bosom,” Oothoon actually takes 
control of the imperative language in this masochist play, “profoundly active 
in her passivity,” in Susan Sontag’s words (99).  
     Welch underscores the distinction between “this defiled bosom” and 
“my pure transparent breast” in Oothoon’s lines, arguing that her call for self-
mutilation is an assertion of her untainted essence, in order to “distinguish 
between her true self and her unwillingly defiled exterior” (121). But more 
than a defence of her essential innocence, with self-disintegrating 
imagination of autoeroticism, Oothoon is actually denouncing Theotormon’s 
sexual impotence and conservatism, which indirectly cause her unwillingly 
bodily arousal in the rape, and his later inactivity and self-victimization. With 
the typical emotional withdrawal and enclosure in the Freudian 
melancholia—“she cannot weep! her tears are locked up” (2.11 CPPB 46)—
Oothoon’s lamentations are intrinsically accusations, as Freud postulates: 
“they are not ashamed, they do not conceal themselves, because everything 
disparaging that they express about themselves is basically being said about 
someone else” (“Mourning and Melancholia” 208). What Oothoon says about 
her dire state limited by five senses in the later part of Plate 2 is truly 
indicating Theotormon’s inability to see through her polluted exterior (“this 
defiled bosom”), acknowledge her intact interior (“my pure transparent 
breast”), and act like a real husband/lover. Instead, Theotormon’s selfhood 
based on the identity of husband/lover has already been annihilated in his 
autoerotic emulation of Bromion’s sexual violence, an abject situation 
Oothoon discloses with the line “all from life I was obliterated and erased” (2. 
                                                
34 Deleuze is referring to Leopold von Sacher-Masoch’s Venus in Furs, in which the male 
protagonist is the masochist and receives verbal and physical violence from his female lover. 
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34 CPPB 47). 
     Theotormon fails to understand the profound meaning of Oothoon’s call 
for self-mutilation: “Theotormon hears me not! to him the night and morn / 
Are both alike” (2.37-38 CPPB 47); what he sees now is only a picture of 
autoerotic and masochist fantasy. Consequently, Theotormon undergoes 
further drastic alterations of his subjectivity. He perceives Oothoon’s 
autoerotic imagination, and “severely smiles, her soul reflects the smile; / As 
the clear spring mudded with feet of breasts grows pure & smiles” (2.18-19 
CPPB 46). Here Theotormon is not only a humiliated husband but also a 
thrilled spectator of the erotic violence that Oothoon puts on through her 
“lively imagination.” His “smiles” upon “the clear spring mudded with feet of 
beasts”—a recapitulation of Oothoon’s rape by Bromion—corresponds to his 
emulation of and identification with the rapist’s sexual violence on the 
Frontispiece. Such is the obscene pleasure taken by Theotormon, 
engendered by the maiming and degradation of a beautiful body in the 
condition of forsaking his previous identity as husband/lover, the condition of 
self-annihilation.35 In his discussion of spectacular violence in Romantic 
imagination, Ian Haywood points out that in the triangular relationship of a 
victimiser, a victim, and a spectator, there is a certain “configuration of 
multiple points of view” that “breaks down the binary opposition of self and 
Other which is implied in the simplistic view-victim model” (6). Oothoon’s 
eagle-rent image on Plate 3 and Theotormon’s autoerotic reaction as a 
spectator demonstrates such a “triangular vignette” in which both characters 
alter their identities in a drastic manner, as Oothoon becomes simultaneously 
victim and victimiser and Theotormon breaks his social identity as a husband                                                  
to take pleasure in Oothoon’s second violation. The visual presentation of 
Plate 3 also reminds us of Blake’s illustrations of John Gabriel Stedman’s 
Narrative of a Five Years Expedition Against the Revolted Negros of 
Surinam. Blake’s designs of black slaves suffering tortures seem to evoke 
sympathy and abolition sentiments in his time. However, the representation is 
                                                
35 Likewise, for Bataille, violence against the beautiful body is the essence of eroticism: 
“Beauty has a cardinal importance, for ugliness cannot be spoiled, and to despoil is the 
essence of eroticism . . . The greater the beauty the more it is befouled” (Erotism 145). 
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problematic for his erotic way of portraying afflicted human bodies, “relating 
to the trans-historical nature of aesthetics, torture, the fetish, and 
pornography,” as Wood correctly observes (94). 
     To conclude this section, I will turn to Bromion’s lines on Plate 4. 
Though allegorically Bromion represents plantation slavery and patriarchal 
oppression in Blake’s time, this antagonist articulates the obscene truth of 
eroticism for Blake. After the lengthy and abstract conversation between 
Oothoon and Theotormon about the restriction of human perception, Bromion 
cuts in with a tempting voice to urge Theotormon to “gratify senses 
unknown”:  
          Thou knowest that the ancient trees seen by thine eyes have fruit; 
          But knowest thou that trees and fruits flourish upon the earth 
          To gratify senses unknown? trees beasts and birds unknown: 
          Unknown, not unperceivd, spread in the infinite microscope, 
          In places yet unvisited by the voyager. and in worlds 
          Over another kind of seas, and in atmospheres unknown.  
                                                     (4.13-18)                                                                                                 
Stevens proposes that the “senses unknown” in Bromion’s speech “alludes to 
a less conventional sexuality” (149). Her argument is based on her queer 
interpretation that Theotormon is also mentally and physically raped by 
Bromion, who is suggesting homosexual anal sex as an unspeakable 
alternative pleasure. In line with Stevens’s “queering” perspective, I would 
argue that Bromion here is referring to a wider scope of sexuality that is 
dismissed as “obscene” in the eighteenth century. Excluded into “places yet 
unvisited,” “worlds / Over another kind of seas,” and “atmospheres unknown,” 
the obscene encompasses all heterogeneous aspects of sex. It is embodied 
in Oothoon’s plucking of the Marygold, which represents polyamorous orgy 
and erotic approximation to death, the rape itself as a violent embodiment of 
sex, and the autoerotic fantasy that entails the disintegration of identity and 
subjectivity. All these heterogeneous experiences exemplify the core 
phenomenon of obscenity: self-annihilation. Oothoon and Theotormon 
abandon their previous social identities, which are constituted by 
conventional gender roles in marriage system. With poetic imagination, they 
actively put themselves in passive and masochist positions to obtain the 
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obscene pleasure that goes beyond the concept of “free love” based on the 
wholeness of individuality and the mutually positive affection between them. 
In conclusion, Visions of the Daughters of Albion is still a piece that serves its 
justified end to criticise slavery and religious oppression, but its covert 
“minute particulars” unveil Blake’s understanding of the obscene side of sex. 
From the obscene, the heterogeneous pleasure emerges from the violent 





Figure 1. Plate iii of Visions, copy A, 1793 (British Museum) 
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Figure 2. Plate 1 of Visions, copy A, 1793 (British Museum) 
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Figure 3. Frontispiece of Visions, copy A, 1793 (British Museum) 
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OBSCENE SUBLIMITY AND DEGRADED MASCULINITY IN MILTON 
 
     Milton: a Poem, written and engraved first in 1804, is Blake’s poetic 
endeavour to “rectify” his greatest precursor John Milton and his works, and 
“avowedly to correct Milton’s errors” (Damon 276). The epic poem relates 
how Milton, now “pondring the intricate mazes of Providence / Unhappy tho 
in heav’n” (2.17), descends once again to the secular world (a scene set in 
Blake’s cottage at Felpham) to reunite with his “Sixfold Emanation”—his 
estranged three wives and three daughters.36 More crucially, this journey 
leads Milton to be incorporated into Blake, himself a character in the poem, in 
order to re-establish his poetic status as a national bard. As Mary Lynn 
Johnson comments, Milton “breaks through warps in time, space, and 
consciousness to correct his personal and doctrinal errors and rekindles, 
through Blake, the spirit of prophecy in Britain” and to fulfil “the transmission 
of his prophetic legacy to Blake’s generation” (233). In the Preface, Blake 
dismisses “The Stolen and Perverted Writings of Homer & Ovid: of Plato & 
Cicero” that mislead even the greatest poets such as Shakespeare and 
Milton. Blake then calls for the restoration of “the Sublime of the Bible” 
(CPPB 95). Instead of reconsidering Blake’s revision of his precursors, this 
section will focus on “the Bard’s Song” in Book 1 of Milton, especially the 
bizarre characterisation of Satan that subverts the more recognised energetic 
devil in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell. Continuing my central theme of the 
obscene, I seek to demonstrate that under Blake’s majestic aspiration in 
Milton to “speak to future generations by a Sublime Allegory” (in his 1803 
letter to Thomas Butts, CPPB 730), he engages Burke’s idea of the sublime 
that he despises and deliberately presents an image of anti-Burkean sublime 
with the effeminised Satan. In Visions, the Blakean obscene is presented 
through Oothoon’s and Theotormon’s autoeroticism that annihilates the 
social identities of husband and wife, while in Milton, it is insinuated by 
subverting the more fundamental identity of sex and gender, which are 
constructed by the conceptualisation of the masculine and the feminine in 
                                                
36 The text of Milton, from Erdman’s edition, is also referenced with plate and line numbers 
in parenthesis. 
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contemporary Britain.   
     To discuss Milton, which is relatively longer, more obscure, and 
therefore more challenging, it is necessary to provide a brief summary of the 
poem. As aforementioned, the major purpose of Milton the poem is to correct 
the errors of Milton the poet. In the title page, a full-page design of Milton’s 
naked figure faces the stormy darkness in the background. Milton raises his 
right hand, as if he intends to wipe out the clouds that obscure his sight, but 
at the same time his hand breaks the title, his very name “MILTON,” in half. 
This gesture already foreshadows the symbolic theme of his self-annihilation 
at the end of the poem. The relatively small and unclear subtitle under 
Milton’s feet repeats one of his poetic purposes set in Paradise Lost: “To 
justify the Ways of God to Men.” Blake only takes the second part of Milton’s 
original declaration: “I may assert Eternal Providence / And justify the ways of 
God to men” (Paradise Lost 1.24-25). That is, in Blake’s view, with Paradise 
Lost Milton only successfully asserts the divine decree but fails to justify it, 
and the justification is to be done in Blake’s own epic poem. Milton’s failure 
are attributed to his errors, which, as Blake senses in Paradise Lost and 
Milton’s life, include his depiction of Satan as the manifestation of 
revolutionary hero against tyranny (as highlighted ironically in The Marriage 
of Heaven and Hell), his Calvinist theology of the three classes of the Elect, 
the Reprobate, and the Redeemed, his over-reliance on the classic poetics of 
military feats and warlike glory (“the silly Greek & Latin slaves of the Sword”), 
and his negative evaluation of women reflected by the characterisation of 
Eve and his own disquieted domestic life.37  
     Although on the surface these errors can be divided into different 
categories of religion, politics, poetics, and gender, they are all intertwined 
                                                
37 Milton’s proposal of divorce based on the incompatibility between husband and wife is 
partially propelled by his first marriage with Mary Powell, who ran back to her parents’ home 
one month after they married. She could not stand the quiet and dull scholar’s life of Milton, 
and on the other hand, Milton considered her incapable of participating in his intellectual and 
poetic activities. His second marriage with Katherine Woodcock was happy but discontinued 
by her death two years after they married; the deep grief led to his composition of the 
piercingly bitter sonnet “Mee thought I saw my late espoused saint.” His last marriage with 
Elizabeth Minshull was satisfactory but disturbed by her discordance with Milton’s daughters. 
See Barbara K. Lewalski’s critical biography The Life of John Milton (Wiley-Blackwell, 2002). 
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with each other and the issue of sexuality has a significant presence among 
them. Near the end of the poem, all what Milton errs in his lifetime and works 
are to be amended by his reconciliation with his wives and daughters. These 
women in Milton’s life are his “Feminine Portion the Six-fold Miltonic Female” 
(41.30), which is embodied by Ololon, the twelve-year-old virgin. Milton’s 
union with Ololon thus symbolises the re-integration of divided sexes. What 
inspires Milton to embark on his descent into the material world is an 
enigmatic “Bard’s prophetic Song,” an episodic narrative that cuts in abruptly 
shortly after the Preface. The Bard’s Song first introduces the current 
cosmological state after the disintegration of Albion the primary “human form 
divine,” “when Albion was slain upon his Mountains” (3.1). For Blake, the 
creation of the world by a demiurgic sky-god such as Jehovah in the Old 
Testament is itself a fall, because of the ensuing establishment of 
institutionalised religion and moral laws.38 This concept can be observed in 
Blake’s design of the Frontispiece of Europe: a Prophecy, where the hoary 
Urizen, Jehovah’s counterpart in Blake’s mythical system, measures and 
delineates the material world with a compass. In this limited circumstance, 
Los—“the expression in this world of Creative Imagination” (Damon 246)—
and his female Emanation, Enitharmon, construct the three classes of men. 
This division is later revealed as the Calvinist categorisation of the Elect, the 
Redeemed, and the Reprobate, which is decreed by Milton’s God in Paradise 
Lost (Johnson 255). The human sensual faculties are also separated and 
confined and “a seventh Age passed over & a State of dismal woe” (3.27). 
On Plate 3, witnessing the degeneration of the material world, “Terrified” in 
“deadly pale,” Los himself disintegrates; “he became what he beheld” (3.29), 
and his mentality splits into “a Female pale” (3.33) and “a Male Form howling 
in Jealousy” (3.36). To sustain this flawed world, Los and Enitharmon build 
“the Looms of Generation” and “Great Golgonooza,” the city of art and 
manufacture (Damon 162). The city of Golgonooza operates with the 
                                                
38 This unique understanding of God as an evil entity and the creation of the material world 
as a degeneration is related to Gnosticism. For the Gnostic influences on Blake, see A. D. 
Nuttall’s The Alternative Trinity: Gnostic Heresy in Marlowe, Milton, and Blake (Oxford UP, 
2007). 
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symbolic representation of agriculture by the children of Los and Enitharmon, 
including Rintrah, Palamabron, and most importantly, Satan.  
     A bizarre family quarrel ensues. The envious Satan, who is assigned 
the work in “the Starry Mills,” wishes to take over Palamabron’s station of “the 
fiery Harrow” and implores Los to give the Harrow to him. The “dark Satanic 
Mill” from the poem in the Preface is not only the metaphor of exploitative 
industry in the contemporary Britain, but represents the ideology of rigid 
rationalism that Blake attributes to Lock and Newton (Johnson 239). It is a 
sharp contrast with Palamabron’s harrowing, which stands for creative and 
enlivening artistic cultivation.39 At this point, Los makes a crucial judgmental 
error by giving Satan “the Harrow of the Almighty” (7.10). The wronged 
brother Palamabron retains his silence in repressed wrath, for he fears that 
“Satan should accuse him of / Ingratitude” (7.11-12). Consequently, Los’s 
enterprise is completely shut down in chaos: Palamabron’s horses of the 
Harrow are maddened and the Gnomes (the workers) are disturbed. The two 
brothers accuse each other of hypocrisy and turpitude before Los sets them 
back to their normal positions. But Satan’s Mills are now dysfunctional 
because of his absence, for which he blames Palamabron. While Los 
laments his erroneous pity on Satan that “divides the soul / And man, 
unmans” (8.19-20), Palamabron realises “That he who will not defend Truth, 
may be compelled to / Defend a Lie” (8.47-48) and calls for a “Great Solemn 
Assembly” (8.46) to settle the score.  
     In the Assembly, Satan reveals his true nature by identifying with the 
Old-Testament God and Urizen: “He created Seven deadly Sins drawing out 
his infernal scroll, / Of Moral laws and cruel punishments upon the clouds of 
Jehovah” (9.21-22). And “the dark Satanic Mills” are now surrounding the 
human world, as foretold in the poem in the Preface: “And was Jerusalem 
built here / Among the dark Satanic Mills” (CPPB 95). In the human world, 
Satan makes “Laws from his own identity. / Compell’d others to serve him in 
                                                
39 Blake illustrates this differentiation in A Descriptive Catalogue of his 1809 exhibition: “The 
Plowman of Chaucer is Hercules in his supreme eternal state . . . the Miller, a terrible 
fellow . . . with brutal strength and courage, to get rich and powerful to curb the pride of Man” 
(CPPB 536). 
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moral gratitude & submission / Being call’d God” (11.10-12). This Satanic 
religion represents the state church and its oppressive laws, as well as the 
national expansion of imperialism (BPD 158). At this point, another strange 
incident follows. Leutha, the female character who symbolises “sex under 
law” and “the sense of sin, or guilt” (Damon 237), appears in the Assembly. 
She wishes to take the blame, as “a Ransom for Satan, taking on her, his 
Sin” (11.30). As early critics have noted, the relationship between Satan and 
Luetha is a variation of the one between Satan and Sin in Book 2 of Paradise 
Lost. Their incestuous union gives birth to the monster, Death, whom Satan 
encounters at the Gates of Hell (Erdman 425; Damon 238). Leutha, as the 
female component of Satan’s mentality, explains that it is she who urges 
Satan to assume Palamabron’s work by effeminising Satan, in a desperate 
longing for Palamabron’s love.  
     The Bard’s Song ends after Leutha’s confession and repentance, and 
her comforting settlement in “a New Space” created by Enitharmon to protect 
Satan from being punished. Leutha’s lustful wish is later fulfilled when she is 
introduced into Palamabron’s tent, where she gives birth to mentally split 
beings, with Death as one of them, echoing the episode in Paradise Lost. 
Leutha as the guilty substitute of Satan, as Johnson comments, is merely a 
parody of authentic atonement and self-sacrifice the image of the Lamb and 
Christ represent (241). The intricate, surreal, and sometimes ridiculous 
narrative of the Bard’s Song presents a challenge for scholars who attempt to 
approach Milton. Although Blake makes it clear that Milton, motivated by 
hearing this Song, is determined to descend to the material world and rectify 
himself, it is almost inexplicable how the Palamabron-Satan brawl and 
Leutha’s weird behaviours function in Milton’s decision and the entire poem. 
     One of the most established interpretations is a biographical one. That 
is, the familial quarrel between Palamabron and Satan retells Blake’s 
relationship with his patron and fellow poet William Hayley during his stay in 
Felpham from 1800 to 1804. Northrop Frye offers a convincing analysis of 
the cultural and aesthetic ideologies Hayley stood for and how they conflicted 
with Blake’s visionary poetry and art. As a patron who expected to introduce 
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and promote artistic work to the public, Hayley acknowledged that he was 
responsible for directing Blake’s “genius into socially acceptable channels” 
(Fearful Symmetry 328). To be social is to conform to norms and to be 
appealing to popular taste. Hayley insisted that Blake modify his works and 
urged him in a courteous and gentle manner that demonstrated his “sincere” 
care for the poet’s welfare. Hence, Blake was caught in a painful dilemma 
between compromise (which would mar his artistic creation) and protest 
(which would lead to the accusation of ingratitude). Frye perceives Blake’s 
real-life plight in the situation of Palamabron facing his brother, the “mild” and 
“soft” Satan, who is “[s]eeming a brother, being a tyrant” (7.22) and “do[es] 
unkind things in kindness! with power armd, to say / The most irritating things 
in the midst of tears and love” (12.32-33). The significance of the 
Palamabron-Satan brawl lies in its reflection of the enmity concealed in 
friendship and patronage that artists might encounter in their careers 
including Blake and Milton. Therefore, after hearing the Bard’s Song, Milton 
comes to an epiphany that “I in my Selfhood am that Satan: I am that Evil 
One!” (14.30). He then realises that one of the ways to redeem himself is to 
annihilate his Satan-persona during his descent to the material world. In his 
Prophet against Empire, David V. Erdman provides another account for the 
Bard’s Song by examining the contemporary political turmoil. As he observes, 
“the strife between Satan and Palamabron derives from the struggle between 
Cromwell and Parliament” (424). Satan’s assumption of Palamabron’s 
position alludes to Oliver Cromwell’s rule in Parliament, and Palamabron’s 
calling for a “Great Solemn Assembly” resonates with Parliament’s operation. 
Erdman further suggests that Satan’s declaration as God parallels 
Cromwell’s and Napoleon’s paths from revolutionary heroes to oppressive 
dictators. And Los’s initial approval of Satan’s action reflects that Milton and 
Blake himself support such a degenerating course at the very beginning. 
Frye’s and Erdman’s readings, through biographical and political 
perspectives respectively, both establish the fundamental interpretations of 
the Bard’s Song.  
     There is, however, a critical deficit in the canonised readings of Frye 
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and Erdman. Both critics neglect Blake’s deliberate feminisation of Satan that 
Leutha enigmatically executes in the poem. Damon detects undertones of 
homosexuality between the “mild” Satan and Palamabron. He takes this 
further by speculating that Hayley/Satan harbours homosexual desire for 
Blake, but he does not explicate this issue (Damon 238). James Reiger’s 
essay “The Hem of Their Garments: The Bard’s Song in Milton” is an 
extension of Frye’s biographical analysis, as he argues that through the 
Bard’s Song Blake proposes the expression of genuine emotions such as 
true wrath, pity, and love instead of “Satanic counterfeits” (271). In Blake and 
Freud, Diane Hume George argues that as a re-accounted role of Sin in 
Paradise Lost, Leutha represents a misdirected outcome of sexual desire, 
which is repressed and twisted by the sense of shame and guilt. According to 
George, Leutha, as the embodiment of sexual desire, is absolved and 
approved in Milton, rather than utterly condemned by Milton in Paradise Lost 
(163). But aside from this, she does not deal with Satan’s effeminacy that 
Leutha incurs. Feminist critics such as Susan Fox and Anne K. Mellor, who 
aim to expose Blake’s sexism and misogyny, generally focus on the status of 
Ololon, Milton’s “Sixfold Emanation” at the end of Book 2. While arguing that 
Ololon is even a more submissive and meeker version of Eve in Paradise 
Lost (Fox 517; Mellor, “Blake’s Portrayal of Women” 148), Fox and Mellor 
show little interest in Leutha’s actions and Blake’s design of Satan’s 
feminisation. Following Fox and Mellor, Marc Kaplan’s essay “Blake’s Milton: 
The Metaphysics of Gender” maintains that Blake’s “cosmos is not only 
gendered, but hierarchical and masculinist in character” (151). Although he 
does discuss the Bard’s Song briefly, he merely interprets Satan’s effeminacy 
as an example of masculinity that is contaminated by female propensities in 
Blake’s works. 
     Later critics have explored the homosexual undertones in the Bard’s 
Song more elaborately. Christopher Z. Hobson believes that Blake’s poetic 
corpus evolves toward a positive embrace of “homosexual relations as 
nonpossessive and equalitarian, at least compared to the possessive, 
sexually rigid, hypocritical forms of heterosexuality” (Blake and 
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Homosexuality 3). Therefore, he argues that the negative portrayal of 
homosexual desire in Satan is in fact “a critique of the moral-sexual 
foundations” of “the English political-religious system after Milton” (80). It is 
also a reflection of the republican-protestant tradition which Milton belongs 
to, as Hobson proposes, that associates homosexuality (particularly in the 
derogatory term of “sodomy”) with aristocratic luxury and governmental 
corruption. Therefore, Leutha’s repentance of her arousing Satan’s “soft / 
Delusory love to Palamabron” (12.6-7) is nothing more than “self-accusation 
and acceptance of guilt” that “too often are components of same-sex 
subjectivity” (“Blake and the Evolution of Same-Sex Subjectivity” 30). 
Referring to Judith Butler’s idea of gender performativity, David Fallon 
highlights the gender fluidity in contemporary British society and Blake’s 
works. He argues against the previous feminist readings of oversimplified 
misogyny, elaborating that Blake’s negative presentations of women often 
emerge in the condition that female characters “assume conventionally public 
and ‘masculine’ attributes . . . when they transgress into transgender 
identities which trouble the pervasive norms of republican-political rhetoric” 
(187). Leutha’s effeminising influence upon Satan represents the social 
anxiety about this transgression of the barrier of gender roles. 
     In my own interpretation of the Bard’s Song, as mentioned at the 
beginning of this section, I read Satan’s feminisation, along with Blake’s 
several “obscene” visual designs of Milton, as a latent response to Burke’s 
conceptualisation of the sublime, which Blake dismisses with contempt. This 
alternative Blakean sublime, under the cover of his outright advocacy of “the 
Sublime of the Bible,” indicates the instability of gender roles that is evoked 
by the cultural phenomenon of effeminacy and its impact on aesthetic, 
political, and social conventions in contemporary British society. I would 
further demonstrate that the Bard’s Song and the visual designs of Milton 
epitomise the Romantic obscene that features the experience of self-
annihilation of identities, social and biological. Blake’s idea of the sublime in 
Milton is manifested by the subversion of gender roles. This subversion is 
also connected with my formulation of the potential affinity between the 
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obscene and the sublime in the introduction, where I have demonstrated that 
in the division of the sublime and the beautiful exists a drastic shifting 
between active subject and passive object, as well as the inversion of power 
relationship between the dominant and the submissive.  
     Blake’s direct response to Burke’s treatise on the sublime can be found 
in his annotations to Joshua Reynolds’s Discourse VIII. Here Blake aligns 
Burke with Locke and Newton, to whom he feels “the same Contempt & 
Abhorrence” because “They mock Inspiration & Vision” (CPPB 660). Blake 
rejects Burke’s discourse because the latter values empirical experience that 
relies on human sensual faculties. To counter this, Blake declares his own 
definition of the sublime in his letter to Thomas Butts: “Allegory addressed to 
the Intellectual powers while it is altogether hidden from the Corporeal 
Understanding is My Definition of the Most Sublime Poetry” (CPPB 730). For 
Blake, although senses invoke imagination and nurture the “Poetic Genius,” 
imagination cannot be confined by sensual perception of the exterior reality. 
Burke’s aesthetics of the sublime and the beautiful is constructed solely on 
sensual observation of exterior objects and “pseudo-physiological 
explanation” (Paley 19). Therefore, his approach allies himself with Newton’s 
mechanical and material account of the universe and Locke’s “philosophy of 
five senses” (Damon 298), which allow no place for Blake’s poetics of 
prophetic visions.40  
                                                
40 There has been ample discussion about the Blakean sublime in preceding studies. 
Morton D. Paley, in Energy and the Imagination (1970), locates Blake’s idea of the sublime in 
the eighteenth-century context, highlighting his similarities with contemporary thinkers such 
as John Dennis, Edward Young, Robert Lowth, and even Burke. Blake and his 
contemporaries have common notions of the sublime: “It is intense, suggestive of infinity, 
and productive of enthusiasm; it is associated with energy and is produced by contraries; it 
is, in its most powerful form, terrifying; and the chief source of it in literature is the Old 
Testament” (Energy and the Imagination 19). In The Romantic Sublime: Studies in the 
Structure and Psychology of Transcendence (1976), Thomas Weiskel stresses Blake’s 
critique of the Romantic sublime, paralleling his negative portrayal of Urizen’s “solipsism and 
rational alienation of perception into mechanical regularity” with the Wordsworthian egotistic 
sublimation, “in which the formal properties of what is seen are dissolved and the residual 
otherness of the thing is alienated as indefinite substance” (68) and the Kantian “higher 
reason” of inscrutability and deprivation. Vincent de Luca’s influential study Words of 
Eternity: Blake and the Poetics of the Sublime (1991) focuses on Blake’s poetic style, with 
which the sublime effects are generated in “bardic” and “iconic” modes. De Luca discusses 
how the sublime in Blake’s works achieves the “effects of flux, boundlessness, and indefinite 
extension” and transcends “temporality into a hard-edge ‘now’ of intellectual intensity” (6). 
Focusing on The Four Zoas, Peter Otto’s 2000 study Blake’s Critique of Transcendence: 
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     Blake not only dismisses the epistemological basis of the Burkean 
sublime and beautiful. Specifically, he has different accounts of how the 
sublime works as an artistic phenomenon. In the Preface to Milton, Blake 
aspires to restore “the Sublime of the Bible,” while the Bible is also one of the 
examples of the sublime in Burke’s treatise. In the section where Burke 
proposes that “A clear idea is therefore another name for a little idea” and 
“sublimity is principally due to the terrible uncertainty” (Enquiry 63), he refers 
to a passage from the Book of Job. In this passage, Eliphaz describes to Job 
a night vision in which the invisible presence of a spirit questions him in 
darkness on behalf of God: “Shall mortal man be more just than God?” (Job 
4: 17). When Burke proceeds to discuss power and its sublime effects based 
on the uselessness in the human activities of work and production, he once 
again raises the examples of Leviathan and Behemoth from Job. On the 
surface, Burke is also promoting what Blake espouses as “the Sublime of the 
Bible.” But how do the two sorts of biblical sublime differ from each other? 
First, also in his annotations to Reynolds’s Discourse VII, Blake directly 
refutes the idea that obscurity is one of the elements of the sublime and 
denies it any aesthetic merits: “Obscurity is Neither the Source of the 
Sublime nor of any Thing Else” (CPPB 658).41 Second, Blake’s illustration of 
the same passage in Job that is quoted in A Philosophical Enquiry can be 
deemed a sharp counter-argument against the Burkean sublime reinforced 
                                                
Love, Jealousy, and the Sublime in The Four Zoas proposes that the Blakean sublime 
means to direct human beings to corporeal reality rather than spiritual transcendence. With 
the multiple perspectives and voices in the poem, as Otto contends, Blake urges the reader 
to be aware of the reality as “a dismembered communal form” and its “traumatic ‘real’ that is 
the foundation for everyday life and yet is disguised by it” (34). The most recent criticism on 
the Blakean sublime includes Steven Vine’s “Blake’s Material Sublime” (2002) and Daniel 
Schierenbeck’s “‘Sublime Labours’: Aesthetics and Political Economy in Blake’s Jerusalem” 
(2007). Vine examines the material aspects of Blake’s works, arguing that “The infinite 
resides in the corrosion and ‘melting away’ of the material, but this process is internal to the 
material itself. The material is not so much sublimated as the sublime is installed in the 
material” (242). Situating the Blakean sublime in the scope of political economy, 
Schierenbeck demonstrates that in Jerusalem, “Blake valorizes the sublime and connects it 
with labor,” “denigrates the delusive repose of the beautiful”, and “uses these images to 
critique the idea of the division of the labor” (23).    
41 Although in his 1799 letter to Dr. Trusler Blake claims that “What is Grand is necessarily 
obscure to Weak men. That which can be made Explicit to the Idiot is not worth my care. The 
wisest of the Ancients considerd what is not too Explicit as the fittest for Instruction because 
it rouzes the faculties to act” (CPPB 702), we should note that for Blake, the sublime is only 
“obscure” when perceived by “Weak men.” 
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by obscurity and against Burke’s understanding of the Bible. Blake’s design 
of “The Vision of Eliphaz” from the illustrations of the Book of Job, produced 
around 1806, shows Eliphaz lying in bed and seeing in astonishment a spirit 
that descends upon him (see Figure 5 on page 109). His hairs stand up, 
visualising the biblical lines: “Then a spirit passed before my face; the hair of 
my flesh stood up” (Job 4: 15). But the figure of the spirit is far from obscure, 
as he manifests himself in dazzling brightness and his contour is delineated 
in explicit clarity. Blake’s portrayal of the spirit as a bearded old man tells us 
that he is more than a representative of the divine will but Jehovah himself. 
His folded arms and wrathful eye convey the ideas of admonishment and 
punishment. Another similar design of night vision in this set of illustrations is 
“Job’s Evil Dream,” which depicts the leprosy-stricken Job lying in bed (see 
Figure 6 on page 110). A nightmare vision afflicts Job, which diverts 
significantly from the biblical section it refers to: “Then thou scarest me with 
dreams, and terrifiest me through visions” (Job 7: 14). In this design, the 
spirit hidden in darkness is no longer obscure. The spirit appears as Jehovah 
himself, pressing himself maliciously on Job, who powerlessly resists with his 
forking arms and turning head—an almost feminine posture. This figure of 
Jehovah is an obvious image of Urizen/Satan, an identification revealed in 
Plate 9 of Milton.42 Every curving lines on his beard, sinews of his muscle, 
every piece of scale of the entwining serpent, and the Hebrew letters in the 
Ten Commandments are all displayed in clarity. Blake’s design is sublime in 
terms of the terror it evokes, but obscurity has no place here. The intense 
effect is generated by the overwhelming threat posed by Jehovah and the 
wretchedness of Job as an annihilated spectator of the former’s sublime 
terror. The image might also remind us of the erotic nightmare brought by 
incubuses, a frequent theme of Gothic art that appears most famously in 
Henry Fuseli’s painting. The power relationship between the figures of 
Jehovah and Job also has an undertone of homosexual rape. In this 
illustration, Blake transcends the empirical perception of the original words 
                                                
42 In the Assembly called by Palamabron, Satan “created Seven deadly Sins drawing out his 
infernal scroll, / Of Moral Laws and cruel punishments upon the clouds of Jehovah” (9.21-
22), declaring “I am God alone / There is no other!” (9.25-26). 
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from the Scripture with his imagination. The Blakean sublime here is 
accomplished through a detailed manifestation of evil and its succumbing 
victim in utmost clarity and, as Blake himself puts it, in “determinate and 
bounding form” (CPPB 550). This representation corresponds to the obscene 
aesthetics I formulate in relation to the sublime in my introduction. The 
human-formed sublime, which consists of a dominant powerful figure and a 
submissive and powerless one, can also be observed in several visual 
designs of Milton.  
     The first one we encounter is Plate 16. It is a full-page design that 
shows the struggle between Milton and Urizen with a caption: “To annihilate 
the Self-hood of Deceit & False Forgiveness” (CPPB 807, see Figure 7 on 
page 111). The context of this image is Milton’s painful epiphany of realising 
that Satan as Jehovah/Urizen, the sky-god of Moral laws, has been part of 
his own psyche. Thus, he strives to remove this evil portion in his self. This 
endeavour is implied by his right foot that breaks the word “Self-hood” in 
half—a gesture similar to the one in the Frontispiece, where Milton’s rising 
arm breaks his own name apart. On Plate 16, Milton in his muscular form 
strides towards Urizen, who spreads open his four limbs with a facial 
expression of woe and erotic ecstasy that resembles Job’s in “Job’s Evil 
Dream.” Milton seizes Urizen with his arms around the latter’s neck, as if in a 
murderous action of strangulation. The overlapped positions of their lower 
bodies engender erotic undertones of homosexuality. Blake here subverts 
Jehovah/Urizen’s original character as an oppressive violator, presenting him 
in a powerless posture that passively receives sexual violence. This design 
does not conform to Christopher Hobson’s assertion that the homosexual 
images in Milton invoke “qualities of fraternity, mutual support, and moral 
heroism” (Blake and Homosexuality 132). With this design, Blake suggests 
that the revolution against tyranny is not only a “Mental Fight” against the 
Urizenic portion in one’s mentality, but also a process of self-annihilation in 
the form of sexual violence that combines terror and orgasmic ecstasy. Once 
again, bodily sex is synthesised with Blake’s Christian revisionism, which 
recapitulates his idea that sacredness is accessed through eroticism that 
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drastically alter human subjectivity and selfhood.   
     Other two examples of Blake’s “obscene sublimity” are the full-page 
illustration of the lines from Plate 22: “And Los behind me stood; a terrible 
flaming Sun: just close / Behind my back; I turned round in terror, and 
behold” (22.6-7), and the full-page design of Plate 39: “Urizen faints in terror 
striving among the Books of Arnon / With Miltons Spirit” (39.53-54). Both 
visual images feature two male figures of straight/high and bending/low 
postures respectively. Some critics have noticed the possible action of 
homosexual fellatio in this arrangement (Essick and Viscomi 33; Blake and 
Homosexuality 133; Woodman 84; Sha 203). The first design depicts Los 
standing in the flaming sun, his head leaning upon the left hand and his legs 
spreading open (see Figure 8 on page 112). The figure of Blake himself 
squats with his legs forming a twisted triangle that resembles Bromion’s and 
Theotormon’s orgasmic postures in Visions. He turns his head backward and 
upward, positioned right at the pubic area of Los. In this crucial moment of 
inspiration when Los “kissed me and wishd me health. / And I became One 
Man with him arising in my strength” (22.11-12), Blake once again 
demonstrates with this visual design that the aesthetic experience of “Poetic 
Genius” is in essence an erotic experience. Particularly, this erotic 
experience is different from the unilateral sex confined in heteronormativity. 
The second full-page design of Plate 39 shows a gender-ambiguous figure 
with long hair and in white robe swooning on the standing naked Milton (see 
Figure 9 on page 113). This depiction can be regarded as the result of the 
struggle on Plate 16 (Blake and Homosexuality 139). In this design, Urizen 
surrenders to Milton and puts his head at the latter’s pubic area, though the 
implication of oral sex here is not as strong and obvious as the Los-Blake 
plate.  
     In the illustrations of the Book of Job and the designs of Milton, Blake 
demonstrates “the Sublime of the Bible” with the homoerotic interaction and 
power relationship between the dominant and the submissive. Homosexuality 
in Blake’s time was generally considered scandalous and obscene, and in 
legal terms was criminalised as sodomy. Randolph Trumbach’s research 
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shows that from the eighteenth century to the first half of the nineteenth 
century, there were more men sentenced to death for sodomy than in the 
past six hundred years in Holland and England (“Sodomitical Assaults” 408). 
However, there were some nuances in what constituted the obscenity of 
sodomy. The archetype of libertine from the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, whose image is partly inspired by Renaissance Humanist self-
sufficiency and erudition, is often depicted as bisexual: “with a whore on one 
arm and a boy on the other” (“Sodomy Transformed” 111). Thus, according to 
Trumbach, adult males who followed the archetype of libertine by seducing 
adolescents are scandalous but in a somewhat seductive and charismatic 
way. In this homosexual relationship, these men still play the conventional 
active role in control of their young victims, who are regarded as feminine 
because of their state of pre-puberty. Their young victims’ unique innocence 
and gender ambiguity also constitute an alternative taste of refinement and 
delicacy.43 The moral condemnation, therefore, is not against the active men 
in a homosexual relationship, but is hurled on “the effeminate sodomite” or 
“molly,” an “adult man who was effeminate in speech, gesture, and dress, 
and who was really half man, half woman” (“Sodomy Transformed” 106). The 
dichotomy between masculinity and femininity in the eighteen century is also 
embedded in political ideologies. In The Independent Man, Matthew 
McCormack examines the sexualised rhetoric of politics in the Georgian 
England. His research demonstrates that an idealised citizenship relies on its 
quality of independence—a synthesis of physical strength, familial value 
based on fatherhood, civic Humanism, and classical republicanism. Such a 
masculine quality is actualised by patriotism, devotion to public issues, and 
resistance to aristocratic culture of luxury, in strong contrast to the negative 
effeminate image of un-Englishness (especially French), passivity, delicacy, 
and decadence (McCormack 104-139). The combination of political 
                                                
43 Richard Sha surveys eighteen-century anatomical treatises by John Hunter, whose works 
were known to Blake as he appears as a character in the latter’s An Island in the Moon 
(Damon199), and Andrew Bell. His study shows that in contemporary biological thinking, 
before puberty (legally fourteen in male and twelve in female) there is only one sex which is 
feminine, and after puberty the secondary sexual differentiation emerges to bring forth 
masculine features for boys (Sha 107-124).   
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ideologies and gender roles, which is highly associated with national identity, 
reinforces the sense of otherness, alienation, and obscenity in those who 
transgress the gender boundary.  
     In Blake’s illustrations and designs of homoeroticism, we can find clues 
of feminisation that constitutes the sense of obscene passivity in “effeminate 
sodomites” in the eighteenth-century British society. In “Job’s Evil Dreams,” 
Job’s gesture of powerless resistance against violation and his trancelike 
facial expression put him in the female position that resembles Fuseli’s “The 
Nightmare,” in which the woman’s dream is also intruded by a ghost-like 
horse and a vicious incubus in a highly erotic manner. Job, a hero that 
represents utmost faith in God and perseverance against suffering in 
Christian tradition, is recast by Blake as a feminised victim ravished by his 
beloved God. In the illustration of Plate 39 of Milton, Milton holds the 
collapsing Urizen, who is also depicted with feminised traits; his clearly 
thinner waist, rather tender bodily contour, and his white robe are all in 
contrast with Milton’s upright and muscular masculinity. In the illustration of 
Plate 22, Blake’s own figure is also imbued with gender ambiguity. The act of 
fellatio emphasises the power positions in sexual interaction, as in cases of 
contemporary sodomy, oral sex was more often performed by the effeminate 
and passive adolescents on their adult and masculine partners. Also, Blake’s 
portrayal of himself, as Hobson also perceives, show “no genitals or with 
female genitals, as some faint lines in the position of labia suggest” (135). 
Morton D. Paley is right in pointing out that Blake differs from other 
contemporary theorists on the sublime by “locating the sublime in the 
energies of humanity itself, and so making it part of his dialectic of liberation” 
(Energy and Imagination 24). But aside from the positive aspiration for 
liberation, Blake’s “sublimity of the human body” also insinuates the 
negativity and “obscenity” of identity subversion. Blake’s deliberate depictions 
of homosexuality and effeminate male bodies in these designs of “the 
Sublime of the Bible” reflect the concept of obscenity not with male-to-male 
sex itself, but with the subversion of contemporary gender roles: the 
degradation of masculinity. Blake makes such transsexuality an essential 
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component in the experiences of religious vision, mental struggles against a 
fallen self, and poetic inspiration. Apart from these visual images, Blake’s text 
in the Bard’s Song in Book I of Milton also displays this unique obscene 
sublimity of transsexuality.                                   
     Milton’s errors in Paradise Lost include giving Satan the poetic energy 
and making him the revolutionary hero of sexual liberation against political 
and religious oppressions, represented by Angel and God, about whom 
Milton “wrote in fetters” (CPPB 35). Therefore, one of Blake’s major tasks in 
composing Milton is to restore Satan and God to their rightful places. This 
task is contained in Blake’s endeavour to promote “the Sublime of the Bible,” 
declared in the Preface. The proper poetic presentation of the biblical 
sublime is one of the central concerns of Blake’s revisionism in Milton, and 
once again he engages Burke’s influential discourse in terms of the 
characterisation of Satan. In A Philosophical Enquiry, Burke refers to Milton’s 
portrayal of Satan in Book 1 of Paradise Lost in the section about obscurity. 
Milton’s Satan displays “excess / Of glory obscured: as when the sun new 
ris’n / Looks through the horizontal misty air” (Paradise Lost 1.593-594) and 
exemplifies Burke’s point that “It is our ignorance of things that causes all our 
admiration, and chiefly excites our passions” (Enquiry 61). In Milton, on the 
contrary, Satan appears “with incomparable mildness” and “most endearing 
love” (7.4-5). During his struggle with Los and Palamabron, Blake’s 
description of him is filled with the word “mild,” and its variants such as 
“mildly,” “mildest,” and “mildness.” And tears are Satan’s most frequent 
accompaniment of argument, as we see “Satan wept, / And mildly cursing 
Palamabron” (7.33-34) and “back return’d to Los, not fill’d with vengeance 
but with tears” (8.6). In addition to recording his personal fight with Hayley in 
an allegorical manner, Blake recasts Satan, the archetypal demon, to the 
position of villain by depriving him of all masculine qualities. With his “youth 
and beauty” and mild manners, Satan is no longer a spectacle of the sublime 
for readers to behold in awe and fear, but is virtually closer to Burke’s 
description of the beautiful: “For sublime objects are vast in their dimensions, 
beautiful ones comparatively small; beauty should be smooth, and polished; 
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the great, rugged and negligent” (Enquiry 124). Burke’s division of the 
sublime the beautiful, as discussed in the introduction, reflects the fixed 
characteristics of gender roles in the eighteenth-century society. Considering 
aesthetic value, he obviously holds higher esteem of the sublime than the 
beautiful. Blake deliberately conforms to Burke’s division and evaluation of 
the two kinds of aesthetics and categorise Satan into the lower one. 
Furthermore, he enhances Satan’s femininity by juxtaposing it with masculine 
sublimity of natural terror and human sacrifice (represented by Meloch’s fires) 
in the subsequent lines: “They [the Genii of Satan’s Mills] Plow’d in tears! 
incessant pourd Jehovahs rain, & Molechs / Thick fires contending with the 
rain thunder’d above rolling / Terrible over their heads; Satan wept over 
Palamabron” (8.27-29).             
     In her crucial confession before the Great Solemn Assembly, Leutha 
admits that she enters Satan’s mentality every night and  
          Like sweet perfumes I stupefied the masculine perceptions 
          And kept only the feminine awake. hence rose his soft 
          Delusory love to Palamabron: admiration join’d with envy 
          Cupidity unconquerable! (12.5-8) 
From one perspective, Blake’s characterisation of Leutha’s origin from 
“Satans inmost Palace of his nervous fine wrought Brain” (12.41) derives 
from the birth of her counterpart, Sin, in Paradise Lost. Blake’s description of 
Luetha’s birth—“back the Gnomes recoil’d / And call’d me Sin, and for a sign 
portentous held me” (12.39-41)—is almost identical to Milton’s: “Back they 
recoiled afraid / At first and called me ‘Sin’ and for a sign / Portentous held 
me” (Paradise Lost 2.759-761). However, Leutha in Milton is no longer the 
she-monster, “Voluminous and vast, a serpent armed / With mortal sting” 
(Paradise Lost 2.652-653), whose womb is ceaselessly gnawed by her own 
deformed children—an incestuous rape that parallels her relationship with 
Satan. As George points out, Leutha’s repentance indicates that “Women in 
Blake are often more flexible than men . . . quicker to see their mistakes and 
to work to redeem themselves” (163). Leutha’s plea is accepted by the Great 
Solemn Assembly and her sin is exonerated, unlike her counterpart in 
Paradise Lost, who follows Satan to his unredeemable downfall. Although 
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Leutha does bring forth a child also named Death, he is a “shadowy Spectre 
of Sleep” in Beulah, which is the realm of dream and subconscious that 
symbolises temporary repose (Damon 43). He does not suffer the same fate 
as his monstrous and incestuous counterpart in Paradise Lost, who is in “The 
other shape / . . . stood as night, / Fierce as ten furies, terrible as Hell / And 
shook a dreadful dart” (2.666, 670-672). Burke regards Death’s terror of 
obscurity in these lines as highly sublime (Enquiry 59), but it is neutralised 
and diminished by Blake in Milton. The characterisation of Leutha, as George 
also observes, might suggest that Blake is more forgiving to the female 
errors, in contrast to Milton, who “rigidly rejected the redemptive aspect of the 
feminine, even though he tried to include it in Paradise Lost” (163).      
     However, from another perspective free from the Miltonic allusions, 
despite emerging as an independent character, Leutha in Blake’s mythical 
system is only an “Emanation,” the female aspect, of Satan. Blake considers 
the unfallen “human form divine” primarily androgynous in mentality. 
However, this harmonious state is not of gender equality, but is dominated by 
its male aspect, as Mellor and Susan Fox have underlined and criticised. As 
an overstepping female aspect, Leutha usurps the male dominance in 
Satan’s mind and generates his “Delusory love to Palamabron.” This design 
again reflects the contemporary idea of homosexuality as a result of the 
breakdown of masculine identity. Such a breakdown makes a man succumb 
to the unconventional desire of playing an effeminate role in his sexual 
psyche and his relationship with others. Therefore, though Hobson maintains 
that Leutha’s guilt is driven by a sense of shame and fear for sexual desire in 
a more general sense that Blake intends to criticise, and that Blake harbours 
a more positive attitude to homosexual love, it is still perceivable that for 
Blake, the subversion of conventional gender roles of masculinity and 
femininity, such as Satan’s feminisation, causes chaos that is almost beyond 
redemption. 
     The Bard’s Song brings Milton a painful epiphany that “I in my Selfhood 
am that Satan: I am that Evil One!” (14.30). It inspires him to annihilate this 
Satanic portion in his mentality by descending to the material world and 
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reunite with his Sixfold Emanation (his three wives and three daughters) 
embodied by Ololon, a twelve-year-old virgin. In Milton, Blake shows his 
righteous goal to emancipate Milton (and himself) from Satan’s hypocrisy—
“Seeming a brother, being a tyrant, even thinking himself a brother / While he 
is murdering the just” (7.22-23)—that symbolises patronage’s harmful effects 
on artistic creation. However, he inevitably manipulates the gender 
stereotypes of femininity, which is obscene if it emerges in men, as a crucial 
component of that hypocrisy. And Milton’s lofty self-annihilation entails his 
removal of this Satanic feminine propensity, reinforcing his patriarchal 
stability in his later reunion with Ololon. In her first appearance, Ololon 
prostrates before Milton, “asking with tears forgiveness / Confessing their 
crime with humiliation and sorrow” (35.32-33), and throws herself “[i]nto the 
Fires of Intellect” to unite with him (42.9). Ololon’s first action recreates the 
action of Milton’s first wife, Mary Powell, who begged forgiveness after she 
ran away because of (as Milton perceived) her lack of interest and intellectual 
capacity in appreciating and participating in her husband’s works.44 Her 
second action into “the Fires of Intellect” can be interpreted as her elevation 
to the poetic inspiration of her husband, but it might also be read as she 
succumbing again to the male superiority of a national bard—a downright 
masculine image who “in terrible majesty” says to Ololon: “Obey thou the 
Words of the Inspired Man” (40.29). 
     Blake’s casting of Ololon as “a Virgin of twelve years” also draws critical 
attention. Damon and George both regard “twelve years” as a sign of 
puberty, which means she is capable of sexual experience and procreation 
(Damon 279; George 175; Essick and Viscomi 196). Paley provides a new 
explanation that Blake draws the idea from the apocryphal Protoevangelium 
Jacobi, modelling Ololon on Virgin Mary in her youth. Virginity is hardly a 
virtue that Blake espouses, for it is cherished and kept by religious doctrines 
                                                
44 In The Early Lives of Milton, Helen Darbishire records the reconciliation between Milton 
and Mary: “the Wife was ready in another Room, and on a sudden he was surprised to see 
one whom he thought to have never seen more, making Submission and begging Pardon on 
her Knees before him; he might probably at first make some shew of aversion and rejection; 
but partly his own generous nature, more inclinable to Reconciliation than to perseverance in 
Anger and Revenge” (66-67). 
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of repression, resulting in “the rewards of continence” and “The self enjoyings 
of self denial” (Visions 7.8-9). Blake’s characterisation of Ololon as a twelve-
year-old virgin insinuates an erotic (or pornographic in a modern 
understanding) sense that emphasises both her sexual innocence and her 
potential to receive male desire. In other words, “twelve-year-old virginity” is 
a state more than suitable for Milton to take advantage of in his attempt to 
reincorporate her into his poetical/sexual enterprise. Hence, it is 
understandable that Blake is more vulnerable to feminist criticism in his later 
works such as Milton, as he moves towards a more conservative position in 
his later career, in regard of gender roles and their supposed qualities that 
are regulated by social conventions. 
     In this chapter, I have demonstrated how Blake’s poetic rendering of 
erotic images correspond to the idea of obscenity as an aesthetic 
phenomenon of self-annihilation of identities, social and biological. In “I saw a 
chapel all of gold” the images of the vomiting serpent and the swine-
consorting speaker signify the essential experience of the sacred accessed 
through transgression and erotic ecstasy instead of purity and wholeness. In 
Visions of the Daughters of Albion, Blake draws from the biological and 
philosophical discourses from his contemporaries such as Erasmus Darwin, 
Samuel-Auguste Tissot, and Jacques Rousseau, presenting heterogeneous 
sexual orientations that subvert the social identities confined in monogamous 
marriage. At last, in his later epic attempt to rectify his greatest precursor, we 
find the Blakean obscene engaging the Burkean sublime, extending the 
breakdown of self and identity to the more essentialist category of gender 
roles. The text and visual designs in Milton: a Poem, along with his 
illustrations of the Book of Job, though inevitably promoting a more 
conservative attitude toward femininity, still demonstrate the degradation of 
masculinity and potential transsexuality. The sexual dynamics in this self-
annihilating subversion conveys what Richard Sha terms as “an eroticized 
aesthetics” of the Romantic sublimity, in which “the rapture of erotic pleasure 
takes the self outside of cognition, and breaks it into fragments” (154). The 
next chapter will further explore this obscene aesthetics in the works of Percy 
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Figure 5. “The Vision of Eliphaz.” Illustrations to the Book of Job, 1821 




Figure 6. “Job’s Evil Dream.” Illustrations of the Book of Job, 1821 
 (Morgan Library and Museum) 








Figure 8. Illustration of Plate 22, Milton: a Poem, Copy A, 1811 (British Museum) 
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Percy Bysshe Shelley: 
Incest, Suffering, and Madness 
 
INTRODUCTION:  
THE RECONCILIATION OF THE TWO DRIVES IN A DEFENCE OF POETRY 
      
     Among the Romantics examined in this research, Shelley is the only 
one who gives a specific account of the idea of obscenity as certain 
representations in literary works. In A Defence of Poetry, Shelley laments that 
tragedy in his age has become “a weak attempt to teach certain doctrines . . . 
which are usually no more than specious flatteries of some gross vice” and 
“hymns to the triumph of kingly power over liberty and virtue” (MW 685).45 
Following this complaint, he observes that, in contemporary comedy, 
“obscenity” is a crucial element of degradation, a “blasphemy against the 
divine beauty in life” (685). Shelley’s definition of the obscene is closely 
connected with his consideration of poetry as a positive drive in society. At a 
deeper level, Shelley’s understanding of the obscene is inextricably linked 
with his idea of the essence of poetry. The re-visitation of the Defence that I 
offer here will uncover what is hidden behind Shelley’s dismissal of the 
obscene as both a decadent form of artistic representation and that which is 
in utter opposition to poetry. Shelley’s dismissal resonates with the 
eighteenth-century juxtaposition of the obscene and the sublime as polarised 
aesthetics, but it also connotes an actual affinity with my formulation of “the 
obscene” as a heterogeneous aesthetic phenomenon. I have already 
demonstrated this formulation in my reading of Blake. “The obscene” as a 
heterogeneous aesthetic phenomenon can also be explored in Shelley’s The 
Cenci and Laon and Cythna, as this chapter will demonstrate.   
     Shelley opens the Defence by addressing the division between reason 
and imagination, a demarcation that seems common in the Romantic context 
as a Wordsworthian espousal of poetry as “spontaneous overflow of powerful 
                                                
45 All quotations from A Defence of Poetry and The Cenci are from The Major Works (Oxford 
UP, 2009) edited by Zachary Leader and Michael O’Neill, hereafter referred to as MW. 
Quotations from Laon and Cythna and other poetics works are from The Complete Poetical 
Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley (Clarendon, 1975) edited by Neville Rogers. 
 116 
feelings” against the Neo-classicist rationalism and formality. Shelley uses 
two Greek words to describe these “two classes of mental action” (MW 674): 
τό λογιζειν (reasoning) and τό ποιεϊν (making). Paralleling Nietzsche’s 
formulation, the former is Apollonian; it represents the “principle of analysis 
and its action regards the relations of things.” The latter is Dionysian; it 
epitomises the “principle of synthesis; and has for its objects those forms 
which are common to universal nature and existence itself” (674). The 
disparity between reason and imagination that Shelley proposes in the 
Defence is not limited to the conflict between sensuality (or passion) and 
rationalism, but is instead concerned more broadly the essential human 
faculty of perception—with the ability to distinguish an object from another 
and to establish an identity by differentiating self from others. Reason, for 
Shelley, is a means to construct boundaries for individuals that “respect 
differences.” Shelley’s idea predates his contemporary Arthur 
Schopenhauer’s concept of principium individuationis, that is, the “principle of 
individuation,” which, Nietzsche maintains is best embodied in the Apollonian 
art of sculpture—the art of delineation that highlights proportion and restraint. 
Imagination, on the contrary, is about seeing “the similitude of things;” thus, it 
is a means to annihilate the boundary between self and others. As Kathleen 
Wheeler’s study has foregrounded the similarity between Shelley’s idea of 
poetry and Nietzsche’s construal of philosophy and truth, I would further 
highlight their similar understandings of artistic imagination.46 To some 
                                                
46 In Romanticism, Pragmatism and Deconstruction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), Wheeler 
argues that in writing poetry, Shelley regards “metaphor as the vehicle for knowledge” and 
rejects “earlier accounts of imagination as a merely expressive or representative faculty or 
already constituted perceptions (8). On the contrary, in the process of imagining “a unity is 
created which releases new and previously unimagined relations”; moreover, in this process, 
and knowledge “is continuously expanding and rearranging itself as central elements are 
pushed to the periphery, while previously periphery unknown elements becomes centres and 
foci of knowledge” (8). Nietzsche’s philosophical writing corresponds to this process of 
imagination. His aphoristic style is based on metaphorical mechanism and renounces “the 
notion of systems of thought and logical chains of reasoning, substituting instead rhetorical, 
figurative, metaphoric language, accompanied by sharp, stimulating, and disturbing jabs at 
the reader” (16). According to Wheeler, Nietzsche’s concept of knowledge and truth not as 
an immovable thing-in-itself but as “a process of incessant appropriation, figuration, 
deciphering, or interpretation” (19) also parallels Shelley’s understanding of knowledge and 
the universe as “genuinely organic, in the sense of continuously evolving in unpredictable 
and unimaginable ways” with “indeterminate growth and transformation as a major character 
of existence” (5).  
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extent, Shelley’s perception of imagination resembles what Nietzsche 
describes in The Birth of Tragedy as Dionysian intoxication, a state of 
ecstasy in which the ability to recognise differences between self and other is 
disabled, and in which “the gulfs between man and man give to an 
overwhelming feeling of unity leading back to the very heart of nature” 
(Nietzsche 59).   
     As a Romantic poet, Shelley elevates imagination over reason: 
“Reason is to Imagination as the instrument to the agent, as the body to the 
spirit, as the shadow to the substance.” He adds that “Poetry, in a general 
sense, may be defined to be ‘the expression of the Imagination’” (MW 675). 
As Wheeler also observes, Shelley “saw imagination not as the special 
province of the artist but as the paradigmatic form of all human mental 
activity” (4). Wheeler complements this with the note that, for Shelley, it is 
“the poet and poetry which lead to truth and knowledge, by means of the 
synthetic power of imagination (as opposed to the merely analytical 
understanding) and its vehicle, metaphor” (4). However, the question inferred 
from this evaluation and its connection with the Greek division between the 
Apollonian τό λογιζειν and Dionysian τό ποιεϊν is: How does Shelley deal with 
the potential threat of self-annihilation and identity loss in the operation of 
imagination?47 After constructing poetry’s formulation as a three-stage 
process of human mentality—existence, perception, and expression—in 
which a certain sense of eternal harmony and beauty reigns over temporary 
discordance, Shelley announces his attempt to “estimate its effects upon 
society” (MW 680). In the ancient times, as Shelley maintains, poetry is 
tinged with a certain religiosity that transcends the mundane world: “it acts in 
a divine and unapprehended manner, beyond and above consciousness” 
(680). Shelley extends his previous idea of imagination as a human drive 
                                                
47 This is also a danger foreseen long ago by Plato in Ion as the premise of artistic 
inspiration. In the dialogue between Socrates and Ion, Plato proposes, through Socrates, 
that poets create their work “because they are inspired and possessed” and because “they 
are not in their right mind”; a poet “cannot compose until he is possessed and out of his 
mind, and his reason is no longer in him” (5). This discourse aims to devaluate poetry as 
something created not by real “skill or art” but rather by an irrational fancy that alienates itself 
farther from the primary metaphysical truth.  
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regardless of reason’s function of differentiation by arguing that the divine 
quality of poetry goes beyond consciousness. Conjuring an image of the poet 
as a nightingale in darkness, he illustrates that the poet’s “auditors” are 
“entranced by the melody of an unseen musician, who feel that they are 
moved and softened, yet know not whence or why” (680). If we carefully 
observe Shelley’s word choices in this account, we can discern that poetry 
stands for an alternative realm to that material world that is perceptible to the 
human senses. Poetry’s origin of pleasure is unknown and cannot be named, 
which means it has transcended the epistemological order of human 
knowledge and is not controlled by the power of interpretation. This construal 
of the poetic imagination resonates with William Hazlitt’s anti-epistemological 
notion of poetry in “On Poetry in General,” in which he holds that “The 
province of the imagination is principally visionary, the unknown and 
undefined,” adding, “It is the undefined and uncommon that gives birth and 
scope to the imagination; we can only fancy what we do not know” (Selected 
Writings 318). In other words, the state of appreciating poetry is a sort of 
“trance,” “transport,” and “fancy” in which pre-existing identities are dissolved 
and forgotten. This is one of the key elements in the sphere of Nietzsche’s 
Dionysian intoxication, Bataille’s l’érotisme sacré, and the self-shattering 
obscenity. For Shelley, if poetry is based on this mysterious state of 
unearthliness and self-oblivion—a state that resonates with “the obscene” 
phenomenon observed in the eighteenth-century theological documents—
how does it positively affects human society? Or, in Shelley’s own words, 
how does it “contribute to the happiness and perfection of man” (683)?  
     For Shelley, the key to harnessing the dangerous state of imagination 
that borders on chaos is morality, a word, which, in its conventional sense, is 
perhaps incompatible with the very tenet of Romantic poetry, as we see 
Blake’s constant attacks on “Moral Laws” that represent both political and 
religious oppressions. Undoubtedly, Shelley has his own interpretation of true 
morality against the conventional moral doctrines that are in fact “specious 
flatteries of some gross vice” (MW 685). As he illustrates in the Defence, a 
poet cannot directly preach what is morally right and what is not. If he does 
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so, he is imitating the tyrannical Jehovah who decrees the Ten 
Commandments. Moreover, for Shelley, it is a misunderstanding that the 
primary aim of poetry is to “produce the moral improvement of man” (681). 
Instead of moral doctrines and social conventions, Shelley’s cosmological 
system has concealed in it an ultimate phenomenon of truth and beauty that 
can only be unveiled through poetry. The perception of such a phenomenon 
is processed by the human’s “a thousand unapprehended combinations of 
thought” to make “familiar objects be as if they were not familiar” (681). In 
Shelley’s view, beauty, in addition to being manifested in natural grandeur, is 
demonstrated within the positive interaction among human beings. That 
interaction, as Shelley maintains, is the “great secret of morals”—“Love” 
(682).  
     Love, for Shelley, is a possible solution to the problematic loss of self in 
the operation of imagination, which tends to dissolve the boundary between 
self and others established by reason. Shelley deems the breakdown of the 
boundary to be the origin of sympathy. That is, he believes that through 
imagination we execute “a going out of our own nature,” and that by 
annihilating self and pre-existing identity we can identify with others around 
us. This is because, for “[a] man to be greatly good,” he “must put himself in 
the place of another and many others; the pains and pleasures of his species 
must become his own” (682).48 Such is the “therapeutic” drive in English 
Romanticism, especially in Shelley’s works: to “heal the division between 
mind and world, subject and object, citizen and the state, that the radical 
Enlightenment had forced open (Roberts 50). Hugh Roberts further 
postulates that for Shelley, “by expanding our identity to the circumference of 
the circle we (therapeutically) dilate our being to a heightened self-
consciousness; the individual self-consciousness is merely the self-
conscious moment of an integral larger whole, ranging, in Shelley’s imagery, 
from a pair of friends and lovers, through the state, to, at least in glimpses, 
                                                
48 Adam Smith, in Part 1 of his The Theory of Moral Sentiments, also emphasises the 
significant role of imagination in the operation of sympathy: “Though our brother is upon the 
rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our senses will never inform us of what he 
suffers. They never did, and never can, carry us beyond our own person, and it is by the 
imagination only that we can form any conception of what are his sensations” (11).   
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the Absolute” (110). In the face of human suffering, Shelley’s account of 
sympathy differs from Burke, who believes that God gives human beings 
pleasure in viewing others’ misery in order to prevent them from shunning the 
misery and also to impede the disintegration of society. For Burke, the 
function of sympathy is to secure social harmony and political stability, which 
denotes his conservatism and pragmatism. For Shelley, sympathy is not 
decreed by God, but is rather an inherent human emotion that is evoked by 
imagination. Moreover, sympathy is freed from external rules; that is, human 
beings show sympathy to others because it is their nature to love and to pity, 
not because certain social norms command them to. Shelleyean sympathy, 
as Roberts argues, also stems from the “therapeutic” drive to extend 
selfhood to encompass the external world and to reunify subject and object, 
whose division is caused by the Enlightenment rationalism.49 Also, Shelley’s 
emphasis on positive affections as an innate human quality rather than as 
constituted by external orders resounds with Blake’s religious ideal of inner 
divinity—the “human form divine”—against an exterior Urizenic sky-god, 
because “All deities reside in the human breast” (CPPB 38).  
     In both “On Love” and the Defence, we can notice Shelley’s 
endeavours to internalise morality as “Love” and to connect it to artistic 
imagination, the basis of poetical creation. Furthermore, he attempts to 
render this “internal goodness” and poetical beauty responsive to the hidden 
divinity of harmony in his cosmological order, which, as he aspires, is an 
ideal replacement of the despotic God worshipped in institutionalised 
Christianity. In short, Shelley aims to contain the negativity of self-oblivion 
and self-annihilation in poetic imagination. In addition, he strives to neutralise 
the potential danger for lunacy and chaos in the poetic imagination by 
arguing for love and sympathy as the essential components of poetry. He 
synthesises such a formulation of poetry with his conception of the world, or 
his view of secular religiosity and politics. Through poetry, human beings can 
                                                
49 As Roberts postulates, “the core of the Enlightenment project as the theoretical or 
analytical ‘separation,’” whose origin lies in Descartes’s idea of “disengaged subject” that 
“initiates the divorce between mind and world, individual and ‘tradition,’ subject and object” 
(33). 
 121 
reflect in their hearts “only the forms of purity and brightness,” an inner 
“Paradise which pain and sorrow and evil dare not overleap” (“On Love” MW 
632). Through poetry, Shelley aspires to realise this inner Paradise in the 
material world, which he believes ought to evolve continuously towards 
perfection—towards a prophesied realm of love, freedom, and equality. This 
is an ideology shared by William Godwin in An Enquiry Concerning Political 
Justice, who likewise proposes a “state of perpetual progress” (104) and 
argues that the evil of humanity lies in “supposing a change impracticable, 
and not incessantly looking forward to its accomplishment” (47). In the 
Defence, to reinforce his synthesis of love/sympathy, poetry, and an ideal 
society, Shelley assiduously emphasises the positive aspect of creating and 
appreciating poetry: “beauty,” “pleasure,” “happiness,” and “delight.” The 
frequency with which he repeats these words lends the work an exhortative 
tone. And yet, his repetitive affirmation of poetry’s positive social effects 
paradoxically reflects his awareness of and anxiety about poetry’s darker 
side. Indeed, this is first implied at the beginning of the Defence when he 
presents his idea of imagination as a boundary-dissolving and self-
annihilating drive. He then constantly indicates the same in his accounts of 
poetry as an entity that transcends will and consciousness: “Poetry is not like 
reasoning, a power to be exerted according to the determination of the 
will . . . the conscious portions of our nature are unprophetic either of its 
approach or its departure” (MW 696-697).  
     Thus, the Defence essentially reveals Shelley’s struggle to reconcile 
two aspects in poetry: one is reified by love and sympathy to envision a 
better state of the material world, despite his constant rejection of didacticism 
and his assertion that poetry serves no moral purposes; the other is 
insinuated by obscurity, unknowingness, anti-will, and unconsciousness. 
Shelley’s efforts to contain the latter in the former in order to justify the 
cruciality of poetry to human happiness is well established in the Defence. 
Equally well established is his desire to achieve this reconciliation in an effort 
to assert poets’ status as “the unacknowledged legislators of the World” (MW 
701). In these regards, Shelley is arguing for a kind of poetry that is “socially 
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positive”: “Poetry turns all things to loveliness: it exalts the beauty of that 
which is most beautiful, and it adds beauty to that which is most deformed” 
(MW 698). However, the extent to which Shelley’s unilateral generalisation of 
poetry is really displayed in his artistic creation is arguable. 
     In the Defence, Shelley regards Milton as a supreme poetic figure who 
“stood alone illuminating an age unworthy of him” (MW 685). Shelley 
considers Milton’s age to be one in which poetry and drama were imbued 
with “Obscenity, which is ever blasphemy against the divine beauty in life” 
(685-686). Obscenity is also a veiled monster “for which the corruption of 
society forever brings forth new food, which it devours in secret” (685-686). 
Shelley further reasons that the obscene goes beyond the scope of direct 
erotic depictions; it is an alternative method of artistic representation that 
perceives “the corruption of society,” or the obscured evil sides of the human 
world. The obscene is also empowered by its indirect and suggestive—
“veiled”—artistic representation, as it “becomes, from the very veil it 
assumes, more active if less disgusting” (686). Social corruption, according 
to Shelley, provides materials for obscenity as an alternative form of art and 
literature. And yet, Shelley does not offer any concrete examples of social 
corruption, such as religious oppression or political despotism. Instead, he 
defines it abstractly and metaphysically as something that aims to 
“extinguish . . . the sensibility to pleasure, passion and natural scenery” 
(687), adding that it “begins at the imagination and the intellect as at the 
core, and distributes itself thence as a paralysing venom, through the 
affections into the very appetites, until all become a torpid mass in which 
sense hardly survives” (687). Shelley’s word choices of “paralysing venom” 
and “a torpid mass” undergird his argument that poetic imagination is free 
from the restraint of will and consciousness. The state resulting from social 
corruption, “in which hardly sense survives,” also resounds with the state of 
Dionysian τό ποιεϊν, where the Apollonian τό λογιζειν and the “principle of 
individuation” are absent. That is, the idea of obscenity fertilised by social 
corruption can thus be considered another aspect of artistic representation 
existing in poetry. Shelley recognises such an “obscene” existence in poetry 
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and indeed he seems determined to reject it in his poetical idealism in the 
Defence. In spite of this, I argue that it is the very “obscene” poetics that he 
seeks to dispel in the Defence, much more than the poetics of love and 
sympathy, that constitutes the major aesthetic impetus in The Cenci and 
Laon and Cythna.  
     Referring to the poetical power in Paradise Lost, Shelley shares a 
similar evaluation with Blake in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, holding 
that “Nothing can exceed the energy and magnificence of the character of 
Satan as expressed in Paradise Lost” and maintaining that “Milton’s Devil as 
a moral being is as far superior to his God” (691-692). This is so even though 
Shelley believes Milton can never “have been intended for the popular 
personification of evil” (691). The disparity between authorial intention and 
the reader’s interpretation concerning Paradise Lost that Shelley senses here 
is recapitulated in the case of Count Cenci and Beatrice in The Cenci. I argue 
that Beatrice, with whom Shelley aims to manifest his poetical ideal of love 
and sympathy, fails to actualise this Shelleyan ideal and is poetically 
outshone by the character of the count. Her villainous and incestuous father, 
on the other hand, powerfully demonstrates the “obscene” aspect of poetry—
the aesthetic phenomenon of utter assimilation against individual will, against 
consciousness, against love and sympathy, against social identities, and the 
bonds/boundaries between them—that Shelley is so resolved to dismiss in 
the Defence.  
      
THE POETIC DESIGNS OF INCEST IN THE CENCI 
 
     In his 1908 monograph A Study of Shelley’s Drama The Cenci, one of 
the earliest modern studies of Shelley’s play of that name, Ernest Sutherland 
Bates points out two major factors that result in critics’ neglect of the play: 
First, the father-daughter incest as a subject matter “is not an attractive or a 
significant theme for the world to-day”; and second, “The Cenci is in its style 
less individually characteristic of the author than is any other of his mature 
works” (1). Its discordance with his other writing might stem from the drama’s 
general dark themes. The play centres on Count Cenci, whose pure 
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malignance surpasses any other antagonist in Shelley’s poetic corpus. 
Cenci’s ultimate triumph is achieved through his murder by Beatrice; the 
daughter’s bloody vengeance (with which she is both morally and 
aesthetically compromised, as I will demonstrate later) is starkly opposed to 
Shelley’s belief in love, sympathy, non-violence, and forgiveness. Over the 
course of the twentieth century, however, neither of the factors that Bates 
highlights have prevented critics from approaching Shelley’s play. Indeed, the 
motif of incest in The Cenci has become one of its most fervently discussed 
topics. Scholars have likewise ruminated on the play’s incompatibility with 
Shelley’s other major works. 
     Echoing to Bates’s argument, critical consensus in early Shelley studies 
is that The Cenci is not performable. And yet, as Kenneth N. Cameron and 
Horst Frenz show in their essay, a considerable number of productions 
starting in the late nineteenth century seems to counter this academic notion. 
This gap between theory (The Cenci is unperformable) and fact (productions 
were highly popular) underscores the artistic will to resist the fixed norms, to 
actualise “the impossible,” and to witness the consequences, be they 
fortunate or catastrophic. From another perspective, to stage the 
unstageable realises Shelley’s original intention for the play to “make 
apparent some of the most dark and secret caverns of the human heart” 
(MW 315), that is, to show the “obscene/unpresentable” aspects of human 
nature. As my analysis will demonstrate, Shelley’s poetical representation of 
incestuous rape in the play also reflects the issue of staging the unstageable, 
of presenting the unpresentable. Shelley achieves this through his 
suggestive poetics, as well as through his designs of Count Cenci’s other 
atrocities.  
     The very first production of The Cenci was staged by the Shelley 
Society at the Grand Theatre of Islington in May 1886. As Cameron and 
Frenz note, the result of this performance also generated a disparity between 
the audience reception and critical evaluation. The former was 
enthusiastically positive, while the latter confirmed that the play should not 
have been staged. Cameron’s and Frenz’s historical tracing shows the 
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contemporary comments on the production in the Victorian drama circle. 
Regarding the play’s morality, the press and critics denounced The Cenci 
with phrases such as the following: “blood-curdling, horrible, revolting”; “no 
flash of genial humour, no gleam of innocent gaiety”; “Stygian darkness”; and 
“utterly obscene as hardly to bear telling” (qtd. in Cameron and Frenz 1083). 
And yet, the audience enthusiastically received it. If, then, the critics’ 
comments accurately reflect the audience’s psychological reactions to the 
play, we have evidence of humankind’s dark and violent inclinations. To put it 
another way, emotionally the nineteenth-century critics may have taken 
pleasure in watching the horror put on stage (certainly the audience did), but 
their moral consciousness, controlled by the social milieu, compelled them to 
condemn its theatrical representations. The pleasure taken is indeed not a 
“gleam of innocent gaiety,” but a form of negative pleasure of self-annihilation 
evoked by terror and suffering that is associated with the Burkean sublime 
(as discussed in Introduction). The critics cannot name this form of pleasure 
because indulging in it would align their sympathy with Count Cenci and 
would thus cause them to renounce an identity that is affiliated with the 
morals of the civic gentry. The critics’ subjectivity, sustained by a rigid 
adherence to social norms, would be endangered through their dark relishing 
of a play fuelled by Count Cenci’s atrocities upon his children—of a drama 
that stages the “obscene.”          
     Setting him apart from the critics, Shelley himself holds The Cenci in a 
very high esteem. As a work that is vastly distinctive from his other writing, 
he is strongly inclined to see it staged since he believes it would be 
enormously popular. Shelley directly mentions his opinion on the play on 
many occasions. For example, in a letter written to Thomas Love Peacock on 
20 July 1819, Shelley states that The Cenci is “written without any of the 
peculiar feelings & opinions which characterize my other compositions” with 
“the greatest degree of popular effect” (LS 2.102). He also expresses his 
wish to see its production at Covent Garden, and in this case he even 
proposes who should play the main characters: Beatrice was to be played by 
Eliza O’Neil and her father played by Edmund Kean (LS 2.102). In his 
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several letters to the publisher, Charles Ollier, Shelley repeatedly expresses 
his belief in The Cenci as a dramatic composition with the potential for great 
public appeal. “I have two works of some length,” he says in a letter written in 
August 1819, “one of a very popular character” (LS 2.111). In another letter 
written in September of the same year, he states that the play is “calculated 
to produce a very popular effect & totally in a different style from any thing I 
have yet composed” (LS 2.116-117). The word “calculated” that Shelley uses 
to describe his intention in composing The Cenci is striking: In the Defence 
he dismisses certain kinds of poetical works as being corrupted by “scientific 
and economical knowledge” and “concealed by the accumulation of facts and 
calculating processes” (MW 695). In this inferior form, poetry is subdued by 
the will of “Self” and its “calculating faculty,” becoming instead the 
embodiment of “the Mammon of the world” (696). Shelley’s usage of the 
word “calculated” in the letter to Ollier seems to categorise The Cenci as the 
very corrupted and inferior kind of poetry. Furthermore, in the latter part of his 
letter to Peacock, Shelley mentions that he wishes to be anonymous in the 
initial publication of The Cenci. After its success he adds, “I would own it if I 
pleased, & use the celebrity it might acquire to my own purposes” (LS 2.102). 
Shelley’s deliberate anonymity to gain self-interest sounds, to some extent, 
“calculating.” The nature of this play is certainly distinctive in Shelley’s corpus 
as it, ironically, fits his category of “the non-poetic” phenomenon 
circumscribed by rationality and pragmatism. In other words, it consists of the 
“calculating faculties” that are in opposition to his conceptualisation of artistic 
imagination.  
     Shelley’s constant juxtaposition of Prometheus Unbound and The 
Cenci is also worth noticing. In his letter to Ollier on 6 March 1820, Shelley 
writes: “‘Prometheus Unbound’, I must tell you, is my favourite poem; I 
charge you, therefore, specially to pet him and feed him with fine ink and 
good paper. ‘Cenci’ is written for the multitude, and ought to sell well . . . the 
‘Prometheus’ cannot sell beyond twenty copies” (LS 2.174). In another letter 
to Ollier dated 16 February 1821, Shelley remarks, “For ‘Prometheus’ I 
expect and desire no great sale. ‘The Cenci’ ought to have been popular” (LS 
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2.263). When expressing his disappointment about the rejection of The Cenci 
by Covent Garden—“The very Theatre rejected it with expressions of the 
greatest insolence”—Shelley abruptly concludes, “about all this I don’t much 
care. But of all that I have late sent, ‘Prometheus’ is my favourite” (LS 2.181). 
Judging from these letters, Shelley’s opinions of Prometheus Unbound and 
The Cenci indicate a strong self-awareness of the poet’s own artistic 
creations and their positions in both his ideal and the reader/audience 
reception. There is a clear division indicated in these letters between a more 
transcending and otherworldly poetic sphere and a more secular, material 
one of popular appeal. Respecting aesthetic evaluation, Shelley undoubtedly 
holds the former in higher esteem. In other words, Prometheus Unbound and 
The Cenci are at the remote ends of his poetic spectrum. The former, as 
Jeffrey N. Cox remarks, is a “liberatory drama” that “turns from the violent 
past to embrace a future founded upon forgiveness and passive resistance” 
(“The Dramatist” 81). On the contrary, the latter is a play centring on two 
components: incestuous desire as a means of patriarchal oppression; and a 
bloody and vengeful patricide. It is a form of swift, violent, eye-for-an-eye 
justice that risks falling into the very despotism Shelley himself wishes to 
counter. Moreover, Shelley is fully aware that The Cenci’s sensationalism—
the “obscenity” that feeds on social corruption, which he highlights in the 
Defence—is far more appealing to the general public than the material found 
in Prometheus Unbound. “Calculated to produce a very poplar effect” (LS 
2.116), The Cenci as a poetic/dramatic work is not only an antithesis of 
Prometheus Unbound, but is also a representation of everything that, in the 
Defence, Shelley rejects as “non-poetic.” I do not raise these issues from the 
letters in order to underscore Shelley’s inconsistency. After all, as the 
Defence was written two years later than The Cenci, it is possible that his 
thinking about poetical creation evolved in the interim. My intention is to 
accentuate the unique status of The Cenci, acknowledged not only by critics 
but also by Shelley himself. Such uniqueness lies in the profound disparity 
between Shelley’s authorial intention, fully articulated in the Preface of The 
Cenci and the Defence, and the actual artistic works he presents. The 
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disparity is also deeply correlated with the conflicts between Shelleyan moral 
poetics of love and sympathy supposedly actualised by Beatrice the heroine 
but which, as I shall demonstrate later, Shelley fails to achieve, and the 
“obscene” aesthetics of violence, twisted desire, and sheer malice embodied 
by Shelley’s poetic design of Count Cenci.  
     In Act 1 scene 1, Shelley writes the following lines to lay the foundation 
for Count Cenci’s characterisation: 
          All men delight in sensual luxury, 
          All men enjoy revenge; and most exult 
          Over the tortures they can never feel— 
          Flattering their secret peace with others’ pain. 
          But I delight in nothing else. I love 
          The sight of agony, and the sense of joy, 
          When this shall be another’s, and that mine. 
          And I have no remorse and little fear, 
          Which are, I think, the checks of other men. (1.1.77-85) 
In this passage, we see a typical rascal of seventeenth-century libertinism. 
He is not unlike the titular character in Mozart’s opera Don Giovanni, a 
reinterpretation of the Don Juan legend that Shelley praised, enjoyed, and 
saw three times in 1818.50 Ronald Tetreault notes the opera’s possible 
impact on Shelley’s writing, arguing that the final sextet is similar to the final 
scene of Act 3 of Prometheus Unbound. The final sextet that concludes Don 
Giovanni is generally a passage for the “good” characters to display their 
shock over the evil rapist’s supernatural downfall and to preach the ultimate 
moral, “Questo è il fin di chi fa mal.”51 However, with the exception of its 
1787 premiere in Prague, the productions of Don Giovanni omitted this final 
scene throughout the nineteenth century. It was not restored until the 
twentieth century, at which time it was included in most modern 
                                                
50 Mozart’s Don Giovanni, with the libretto by Lorenzo Da Ponte and premiered in Prague in 
1787, retells the legendary amorous adventure of Don Juan. In the beginning of the opera, 
after attempting to rape Donna Anna, Giovanni kills her father, the Commendatore, who 
comes to defend his daughter’s honour. After a series of attempts to seduce other women 
and to escape justice, Giovanni encounters the stature of the late Commendatore in a 
graveyard. As the stature declares that justice will be done upon him soon, Giovanni 
defiantly invites it to dinner. In the final banquet, the ghost of the Commendatore arrives and 
demands Giovanni’s repentance. The libertine defies the demand and is dragged into Hell.  
51 “Such is always the wretched end of evildoers.” The translations from Don Giovanni’s Italian 
libretto here are all mine.  
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productions.52 Therefore, it is doubtful that Shelley actually saw the final 
scene of Don Giovanni when he attended the opera. Even if he did, it is also 
doubtful that he would have been moved by this obviously didactic ending. 
He would likely have seen it as “a dramatic aftereffect, a reinstatement of 
boring normality,” as Daniel Herwitz comments (121), because in terms of 
dramatic and musical tension, it is inferior to the sublime terror of the 
previous Commendatore scene. As Lydia Goehr and Herwitz both observe, 
the final sextet and ensemble show “a dripping falsetto cheerfulness,” adding 
that “[d]uring the nineteenth century this final scene struck some in the 
musical world as so obviously false that they omitted it entirely, believing the 
opera ended better perishing in D minor” (xv) of the Commendatore scene. 
Hence, I hold a more reserved attitude toward Tereault’s correlation between 
the final sextet-ensemble and Act 3 of Prometheus Unbound, though both 
scenes present the literary convention of restoration from chaos to order.  
     The characterisation of Giovanni himself (achieved through both 
Mozart’s music and Lorenzo Da Ponte’s libretto), I would speculate, has 
more intense impact than the sextet-ensemble on Shelley, who parallels 
Giovanni with Lord Byron in a conversation with Thomas Medwin (Hunt, The 
Autography 295). Indeed, Giovanni’s amorous pursuits, utter contempt for 
social norms, remorseless commitments to sensual enjoyments, and 
defiance against religious authority easily evoke an image of the Byronic 
hero. Consider two compelling lines sung by Giovanni, during the ball scene 
at the end of Act 1: “È aperto a tutti quanti, / Viva la libertà!”53 This 
celebration of equality and freedom (however superficial and ironic, 
considering how frequently he exploits his noble title) in the context of post-
Revolution 1817 is a representation of both the initial revolutionary passion 
and the later violence derived from it. Consider in the same context Count 
Cenci’s championing of “sensual luxury” and his exultation “Over the tortures 
they can never feel” and “secret peace with others’ pain.” These resound with 
                                                
52 For the problematic scena ultima of Don Giovanni and its inclusion and omission in 
different productions, see Ian Woodfield’s study, The Vienna Don Giovanni (Woodbridge: 
The Boydell Press, 2010), pp. 95-110. 
53 “It [the banquet] is open to all; / Long live liberty!” 
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Giovanni’s hedonist and materialist declaration: “Vivan le femmine! Viva il 
buon vino! / Sostegno e gloria d’umanità!”54 These lines are mockingly and 
disdainfully sung in response to the earnest and agonised plea of his former 
victim, Donna Elvira, for him to cast off his reprobate ways.  
     Both villains demonstrate that the suffering of others intensifies material 
and sensual pleasures. In Count Cenci’s confession that he has “no remorse 
and little fear, / Which are, I think, the checks of other men,” we can observe 
a similar adamantine will to continue on his self-chosen path to that which we 
see in Don Giovanni’s Commendatore scene. The music of the 
Commendatore, as Herwitz points out, is of the form of “declamation, 
standard rhetoric in opera seria, pronouncements by gods, divinities, and 
oracles” that “commands authority and insists upon commandment” (121). 
Giovanni’s defiant refusal to repent, even when he is confronted by the 
terrible ghost of the Commendatore and all-consuming hellfire, cause him to 
once again, transcend the judgments of social norms and moral laws—to go 
“beyond good and evil,” as Nietzsche puts it. In this very scene, Giovanni 
perhaps evokes Byron’s Manfred (Act 3 scene 1) in Shelley’s mind. In 
Byron’s work, the afflicted yet proud hero rejects the religious console and 
urge for penitence offered by the Abbot of St. Maurice. Such remorseless 
conviction (be it evil or not) displayed by Mozart’s scoundrel and coloured by 
certain tinges of a typical Byronic hero is reflected in Shelley’s composition of 
The Cenci and his design of the play’s arch-villain. Indeed, as Bates remarks, 
Count Cenci has “his own courage in opposition to the prescript of society” 
and “the pride of the heroes in Byron’s romantic poems” (67). In terms of 
Shelley’s view on Don Giovanni, Tetreault refers to the poet’s comment on 
Giuseppe Ambrogetti, the baritone who sang the role: “He seems to be the 
very wretch he personates” (159). Tetreault is probably right to argue that 
“Despite its Satanic attractiveness, the character did not deceive Shelley” 
(159). Shelley is aware that he is depicting an evil figure who takes pleasure 
in others’ sufferings; yet, it is exactly through his unwavering evil that the 
character gains a major aesthetic impetus of poetry. Shelley proposes in the 
                                                
54 “Long live women! Long live fine wine / Which are the pillars and glories of humanity!” 
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Defence that we see the same impetus in Paradise Lost, and it is by this 
impetus that Satan, who “has conceived to be excellent in spite of adversity 
and torture,” achieves superiority over God (MW 692).  
     Act 1 scene 3 of The Cenci presents an initial climax for the 
reader/audience to further grasp Count Cenci’s nature and his relationship 
with his children. This scene comprises the “banquet of horror,” the literary 
convention that provides a drastic shift of dramatic air from festive mirth to a 
shocking revelation of horrible truths, usually including gruesome death, 
ghosts, or madness.55 In the first speech that Count Cenci delivers to his 
guests in this scene, he seems to clarify the rumoured accusations against 
him by urging those to whom he is offering hospitality to “think me flesh and 
blood as well as you; / Sinful indeed, for Adam made all so, / But tender-
hearted, meek and pitiful” (1.3.11-13). This is not a hypocritical attempt to 
earn goodwill or trust, but a deliberate and playful trick to intensify the abrupt 
shift in atmosphere from joy to horror that he is about to precipitate. The 
reader/audience has been prepared for a catastrophic outcome ever since 
Beatrice’s revelation to Orsino that her father “has heard some happy news / 
From Salamanca, from my brothers there,” and “would gladlier celebrate their 
deaths” in the previous scene (1.2.48-52). Nevertheless, it is still a 
compelling moment when Count Cenci announces that “the most desired 
event” for which he intends to share “a common joy” with guests is in fact his 
sons’ deaths in Salamanca. Critics such as Jerrold E. Hogle perceives this 
scene to be the count’s “theatrical mirroring”: “He is so much a theatrical 
character that his very significance—and certainly his continued power over 
others—depends on the reaction of an auditor to his aggression” (Shelley’s 
Process 150). Furthermore, the antagonism between a parent and his 
children, echoing with the archetypal conflict between the Old Testament 
father-Jehovah and the New Testament son-Jesus (the “human form divine”) 
in Blake’s system, is here established. This antagonism is confirmed later by 
                                                
55 Other examples, to name a few, include the banquet scenes in Act 5 of Titus Andronicus 
and Act 3 of Macbeth, the wedding at the beginning of Horace Walpole’s The Castle of 
Otranto, and the ballad of “Alfonso the Brave and Fair Imogine” in Matthew Lewis’s The 
Monk. Perhaps another memorable example, taken from our time, is “The Red Wedding” in 
George R. R. Martin’s fantasy novel A Song of Ice and Fire.  
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the Pope’s remark that “Children are disobedient, and they sting / Their 
fathers’ hearts to madness and despair” (2.2.32-33). “[T]he great war 
between the old and young” (2.2.38) then becomes the dark theme that 
haunts the entire play.  
    Count Cenci’s viciously joyful announcement of his two sons’ deaths and 
their causes duly presents Shelley’s view of religion: 
          . . . God! 
          I thank thee! In one night didst thou perform, 
          By ways inscrutable, the thing I sought, 
          My disobedient and rebellious sons 
          Are dead! (1.3.40-44) 
In response to this horrible revelation, which Count Cenci attributes to God’s 
will, Beatrice’s attempt to comfort the fainting Lucretia is demonstrative of the 
play’s expression of God’s supposed goodness and justice. Beatrice, in other 
words, counters her father’s attribution of his sons’ deaths to providence, 
aiming to comfort Lucretia with the following words: “there is a God in 
Heaven, / He would not live to boast of such a boon” (1.3.52-53). Her father 
quickly contests this counterargument, claiming that in the deaths of her 
brothers, the “most favouring Providence was shown” (57): One is crushed to 
death attending a mass when the church collapses, and the other is 
accidentally murdered by a cuckolded lover. The two incidents happen “in the 
self-same hour of the same night; / Which shows that Heaven has special 
care of me” (64-65). Here the father and the daughter argue for two 
distinctive aspects of Christian divinity, predating the “Wild Spirit, which art 
moving everywhere” that is both “Destroyer and Preserver” in the poet’s later 
composition, “Ode to the West Wind” (MW 412).  
     In this scene of the count’s complete triumph, Shelley accentuates the 
violent aspect of Christian God.56 The irony of Rocco’s death while attending 
                                                
56 The Count’s faith in a malignant God bears a resemblance to the concept of Nature in the 
eighteenth-century French materialist philosophy, propelled by the development and 
spreading of scientific knowledge. This philosophy, seen in Julien Offray de La Mettrie and 
Denis Diderot’s works, proposes an unseen cosmological order in which the strong subsists 
and thrives by preying on the weak. In this philosophy, evil can better enrich the cosmos 
than goodness. Such is the alternative faith espoused by the amoral and depraved 
characters in, for example, Marquis de Sade’s novels. See David Coward’s introduction to 
the Oxford edition of Sade’s The Misfortunes of Virtue and Other Early Tales (xxxii). 
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a mass in a collapsing church that kills another sixteen innocent Christians, 
and the coincidence that the tragic incident occurs on “twenty-seventh of 
December,” the Eve of the Holy Innocents, attest to Shelley’s poignant 
criticism of the human folly of constructing a moral system on the basis of 
religiosity. Beatrice does not know that this very God she and her villainous 
father both name is not an all-loving and just deity. Instead, God is the “Wild 
Spirit,” a “Maenad,” and “dirge” in Shelley’s “Ode to the West Wind.” That is, 
in so far as the divinity she names has formed the world with cruel mutability, 
God is utterly amoral—completely unconcerned with what is right and what is 
wrong. (This is quite different from being “immoral,” which is inextricably 
linked with morality.)  
     The divine mutability that works here in Count Cenci’s favour is the very 
fountain of poetry that lifts a poet up and hurls him “upon the thorns of life,” 
making him bleed. In other words, as Shelley puts forth in the Defence, 
human suffering is the very poetic truth, the “original purity and force” of the 
hidden divine order that a poet is obliged to adorn and represent with poetic 
words.57 Beatrice’s weak denial of a malignant God also predates the final 
line of “Ode to the West Wind,” which Shelley changes from an affirmative 
line (“When Winter comes Spring lags not far behind”) to a doubtful one (“If 
Winter comes, can Spring be far behind?”). What Shelley’s revision in “Ode” 
implies, and what Beatrice fails to see in Act 1 scene 3, is that the divine 
order does not secure human happiness for the “good people.” By contrast, 
innocent suffering is the key driver; it propels the cosmological progression. 
Following this, great poetry gains materials from pain, sorrow, and 
wretchedness caused by malignance and cruelty: The “monster of obscenity” 
feeds on “the corruption of society” (Defence, MW 685-686). With the father-
daughter argument over the inclination of divine order in the beginning of The 
Cenci, Shelley arguably indicates that this play will focus on a sort of 
                                                
57 Shelley’s argument that poetry created by poets is already a decline from truth—“a feeble 
shadow of the original conceptions of the poet” (MW 697)—is a very Platonic concept that 
affirms a primitive and unstained idea and its fallen representations in the material world. It 
also echoes Nietzsche’s contention in The Birth of Tragedy that words’ limited ability to 
represent alleviates the unbearable terror of the poetic truth and renders it approachable by 
human perception.   
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“negative poetics” that borders on what he regards in the Defence as “the 
obscene.” This poetics outshines the positive poetics of love and sympathy 
Beatrice unsuccessfully represents.  
     Count Cenci’s wicked “libation” on his dead sons is another 
demonstration of religious inversion: 
          Oh, thou bright wine whose purple splendour leaps 
          And bubbles gaily in this golden bowl 
          Under the lamplight, as my spirits do, 
          To hear the death of my accursèd sons! 
          Could I believe thou wert their mingled blood, 
          Then would I taste thee like a sacrament (1.3.77-82) 
In this grotesque parody of the Eucharist, Jesus’s sacrificial blood shed to 
redeem the sin of humankind is “strongly misread,” as Harold Bloom might 
put it. Rocco’s and Stephano’s innocent blood accomplishes their father’s 
sadistic exultation. Such is the mockery of the New Testament tenet of love 
and forgiveness (represented by the Eucharist) by the Old Testament 
despotism (represented by the count as a tyrannical father). Count Cenci’s 
constant exploitation of Christian images and motifs highlights Shelley’s 
perception of religious people in the nineteenth-century Italy, for whom 
religion “is adoration, faith, submission, penitence, blind admiration” rather 
than “a rule for moral conduct.” Shelley goes on to point out that this kind of 
religion has “no necessary connection with any one virtue,” for “The most 
atrocious villain may be rigidly devout” (“Preface,” MW 317). Even though, in 
all seven possible textual sources of The Cenci, Count Cenci’s greatest 
crime is atheism,58 Shelley deliberately deviates from the historical fact of 
Count Cenci’s denouncement of God. In Shelley’s version, Cenci believes in 
God, but the belief is in a deity that endorses all the count’s wicked deeds. 
The inversion of the Christian rite of Holy Communion and the ensuing 
chaotic state that concludes the scene evoke the maniacal phenomenon of 
the heretic ritual of Dionysus. Such a practice was abhorred by the 
eighteenth-century theologians as an “obscene blasphemy” that was 
                                                
58 See Truman Guy Steffan’s summarisation and analysis of these historical documents in 
his study “Seven Accounts of the Cenci and Shelley’s Drama” in the 1969 issue of Studies in 
English Literature 1500-1900. 
 135 
empowered by a transgression of taboos and boundaries that demarcated 
the sacred from the profane. In the final tumultuous exchange of words 
between the father and the daughter in this scene, Beatrice’s lines 
foreshadow the upcoming theme of vengeance: 
          Father, never dream, 
          Though thou mayst overbear this company, 
          But ill must come of ill. —Frown not on me! 
          Haste, hide thyself, lest with avenging looks 
          My brothers’ ghosts should hunt thee from thy seat! (1.3.149-53) 
By auguring a revenge against her father (“But ill must come of ill”) and 
calling for her brothers’ spectres, she potentially alienates herself from the 
benign God who delegates a religious system founded on the Shelleyan 
“internalised morality” of love and sympathy. At this moment, Beatrice’s lines 
associate her with a failure to represent the positive aspects of poetry that 
Shelley articulates in the Defence. Another major motif regarded as 
obnoxious and obscene by early critics is also prefigured in Count Cenci’s 
speech, which concludes Act 1. Upon his daughter’s growing defiance, the 
count implies that there is a means to subjugate Beatrice: “I know a charm 
shall make thee meek and tame” (1.3.167). His idea—to rape her—is so 
heinous that even makes himself hesitant to execute it: “I feel my spirit fail / 
With thinking what I have decreed to do” (1.3.171-72). But this momentary 
doubt turns into resolve in the final line: “It must be done; it shall be done, I 
swear!” (1.3.178). The motif of incest is insinuated here with Count Cenci’s 
stressing on the word “done,” which, as Leader and O’Neill suggest, is 
inspired by Shakespeare’s frequent usage of the word in Macbeth to imply 
regicide (MW 756). Both Beatrice’s patricide and Macbeth’s regicide stand 
for the breach of conventional and hierarchal relationships between social 
identities. In other words, both signify the terror of the breakdown of identity 
(Beatrice as a daughter and Macbeth as a subject) and normalcy (their 
supposed love and loyalty to the count and the king). Shelley has established 
the fundamental characterisations of Count Cenci and Beatrice and the 
conflicting state between them as the strife between different aspects not 
only of religion but also of poetry. The two major themes—violent revenge 
and parent-child incest—seamlessly fit into Shelley’s category of the obscene 
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representations that feed on “social corruption,” calculated to intensify the 
aforementioned strife. 
     We become increasingly aware of Count Cenci’s intention to commit 
the act of incest at the beginning of Act 2, in which we are introduced to 
Beatrice’s agitation and fear, although we are not yet privy to the cause of 
them. Her emotions culminate in madness in Act 3, after Cenci has raped her 
off-stage, between these two acts. At the level of action and language, 
Shelley avoids direct representation of such a controversial motif; Count 
Cenci’s incestuous rape of Beatrice is never shown on-stage, nor is it 
explicitly named in the entire play. Nevertheless, Bates points out that the 
consequences of implying it resulted in critics’ major objections to the play’s 
production as well as critical dismissals throughout the nineteenth century. In 
later Shelley studies, the incest motif in The Cenci started to be tackled as 
such. That is, incest is not merely one of the examples of the Count’s “pure 
malice,” as early critics, such as Bates, maintain. Before examining the 
incestuous rape in The Cenci, the intense contrast between parent-child 
incest and sibling incest in Shelley’s views and works has to be highlighted 
first. Richard Cronin observes that for Shelley, sibling incest is “a static ideal 
of self-subsistence for an ideal of reciprocity” (65). In “Incest as Romanic 
Symbol,” Peter Thorslev also distinguishes the two incest motifs in English 
Romanticism; he argues that for Byron (from whose biography we can infer 
his accepting attitude toward sibling incest case) and Shelley, parent-child 
incest is a representation of political/religious oppression, while sibling incest 
“is invariably made sympathetic, is sometimes exonerated, and in Byron’s 
and Shelley’s works, is definitely idealized” (47). The motif of the aged tyrant 
preying on his own children, as Thorslev remarks, is one of the peculiar traits 
of the Romantic period: The past was “parasitic upon the future,” and the 
outdated “fathers, authorities, and traditions” were “unwilling to grow old 
gracefully and wither away,” “even attempting grotesquely to renew their 
youth by devouring their young or by reproducing upon them” (47). Shelley’s 
treatment of father-daughter incest in The Cenci, however, does not merely 
stand in contrast to the ideal of incestuous love between siblings, nor is it 
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simply another pernicious exemplification of patriarchal oppression. Instead it 
stands for, on a subtler level, Shelley’s mastering of that aspect of poetry that 
he apparently dismisses in the Defence—the “obscene.” 
     According to a study by Truman Guy Steffan, all seven historical 
accounts of the Cenci incident, including four editions of the anonymous 
“Relation of the Death of the Cenci Family” in Italian and the two rendered 
and published by Mary Shelley in The Poetical Works of Percy Bysshe 
Shelley, record that Count Cenci attempted to sexually assault Beatrice. 
Likewise, all seven accounts reference his wicked remark that the offspring 
of such an incestuous union will be a saint. However, none of them record 
that he succeeded in raping his daughter. In other words, Shelley 
significantly changes the historical facts concerning the Cenci incident, as 
regards the count’s incestuous desire for Beatrice and his other atrocities 
(the latter of which will be described below). This is so despite Shelley’s 
claim that “At all events it is matter-of-fact” (LS 2.198) in his letter to Lord 
Byron on 26 May 1820.59 Monica Brezinski Potkay’s study on the sources of 
The Cenci corroborates this detail: “Shelley largely created the legend of the 
Cenci incest. He posited as a completed act what earlier writers described as 
an unsuccessful attempt or series of attempts” (57). That is to say, Shelley 
handles the father-daughter incest in his sources of the Cenci incident with a 
three-phase process of representation. First, he actualises the 
unaccomplished incestuous rape in his play; second, he renders it off-stage 
between Act 2 and Act 3, and refrains from naming it in any line of the play; 
third, he brings it back onto the stage in a highly suggestive poetics by 
representing Cenci’s other atrocities with symbolic meanings. For Shelley, 
the actual incestuous consummation is so crucial that he has to modify the 
historical accounts to which he has access in order to actualise it in the plot, 
albeit off-stage. Shelley’s fictionalised rape is more than a narrative device 
employed, as Barbara Groseclose argues in her “The Incest Motif in 
                                                
59 We must, however, bear in mind that all these sources are not absolutely truthful accounts 
of the incident; they are “necessarily distorted because the investigation of the accused and 
the papal archives had not been open to the public” (Steffan 601). “The historical facts” I 
refer to here are probably not the authentic history, but are instead the “facts” in which 
Shelley believes and that he asserts to have accurately represented in his play.  
 138 
Shelley’s The Cenci,” to “link serious provocation with the magnitude of 
crime” and justify Beatrice’s later patricide (226).      
     As indicated above, Shelley’s suggestive poetics brings the 
“obscene/off-stage” incest motif implicitly onto the stage. Act 2 begins with 
Beatrice storming into Lucretia’s room in agitation. She calls out to God, but 
the tone is almost sceptical: “Thou, great God, / whose image upon earth a 
father is, / Dost thou indeed abandon me!” (2.1.16-18). She speaks of a 
nameless fear from her father: “I see his face; / He frowns on others, but he 
smiles on me” (19-20). In these lines Beatrice overlaps the image of her 
father with God, insinuating her alienation from her previous belief in a 
benign and all-loving deity. The “frown” and the “smile” imply that she faces 
an extraordinary threat from her father; they also draw attention to her 
sexuality (an aspect of children’s characters that is not commonly dwelt on in 
relation to their parents). Asked by Lucretia and Bernardo about the origin of 
her agitation and dread, Beatrice replies that “It was one word, Mother, one 
little word; / One look, one smile” (2.1.63-64). Her extremely restrained 
lexicon in describing the unnameable deed, in “a forced calmness” (as 
Shelley instructs in a stage direction), heightens the tension and the 
reader/audience’s curiosity in the source of her distress. The concept of 
obscurity in the Burkean sublime that entices human sensation is subtly at 
work here.  
     Shelley’s suggestive poetics that brings the off-stage incest back onto 
stage is based on his elaboration of the Count’s atrocities, which are 
innovative in so far as they deviate from historical accounts. Most sources 
record Count Cenci’s vicious treatments of his wife and children. One of the 
sources on which perhaps Shelley relies the most is Mary Shelley’s 
translation of the “Relation of the Death of the Family of the Cenci,” included 
in the 1874 reprinted version of 1839 edition of Shelley’s poetical works 
edited by Mary and published by Edward Moxon. In this source, the count’s 
deeds are detailed. In it, there is also an elder daughter who, along with 
Beatrice, is the victim of their father’s violence. However, her supplication to 
the Pope results in her being granted a marriage to a gentleman, by which 
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she is liberated from her father’s threats. Count Cenci, as Mary Shelley’s text 
goes, “fearing that his youngest would, when she grew up, follow the 
example of her sister . . . shut her up alone in an apartment of the palace, 
where he himself brought her food, so that no one might approach her; and 
imprisoned her in this manner for several months, often inflicting on her 
blows with a stick” (PWS 161). The source does not contain any physical or 
verbal abuse towards Beatrice’s other brothers, except that the count 
rejoices in hearing the deaths of Rocco and Cristofero (Cristofano in The 
Cenci), “saying that nothing would exceed his pleasure if all children died,” 
and “as a further sign of his hatred, he refused to pay the smallest sum 
towards the funeral expenses of his murdered son” (161). Percy Shelley also 
omits two common facts shared by all the historical documents: Count 
Cenci’s crime of sodomy and promiscuity with other women (Steffan 606). 
These changes functions to remove any distractions from his focus on the 
father-daughter incest. Deviating from his sources, Shelley revises the 
count’s original misdeeds in The Cenci, in order to bring the off-stage incest 
motif back onto the stage.  
     After the prefiguration in Act 1, Shelley indirectly introduces the incest 
motif in Act 2 by having Beatrice recount the count’s earlier acts of mental 
and physical violence against her youngest brother, Bernardo, and herself: 
          Oh! He has trampled me 
          Under his feet, and made the blood stream down 
          My pallid cheeks. And he has given us all 
          Ditch water, and the fever-stricken flesh 
          Of buffaloes, and bade us eat or starve, 
          And we have eaten. —He has made me look 
          On my beloved Bernardo, when the rust 
          Of heavy chains has gangrened his sweet limbs, 
          And I have never yet despaired—but now! 
          What would I say? (Recovering herself) 
          Ah! no, ’tis nothing new. (2.1.64-72) 
In these lines, Shelley’s detailed depiction of Count Cenci’s abhorrent abuses 
of Beatrice and Bernardo extends far beyond the scope of all sources, 
including Mary Shelley’s translation of the “Relation.” The significance of this 
invention lies in its parallelism with the implication of the unnameable 
incestuous crime embedded in Beatrice’s lines. In The Cenci, instead of 
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“blows with a stick” as we encounter in the “Relation,” the violence is 
aggravated: the count “tramples” on Beatrice’s face. Furthermore, Percy 
Shelley’s narrative deviates from other sources’ emphasis on external force 
to a focus on the count’s internal corruption, which is embodied by “Ditch 
water, and the fever-stricken flesh,” water and food that are contaminated, 
bordering on the transgression of the boundary between purity and 
uncleanness. As Maggie Kilgour proposes in her study on the cultural 
significance of cannibalism, eating is essentially an act of incorporation—an 
undertaking concerning the somatic boundary between the inside and the 
outside. It “involves a delicate balance of simultaneous identification and 
separation that is typified by the act of incorporation, in which an external 
object is taken inside another” (4). Absorbing proper food fortifies the 
boundary between the internal and the external, while consuming unclean 
food weakens and even breaches it. Therefore, Shelley’s innovation of 
contaminated food in Beatrice’s speech vastly deviates from every source of 
the Cenci incident and has subtle meanings. Viewed through Mary Douglas’s 
anthropological lens, “Ditch water” and “fever-stricken flesh” are not as 
unclean as, for example, dirt, rubbish, or excrement, whose inedible 
otherness is so obvious that it is easy to exclude them from a list of edibles. 
Ditch water and fever-stricken flesh, therefore, are closer than these to 
edibles because they still maintain certain propensities of food proper; it is 
exactly this “half-identity” that destabilises the boundary between filth and 
food disables Beatrice from repelling the contaminated and from resisting her 
father’s covert will to pollute her from the somatically inside.60 As Kilgour 
also points out, “consume” and “consummate” are the same word in French, 
thus accentuating the connection between eating and sex. Both actions 
demonstrate “the fallaciousness of the illusion of self-sufficiency and 
autonomy that the inside/outside opposition tries to uphold by constructing 
firm boundary lines between ourselves and the world” (9). Beatrice’s 
consumption of “Ditch water” and “fever-stricken flesh” potentially signifies 
                                                
60 For Douglas’s discussion of the significance of the unclean objects and their ambiguous 
“half-identities” in religious rituals, see Chapter 9 of Purity and Danger, p. 173-195.  
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her father’s incestuous desire, whose fulfilment is an action of symbolic 
eating—the utter incorporation that “creates a total identity between eater 
and eaten while insisting on the total control—literal consumption—of the 
latter by the former” (Kilgour 7).  
     The bodily suffering inflicted on Bernardo by the Count—“the rust / Of 
heavy chains has gangrened his sweet limbs”—can also be interpreted from 
the same symbolic perspective. Shelley deviates from the direct physical 
violence, such as beating or whipping, that is recorded in all sources of the 
Cenci incident. With artistic liberty, he adds Bernardo’s “gangrene,” a specific 
kind of pathological wound that, in A Dictionary of the English Language by 
Samuel Johnson, is defined as “a stoppage of circulation followed by 
putrefaction” and shares synonymous relations with other words such as 
“corruption” and “mortification” (Johnson 1804). The “gangrene” suffered by 
Bernardo, along with the “Ditch water” and “fever-stricken flesh” consumed 
by himself and Beatrice, are symbolic in that they suggest that the count’s 
dark intention is to corrupt his children (especially Beatrice) from within; that 
is, the vicious father seeks to effect an evil “becoming” in his children that 
begins on the inside. Moreover, both acts are dramatic devices by which 
Shelley insinuates the unnameable, “obscene/off-stage” incestuous desire of 
the count, as Beatrice potentially parallels them with incest by saying that 
they are “nothing new” after her incestuous rape by the count. Working in this 
way, Shelley’s unique rewriting of the Cenci children’s sufferings serves to 
lay bare the nature of father-daughter incest in a highly suggestive manner; 
in other words, the count’s incestuous desire is a further attempt to internally 
corrupt his offspring, an extended manoeuvre to irreversibly alter Beatrice 
from the inside, to “Let her then wish for the night” (2.1.187), as in the play 
“the night” represents a dark realm of evil in which Count Cenci executes his 
atrocities. What he desires through the act of incest that dissolves all social 
boundaries is a complete incorporation of Beatrice into evil and the creation 
of an alter ego in her mind, to which his speeches in Act 4 will attest.61  
                                                
61 Hogle interprets the rape as Count Cenci’s ultimate attempt to destroy Beatrice’s growing 
defiance, which “exposes the merely staged, rhetorical, and dependent basis of his power.” 
Hogle adds that through the rape, the count is able to create “a state of nothingness” in 
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     Another innovation of Count Cenci’s ill treatment of his children that 
functions to intensify the momentum of unspeakable incest is the subsistence 
deprivation of his eldest son Giacomo. In Act 2 scene 2, Giacomo discloses 
his father’s misdeed to Camillo: 
          ’Tis hard for a firm man to bear: but I 
          Have a dear wife, a lady of high birth, 
          Whose dowry in ill hour I lent my father 
          Without a bond or witness to the deed: 
          And children, who inherit her fine senses, 
          The fairest creatures in the breathing world; 
          And she and they reproach me not. (2.2.18-24) 
At this stage, the effects of the count’s deliberate withholding of Giacomo’s 
dowry have not yet appeared. Though suffering in poverty, Giacomo’s wife 
and children still love him and believe in him. The hidden significance of 
Shelley’s design here is manifested in Act 3 scene 1, where Count Cenci 
annihilates their love and faith by fabricating a story in front of Giacomo’s 
wife that her husband has squandered the dowry himself in “secret riot” 
(3.1.320). After his wife relates this invented story to their children, they are 
all convinced that their father is the reason for their poverty. Consequently, 
all filial affection is corrupted and degraded to despair and potentially, wrath 
and hatred: “Give us clothes, father! Give us better food! / What you in one 
night squander were enough / For months!” (3.1.328-30). What the count 
accomplishes here is not mere playful malice, but another extended variation 
of the “internal corruption” shared by Beatrice and Bernardo. Moreover, it 
indicates the count’s ultimate intent to assimilate Giacomo by driving a 
wedge between Giacomo and his family that mirrors the wedge the count has 
already driven between him and his own children. In short, the count intends 
to make Giacomo the very paternal tyrant hated by his own family and by 
Giacomo himself. Indeed, the count succeeds in doing so, as Giacomo 
further laments: “I looked, and saw that home was hell. / And to that hell will I 
return no more” (3.1.330-31). All these unique abuses imposed by the count 
on Beatrice, Bernardo, and Giacomo—contaminated food, gangrene, and the 
                                                
Beatrice’s consciousness that he will “contain absolutely in his phallic aggression” (Shelley’s 
Process 151).  
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provocation of Giacomo’s family feud—are Shelley’s poetic inventions. They 
replace the ordinary physical violence and licentiousness recorded in his 
source materials in an effort to insinuate the obscene/off-stage incest as a 
means by which the count converts, corrupts, and assimilates Beatrice from 
within. As she herself says after the rape: “But now!—O blood, which art my 
father’s blood, / Circling through these contaminated veins” (3.1.95-96). 
     After the incestuous rape, Beatrice’s uncontrolled agitation confirms the 
effectiveness of the Count’s design: “I, who can feign no image in my mind / 
Of that which has transformed me” (3.1.108-09). Beatrice, whose heart “Is 
like a ghost shrouded and folded up / In its own formless horror” (110-11), 
has detached herself from the New Testament God of love, sympathy, and 
forgiveness. She has become an agent of the vengeful Old Testament deity, 
determined to execute “something which shall make / The thing that I have 
suffered but a shadow / In the dread lightning which avenges it” (87-89). In 
the conversation that takes place between Beatrice, Lucretia, and Orsino in 
Act 3 scene 1, Shelley again executes various suggestive methods to 
present the unnameable and off-stage incestuous rape. In Beatrice’s lines 
the incestuous rape is “a wrong so great and strange, / That neither life nor 
death can give me rest” (139-40). It belongs to “deeds / Which have no form, 
sufferings which have no tongue” (141-42). If she speaks of the crime, her 
“tongue should like a knife tear out the secret / Which cankers my heart’s 
core” and “lay all bare / So that my unpolluted fame should be / With vilest 
gossips a stale mouthèd story” (156-59). Apart from employing obscurity to 
intensify the mysterious terror of incest, Shelley also indicates the incest’s 
obscene/unpresentable nature as a social taboo. Such a crime renders 
Beatrice silent and deprives her of the ability to expose her victimiser. As 
Young-Ok An observes correctly, “Beatrice knows that in the eyes of society 
she would be seen as suspicious collaborator in an incestuous relationship” 
(42). Also, the metaphor of incest as a secret that “cankers my heart’s core” 
echoes the chains that “gangrene” Bernardo’s “sweet limbs,” again 
suggesting the dark theme of internal corruption of the innocent. By the end 
of Act 3 scene 1, the count’s atrocities have accumulated to drive the main 
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actions of patricide plotted by Beatrice, Lucretia, Giacomo, and Orsino. This 
includes the failed first attempt on the Count’s passage to the Castle of 
Petrella and the successful assassination during his sleep executed by his 
two old enemies hired by Beatrice.  
     In Act 4 scene 1, after escaping from his assailants’ attempt on his life 
and safely entering the Castle of Petrella, Count Cenci reiterates his 
motivations for raping his daughter: to “poison and corrupt her soul” (4.1.45) 
and to force her to “if there be skill in hate / Die in despair” (49-50). He also 
plans to hurl Bernardo—another victim, whose youth, like Beatrice’s sex and 
beauty, represents the untarnished innocent soul, into “The sepulchre of 
hope, where evil thoughts / Shall grow like weeds on a neglected tomb” (52-
53). Here once again Shelley accentuates the nature of father-daughter 
incest as a form of violent assimilation and incorporation of the children into 
the father’s evil nature. Furthermore, the count even dwells on the abhorrent 
possibility of Beatrice giving birth to a child as the wicked fruit of the 
incestuous act:  
          . . . May it be 
          A hideous likeness of herself, that as 
          From a distorting mirror, she may see 
          Her image mixed with what she most abhors, 
          Smiling upon her from her nursing breast. 
          And that the child may from its infancy           
          Grow, day by day, more wicked and deformed, 
          Turning her mother’s love to misery: 
          And that both she and it may live until 
          It shall repay her care and pain with hate, 
          Or what may else be more unnatural, 
          So he may hunt her through the clamorous scoffs 
          Of the loud world to a dishonoured grave. (4.1.144-157) 
This secret intention of the count parallels his manipulation of Giacomo’s 
family. If the incestuous act results in a child, its appearance will mirror both 
herself and her father; the natural bond of mother and son will compel 
Beatrice to love and care for it, but its origin and its resemblance of her 
victimiser will force her to simultaneously abhor it. In this situation, the 
boundaries between self and other, love and hate, are all dissolved into a 
manic chaos. Thus, another duplication of irreversible antagonism between 
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two familial generations will be completed, which, as in the case of Giacomo, 
will displace Beatrice, moving her from a position of innocent victim to one of 
a patriarchal (though female) victimiser as her father. The last three lines 
quoted above—especially the references to “what may else be more 
unnatural” and “a dishonoured grave” even prefigure another incestuous 
violation, in which Beatrice is raped by her own son. Such an act echoes 
Milton’s design of Sin and Death in Paradise Lost (Potkay 59). Moreover, as 
Andrea K. Henderson also observes, we see in this passage “the evil of 
incarnation and fathering,” with which the count aims to annihilate Beatrice’s 
inner self by “fathering in his own child another child” (101). In all historical 
sources, the only account of Count Cenci’s fancy in this regard is that he 
“tried to persuade the poor girl, by an enormous heresy, that children born of 
the commerce of a father with a daughter were all saints,” as recorded by 
Mary Shelley in her translation.62 It is thus striking that Percy Shelley 
converts this original motivation, which seems in his sources to be a 
seductive account of mere lechery, to such an abhorrent extent: It is the 
count’s desire to recreate and perpetuate patriarchal tyrants and family 
antagonism.  
     In the analysis so far, I have explicated how Shelley’s characterisation 
of Count Cenci varies vastly from his sources and how the deviation brings 
the obscene/off-stage father-daughter incest back onto stage, suggestively 
serving as the embodiment of an alternative poetics of corruption and 
assimilation. Shelley’s formulation of the count’s motivations is ethically 
horrid but aesthetically powerful, reflecting the “obscene” poetics that starkly 
opposes the poetics of love and sympathy that Shelley delineates and 
champions in the Defence. His lines celebrating all the atrocities the count 
has imposed on his family further testify to the composition’s heterogeneous 
aesthetics of the amoral and asocial:  
                                                
62 The record of this specific heresy spoken by the count can be found in Mary Shelley’s 
translation of “The Relation” in the edition of Shelley’s poetical works published by Reeves 
and Turner in 1886. It also appears in the Buxton Forman’s edition in 1876, but originally 
Mary omits it in the 1839 edition, as her footnote explains: “The details here are too horrible, 
and unfit for publication” (PWS 161). For more detailed information, see Steffan’s essay, p. 
602-603. 
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          I will pile up my silver and my gold; 
          My costly robes, paintings and tapestries; 
          My parchments and all records of my wealth, 
          And make a bonfire in my joy, and leave 
          Of my possessions nothing but my name; 
          Which shall be an inheritance to strip 
          Its wearer bare as infamy. (4.1.56-62) 
Count Cenci’s declaration that he will destroy all his material treasure in a 
bonfire of joy after he completes his scheme of corrupting Beatrice and 
Bernardo contrasts his embracing of material luxuries at the beginning of the 
play. By doing evil upon his children, he is emancipated from the restraint of 
the material world, where accumulation of wealth and subsistence of physical 
life are the primary goals. This reasoning echoes Burke’s point that one of 
the aesthetic powers of the sublime lies in its anti-pragmatism. Also, the very 
mental state the count relates in this passage resonates with Bataille’s idea 
of the sacred, a sphere in which all resources are to be squandered and all 
conducts of pragmatism and purposiveness are to be forsaken. The poetic 
power that Shelley bestows on Count Cenci lies in his absolute commitment 
to evil (with certain literary tinges of the Byronic hero and the eighteenth-
century libertine such as Mozart’s Don Giovanni) and his multi-layered 
motivation of assimilation and incorporation. This characterisation actually 
corresponds to the unconscious and the identity-annihilating aspect of 
poetry, which Shelley endeavours to reject as “obscenity” and to harness 
with his “internal morality” of selflessness, love, and sympathy in A Defence 
of Poetry.   
     In The Cenci, Beatrice initially epitomises the positive aspect of poetry, 
the goodness of which is best offset by her father, who similarly embodies 
the negative aspect of poetry. Shelley seeks to accomplish a dramatic 
representation of the portrait of Beatrice at the Colonna Palace, which had 
deeply impressed him. In the Preface he records that how his imagination 
and sentiments were evoked when he saw the portrait: “she seems sad and 
stricken down in spirit, yet the despair thus expressed is lightened by the 
patience of gentleness,” he writes, adding, “the lips have that permanent 
meaning of imagination and sensibility which suffering has not repressed and 
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which it seems as if death scarcely could extinguish” (MW 318). Whether 
Shelley’s attempt to dramatically represent Beatrice’s image in the Preface—
“one of the loveliest specimens of the workmanship of Nature” (318) in which 
“energy and gentleness dwell together without destroy one another” (319)—
is successful or not remains a critical issue. Mary E. Finn argues that 
Shelley’s ekphrasis, the “verbal rendering of an art object,” of Beatrice’s 
portrait is “a series of competitions over which image of Beatrice will survive” 
to “invent and establish a composite verbal portrait of Beatrice Cenci that will 
prevail as authoritative” (178). Indeed, Beatrice’s lines in The Cenci are 
permeated with verbal aggressiveness after her determination for patricide. 
Shelley’s characterisation of Beatrice in the later part of the play goes far 
beyond his perception of the Colonna Palace portrait described in the 
Preface. If Shelley wishes to establish Beatrice as a heroine embodying the 
positive poetics of love and sympathy based on imagination and sensibility, it 
is important to note that such an attempt must fail if the alternative poetics of 
corruption and assimilation represented by the count succeeds. I will attempt 
to settle this critical issue by examining the subtle interactions between 
Beatrice and the two assassins Olimpio and Marzio, whom she hires to 
murder her father.  
     The conversation between Beatrice, Olimpio and Marzio in Act 4 
scenes 2 and 3 exemplifies Beatrice’s verbal aggressiveness with certain 
resonances to other literary works. In scene 2, when Beatrice is assigning 
the murderous task, the two assassins are startled by a sudden and 
unknown noise. Beatrice scolds them fiercely for their response to it: “Ye 
conscience-stricken cravens, rock to rest. Your baby hearts” (4.2.39-40). In 
scene 3, Olimpio and Marzio retreat from the count’s chamber with the 
murder left undone, because the former “dare not kill an old and sleeping 
man” (4.3.9) and the latter sees his own father’s image in the count: “I knew it 
was the ghost / Of my dead father speaking through his lips, / And could not 
kill him” (4.3.20-22). Beatrice is again infuriated and calls them “Miserable 
slaves,” “Base palterers,” and “Cowards and traitors” (4.3.23, 26-27). 
“Snatching a dagger from one of them and raising it,” she then dismisses 
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words for actions (“Why do I talk?”) and, through a ferocious threat, reduces 
the two men from doers to inactive talkers: “Hadst thou a tongue to say, / 
‘She murdered her own father,’ I must do it! / But never dream ye shall 
outlive him long!” (4.3.31-33). Beatrice’s lines and actions here bear a 
striking resemblance to those of Lady Macbeth in Shakespeare’s tragedy—a 
play that also explores the nature and psychological state of a hierarchy-
subverting crime. The “conscience-stricken cravens” and “baby hearts” are 
reminiscent of Lady Macbeth’s comment in Act 1 scene 5 about her 
husband’s faltering ambition: “It is too full o’ th’ milk of human kindness.” 
Furthermore, in Beatrice’s action of “snatching” a dagger from one of the 
assassins, we almost see Lady Macbeth taking over the regicidal dagger 
from her husband, who dares not enter again the chamber where the 
murdered Duncan lies. As Leader and O’Neill point out, Beatrice’s dismissal 
of the assassins’ conscience as “an equivocation” that “sleeps over / A 
thousand daily acts disgracing men; / And when a deed where mercy insults 
heaven . . .” (4.3.28-29) alludes to the Porter’s lines in Act 2 scene 3 of 
Macbeth about the “equivocator, that could swear in both the scales against 
either scale” (MW 758). The ambiguous nature of conscience, which Beatrice 
raises to chastise the two assassins for their hesitation, signifies the ironic 
fact that “conscience” only works when doing good is of one’s self-interest. 
By being determined to commit patricide as an act of vengeance, Beatrice 
has cast off the restraints of moral conventions and come to realise, perhaps 
unconsciously, the inconsistent nature of human conscience. However, her 
understanding at this juncture ironically echoes her father’s statement in Act 
4 scene 1, where Count Cenci also claims, “Conscience! Oh, thou most 
insolent of lies! (4.1.177).  
     When the murder of the count is about to be exposed to Savella the 
Legate, who has come to announce the count’s arrest, Beatrice jubilantly and 
almost disdainfully responds to Lucretia’s fear, saying that they can easily 
fool the authority with “cheap astonishment” and “guiltless pride” (4.4.44-45). 
Moreover, she cares nothing for the consequence: 
          . . . The deed is done, 
          And what may follow now regards not me. 
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          I am as universal as the light; 
          Free as the earth-surrounding air; as firm 
          As the world’s centre. (4.4.46-50) 
Leader and O’Neill note, but do not analyse in depth, the similar lines in Act 3 
scene 4 of Macbeth, when Macbeth is informed of the death of Banquo and 
the escape of his son Fleance. After learning about Banquo’s death, Macbeth 
feels “Whole as the marble, founded as the rock; / As broad and general as 
the casting air” (3.4.21-22). With this Shakespearean allusion, Shelley again 
latently juxtaposes Beatrice with the regicidal antagonist. Both are immersed 
in the transcendental ecstasy of murders accomplished, which make them 
feel they are united with the cosmological order: “the light,” “the earth-
surrounding air,” and “the world’s centre” in Beatrice’s case; and “the 
marble,” “the rock,” and “the casting air” in Macbeth’s. Moreover, both 
become the sovereigns of their own existence. For F. R. Leavis, Shelley’s 
frequent allusions to Shakespeare in The Cenci confirm “the vague, 
generalizing externality of Shelley’s rendering” (226). Patricia Hodgart also 
dismisses them as confusing flaws and intrusions, despite that “the creation 
of Beatrice is an admirable one and the action of the play well-managed 
(130). By contrast, I demonstrate in the analysis above the dramatic function 
of the Beatrice-Macbeth correspondence that Shelley adopts. By allusively 
equalling Beatrice with the regicidal—and to a symbolic extent, also 
patricidal—Macbeth/Lady Macbeth, Shelley deprives Beatrice of her moral 
ground. He insinuates that her justice is not justice, instead being simply 
another crime. In this way, her act is also aligned with Macbeth/Lady 
Macbeth’s crime, although the Shakespearean characters’ crime is based on 
superstition and ambition. Therefore, Shelley utilises these poetical parallels 
between The Cenci and Macbeth to certify Count Cenci’s success in 
corrupting and assimilating Beatrice through his atrocities, especially the 
incestuous rape.63  
     In Act 5, Beatrice’s self-defence in the trial is yet another example of 
                                                
63 For another detailed comparison between The Cenci and Macbeth, see D. Harrington-
Lueker’s 1983 essay “Imagination versus Introspection: The Cenci and Macbeth” in Keats-
Shelley Journal. 
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Shelley’s deviation from his source materials, and a further confirmation of 
Beatrice’s latent identification with the count. The confrontation between 
Beatrice and Marzio is a dramatic extension of Mary Shelley’s translated 
account of the interrogation: “Marzio, overcome and moved by the presence 
of mind and courage of Beatrice, retracted all that he had deposed at Naples, 
and rather than again confess, obstinately died under his torments” (PWS 
162). In its counterpart in Act 5 scene 2 of The Cenci, Marzio’s initial 
confession is moved from Naples to Rome. When Marzio discloses how 
Beatrice “did urge with menaces and bribes / To kill your father” (5.2.24-25) 
to the judge and Cardinal Camillo, Beatrice “advances towards him” with a 
threatening glare. Marzio, instead of being “moved by the presence of mind 
and courage of Beatrice” as Mary Shelley’s text describes, is terrified by 
Beatrice’s silent wrath: “O, dart / The terrible resentment of those eyes / On 
the dead earth!” (5.2.29-31). Beatrice echoes her furious reaction to Marzio’s 
and Olimpio’s fear and hesitation to carry out the murder with a curse: “never 
dream ye shall outlive him long!” (4.3.33). In her self-righteousness, Beatrice 
has unconsciously possessed her father’s despotic disposition, using threats 
to forbid the tortured man to disclose her crime.  
     Marzio nevertheless confesses and, in order to address this, Beatrice 
defends herself in a speech that can be broken into three parts: first, a 
criticism of the jurisdiction relying on torture to extract false confession 
(5.2.39-43); second, an argument that she would be too imprudent and 
foolish to let Marzio—“this man, this bloody knife / With my own name 
engraven on the heft, / Lying unsheathed amid a world of foes, / For my own 
death” (98-101) —stay alive, if she was the one behind the murder; third, a 
lengthy appeal to Marzio that his confession would ruin both her, “Who was 
most pure and innocent on earth” (138), and the reputation of “our ancient 
house, and stainless fame” (146). The first part, in which she speaks out 
against a torture-based jurisdiction is a correct observation of the Inquisition. 
However, ironically in Beatrice’s case, the confession extracted from the 
tortured Marzio is true: She did plot her father’s death. The second part only 
implies that she regrets not simply killing Marzio right after the count’s death 
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in order to silence him forever. The third part in which she urges Marzio to 
renounce his confession, merely demonstrates her overt self-righteousness 
and complete disregard for the broken man in front of her. If Shelley intends 
to execute, in Finn’s words, an ekphrasis of the image of Beatrice—the one 
that so impresses him with “the patience of gentleness” and the “permanent 
meaning of imagination and sensibility” at the Colonna Palace—his 
endeavour is considerably undermined by how she is presented in this 
climactic confrontation with Marzio.  
     Proud, cruel, and self-righteous about her unquestionable “innocence,” 
the Beatrice in this scene is latently a variation of her father, who is likewise 
proud, cruel, and self-righteous about the evils he has done. After Beatrice’s 
self-defence, Shelley concludes the scene following Mary Shelley’s original 
account that Marzio is moved by Beatrice’s courage, declaring that “I alone 
am guilty” (5.2.159) and “She is the most innocent!” (165). However, from 
Marzio’s perspective, what he sees is a woman who uses him to accomplish 
her murderous goal and now throws all the guilt upon him, aggrandising 
herself while forsaking him. Shelley’s abrupt return to the source material 
renders Marzio’s renunciation of his testimony and self-sacrifice a forced 
twist that borders on absurdity. Considering Beatrice’s treatment of Marzio 
and her problematic moral issue, Finn is correct when she concludes: “The 
thoughts Beatrice entertains to beget and especially to defend the act of 
murder are constructed and disciplined by the kind of casuistic ethic that 
belongs to the theological-legal tradition that has allowed Cenci to prosper” 
(186). In terms of resisting oppression, Shelley recognises in the Preface that 
“[r]evenge, retaliation, atonement, are pernicious mistakes” (MW 316). He 
embodies this pacifism by denouncing the militant Old-Testament “Demon-
God” in Queen Mab, the nonviolent revolution in Laon and Cythna, and 
Prometheus’s forgiveness of Jupiter after recalling his vengeful curse against 
his oppressor in Prometheus Unbound. In Cenci, Beatrice fails to exemplify 
this Shelleyan ideal of pacifism not only because she commits patricide as an 
act of vengeance, but also because her subsequent self-defence is 
downright self-centred and regardless of the man who serves as her 
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murderous instrument. On the level of aesthetics, her self-defence also 
deprives her of the nobility that a tragic heroine ought to possess.  
     In this section, I have explored Shelley’s composition of The Cenci in 
relation to his source materials and other literary works. In the 
characterisation of the count, Shelley dwells upon Mozart’s Don Giovanni 
and the Byronic hero, thus granting him charisma as considerable as Milton’s 
Satan. With his rewriting of the count’s atrocities, Shelley suggestively brings 
the obscene/off-stage father-daughter incest back onto stage as an essential 
literary and aesthetic motif of inner corruption and utter assimilation. 
Shelley’s frequent allusions to Macbeth attest to the effect of the Count’s 
dark intent on Beatrice and her unconscious identification with her villainous 
father. In the climactic trial scene, Shelley further degrades the character of 
Beatrice in her confrontation with Marzio, rendering her both morally and 
aesthetically problematic. The obscene/off-stage motif of incest in The Cenci 
is beyond “pure malice” and is more than a dramatic device to justify 
Beatrice’s patricide, as critics such as Groseclose maintain. It also differs 
distinctively from the incest in other literary works, especially those in the 
Gothic tradition. Count Cenci’s incestuous desire for Beatrice is not like, for 
example, Manfred’s sexual attempt on his de facto daughter, Isabella, in The 
Castle of Otranto, which signifies the obsession of heritage and lines of 
succession. Shelley’s design of father-daughter incest is also unlike that 
which we encounter at the end of Matthew Lewis’s The Monk, which serves 
as a reader-stimulating twist to aggravate the fallen antagonist’s sin. The 
incest motif in The Cenci is a unique artistic representation in English 
Romanticism, which generally focuses on and idealises sibling incest. 
Reinforced by Shelley’s innovations of other atrocities with symbolic 
meanings, the indirect but powerful representations of father-daughter incest 
in The Cenci exemplifies the poet’s latent inclination to an alternative poetics. 
It is empowered by hatred and violent eroticism, by which all social 
bonds/boundaries are dissolved. This is a clear diversion from the positive 
poetics based on love and sympathy that Shelley espouses in A Defence of 
Poetry and other major works, and which Beatrice fails to represent in this 
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tragedy. The next section focuses on Laon and Cythna, a poem containing 
what is widely regarded as “positive” sibling incest. In it, I examine Shelley’s 
erotic poetics of suffering and madness—represented by the motifs of 
torture, cannibalism, rape, and pregnancy—as another “obscene” aesthetic 
phenomenon in Shelley’s poetic corpus.                    
 
THE EROTIC POETICS OF SUFFERING AND MADNESS IN LAON AND CYTHNA 
 
     Laon and Cythna, Or The Revolution of the Golden City: A Vision of the 
Nineteenth Century in the Stanza of Spenser was written and published in 
1817 before an immediate retraction by the publisher, Charles Ollier. Upon 
Shelley’s revisions, it was republished as The Revolt of Islam in 1818. It is 
Shelley’s attempt to represent the process of the French Revolution from its 
birth, to its decay, and to its ultimate failure. Though set in a fictional Eastern 
city, Argolis, that is based on “Constantinople & modern Greece,” the poem is 
“a tale illustrative of such a Revolution as might be supposed to take place in 
an European nation” (LS 1.563). In this epic, Shelley seeks to counter the 
pessimism pervading “the temper of the public mind” (CPWS 99) towards the 
bloody consequences of the French Revolution and to rekindle hope for 
envisioning a better future. To contain the “sanguine eagerness for good” and 
wipe out the “infectious gloom” that was overshadowing literary works during 
the post-Revolution period, Shelley assigns the task of leading the revolution 
to a couple of young lovers, who are also brother and sister. The ceaseless 
warring state between the young and the old is a Romantic trope initiated by 
Blake’s antithesis between the Old Testament father-god and the New 
Testament son-Christ. It is an important element in Shelley’s epic that will 
reappear in the later The Cenci, as analysed in the previous section. Also, 
the revolution being led by a young couple represents Shelley’s rejection of 
the reactionary ideologies espoused by the first-generation Romantics, 
especially Wordsworth.64 If designating a young couple as the leaders of 
                                                
64 Both W. A. Ulmer and J. Andrew Hubbell highlight Shelley’s response to Wordsworth’s 
The Excursion in Laon and Cythna. The former underscores Shelley’s criticism of his great 
precursor’s retreat to nature (and the Christian ideology behind it) as a self-centred and self-
aggrandising “sublime egotism”; the latter considers the love between Laon and Cythna as a 
major impetus for revolution, which is a refutation of Wordsworth’s division of the private and 
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revolution is a symbolic rebellion against the ancien régime and anti-
revolutionary conservatism, the sibling incest between Laon and Cythna can 
be deemed a further undermining of the social conventions behind political 
and religious systems, which Shelley calls “Custom’s hydra brood” (1.33.419) 
and “the serpent Custom’s tooth” (8.27.3439). It is an exemplification of the 
positively-represented and conventional sibling incest in English 
Romanticism. However, as a morally controversial issue, incest also 
constitutes one of the two major reasons for the epic’s immediate retraction 
by the publisher (the other being Shelley’s constant attacks on Christianity). 
     In Shelley’s view, Ollier’s withdrawal of the publication was presumptive 
and self-defeating.65 Nevertheless, upon Ollier’s insistence Shelley revised 
the poem for a second publication and retitled it The Revolt of Islam, though 
the extent of his revisions to this four-thousand-line epic is exceedingly 
minor. Regarding the issue of sibling incest, the revisions comprise no more 
than “some alterations which consist in little else than the substitution of the 
words friend or lover for that of brother & sister” (LS 1.582). Compared with 
the revisions respecting religion, it is obvious that Shelley is not nearly so 
concerned with the impact and danger provoked by incest as he is with what 
may be incurred by his scepticism about Christianity—one which prompts 
him to border on atheism.66 The substitutions of “brother” and “sister” 
certainly do not remove the incestuous implications but rather generate more 
room for the reader’s imagination to fill in the gaps. Categorically dissatisfied 
with the revisions, John Taylor Coleridge (not Robert Southey, as Shelley first 
suspected) wrote a searing review of The Revolt of Islam in the 1819 April 
issue of The Quarterly Review, saying that by revising the poem Shelley “has 
reproduced the same poison, a little, and but a little, more cautiously 
disguised, and it is thus intended only to do the more mischief at less 
                                                
the public.  
65 In a letter to Ollier written in December 1817, Shelley said: “You do your best to condemn 
my book before it is given forth, because you publish it, and then withdraw, so that no other 
bookseller will publish it, because one has already rejected it” (LS 580). 
66 As Frederick L. Jones, notes, of all forty-three passages that Shelley modifies for the 
second publication, only eight are related to the sibling incest. The rest of them all concern 
religion (LS 582). 
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personal risk to the author” (461).  
     In both the hostile Quarterly review and Leigh Hunt’s 1819 defending 
article in The Examiner, the major debates centre on religion and politics. 
Incest is merely taken as a piece of evidence of Shelley’s alleged proposal 
for political anarchy and atheism. During the period from 1817 to 1818, when 
the poem was written and published, England was undergoing a series of 
political struggles between the government and radical reformers (Grimes 
98). Shelley’s fierce attacks on political and religious authorities easily 
attracted attention from the conservatives, as had his earlier poem Queen 
Mab in 1813. Coleridge’s 1819 Quarterly review focuses mainly on Shelley’s 
hostility toward governmental institutions and Christian belief. In it, he 
criticises the poet for paralleling an oriental tyranny with the British 
government, as well as for espousing a very vague idea of “Love” as a 
replacement of faith and the law. In his response to the review in The 
Examiner, Hunt defends Shelley’s radicalism: “Mr. Shelley has theories, as 
we have said before, with regard to the regulation of society, very different 
certainly from those of the Quarterly Reviewers, and very like opinions which 
have been held by some of the greatest and best men, ancient and modern” 
(653).  
     In The Quarterly Review, Coleridge views the incest in Laon and 
Cythna as one of the delinquent results of Shelley’s proposed reformed 
world—one without “civil institutions and religious creeds” (463-464). Through 
this proposal, Coleridge argues, Shelley “has invaded the purity and chilled 
the unsuspecting ardour of our fireside intimacies” (469). Coleridge does not 
inspect the sibling incest in Laon and Cythna in either a larger poetic context 
or in terms of any symbolic meaning. Instead, he only addresses it in order to 
discredit Shelley as a decent person: “Mr. Shelley is a very vain man” (469). 
Countering this, Hunt writes: “Failing in the attempt to refute Mr. Shelley’s 
philosophy, the Reviewers attack his private life” (652). Thus, the 
contemporary criticisms of the sibling incest generally centre on its 
connection with Shelley himself, whose life the critics infamously juxtapose 
with Byron’s and Hunt’s, whose alleged sexual libertinism is also tinged with 
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incestuous desire (Donovan 69). As Alan Richardson points out, the incest 
motif in literature has become a flourishing topic in literary studies in the 
twentieth century. With the help of modern theorists such as James George 
Frazer, Sigmund Freud, and Claude Levi-Strauss, researchers are no longer 
confined to biographical scope and are free to examine incest in literature 
using a range of approaches (Richardson, “The Danger of Sympathy” 737-
738). Shelley’s design of sibling incest in Laon and Cythna is no exception; a 
practice beginning in the twentieth century, the epic is now often examined in 
relation to the poet’s ideals of individuality, interpersonal affection, and social 
reality.  
     As I referenced in the previous section, Thorslev notes the division 
between sibling incest and parent-child incest in the Romantic works, 
proposing that the former represents an ideal form of human affection, while 
the latter stands for patriarchal oppression. Affirming the importance of the 
incest motif in English Romanticism, Alan Richardson illustrates that the 
Romantic sibling incest accentuates the shared life experience “that unites 
the couple through countless mutual associations built up during the most 
idyllic stage of life” (“The Dangers of Sympathy” 739). Therefore, it is in 
essence different from the incest in Gothic tradition, which is generally 
predestined and fatalistic. Richardson argues that the incestuous love in 
Laon and Cythna, like Byron’s Manfred, is an extension of Wordsworth’s 
affection for Dorothy in The Prelude—it emblematises the Romantic hero’s 
identification with his female counterpart. In a different essay, Richardson 
further argues that such male identification with his intimate female partner is 
a form of gender incorporation and colonialism of the feminine, one which 
fortifies the Romantic male subjectivity (“Colonization of the Feminine” 15-
20). Several critics draws on this concept of identification to interpret the 
sibling incest in Shelley’s poem. Richard Cronin perceives that Shelley, in his 
essay entitled “On Love,” regards narcissism as the origin of love; Cronin 
goes further to say that the “likeness” between Laon and Cythna becomes 
the “condition of the consummation” that brings forth “an ecstatic moment in 
which recognition of the self becomes indistinguishable from recognition of 
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the other” (63). Teddi Lynn Chichester extends the idea of identification by 
tracing Shelley’s childhood, which was shared with his sisters in Field Place. 
She then demonstrates how Laon’s love for Cythna represents Shelley’s 
personal longing to return to such a pastoral and harmonious realm. She 
highlights the symbolic meanings of Laon’s physical and mental suffering in 
the poem as a trial of feminisation, “an exercise in imaginative 
transsexualism” (86), to annul his masculine inclination toward violence. 
Adding to the above interpretations, Hugh Roberts sees the incestuous love 
in the poem “as both sceptical disruption of the customary forms of marital 
relationship and as the complete and more perfect realization of the unifying, 
therapeutic, promise of marriage” (183).  
    As aforementioned, the sibling incest in Laon and Cythna is the critical 
focuses of many previous studies. In light of this, in addition to revisiting the 
incestuous consummation narrated in Canto 6, I will connect its erotic 
connotations to several episodes in the poem that are relatively less noted in 
existing critical scholarship. These episodes contain two common motifs: 
suffering and madness. They include Laon’s cannibalistic vision in his 
tormenting captivity in Canto 3, his potentially sexual encounter with the 
mysterious woman Pestilence in Canto 6, and Cythna’s description of her 
pregnancy and madness in her confinement in Canto 7. Therefore, this 
section will not only focus on Shelley’s design of sibling incest—ostensibly 
the opposition to the father-daughter incest in his later play The Cenci—but 
also on Laon’s and Cythna’s mental transformations, incurred by suffering 
and madness, that parallel both their incestuous love and the process of 
revolution. I will argue that even though the sibling incest between the title 
characters is a positive form of Romantic sexuality and one of the most 
powerful epitomes of the Shelleyan sympathy, in Laon and Cythna Shelley 
still employs the “obscene” poetics of self-annihilation in the episodes that I 
mention above. Moreover, on the level of aesthetics, such a poetics 
outweighs Shelley’s efforts to pursue his political ideal, which is represented 
in a highly didactic and repetitive manner. Before I begin the major 
discussion, beginning in Canto 3, I will briefly summarise the previous cantos 
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and offer interpretations of the incest motif therein as it relates to my major 
argument.            
     The poem opens with a fourteen-stanza canto dedicated to Mary 
Shelley, in which Percy Shelley recounts his idyllic childhood, his unhappy 
years at Eton, his life of love with Mary, and his loss of custody of the two 
children he had with Harriet Westbrook in May 1817. With this prefacing 
canto Shelley summons his personal experiences to prefigure the personal 
and interpersonal crisis that Laon and Cythna encounter in the epic. By doing 
so, Shelley also extends the scope to social and political contexts, 
delineating his purpose to “shake the Anarch Custom’s reign” (10.86) and to 
“look from our tranquillity / Like lamps into the world’s tempestuous night” 
(14.122-123).67  
     The main narrative of Laon and Cythna starts with “a monstrous sight” 
in Canto 1, that is, with “An Eagle and a Serpent wreathed in fight” (1.8.191-
193).68 The fierce contest between an eagle and a snake had already 
appeared in Alastor, published in 1816. In this earlier poem, the nameless 
Poet (who stands for Wordsworth’s self-excluding solitude from the human 
world) is wandering and pining in the sphere of Nature, where “the bright 
arch of rainbow clouds / And pendent mountains seen in the calm lake” only 
                                                
67 Though this canto is not related to the plot, Shelley’s self-reference as a “Knight of Faery” 
in service of a “Queen” seems to prefigure a narrative of medieval chivalry and corresponds 
to the form of Spenserian stanza employed in the epic. But, the “adventures” that Shelley 
undergoes and relays in the following cantos are nothing like the heroic deeds of slaying a 
dragon or rescuing a damsel in distress. The personal ordeals Shelley presents herein 
signify the physical and mental tests the protagonists endure in Laon and Cythna. Shelley’s 
recollection of the patriarchal oppression at Eton, “The harsh and grating strife of tyrants and 
of foes” (“To Mary” 3.27), foreshadows Othman’s despotic rule in the Golden City of Argolis. 
Shelley’s implication of losing the custody of his children with Harriet in the eighth stanza, as 
Leader and O’Neil point out, perhaps also predicts Cythna’s daughter being taken away from 
her after birth, described in Canto 7. He learns from these painful experiences not to resort 
to violent resistance. His is a lesson in nonviolence: “I will be wise, / And just, and free, and 
mild” and “I then controlled / My tears, my heart grew calm, and I was meek and bold” (4.31-
32, 36). Mildness/meekness and forgiveness were ostensible feminine qualities in the 
nineteenth-century social context, but they were also the virtues that a Christ-figure 
possesses in the face of oppression (Chichester 81). Shelley’s belief in this New Testament 
all-loving ideology—“Let scorn be not repaid with scorn” (9.76)—foreshadows Laon’s 
conversion from martial retaliation to nonviolent revolution led by Cythna, and the 
Prometheus that combines certain Christ-propensities in the later Prometheus Unbound. 
68 Starting from Canto 1, the text of Laon and Cythna will be referenced by canto, stanza, 
and line numbers in parenthesis cited from The Complete Poetical Works of Percy Bysshe 
Shelley, vol. 2, edited by Neville Rogers. 
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evoke “loathliest vapours hung” and “the foul grave” (213-217). There he is 
disturbed by “a distempered dream” (225) of a struggle between an eagle 
and a serpent. In this episode of Alastor, the highly erotic eagle-serpent 
image represents a nocturnal unrest that is stirred by sexual desire and is the 
vicious result of the Poet’s self-alienation from humanity: “As an eagle 
grasped / In folds of the green serpent, feels her breast / Burn with the 
poison, and precipitates / Through night and day” (227-230). In Canto 1 of 
Laon and Cythna, Shelley once again employs the eagle-serpent image. 
However, in this poem he enlarges its scope, transforming it from the 
metaphorical to the allegorical. This is immediately observable in the way in 
which Shelley capitalises both “Eagle” and “Serpent,” in contrast to their 
lower-case counterparts in Alastor. Set in the context of natural turmoil, of 
sublime grandeur and terror, the eagle-serpent war signifies Shelley’s 
Manichean dualistic world view: “Two Powers o’er mortal things dominion 
hold / Ruling the world with a divided lot” (1.25.347-348). The serpent, 
originally an image of evil and temptation in the biblical context, becomes 
more ambiguous in the Romantic works and is sometimes even portrayed 
positively. Politically, the image of serpent was flown on a banner of the 
American Revolution, the Gadsden flag, accompanied by the defiant line, 
“Don’t tread on me.” And, as part of the Romantic re-evaluation of the Bible, 
the serpent/Satan stood for sexual liberation against religious repression. In 
this “portentous fight” that foretells the future revolution, Shelley regards the 
Serpent as a representative of good. But the Serpent’s eventual defeat by 
the Eagle also hints at the failure which, in Shelley’s view, is inevitable when 
violence is part of a revolutionary process. 
     The defeated and wounded Serpent is tended by a nameless Woman, 
“fair as one flower adorning / An icy wilderness” (1.16.264-265). As the 
Woman “unveiled her bosom,” the Serpent lies “coiled in rest in her embrace” 
(1.20.302, 306). Here we can observe a hidden identification of the Serpent 
with Laon, who is also cared for and healed by a Hermit after he is captured 
and tortured by Othman’s soldiers.69 Chichester contends that the Serpent 
                                                
69 In Stanza 22 the narrator asks: “Shall this fair woman all alone, / Over the sea with that 
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represents a latent “Shelleyan self-image.” The Serpent, like Laon in Canto 4, 
must annihilate its masculine fierceness, reflecting Shelley’s aspiration to 
return to the feminine garden in Field Place with his sisters. By the end of 
Canto 1, Shelley presents an incorporation of the Serpent and the Woman, 
who become “a Form, / Fairer than tongue can speak or thought may frame” 
and “sate / Majestic, yet most mild—calm, yet compassionate (1.57.632-633, 
639-638). Such is the androgynous image in Shelley’s ideal that combines 
both masculine and feminine qualities, a perfect union of both sexes.70 This 
episode of eagle-serpent fight and serpent-woman union establishes the 
essential Shelleyan concept of revolution in Laon and Cythna that reflects the 
French Revolution: its doomed failure for abuse of violence, the necessity to 
temper such masculine aggressiveness, and the possible vision of 
successful revolution based on gender-dissolving love and sympathy. 
     Shelley’s development of the eagle-serpent image, from Alastor to 
Canto 1 of Laon and Cythna, shows his understanding that all human 
interactions, encompassing social and political conflicts, originate in a sexual 
drive that is itself contained and categorised by gender differences in society. 
Shelley’s aspiration to an ideal social reform based allegorically on an 
androgynous image echoes Blake’s concept of “human form divine,” the re-
integration of the split human mentalities and the reunion of the masculine 
“Spectre” and the feminine “Emanation.” Therefore, we can expect to see in 
Laon and Cythna a certain alleviation and even degradation of masculinity in 
the late eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century social and aesthetic 
contexts. Chichester insightfully terms Shelley’s rendering of Laon’s 
masculinity as “imaginative transsexuality,” through which Shelley “envisions 
in Laon and Cythna a vital sisterhood of love, community, and self-sacrifice 
that evades and even subverts the ‘brotherhood of ill’ which the patriarchal 
                                                
fierce Serpent go? / His head is on her heart, and who can know / How soon he may devour 
his feeble prey?” (1.22.318-321). The Serpent’s pronoun becomes “he” rather than the 
previous “it,” further stressing its identification with Laon. 
70 This perfect androgynous form, as we might note, is still a “He,” attesting to Anne K. 
Mellor’s and Alan Richardson’s arguments that the Romantics and their heroes do not truly 
dissolve gender difference, but only assimilate the feminine to solidify their own male 
subjectivity. 
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tyrant Othman creates” (100). Drawing on Chichester’s argument, I seek to 
further point out that Shelley achieves this sexual transformation with an 
erotic poetics of suffering and madness that again borders on an “obscene” 
annihilation of the Romantic selfhood and subjectivity.  
     Canto 2 presents the primary innocence of Laon’s cohabitation with 
Cythna in an idyllic bower, which reflects Shelley’s own childhood in Field 
Place. In this Canto Shelley establishes the incest setting for his 
protagonists. For instance, in Stanza 20 Laon declares, “I had a little sister, 
whose fair eyes / Were lodestars of delight, which drew me home” and who is 
his “only source of tears and smiles” (2.21.847-848, 855). In Stanza 25, 
Shelley describes Cythna as a “child of twelve years old” (2.25.885), a 
specific age that reminds us of Ololon, the “Virgin of twelve years” in Blake’s 
Milton. The twelve-year-old signifies the initiation of female puberty as well as 
the capacity for sexual interactions with men, as discussed in the previous 
chapter. Cythna’s age here implies her awareness of sexual difference and 
the new identity based on it, confirming her erotic relationship with Laon. In 
the republished The Revolt of Islam, “a little sister” is changed to “An orphan” 
and “a playmate,” who lives with Laon’s parents, but Cythna’s identity as 
Laon’s “own shadow” and “A second self, far dearer and more fair” (2.24.874-
875) remains unaltered. Therefore, despite his modifications of nouns, 
Shelley still underscores the sibling incestuous love as a form of utter 
identification and incorporation.  
     The idyllic setting of Canto 2 is a nursing bower, which provides space 
for the couple’s incestuous love to grow. Here, Laon lies in “her smile-
peopled rest” (2.34.970) with “the female mind / Untainted by the poison-
clouds which rest / On the dark world” (2.35.973-975). In this protective and 
harmonious realm, they still perceive the human suffering in the external 
world. Shelley begins to extend the scope of sexual love between the 
protagonists to a broader sense of sympathy, when Cythna “had endued / My 
purpose with a wider sympathy” and together they lament “the servitude / In 
which the half of humankind were mewed” (2.36.983-984, 985-986). Laon 
further observes, “Never will peace and human nature meet / Till free and 
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equal man and woman greet / Domestic peace” (2.37.994-996). Here Shelley 
prefigures the idea of gender equality, which derives also from the siblings’ 
incestuous love as a form of identification, as the crucial element in his ideal 
social reform. We see Shelley’s development of sibling incest from love 
between individuals, to the idealised representation of gender equality, and to 
universal sympathy for all of humankind. Although the primary pastoral 
paradise in which Laon and Cythna develop their love nurtures the idea of 
Shelleyan sympathy, they are bound to leave this unearthly place behind to 
actualise Shelleyan sympathy in the mundane world. They must sever their 
bound with this natural bower of nurturing maternity, as Jesus must declare 
to his mother: “What have I to do with thee?” They must part, only to meet 
again not in “yon cold vacant Heaven” but “Within the minds of men, whose 
lips shall bless / Our memory, and whose hopes its light retain / When these 
dissevered bones are trodden in the plain” (2.48.1095-1098). Here, Shelley 
emphasises Laon’s and Cythan’s destined entrance into the real world, which 
is opposed to Wordsworthian self-centred solitude in nature and alienation 
from human beings (which he criticises in Alastor). Such unhealthy espousal 
of solitude, as Peacock observes in Alastor, is “a spirit of evil,” (qtd. in 
Leader’s and O’Neill’s note, MW 716), which will degrade nature to “the deaf 
air” and “the blind earth, and heaven / That echoes not my thoughts” (Alastor 
289-290). Incestuous love, originally a social taboo, the prohibition of which 
guarantees familial structure and thus entire human civilisation, becomes in 
Shelley’s poem “a symbol of interpersonal unity” (Roberts 182) and the basis 
of positive human drive. Through it, Shelley can re-enter and ameliorate 
society and civilisation.  
     At the end of Canto 2, after acknowledging their task to expand the 
scope of their love and take it into the outside world, Laon and Cythna do not 
actually intend to leave their bucolic bower immediately. They are “calm with 
passion” and “moved towards our home; where, in this mood, / Each from the 
other sought refuge in solitude” (2.49.1104, 1106-1107). The oxymoronic 
“calm with passion” suggests their inability to act in human society, and the 
final line of Canto 2 ironically evokes the Wordsworthian “self-centred 
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seclusion” (Preface to Alastor, MW 92) in nature, the “refuge in solitude” that 
Shelley has reproached in Alastor. The incident that truly drives Shelley’s 
protagonists into the outer world is the violent intrusion of Othman, the tyrant 
of the Golden City. In Laon’s dream vision that starts Canto 3, Shelley again 
presents the similar nocturnal unrest of sexual desire seen in Alastor, as 
Laon experiences in his sleep “a boundless chaos wild and vast” of “rapture 
sick” and “pain aghast” (3.1.1113, 1116).71 Laon’s mental unrest contrasts 
with the natural harmony surrounding him and Cythna and himself, 
suggesting that inactive pleasure in natural beauty prevents them from 
actualising their love in worldly revolution. It also foreshadows the first main 
action of the plot that will drive the couple from their idyllic garden: Cythna’s 
abduction by Othman’s soldiers.   
     The malevolent and sexual vision that disturbs Laon’s dream in Stanza 
5—“the gaping earth then vomited / Legions of foul and ghastly shapes, 
which hung / Upon my flight; and ever, as we fled, / They plucked at Cythna” 
(3.5.1148-1151)—becomes reality when the couple’s cottage is invaded by 
Othman’s soldiers, “whose glittering swords were bare, / And whose 
degraded limbs the tyrant’s garb did wear” (3.6.1161-1162). After witnessing 
Cythna’s seizure by the enemies, Laon draws his knife and “with one 
impulse, suddenly / All unaware three of their number slew” (3.10.1194-
1195), He does this even though Cythna has urged him not to resort to 
violence. This episode is one of the most crucial moments of the entire epic. 
In terms of narrative, it brings the couple out of their bower of nature and into 
the human world. It also initiates a series of trials they must undergo to 
achieve Shelley’s revolutionary ideal. Critics also accentuate the 
psychosexual significance of Laon’s martial action here. Stuart M. Sperry 
argues that this scene “reveals much of Shelley’s intuitive understanding of 
                                                
71 We can also note that Laon’s highly sexual vision, one that blends pleasure with pain is 
“never memory’s theme” (3.1.1114). Shelley emphasises that Laon’s vision does not belong 
to “memory” because his unrest is associated with his future, which lies outside the natural 
paradise that presently harbours him. Here Shelley also evokes the Romantic understanding 
of “memory” as the negative opposition to artistic inspiration, an antithesis that Blake also 
recognises, especially in the Preface to Milton: “the Daughters of Memory shall become the 
Daughters of Inspiration” (CPPB 95). 
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the human psyche, that aggression is the inevitable outgrowth of masculinity” 
(“The Sexual Theme” 41). W. A. Ulmer interprets Laon’s vision of Cythna’s 
assault and the later realised action of it as a “psychomachia where Laon 
plays all the roles” (59). Chichester argues that Laon’s dream vision “has 
materialized as the phallic weapons that both Laon and the soldiers wield” 
(91). Their readings suggest that Laon’s violent resistance makes him 
unconsciously identify with the masculine oppression that Othman 
represents. Such aggressiveness and retaliation are negative masculine 
propensities that derail the French Revolution and that Laon has to eliminate 
in order to re-join Cythna in the Golden City to lead a peaceful resistance. 
After Cythna is taken away from him, Laon has to undergo tortures at the 
hand of Othman’s henchmen before being rescued and healed by the 
nameless Hermit. Through these experiences Laon gradually tempers the 
masculine aggressiveness of his male psyche.  
     Knocked into unconsciousness, Laon is taken by Othman’s minions to 
“a cavern in the hill” (3.13.1216) and bound “to the platform of the pile . . . / 
With chains which eat into the flesh, alas, / With brazen links” (3.14.1225-
1230). In this plight, Laon feels that “The darkness of brief frenzy cast on me, 
/ So that I knew not my own misery” (3.15.1237-1238) and “the peace of 
madness” (3.17.1252). After seeing the boat that carries Cythna away “to her 
blighting slavery sold” (3.17.1259), Laon suffers from the biting chains, and 
subsequently from thirst and hunger: “I chewed the bitter dust, / And bit my 
bloodless arm, and licked the brazen rust” (3.21.1295-1296). On the fourth 
day, the physical suffering begin to invade Laon’s mentality, as he 
experiences: 
          . . . A fearful sleep, 
          Which through the caverns dreary and forlorn 
          Of the riven soul, sent its foul dreams to sweep 
          With whirlwind swiftness—a fall far and deep,— 
          A gulf, a void, a sense of senselessness— (3.22.1328-1302) 
This mental chaos brings forth “a choir of devils” to “supply those ceaseless 
revels” (3.23.1307, 1310) in Laon’s dream vision. In this episode, Shelley 
casts Laon in a Promethean image of physical suffering, and presents his 
psychological reactions to extreme bodily affliction. Shelley frequently 
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deploys oxymoronic phrases such as “the peace of madness” and “a sense 
of senselessness,” which indicate the breaking of boundaries between 
extreme opposites. The oxymoron signifies the deactivation of Laon’s human 
faculties to interpret and to categorise objects, in this case his own emotions. 
The deactivation also results in his failed perception to distinguish reality 
from dream: “thought could not divide / The actual world from these 
entangling evils” (3.23.1311-1312). Consequently, his subjectivity borders on 
disintegration, as confirmed by his “riven soul,” as well as by his recollection 
that “I descried / All shapes like mine own self hideously multiplied” 
(3.23.1313-1314). Moreover, considering Shelley’s depiction of Laon’s 
experiences of pain and violence—his ominous dream vision and his 
mentality in the abduction scene—we find more erotically-tinged phrases, 
such as “rapture sick” and “brainless ecstasy,” which echoes his “terrific 
trance” in this agonising captivity. Casting Laon in an agonised 
Promethean/Jesus image but imbued with eroticism, Shelley’s poetics of 
suffering and madness is a unique representation of the disruption of human 
psyche in extreme conditions, when a human subject is unable to 
differentiate sanity from madness, reality from dream, pain from pleasure, 
and self from non-self.72 The mental condition also parallels Nietzsche’s 
Dionysian intoxication, a state in which principium individuationis, the human 
capability to differentiate, categorise, and interpret objects, is suspended.  
     In Laon’s final dream vision of this maniacal plight, when “The sense of 
day and night, of false and true, / Was dead within me” (3.24.1315-1316), 
Shelley presents an even more shocking image of cannibalism: 
          Methought that grate was lifted, and the seven 
          Who brought me thither four stiff corpses bare, 
          And from the frieze to the four winds of Heaven 
          Hung them on high by the entangled hair: 
          Swarthy were three—the fourth was very fair: 
          As they retired, the golden moon upsprung, 
          And eagerly, out in the giddy air, 
                                                
72 Also, with the synthesis of bodily pain, religiosity, and eroticism in this passage, Shelley 
predates Bataille’s famous remark on the photograph of Chinese torture “Hundred Pieces,” 
in which the victim’s body is cut piece by piece slowly. For Bataille, the photograph is “at 
once ecstatic and intolerable” and illustrates “a fundamental connection between religious 
ecstasy and eroticism—and in particular sadism” (The Tears of Eros 206). 
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          Leaning that I might eat, I stretched and clung 
          Over the shapeless depth in which those corpses hung.    
                                              (3.25.1324-1332) 
The three “swarthy” corpses can be easily identified as the three soldiers 
Laon slays in the abduction scene. However, the fourth one, “A woman’s 
shape, now lank and cold and blue, / The dwelling of the many-coloured 
worm” (3.26.1333-1334), is Cythna herself: “it seemed that Cythna’s ghost / 
Laughed in those looks, and that the flesh was warm / Within my teeth” 
(3.26.1338-1340). Critics have paid much attention to Laon’s vision, which 
simultaneously transgresses a number of the severest taboos in Shelley’s 
contemporary social context: cannibalism, necrophagy, homosexuality, and 
incest. E. B. Murray calls this scene Shelley’s “Gothic extravagance” (573). 
Sperry deems it a Freudian projection of Laon’s sexual desire for Cythna as 
his loved object for assimilation (“The Sexual Theme” 42). Ulmer argues that 
the vision is a warning to Laon of “the horror of aggression” that is “a 
precondition for sexual enjoyment of the woman” and would “turn him to a 
saving pacifism” (60-61). Chichester regards Laon’s eating of Cythna’s dead 
flesh as the “communion at a new altar, where (Christlike) woman reigns 
supreme” (92). The event is that which leads him to revive “his absent/dead 
sister” and “her spirit within himself” (92). Both Ulmer and Chichester 
recognise Laon’s cannibalistic vision as a necessary epiphany for him to 
regret his previous resort to violence, which might also doom Cythna 
eventually. Hence, it functions to annihilate the last residue of Laon’s 
aggressive masculinity so that he can reunite with Cythna in the nonviolent 
revolution that will follow. As Chichester concludes, it also symbolises 
Shelley’s desire to re-identify with the sorority of his childhood, spent in Field 
Place.  
     More than a positive symbolic transition from masculinity/violence to 
femininity/pacifism as Ulmer and Chichester propose, Shelley’s design of 
Laon’s cannibalistic vision retains the poetics of disruption, which was also 
seen in Laon’s earlier suffering and madness. Laon sees the fourth corpse as 
a female, “lank and cold and blue,” who has a “the white and hollow cheek.” 
Yet, what make him recognise her as Cythna are her “radiance” and “horny 
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eyes” (26.1333-1337). Once again Shelley’s oxymoronic descriptions of 
Cythna’s corpse as simultaneously “cold and blue” and full of “radiance” and 
“warm” blur the boundary between life and death, and furthermore insinuates 
the affinity between death and eroticism. The significance of this episode is 
that cannibalism as a cultural and literary motif in Shelley’s time was a means 
to distinguish civilisation and barbarity, to alienate the cultural otherness and 
solidify the subjectivity of the Western civilisation. As Kilgour points out, 
cannibalism functions to “accuse a minority that resists assimilation into the 
body politics of that body’s own desire for total incorporation” (5). This 
ideological phenomenon, as Kilgour further argues, is certified by the 
accusation of Jewish cannibalism in the Middle Ages, of the Catholic 
cannibalism during the Reformation, and of the aboriginal cannibalism in the 
New World at the height of imperialism and colonialism. Kilgour also notes 
that cannibalism is contained in the Christian idea of communion, suggesting 
that the boundary between the civilisation represented by Christian Europe 
and the barbarity of the New World is sometimes easily blurred. In Laon’s 
case, Shelley audaciously employs the motif of cannibalism upon his 
protagonist, a white European hero who first cannibalises three “swarthy” 
foreigners out of desperate hunger, and then cannibalises his sister in a 
highly erotic manner. Recalling the etymological affinity between “consume” 
and “consummate” pointed out by Kilgour, we can observe the connection 
between incest and cannibalism, which we have already seen in The Cenci. 
In this visionary episode, Shelley on the one hand subverts the division and 
hierarchy between civilisation/Europe and barbarity/non-Europe at the level 
of contemporary cultural context; on the other hand, he eroticises the 
religious rite of communion with incestuous connotations because in this 
vision, as Chichester proposes, Cythna is supposed to represent the idea of 
pity and self-sacrifice of Jesus Christ. Once again Shelley echoes Bataille’s 
idea of l’érotisme sacré, with which “the religious horror disclosed in sacrifice 
becomes linked to the abyss of eroticism” (Erotism 207).  
     What follows Laon’s cannibalistic vision is another vision of “The shape 
of an old man” that replaces his previous horrible dream. The vision is soon 
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realised when the Hermit appears and rescues Laon from the rocky platform 
at the end of Canto 3. Laon’s time spent with the Hermit in Canto 4 is another 
process of tempering his masculinity. The Hermit, as Mary Shelley notes, is 
modelled on Dr James Lind, Shelley’s mentor at Eton. Roberts argues that 
the character is also modelled on William Godwin and Thomas Paine, “the 
past heroes of ‘90s radicalism’” (170). As Chichester points out, the figure 
also represents the idea that “even the most muscular and ‘giant’ 
representative of the male sex can exemplify feminine qualities” (92). Indeed, 
Shelley’s description of the Hermit, who tenderly takes care of Laon and 
heals his wounds, is full of the paradoxical combination of the masculine and 
the feminine; he is “Stately and beautiful” (3.27.1349), “so grand and mild” 
(3.33.1401); he has “sweet and mighty eloquence” (4.11.1505) and “soft 
looks of pity” that can dart “A glance as keen as is the lightning’s stroke” 
(4.6.1465-1466). The Hermit not only takes on a mother’s role by 
demonstrating his nurturing and healing ability but also stands up against the 
institution of marriage, which is traditionally centred on and empowered by 
the father.73 In Stanza 18, he informs Laon of the peaceful revolution led by 
a mysterious lady, who is later revealed as Cythna, in the Golden City. Upon 
hearing the Hermit’s account of how “a maiden fair . . . arise[s], and make[s] / 
Her sex the law of truth and freedom hear” (4.18.1570-1573), Laon learns to 
employ the gentle power of language instead of using brute force: “great is 
the strength / Of words” (4.18.1569-1570). Indeed, all the oppressed people 
“bend beneath the spell / Of that young maiden’s speech” (4.20.1592-1593). 
This is in opposition to the traditional understanding that word and speech, 
associated with females, are powerless tools for handling serious matters, 
while actions, taken by males, are the best means to heroic feats. In the 
interaction between the Hermit and Laon, Shelley presents the former as a 
                                                
73 In his self-introduction, the Hermit tells Laon that inspired by his writings, the 
“marriageable maidens, who have pined / With love, till life seemed melting through their 
look, / A warmer zeal, a nobler hope, now find” (4.13.1526-1528). Shelley’s lines here 
resemble Blake’s in Visions of the Daughters of Albion: “The virgin / That pines for man; shall 
awaken her womb to enormous joys / In the secret shadows of her chamber” (CPPB 50). 
Through the Hermit Shelley promotes the liberation of sexual desire from the regulation of 
marriage, as does Blake against the virtue of chastity, though Shelley presents such a 
liberation in a more sublimated form rather than Blake’s direct bodily description. 
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heterogeneous father-figure, who subverts the archetype of patriarch in the 
Christian tradition (deriving from the Old Testament Jehovah) to inspire Laon 
to incorporate feminine qualities. By acquainting himself with these feminine 
qualities from the Hermit’s motherly care and teaching, Laon passes another 
stage of alleviating his masculine aggressiveness.74  
     After leaving the Hermit’s tower with “blooming ivy-trails,” “the spangling 
sands,” and “rarest sea shells” (4.1.1416-1419)—another variation of the 
Shelleyan bower of maternal nature—Laon arrives at the Golden City to aid 
the revolution, girded with a new belief in nonviolent reformation. His 
conversion to pacifism is soon proved when he stops a fight between the 
rebels and Othman’s soldiers by throwing himself at a thrusting spear:  
          One pointed on his foe the mortal spear—  
          I rushed before its point, and cried ‘Forbear, forbear!’  
          The spear transfixed my arm that was uplifted   
          In swift expostulation, and the blood  
          Gushed round its point” (5.8.1790-5.9.1794).  
By receiving a phallic spear, Laon puts himself in both the feminine position 
of the penetrated and in the role of self-sacrificing Christ, for he “takes the 
punishment for the sins of others and serves thereby to absolve them of their 
crimes” (Roberts 189).75 After the successful revolution, Laon meets the now 
dethroned Othman in the palace, where he sees a girl beside the tyrant. This 
girl “stood beside him like a rainbow braided” with “A sweet and solemn 
smile, like Cythna’s cast” (5.24.1927-1930). Though Laon does not know she 
is the child brought forth by Cythna after being raped by Othman, he feels 
nameless affinity with her and “with a father’s kiss / I pressed those softest 
eyes in trembling tenderness” (5.24.1934-1935).  
     Shelley’s casting of Laon as a Christ figure becomes pronounced when 
the furious multitude demands a trial for the deposed Othman: “He who 
                                                
74 However, there are also negative connotations in the Hermit’s benign characterisation, as 
“That hoary man had spent his livelong age / In converse with the dead, who leave the 
stamp / Of ever-burning thoughts on many a page, / When they are gone into the senseless 
damp / Of graves” (4.8.1477-1481). Roberts observes in his history that “The old Hermit 
‘feeds’ on the dead to become like them…with a thanatological cannibalism of the past” 
(171). 
75 Chichester notes this as another degradation Laon’s masculinity, though she argues that 
“his strident claims to self-abnegation somewhat undermine his credibility as an embodiment 
of sympathetic love” (95). 
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judged let him be brought / To judgment! blood for blood cries from the soil / 
On which his crimes have deep pollution wrought!” (5.32.1999-2001). Shelley 
almost repeats the very scene in Chapter 8 of the Gospel of John in the New 
Testament, in which the scribes and Pharisees sentence an adulterous 
woman to be stoned to death. Laon dissuades the crowd from violence 
against Othman, saying a line that clearly alludes to Jesus’s famous phrase, 
“He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at him” (John 
8:7): “Is there one who ne’er / In secret thought has wished another’s ill” 
(5.34.2018). Moved by Laon’s speech, the people “kissed my feet / In pity’s 
madness” (5.35.2031-2032) and even comfort the distressed Othman by 
allowing him to live freely in a mansion resembling his previous palace. 
Apparently, such a result of the revolution accords with Shelley’s purpose to 
envision the beau ideal of the French Revolution. That is, the state is 
“relieved by milder pictures of friendship & love & natural affection” (LS 564) 
after the despotic regime is peacefully overthrown. The despot himself is 
forgiven and cared for rather than abused and executed by his people, as 
Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette were. However, Shelley’s attitude to this 
seemingly happy outcome of the revolution in the Golden City is ambiguous. 
The simultaneously positive and negative phrase of “pity of madness” 
suggests how irrational and easily manipulated “the temper of the public 
mind” (Preface, CPWS 99) is, and how easily they can follow another 
authoritarian figure with blind idolatry (“kissed my feet”). Moreover, Shelley’s 
depiction of Othman when he is faced with forgiveness and kindness is both 
subtle and realistic: He paints Othman in the way one might expect a 
powerful man to react to those more inferior people who have vanquished 
him. There is no reconciliation, but only harboured malice: “his straight lips 
were bent, / Men said, into a smile which guile portended” (5.36.2041-2042). 
Here Shelley has already foreshadowed the final failure of the revolution and 
the retaliation of tyranny, as he is aware that as a revolutionary hero Laon 
must act with power. Such is “the power to change events,” as Roberts 
perceives, and “The most obvious power is always that employed by the 
structures one seeks to overthrow” (172). 
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     By the end of Canto 5, Laon and Cythna enjoy, alongside the liberated 
people a “sacred festival, / A rite to attest the equality of all / Who live” 
(5.37.2047-2048).76 It is also a feast that celebrates Shelley’s 
vegetarianism—“Never again may blood of bird or beast / Stain with its 
venomous stream a human feast” (5.51.5.2245-2246). However, the mirth 
following their revolutionary success is then interrupted by “rallying cries of 
treason and of danger” (6.3.2353) when the troops, sent by foreign despots 
to help Othman’s restoration, arrive at the Golden City. In the chaos, when 
Laon is about to be overrun by hostile soldiers, he sees 
          . . . with reinless speed 
          A black Tartarian horse of giant frame 
          Comes trampling over the dead; the living bleed 
          Beneath the hoofs of that tremendous steed, 
          On which, like to an Angel, robed in white,  
          Sate one waving a sword . . . (6.19.2497-2503) 
This unknown rider rescues Laon; four stanzas later, he and the reader 
realise simultaneously that this person is Cythna. Here Shelley casts Laon in 
the position of a traditional damsel in distress, salvaged by a valiant knight. 
He also masculinises Cythna through images of a steed and a sword, the 
latter being a frequent phallic image that, in the abduction scene in Canto 3, 
signifies Loan’s male aggression. Moreover, her horse tramples over 
numerous men, alive and dead. Her martial action in this episode borders on 
cruelty and, surprisingly, contradicts her plea for peace in the abduction 
scene.  
     In Canto 6, Laon and Cythna escapes from their pursuers and arrives 
at another retreat. The natural bower to which they come is a ruin. On its roof 
“Fair clinging weeds with ivy pale did grow, / Clasping its gray rents with a 
verdurous woof, / A hanging dome of leaves, a canopy moon-proof” 
(6.27.2575-2577). In this place, similar to the initial bower in which they 
                                                
76 Lori Molinari discusses extensively the revolutionary festival in her essay “Revising the 
Revolution: the Festival of Unity and Shelley’s Beau Ideal.” She pays specific attention to the 
three statues surrounding Cythna’s throne on the pyramid, the three mysterious images of a 
giant, a woman breastfeeding a basilisk, and a worm called “Faith,” from Stanza 49 to 50 in 
Canto 5. Molinari proposes that the festival that features the three statues is Shelley’s 
recapitulation of the French “Festival of the Unity and Indivisibility of the Republic” that took 
place on 10 August 1793.  
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spend their childhood, Laon and Cythna complete their sexual union. From 
Stanzas 30 to 37 Shelley endeavours to depict an ideal intercourse of perfect 
harmony and mutual affection that starts with the line, “To the pure all things 
are pure!” (6.30.2596). He presents eroticism as an experience in which 
language is deactivated, “When wildering passion swalloweth up the pauses 
/ Of inexpressive speech” (6.31.2607-2608) in “the sickness of a deep / And 
speechless swoon of joy” (6.34.2637-2638). At the same time, he 
accentuates the theme of sibling incest, using conspicuous expressions: 
“The common blood which ran within our frames” (6.31.2610) and “I felt the 
blood that burned / Within her frame, mingle with mine” (6.34.2635).77 The 
erotic ecstasy, as Shelley implies, is a state in which language no longer 
functions. It is an intoxicated state in which the signifier fails to signify the 
signified. The human faculty of signification in language also represents the 
ability to interpret and differentiate external objects as things that are other 
than self. Its deactivation in eroticism again points to the disintegration of 
subjectivity and the annihilation of social identities, now exemplified by 
Laon’s and Cythna’s sibling incestuous love. In Stanza 35, the sexual union 
is marked by  
          . . . one moment that confounded thus 
          All thought, all sense, all feeling, into one 
          Unutterable power, which shielded us  
          Even from our own cold looks, when we had gone 
          Into a wide and wild oblivion 
          Of tumult and of tenderness? or now 
          Had ages, such as make the moon and sun, 
          The seasons, and mankind their changes know, 
          Left fear and time unfelt by us alone below? (6.35.2641-2649) 
Shelley confirms that sexual ecstasy is an oxymoronic experience of 
harmony and disruption, as it destroys all individual faculties—“All thought, all 
sense, all feeling”—and reunites them in a dark and chaotic being, an 
“Unutterable power.” But only in this chaotic “wild oblivion” can human beings 
transcend the vicissitude of time and space, and reach the state of eternity 
sought so futilely by worldly religions. Paradoxically those who enter into this 
                                                
77 These phrases that make the sibling incest obvious are changed in the republication, The 
Revolt of Islam. 
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sacred state of eroticism are also wracked by negative sensations of pain: 
“The failing heart in languishment,” the “quick dying gasps,” and the “faint 
eyes” in “tears of a wide mist boundless and dim” (6.36.2650-2654). This 
causes in them the experience that approximates to ultimate death, the 
“divine darkness” of “blind mortality” (6.37.2660-2661). The synthesis of 
sexual drive and death drive in the sibling incestuous union, as we can note, 
parallels Laon’s erotic fantasies during his Promethean/Christ-like torture in 
Canto 3, where his extreme suffering casts him into a trancelike experience 
of self-oblivion, in which pain is mixed with pleasure.78  
     In the later part of Canto 6, as Cythna is troubled by hunger and rests 
in the retreat, Laon rides her Tartar steed to determine the outcome of the 
latest conflict in the Golden City and to seek food for Cythna. In the middle of 
his journey, he enters “a desolate village in a wood” whose dwellers have 
been stricken by war and famine. Laon searches for any survivors but only 
finds a woman, who is  
          . . . withered from a likeness of aught human 
          Into a fiend, by some strange misery; 
          Soon as she heard my steps she leaped on me, 
          And glued her burning lips to mine, and laughed 
          With a loud, long and frantic laugh of glee, 
          And cried, ‘Now, Mortal, thou hast deeply quaffed 
          The Plague’s blue kisses—soon millions shall pledge the draught!        
                                                (6.48.2760-2766) 
This grotesque woman calls herself “Pestilence,” an identity she adopts after 
her two children die during the war: “Since then I have no longer been a 
mother, / But I am Pestilence” (6.49.2771-2772). Pestilence asks Laon’s 
purpose, and after knowing he is in search of food, she leads him to her 
cottage, where she “piled three heaps of loaves, making a dearth / Among 
the dead—round which she set in state / A ring of cold, stiff babes” 
                                                
78 It is also noteworthy that Shelley’s placement of this episode of actual consummation right 
after the defeat of the revolution implies his ambiguous attitude to the sexual union between 
his hero and heroine. Sperry also observes that the sexual delight here, “centred on the 
complete identification of Laon and Cythna, proves inadequate to the strains it must 
undergo” (“The Sexual Theme” 49). In terms of narrative, their consummation is more like an 
escapist consolation for the political failure than it is an optimistic drive for them to continue 
the revolution. After all, in the subsequent cantos and until the final immolation, they barely 
achieve anything in reality. 
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(6.51.2791-2793). She offers the bread circled by the bodies of dead infants 
to Laon, whose eyes and heart ache upon seeing the dreadful spectacle. 
Laon accepts the food nonetheless and returns along to Cythna, after his 
unsuccessful attempt to persuade Pestilence to come with him so he can 
offer her his help. Critics have generally ignored this minor but bizarre 
episode, despite its highly sexual connotations. Richard Cronin briefly 
mentions that Pestilence is “Cythna’s antitype,” in whom “the ideal has 
projected its own antithesis” (Shelley’s Poetic Thoughts 106). Ulmer argues 
that when Pestilence forces her kiss on Laon’s lips, she represents a form of 
feminine sexual violence that stems from maternity, indicating that the entire 
epic can also be read as an Oedipal family romance, in which Laon and 
Othman are “competitors for Cythna, rivals for the prerogatives of 
fatherhood” (64). More recently, in his Shelley and the Romantic Imagination, 
Thomas R. Frosch presents another psychoanalytic interpretation, arguing 
that Pestilence is one of the “bad mothers” in the poem, who conveys an 
archaic anxiety generated by children’s sexual/genital maturity and maternal 
attachment (119). 
     At first sight, Shelley’s Pestilence is an apparent inversion of the mother 
figure, whose ability to give birth and nurture lives becomes a fatal power to 
“slay and smother.”79 But this seemingly negative portrayal is in fact more 
ambiguous if we notice Shelley’s latent connection between eating and 
eroticism here. The hunger Laon and Cythan feel, as Frosch points out, is the 
outcome of their sexual union, a symbolic punishment for sexual maturity that 
alienates children from their mother, the primitive femininity they must detach 
from in order to establish social subjectivity (119). Though shocked and 
perhaps disgusted by Pestilence’s wretched appearance and maniacal 
demeanour, Laon nevertheless accepts the bread she offers, the loaves 
polluted by dead infants’ bodies. After his imaginative consumption of 
Cythna’s corpse in Canto 3, Shelley once again has Laon’s action border on 
                                                
79 As a twisted and decadent mother figure, Pestilence is reminiscent of Wordsworth’s 
Martha Ray in “The Thorn.” Though it is unclear that Martha’s child is a stillborn or killed by 
Martha herself, both women are driven into madness by the deaths of their children, which 
result from patriarchal malice (the heartless Stephen Hill and the war waged by Othman). 
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cannibalism. Bizarrely, though the bread contaminated by infants’ corpses 
has potential meanings of cannibalism and necrophagy, it becomes “Our 
peaceful meal” and is consumed by Laon and Cythna without slightest 
hesitation. Furthermore, the bread revives Cythna, as we see “in her eyes, 
an atmosphere / Of health and hope; and sorrow languished near it” 
(6.55.2823-2828). That is, as an ostensible negative mother figure, 
Pestilence actually has positive effects on Shelley’s hero and heroine. Being 
deprived of her children through paternal violence, Pestilence represents the 
primitive wholeness of the mother-body by practising a ritual that simulates 
the cannibalism of her own children. Cannibalism suggests “the idea of 
return,” as Kilgour also proposes, “to communion with an original source . . . 
through the loss of human and individual identity” (11). In the madness that 
drives her to encircle the bread with the bodies of her dead children, 
Pestilence returns to the ultimate state of femininity that disintegrates the 
boundary between self and others, a boundary established to maintain and 
fortify subjectivity and individuality. Because Pestilence’s cannibalistic 
offering revivifies the protagonists, Shelley potentially acknowledges in this 
episode the existence of a pre-Oedipal maternal wholeness and a tendency 
to return to this state of primitive femininity. Laon obtains the crucial bread at 
the price of being violated by Pestilence’s “burning lips” and “Plague’s blue 
kisses.” His masculinity is then marred and weakened when he and Cythna 
consume the semi-human-flesh bread. Therefore, Pestilence in this episode 
is not merely an “antitype” or a “dark double” of Cythna. She also represents 
the return to primitive femininity, the state of the abject, to use Kristeva’s 
words, where selfhood and identity are annihilated. As the embodiment of 
ultimate femininity, Pestilence’s somatic contact with Laon (including her kiss 
and the bread) further degrades the hero’s masculinity. From another 
perspective, contradictory to her name and her asserted power to “smother 
and slay,” Pestilence in fact revives Cythna from her hunger-driven torpidity. 
In this mysterious and grotesque character, we can once again see how 
Shelley employs the obscene motif of cannibalism in the characterisation of 
his protagonists in this epic poem. He does so in a way that apparently 
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promotes positive interpersonal and social relationships that are based on 
love and sympathy.  
     Another function of Laon’s encounter with Pestilence as a 
heterogeneous mother figure is to prepare him for hearing Cythna’s “strange 
tale of strange endurance” (7.3.2848) revealed in Canto 7. In this ordeal, 
Cythna parallels Pestilence as a mother in distress, whose child is also taken 
away from her. What complicates Cythna’s maternal experience is that her 
child is the fruit of her rape by Othman. A similar circumstance happens in 
Count Cenci’s vicious fantasy about Beatrice giving birth to a child born of the 
incestuous rape. In the case of The Cenci, such a child will hurl the mother 
into a living inferno of emotional conflicts between love and hate, and will 
perpetuate the antagonism between the old and young generations. Shelley, 
in the earlier Laon and Cythna, presents Cythna as another rape victim, 
mothering a child of the forced union. However, Cythna’s loving attitude 
towards her child is different from Beatrice’s towards hers, at least in Count 
Cenci’s imagination. 
     In Canto 7, Cythna relates to Laon the events following her abduction. 
Othman hears her singing with a lute. It is a “wild, and sad, and spirit-thrilling 
lay” (7.4.2863) that incites his lust for her. Although Cythna’s “wondrous 
loveliness” of “great Nature’s sacred power” (7.5.2866-2867) impedes him 
temporarily, Othman accomplishes his obnoxious deed as “A king, a 
heartless beast, a pageant and a name” (7.5.2874). This line suggests how a 
masculine identity, “a name,” is established and fortified by oppressing the 
weak, the feminine. But Shelley soon shows a sense of the “power of the 
powerless” through Cythna’s suffering and madness. Her “awful frenzy” in the 
aftermath of the rape was not only appalling to Othman, as “aghast and pale 
the Tyrant fled away” (7.6.2883), but also  
          . . . was a beam of light, a power  
          Which dawned through the rent soul; and words it gave,  
          Gestures and looks, such as in whirlwinds bore 
          (Which might not be withstood, whence none could save) 
          All who approached their sphere, like some calm wave 
          Vexed into whirlpools by the chasms beneath (7.7.2884-2889). 
In this passage Cythna’s passive suffering nurtures an active power that 
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soon radiates from her broken self, her “rent soul.” Moreover, Shelley 
elevates Cythna’s suffering to the level of the natural sublime; the victimised 
Cythna becomes “whirlwinds,” “whirlpools,” and a fathomless abyss that 
subdue and absorb all spectators. Through such a representation, Shelley 
demonstrates that the extreme pain and disorder of feminine passivity can 
generates a strong power of activity with its extreme pain and disorder. That 
is, Cythna’s “awful frenzy” first intimidates Othman and then her radiant 
“madness” evokes other slaves’ sympathy and anger, who become “Fearless 
and free” and “began to breathe / Deep curses” (7.7.2891-2892), sowing the 
seed of the forthcoming revolution.  
     To prevent Cythna from spreading her influence in the palace, Othman 
sends two servants to imprison her in a cave surrounded by water. The two 
servants are “a green and wrinkled eunuch” and a “wretch from infancy / 
Made dumb by poison” (7.8.2895, 2898-2899). The peculiarity of these two 
slaves has drawn critical attention, especially because of the episode’s 
negative presentation of the Orient. Emily A. Haddad points out that the 
“castration makes an immediate reference to (unnatural) oriental practice” 
and the second slave’s origin in “fire island” “also confirms the oriental 
quality” (21). She concludes that Shelley’s design of the two slaves not only 
conflates tyranny with slavery, but also aligns the characters with the Eastern 
world. Michael J. Neth highlights the different connotations of the eunuch’s 
greenness: It paradoxically represents fertility in plants and illness/jealousy in 
human beings. He also connects the speechless slave to the act of muting 
slaves with poison, a cruel punishment exercised by slave owners in 
Jamaican and American plantations.80 In the context of Shelley’s epic, the 
green eunuch and the voiceless diver serve as Othman’s warning about 
Cythna’s resistance, whose punishments are the deprivation of fertility and 
the loss of voice. Additionally, the eunuch is a reflection of Othman’s own 
anxiety as an aging man who gradually loses his sexual potency. In a larger 
symbolic sense, he is a reflection of the old generation’s deteriorating 
                                                
80 See Neth’s commentaries in The Complete Poetry of Percy Bysshe Shelley (Johns 
Hopkins, 2012), p. 801. 
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sexuality and physical strength, which breeds in the old a jealousy and 
hatred for the young.  
     During the imprisonment “in a cave / Above the water, by that chasm of 
sea” (7.7.2929-2930), a sea-eagle regularly brings Cythna food. The 
assaulted and imprisoned woman then sinks into another state of disorder, 
with “The fiend of madness” disturbing her at intervals. A symptom of this 
nameless madness is the incapacity to correctly perceive and categorise 
external objects, as in Cythna’s eyes “the sea-eagle looked a fiend, who bore 
/ Thy mangled limbs for food” (7.15.2961-2962). Again Shelley employs the 
motif of cannibalism as Cythna imagines that the food brought by the sea-
eagle is Laon’s flesh. While she is in this chaotic state, Cythna discovers that 
she is pregnant as a result of her rape by Othman: 
          Another frenzy came—there seemed a being 
          Within me—a strange load my heart did bear, 
          As if some living thing had made its lair 
          Even in the fountains of my life; (7.16.2967-2970) 
Shelley’s description of Cythna’s pregnancy and childbirth is simultaneously 
explicit and ambiguous. In Stanza 17, Cythna feels that “new pulses seemed 
/ To beat beside my heart” and “There was a babe within,” and she tells Laon 
that “after a lapse of lingering pain, / I saw that lovely shape, which near 
heart had lain” (7.17.2977-2982). All these detailed depictions of pregnancy 
are interspersed with ambivalent phrases such as “Methought,” “I dreamed,” 
“I deemed,” and “I doubt,” as E. B. Murray also notices (576). That is, readers 
cannot be certain if what Cythna relays is true or is a consequence of her 
hallucinations. Nevertheless, Cythna’s pregnancy, be it imaginative or real, 
must be the result of her rape by Othman, because in terms of the poem’s 
timeline, this incident happens before her sexual union with Laon in Canto 6. 
To the child born of her painful and shameful violation, Cythna shows an 
entirely different attitude from Beatrice’s in Count Cenci’s fancy. Instead of a 
being mixed with her own appearance and her violator’s loathsome outward 
features, as is the case in The Cenci, Cythna sees 
          . . . a babe, beautiful from its birth,— 
          It was like thee, dear love, its eyes were thine, 
          Its brow, its lips, and so upon the earth 
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          It laid its fingers as now rest on mine 
          Thine own, belovèd! (7.18.2983-2987) 
From Cythna’s viewpoint, the child does not seem to bear any resemblance 
to her biological father, Othman. Instead, Cythan sees another Laon in her 
baby. Unlike Beatrice, whose child becomes an object of hate and pain, the 
child born of Cythna’s rape becomes her sole consolation in her confinement. 
That is, the child is a singular comfort—until one night when she suddenly 
vanishes, “like those illusions clear and bright, / Which dwell in lakes” 
(7.22.3023-3024). Cythna speculates that the dumb diver takes away the 
child in the night, which makes she feel “the very life was gone / Out of my 
heart” (7.23.3033-3034). Her physical changes (her swollen breasts) and 
mental distress attest to the existence of the child and her profound love for 
it.  
     From her narrative, which oscillates between reality and fantasy, we 
can observe that Cythna has to renounce her human faculties of perception 
and reasoning; the former enables her to discern Othman’s likeness in the 
child, and the latter compels her to confirm that the child is Othman’s based 
on the epic’s timeline. While relaying the tale to Laon, Cythna evokes her 
vision in madness and deactivates the two faculties. Only by doing so, she is 
able to erase Othman’s loathsome features (which may actually be there) 
from the child and further imagine Laon’s images (which are actually unlikely 
to be there) in the child, as if she is the result of the happy consummation in 
their idyllic retreat in Canto 3 (which happens, chronically, after the childbirth 
in the sea cave). To purify the vicious outcome of rape and regard it as a 
happy fruit of the mutual affection between her and Laon, Cythna has to 
suspend her reason and defy the order of time and space. In other words, 
when Shelley defines Cythna’s pregnancy, childbirth, and love for the child in 
Canto 7 as her “brainless fantasy,” he insinuates the idea that only through 
madness caused by extreme suffering can she emancipate herself from her 
oppressed state as a rape victim and dissolve her supposed repugnance at 
the child, born of such a disgraceful union with her violator. In this context, 
Cythna’s madness, the suspension of principium individuationis, also 
epitomises the power of imagination, from which springs forth artistic/poetical 
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creation that can transcend the plight that plagues her in reality. Without 
poetic imagination, as Cythna later laments, “Sense and Reason” will “bid the 
heart / That gazed beyond the wormy grave despair: / These eyes, these lips, 
this blood, seems darky there / To fade in hideous ruin” with “no calm sleep” 
but only “senseless death—a ruin dark and deep!” (9.32.3749-3756).  
     The revolution that Shelley aspires to does not come to pass in Laon 
and Cythna. In Canto 12, Laon is seized and bound on a pyre by Othman’s 
soldiers. Cythna, predating Brünnhilde riding her warhorse into her husband 
Siegfried’s pyre in the final scene of Richard Wagner’s Götterdämmerung, 
rises from her Tartan steed and joins Laon in the flames. The couple is 
miraculously transported from the pyre to a final natural retreat. They are also 
united with Cythna’s child, now a “bright Shape” and a “plumed Seraph,” who 
then recounts the aftermath of the immolation. This final bower of union, 
“exempted now from mortal fear or pain,” is identified as “The Temple of the 
Spirit” in the final stanza of the poem, thus concluding the epic in a spiritual 
harmony. Shelley ends Laon and Cythna by returning to a metaphysical 
realm of Platonism with the mundane world remaining in the same state of 
perdition. It is perhaps not surprising that John Taylor Coleridge’s Quarterly 
review dismisses the poem as an utter misapplication of ideas and a 
misconception of reality. The final happiness in a purely metaphysical realm 
seems to provide certain proof for later negative comments about Shelley’s 
poetry, such as Matthew Arnold’s famous “beautiful and ineffectual” remark 
and F. R. Leavis’s disapproval of Shelley’s “weak grasp upon the actual” (qtd. 
in Reiman and Fraistat 541, 546). Even Harold Bloom, one of the mid-
twentieth century’s strongest champions of Shelley’s works, calls it “an 
abortive allegorical epic which I do not admire” (8). Kenneth Neil Cameron 
also criticises its length, its obscuring of realism and fancy, and its absence of 
“unity of structure and mood” (The Golden Years 311).  
     My analysis of Laon and Cythna does not aim to defend Shelley’s 
ineffectuality in presenting the beau ideal of revolution, as he promises it will. 
On the level of aesthetics, I do not believe that Shelley conveys his ideas 
about political and social reforms in a compelling way. His preaching of 
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ideologies against religion and social conventions such as freedom, equality, 
and universal love are highly repetitive and didactic, as shown from Cantos 8 
through 11. However, the discussion in this section illuminates how Shelley’s 
poetics of suffering and madness forms the essential process of Laon’s and 
Cythna’s mental transformation. Through the “obscene” experiences of bodily 
torture, imaginative cannibalism, incest, and rape, Laon and Cythna undergo 
chaotic states of “brainless fantasy” and a “sense of senselessness.” In these 
states, where eroticism and poetic imagination are synthesised so as to be 
mutually reinforcing, Laon and Cythna violently annihilate their previous 
identities to approximate Shelley’s ideal of mutual affection based on 
incestuous love. This love can be, in Roberts’s words, “transformed into the 
all-embracing unity of divine erōs” (189) and extended to all of humankind. 
Shelley may have fail to achieve his ultimate aim with this epic. Nevertheless, 
his poetics of suffering and madness attests to the aesthetic phenomenon of 
self-annihilation that destabilises and disintegrates rather than fortifies 
Romantic subjectivity—the very “obscene” side of sexual desire in English 





















































John Keats:  
Poetic Imagination, Erotic Love, and Religious Ecstasy 
 
INTRODUCTION: FROM “EFFEMINACY” TO THE “UNPOETICAL” POET  
        
     As my readings of Blake and Shelley demonstrate, one of the most 
significant components of the “obscene” aesthetics of self-annihilation in 
Romantic poetry is transsexuality, or more specifically, the degradation of 
masculine subjectivity. In Blake’s Milton, Satan, the prototype of the 
Romantic rebellious hero originating from Paradise Lost, is feminised as a 
mild and weeping creature; in Plate 22 of Milton, Blake positions himself in a 
feminine/sodomised position of fellatio. In his illustrations of Job, Blake also 
recasts the model of Christian virtues of faith and perseverance as a rape 
victim indulging in an ecstatic state. In Shelley’s epic poem, the hero Laon 
undergoes a series of torments that undermine his masculinity in similar 
erotic experiences of extreme pain and pleasure. Accordingly, in Romantic 
poetry, traditionally regarded as a masculine phenomenon, which is partly 
exemplified by the canonisation of the Big-Six, as Anne K. Mellor points out 
in her Romanticism and Feminism (8), the hero’s transsexuality through 
feminisation or degradation of masculinity is not only a necessary factor for 
the poets’ aspiration for political or religious ideals. It insinuates darker and 
alternative aspects of poetry that comprise disruption of selfhood, 
unconsciousness, anti-knowledge, and anti-subjectivity—“the confrontation of 
the feminine” that “does not succeed in differentiating itself as other but 
threatens one’s own and clean self” (65) as Julia Kristeva would put it. What I 
have explored in Blake’s and Shelley’s works is the very “femininity” that 
ought to be excluded, to be “abjected,” in order to sustain the masculine 
selfhood and subjectivity. In Keats, the issue of femininity originates from his 
construal of poetic imagination as an erotic process of self-annihilation. This 
formulation can be established through an examination of his letters, and 
further explored in his later narrative poems—“Isabella; or, the Pot of Basil” 
and “The Eve of St. Agnes”—as this chapter aims to accomplish.     
     Generally, the representations of transsexuality in Blake and Shelley 
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are interwoven in the fabric of their allegorical and symbolic poetics and had 
been discovered and analysed in modern studies. The case of Keats is 
different. Keatsian femininity in his poetry was not only noticed, but ridiculed 
and lampooned by his contemporaries, including critics and fellow poets; it 
was also a derogative personal characterisation of the poet himself. In his 
1818 article “On the Cockney School of Poetry” published in Blackwood’s 
Edinburgh Magazine, John Gibson Lockhart dismisses Keats’s works as 
“loose, nerveless versification” and the poet as “a still smaller poet” and “a 
boy of pretty abilities” (530) after denouncing Keats’s “profane and 
vulgarised” adaptation of Greek mythology. The word “pretty” that Lockhart 
uses here evokes another incident during Keats’s meeting with Wordsworth 
at Thomas Monkhouse’s place in London in 1817. As Benjamin Robert 
Haydon records, after Keats recited a hymn to Pan in Endymion for 
Wordsworth, of whom Keats is “a young Worshipper,” Wordsworth coldly 
remarked “a Very pretty piece of Paganism” (Butler 136), which profoundly 
hurt Keats’s feeling.81 Both Lockhart and Wordsworth used “pretty” to 
describe the subject matter of Greek mythology in Keats’s poetry. The word 
“pretty” stands for attraction and pleasantness in appearance especially of 
women and children, but in a “delicate or diminutive way” according to the 
Oxford English Dictionary (“pretty, adj2a”). Its feminine connotation is 
ostensible. Greco-Roman mythology not only represents the polytheist 
paganism against the monotheist Christianity, it also stands for a 
cosmological order centred on a female Mother Earth, contradicting to the 
one based on an utterly male father-son identification of Jehovah and Jesus 
in Christianity. Keats’s espousal of the former and rejection of the latter can 
be traced as early as his 1816 sonnet “Written in Disgust of Vulgar 
Superstition,” in which he recalls the classical “fireside joys” and “Lydian airs” 
in a despondent age of the Christian “sermon’s horrid sound” (PJK 88).82 In 
                                                
81 In his more recent study John Keats: A New Life, Nicholas Roe holds a reserved attitude 
to the incident. Keats was probably not affected much by Wordsworth’s comment, because 
they met at least five times in the following week. Roe even speculates that Keats might 
actually take the “pretty Paganism” comment as a compliment (196). 
82 Except indicated otherwise, all quotations from Keats’s poetical works are from The 
Poems of John Keats edited by Jack Stillinger (Heinemann, 1978). All quotations from 
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the dedication to Leigh Hunt of his 1817 collection, Keats again shows 
nostalgic sentiments for the classic “Glory and loveliness” of “crowd of 
nymphs” and “The shrine of Flora” (20). In the early nineteenth century, 
classic paganism exalts female power of reproduction and approves 
“unlicensed sexuality in women,” as Marilyn Butler points out (136), while 
institutionalised Christianity entails the exclusion of female sexuality and 
often champions the virtue of chastity. The negative notion of Keats’s 
femininity in his person and poetry is thus inferred on various levels in both 
Lockhart’s “a boy of pretty abilities” derision and Wordsworth’s “pretty 
Paganism” dismissal.  
     Another contemporary criticism of Keats’s problematic sexuality comes 
from Lord Byron. In terms of Keats’s 1820 volume that includes “Isabella,” 
“Lamia,” “The Eve of St. Agnes,” and the great Odes, Byron deems Keats’s 
works “the Onanism of poetry” and calls the poet “this miserable Self-polluter 
of the human Mind” (Byron and Moore 217). In another journal, Byron again 
lambastes Keats’s poetry as “a sort of mental masturbation” (225). Rachel 
Schulkins notes the connotation of effeminacy in Byron’s comments, pointing 
out that “Keats’s poetry trespasses the conventional cultural construction of 
masculinity by embracing feminine qualities such as passivity, sentimentality 
and luxury” (1). In his article in The Indicator, Leigh Hunt perceives that 
Keats’s Apollo in Hyperion is “too effeminate and human” and “weeps and 
wonders somewhat too much” (352). In his essay “On Effeminacy of 
Character” William Hazlitt analyses the idea of effeminacy, which “arises from 
a prevalence of the sensibility over the will” and “want of fortitude,” and those 
who indulge in such a complex “live in a luxurious endless dream” (“On 
Effeminacy” 105). At the end of this essay Hazlitt contrasts Byron’s poetry 
with Keats’s, arguing that the latter “was a deficiency in masculine energy of 
style” despite all its “beauty, tenderness, delicacy” (113). In his “To a Poetical 
Friend,” George Felton Mathew, though in a praising tone, also observes that 
Keats “delightest in fanciful song” and “strange tales” and infuses “wonderful 
                                                
Keats’s letters are from The Letters of John Keats, 1814-1821 in two volumes, edited by 
Hyder Edward Rollins (Harvard UP, 1958).  
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loves” and “blisses abounding” into his poetry (KPP 10). The comments 
above indicate that for his contemporaries, Keats’s femininity lies in his self-
indulgence in youth, excessive sensual pleasures, irrational fancy, and 
alienation from realty.  
     The feminisation of Keats himself can be observed in the remarks of 
those critics who come to Keats’s defence. Martin Aske’s article “Keats, the 
Critics, and the Politics of Envy” provides certain insight into Keats’s self-
acknowledged femininity. Aske refers to John Hamilton Reynolds’s defence 
of Keats as a victim of brutal critics from Blackwood and the Quarterly. 
Reynolds juxtaposes Keats with female writers such as Lady Morgan, who 
also suffers from the Quarterly’s harsh review. Richard Waterhouse supports 
Keats in a more sensual (or even erotic) manner, saying that the Quarterly 
reviewer of Endymion “laid his finger of contempt on such beauty” (qtd. in 
Aske 51). Keats’s own defence echoes Waterhouse’s words: “I admire 
Human Nature but I do not like Men—I should like to compose things 
honourable to Man—but not fingerable over by Men” (LK 1.415). Therefore, 
there is a different version of feminised figure from the self-indulgent youth 
observed by Byron and Hazlitt; Keats in his defenders’ and his own eyes 
resembles a damsel in distress, innocent and powerless, who is threatened 
by the malicious and erotic caresses of the “fingers,” a masculine and phallic 
image represented by hostile critics. In this passivity Keats perhaps has 
Thomas Chatterton in mind, whose suicide at the age of seventeenth had 
become an iconic image in English Romanticism. In his sonnet dedicated to 
Chatterton, Keats laments: “Thou didst die / A half-blown flower, which cold 
blasts amate” (PJK 32). Such a metaphorical depiction of a pretty, sensitive, 
and fragile youth ruined by a malignantly critical and cruel society parallels 
his self-portrayal of being “fingerable over by Men.” After Keats’s death, in the 
Preface of his elegiac Adonais, Shelley replicates Keats’s lamentation on 
Chatterton: “where canker-worms abound, what wonder, if its young flower 
was blighted in the bud” (MW 529). The effeminate metaphor of an infant 
flower nipped before its maturity by the cruel external world (which perhaps 
also echoes Blake’s “The Sick Rose”) has been attached to Keats, who must 
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“Die of a rose in aromatic death,” as Hazlitt quotes Pope’s line from An Essay 
on Man in his “On Effeminacy of Character” (113).  
     However, it can be observed that Keats’s self-identification of gender 
qualities oscillates between masculinity and femininity, and such unstable 
mental status is significantly connected to his self-awareness as a poet and 
his relationship with poetry and with the exterior world. In his journal letter to 
George and Georgiana on 13 March 1819, Keats mentions “I know not why 
Poetry and I have been so distant lately I must make some advances soon or 
she will cut me entirely” (LK 2.74). Here the personified poetry is feminine, 
while Keats as a poet regards himself as a male suitor who “advances”—a 
masculine and aggressive gesture—upon a coy lady. Therefore, it can be 
discerned that Keats sometimes seeks to establish and affirm his masculine 
identity as a male poet, striving to identify, as Margaret Homans notes, “not 
only with male sexual potency but also with the masculine appropriation of 
the feminine” (564). In another letter to George and Georgiana on 19, Keats 
describes his indulgence in oversleeping indolence—“My passions are all 
asleep from my having slumbered till nearly eleven and weakened the animal 
fibre all over me to a delightful sensation about three degrees on this side of 
faintness”—that is a “state of effeminacy,” in which “the fibres of the brain are 
relaxed in common with the rest of the body” (LK 2.78). In this depiction of 
self-recognised effeminacy, Keats conveys the idea that his state in artistic 
creation is of physical inactiveness and languor with chaotic sensations 
running amok in his brain. It is also a state of ecstasy: “This is the only 
happiness; and is a rare instance of advantage in the body overpowering the 
Mind” (LK 2.79), echoing his notion of “Negative Capability” in the earlier 
letter in 1818. Keats then describes three personified figures of Poetry, 
Ambition, and Love in his trance, “three figures on a greek vase—a Man and 
two women” (LK 2.79). Here strangely the gender roles of poet and poetry 
are reversed again, with Keats being an effeminate figure while Poetry being 
a Man.   
     Discussing the ambivalence of masculinity and femininity in Keats’s 
writing, Susan J. Wolfson correctly observes that Keats strives to “create a 
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poetic identity and win acceptance as a poet” by internalising “social and 
psychological attitudes about gender” (“Feminizing Keats” 325). That is, 
Keats was fully aware of the ideal masculinity in his time, and aspired to 
accommodate it in his poetical works to obtain positive recognition. It is the 
reason he imagines himself as a male suitor (the poet) to woo a lady (poetry) 
before he truly starts writing. Wolfson takes her argument further by stating 
that after Keats embarks on writing poetry, he “imagines the masculine self 
being feminized or rendered effeminate by women exercising power and 
authority” and “projects feminine figures as forces against manly self-
possession and its social validator, professional maturity” (“Feminizing Keats” 
325). Thus, the very process of poetic creation consists of a liminal point. On 
one side, there is the real world of Keats’s self-affirmation of masculinity, and 
on the other side, the realm of poetic imagination, in which such affirmation is 
threatened and dissolved. Accordingly, for Keats, writing poetry is itself an 
experience of transsexuality, “this state of effeminacy,” in which he forsakes 
his masculine identity. In his letter to John Taylor on 27 February 1818, Keats 
famously asserts an axiom of poetry resembling Wordsworth’s “spontaneous 
overflow of powerful feelings” that “if Poetry comes not as naturally as the 
Leaves to a tree it had better not come at all” (LK 1.238-239). Such 
spontaneity insinuates his idea of poetic creation as a process of anti-will and 
unconsciousness. In writing poetry, it is his will to maintain a masculine 
subjectivity and obtain social acknowledgement from the predominately 
masculine literary circle, and his consciousness as a male poet that are 
endangered and annihilated.  
     The loss of subjectivity and pre-existing identity becomes essential in 
Keats’s formulation of writing poetry. In his most renowned letter to George 
and Tom in December 1817, Keats proposes that a great man of literature 
such as Shakespeare must possess “Negative Capability,” the quality of 
being “capable of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any 
irritable reaching after fact & reason” (LK 1.193). “Uncertainties” and “doubts” 
signify an alternative epistemological order (or non-order) of anti-knowledge 
and anti-truth, as Tim Milnes perceives that Keats’s “rejection of the 
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verificationist values of the Enlightenment raises the possibility that the 
aesthetic is the uncanny and vengeful doubt of truth as well as its 
consummation” and “the unassimilable untruth of a determining otherness” 
(71). The capitalised word “Mysteries” has clear religious meaning. As the 
Oxford English Dictionary shows, “mystery” is a “religious truth known or 
understood only by divine revelation” or “a doctrine of faith involving 
difficulties which human reason is incapable of solving” (“mystery, n2a”) but it 
can also stand for rituals in the Christian Church, especially the Eucharist 
(“mystery, n3”). It reminds us of Keats’s affinity to the classic Greco-Roman 
mythology, the “pretty Paganism” as retorted by Wordsworth, and his 
relatively more negative evaluation of institutionalised Christianity. As the 
Shelleyan imagination in A Defence of Poetry, Keatsian Mystery here is 
reminiscent to the Nietzschean idea of Dionysian intoxication, where “fact & 
reason” are out of reach, principium individuationis is disabled, and the 
subject’s epistemological power of categorisation and interpretation is lost.  
     Keatsian Mystery can be further traced in his verse letter to John 
Hamilton Reynolds on 25 March 1818. This “Epistle,” originally aiming to 
entertain the ill Reynolds, reveals Keats’s concerns for artistic creation and 
the heterogeneous mental state it entails. Keats opens the poem with his 
half-slumberous experience, which resembles Laon’s disturbed yet erotic 
vision depicted by Shelley, a “disjoined” mental condition that synthesises 
pain and pleasure. Moreover, what emerge in the poet’s trance are illogical 
and unreasonable images: the grotesque fusion of “witch’s eyes” and 
“cherub’s mouth,” the indecorous “Voltaire with casque and shield and 
Habergeon, / And Alexander with his night-cap on,” and the anachronistic 
Socrates with “his cravat” (LK 1.259). All these images convey the idea of 
breaching conventional relationships of association and identification. The 
second stanza presents a pagan sacrificial ritual of “Some Titian colours” that 
predates Stanza 4 of the later “Ode on a Grecian Urn.”83 From classicism to 
medievalism, Keats in the next stanza refers to another painting of Claude 
                                                
83 As Stuart Sperry and several other critics have noted, there is no such a painting by Titian 
that portrays this scene of sacrifice, and Keats probably was thinking of Claude Lorrain’s 
Sacrifice to Apollo (“The Epistle” 585). 
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Lorrain, The Enchanted Castle, which is “[u]pon a Rock, on the Border of a 
Lake, / Nested in Trees” (LK 1.260). The “old Magic like Urganda’s sword” 
and the “Merlin’s Hall” evoke medieval romance and fantasy, engendering an 
unrealistic atmosphere so detached from the present and physical world 
where Keats and Reynolds dwell.  
     Both the classic and medieval scenes develop into the central idea of 
“material sublime” in the eighth stanza: “O that our dreamings all of sleep or 
wake / Would all their colours from the sunset take: / From something of 
material sublime” (LK 1.261). The phrase “material sublime” has been noted 
and discussed by critics. By reading it as “sublime (adjective) material 
(noun),” Jack Stillinger gives the phrase a rather simple meaning: something 
“elevated, uplifted from the world” and “unearthly, like the fantastic dreams” 
(“Keat and Romance” 596). Sperry interprets the phrase as “the desire of the 
imagination to possess at once the best of both worlds, the ethereal and the 
concrete” (“The Epistle” 589). Louise Z. Smith proposes that “material 
sublime” is both “noun-adjective and as adjective-noun,” arising from the 
external world rather than subjective feeling. She further argues that for 
Keats dreaming “is not an escape from the jostling world, but an intense 
perception of beauty and truth in that world” (303). While both Sperry and 
Smith believe that through this phrase Keats is promoting an aesthetic ideal 
that counters the Platonic dichotomy of metaphysical ideas and physical 
matters, Besty Winakur Tontiplaphol more recently stresses Keats’s wish for 
“sensory surfeit, not the grand immateriality” (“Pleasure in the Age of Talkers” 
46).  
     Aside from the above interpretations, the meaning of “material” can be 
situated in early modern medical contexts, defined by Samuel Johnson’s A 
Dictionary of the English Language as “corporeal” and by the Oxford English 
Dictionary as “of a disease” (“material, adj1b”). The correlation between 
Keats’s life as a general practitioner of medicine and his poetic creation has 
been addressed extensively in Keats studies, from as early as William Hale-
White’s 1938 Keats as Doctor and Patient, Daniel Goellnicht’s 1984 The 
Poet-Physician: Keats and Medical Science, and Hermione de Almeida’s 
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1991 Romantic Medicine and John Keats to the 2017 essay collection John 
Keats and the Medical Imagination edited by Nicholas Roe. In these studies, 
though Keats’s medical background and his life oft-impacted by disease and 
death are traced to offer new insights into his poetic works, none of them 
consider the possible medical meaning of the term “material sublime.” 
Although de Almeida does discuss the “Epistle,” arguing that the verse-letter 
represents “the poet’s attempt to use his imagination to soothe and comfort a 
sick friend and to counteract actual disease with images of health” (43), she 
pays no attention to “material sublime” at all.  
     W. P. Albrecht notes that Keats’s usage of the word “sublime” reflects “a 
state of mind remote from ordinary perception dulled, as it is, by self-
centeredness, materialism, and the confusion of daily cares,” adding that 
“Keats does not separate the sublime from the beautiful except as ‘sublime’ 
may mean the intensity of emotion necessary to beauty” (196). However, in 
Keats’s letters, the sublime also emerges alongside his heightened worries 
for Tom’s illness, such as the “sublime Misery” in the one to Benjamin Bailey 
in October 1817 (LK 1.173). During his stay in Dumfries, visiting Robert 
Burns’s Cottage and Tomb, Keats encountered a vulgar man, “a curious old 
Bitch,” “a flat old Dog,” whose indecorous manner, in Keats’s view, disgraced 
the solemn air of Burns’s heritage and “hindered my sublimity” (LK 1.324-
325). Such “sublimity” that Keats strongly perceived in the Cottage was 
engendered by the Scottish bard’s suffering, as he laments that “His Misery 
is a dead weight upon the nimbleness of one’s quill,” and, alluding to King 
Lear in prison, “he was miserable—We can see horribly clear in the works of 
such a man his whole life, as if we were God’s spies” (LK 1.325). That is, 
despite Keats’s assertion that the sublime is an essential component of the 
“eternal Being” of beauty, it intrinsically co-exists with human suffering, both 
physical and mental, signifying “the power of otherness to bring desolation” 
(Ende 90). Combining the word “material,” which indicates unhealthy 
corporeality in the medical context of Keats’s time, the Keatsian “material 
sublime” thus denotes a form of aesthetics that is empowered by the human 
body, particularly the abnormal and pathological body afflicted by disease or 
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violence, such as Reynolds’s current sick body and those victimised by “an 
eternal fierce destruction,” reified by Keats’s description of “The shark at 
savage prey—the hawk at pounce, / The gentle Robin, like a pard or ounce, / 
Ravening a worm” (LK 1.262). 
     This interpretation of the “material sublime” brings forth the crucial role 
of human suffering in Keats’s idea of poetic creation. Following the “material 
sublime,” Keats recognises that “For in the world / We jostle,” a pessimistic 
line that echoes his reflection on King Lear about “the fierce dispute / Betwixt 
damnation and impassion’d clay” (PJK 225). In the “Epistle,” Keats 
underscores the inability of knowledge and reason to redeem human beings 
from the destined suffering; he dares not “philosophize” and he will never be 
awarded “the prize” of “High reason, and the lore of good and ill” (LK 1.262). 
In the line “Things cannot to the will / Be settled, but they tease us out of 
thought,” the idea of Negative Capability re-emerges and Keats recapitulates 
the decentralisation of knowledge and the subversion of epistemological 
order. The “Things” not only include objects and scenarios in the exterior 
world—natural grandeurs in the Burkean sublime—but also human feelings 
responsive to the exterior world and to human interactions, benign or 
malignant. Even the achievements of scientific knowledge and philosophical 
reasoning cannot settle Keatsian Mystery of negativity, “Where but to think is 
to be full of sorrow,” as he laments in “Ode to a Nightingale” (3.27 PJK 370). 
The “material sublime” complicates the nature of this verse letter, originally 
meant to entertain the sick Reynolds, with the transition from the fantastic 
and pleasant depictions of Lorrain’s neoclassic art to a pessimistic evaluation 
of human subjectivity and selfhood that are based on knowledge and its will 
to truth. This pessimism over the deposition of epistemological order 
corresponds to the grotesque, indecorous, and anachronistic chains of 
association (or anti-association) in the first stanza.  
     What is more striking is that Keats does not deem poetry an ideal 
substitute for knowledge and reason to emancipate human beings from 
suffering. Conversely, poetic imagination is “yet still confin’d,— / Lost in a sort 
of Purgatory blind” (LK 1.262). For Keats, poetry is not an instrument that can 
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restore human subjectivity and re-establish a new epistemological order. A 
poet and his poetry deepen and aestheticise the loss of human subjectivity 
and offer an alternative perspective to survey suffering in the human world, 
instead of absolving them. Milnes insightfully observes that for Keats, when 
“reason lurches into scepticism, and thence into alienation and indifference, 
the consolation of the aesthetic is increasingly imbued with power of alterity 
(68). But at the end of the “Epistle” and, as discussed in the following section, 
in “Isabella,” there seems to be no consolation at all, as Keats has moved 
away from his earlier optimism about poetry and love in, for example, 
Endymion, which possess the power to break the “prison, / Of flesh and 
bone” that “curbs, and confines, and frets / Our spirit’s wings,” and withstand 
the “despondency” that “besets / Our pillows,” and redeem “our dull, 
uninspired, snail-paced lives” (4.20-23, 25).84 Rather than providing comfort 
and hope as positive drives for human beings to sustain subjectivity in their 
agonising existence, Keats’s later poetry generates a sort of negative and 
“obscene” pleasure by erotising human suffering. For Keats, poetic creation 
is not only a state of anti-knowledge and anti-truth, “uncertainties, Mysteries, 
and doubts.” It is also a process that is anti-living, unhealthy, pathological, 
self-corroding and self-destructive. The issue of feminisation, therefore, is 
actually a necessary phenomenon in Keats, since it is necessitated by the 
self-annihilation of John Keats as a male poet. That is, Keats is neither a 
man, nor a poet, as he postulates in a letter to Richard Woodhouse in 
October 1818: “As to the poetical Character itself . . . it is not itself—it has no 
self” and “A Poet is the most unpoetical of any thing in existence; because he 
has no Identity” (LK 1.386-387). Furthermore, Keats detaches his poetry from 
himself as a poet: “not one word I ever utter can be taken for granted as an 
opinion growing out of my identical nature—how can it, when I have no 
nature?” (1.387). Here we have a Keatsian paradox. Keats is the most 
poetical because he fulfils, to the greatest extent, the condition of self-
                                                
84 Later in The Fall of Hyperion, Keats re-aspires to the redemptive quality of poetry, or what 
Hugh Roberts terms “therapeutic drive” in English Romanticism, by declaring that “sure a 
poet is a sage; / A humanist, physician to all men’ who ‘pours out a balm upon the world” 
(1.189-190, 201). 
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annihilation; in other words, Keats is the most poetical because he is the 
most unpoetical.  
     While he acknowledges the heterogeneous state of writing poetry as 
anti-epistemological and self-annihilating, Keats as a poet still aspires to 
have a positive contribution to the world, “ambitious of doing the world some 
good” (LK 1.387). Such is the basis of his oscillation between social 
masculinity and anti-social femininity. It is similar to the self-conflicting 
Shelley in A Defence of Poetry and The Cenci, who likewise proposes the 
positive social function of poetry, but at the same time, discerns the darker 
drives in poetry that necessarily jeopardise the former function. Keats is more 
conscious of this destined contradiction between a poet’s will to social 
contribution and his poetic creation that tends to overthrow such a will, as he 
recognises himself as “the camelion Poet,” who delights in “conceiving an 
Iago as an Imogen,” a sort of amoral, “beyond good and evil” aesthetics that 
“shocks the virtuous philosopher” (LK 1.387). At the end of this crucial letter 
to Woodhouse, after confessing that what he has been saying about “the 
poetical Character” is perhaps not “from myself; but from some character in 
whose soul I now live” (LK 1.388), Keats assures his friend that his affections 
and regards for him are “from myself.” In other words, Keats is unable to 
recognise his friendship with Woodhouse when he is in the mode of writing 
poetry. Once again Keats indicates that “the poetical Character” and the state 
of poetic creation are anti-social phenomena of self-annihilation and oblivion 
of all positive social connections.  
     In the following sections, I will examine Keats’s narrative poems in his 
1820 collection—Isabella; or the Pot of Basil, Lamia, and The Eve of St. 
Agnes—in order to argue that these poetic works attest to my formulation of 
Keats’s negative and heterogeneous idea about poetry itself, which 
exemplifies the “obscene” aesthetic phenomenon of self-annihilation in 
English Romanticism. In his retellings of Boccaccio’s tale, Keats not only 
presents the patriarchal and commercial oppression upon romantic love and 
sexual desire, as many critics have discussed, but also presents such 
affection and desire, based on poetic imagination, are in essence 
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pathological, and self-destructive. Furthermore, Isabella’s creation of the “Pot 
of Basil” that contains Lorenzo’s severed head is the actualisation of Keats’s 
poetic creation that borders on anti-social and self-annihilating oblivion, 
corresponding to the poet’s oblivion of his social connection with Reynolds at 
the end of this letter of “material sublime.” In “The Eve of St. Agnes,” by 
eroticising the Christian images and motifs, Keats incorporates sexual desire 
with the experience of religious sacredness. In the later part of the poem, by 
deploying pagan and folklore images of Merlin, the mermaid, “La belle dame 
sans mercy,” and Medusa, Keats further demonstrates that the erotic 
experience accessed through ritualistic practice dissolves the boundary 
between male activity and female passivity. In these two poems, Keats 
reveals the intense interrelationship between erotic love, poetic imagination, 
and religious sacredness as a negative and “obscene” aesthetic 
phenomenon. As traditionally poetic creation is considered a masculine 
phenomenon in the Romantic period, Keats’s works manifests an alternative 
feminine aspect of poetry. The eroticism in these works demonstrates that 
although sexual desire often symbolises the Romantic rebellion against 
political/religious oppression and rationalist repression, as a route to 
establish individuality and subjectivity, the erotic subject in Keats is 
endangered, de-normalised, and dissolved in the experiences of artistic 
creation and religious sacredness.  
 
“ISABELLA” AND THE PATHOLOGICAL POETICS OF EROTIC LOVE 
 
     In “Sleep and Poetry,” the concluding poem of his 1817 collection, 
Keats announces his farewell to the sensual delights of “the breath / Of 
flowering bays, that I may die a death / Of luxury” and “The o’verwhelming 
sweets, ’twill bring to me the fair / Visions of all places” (57-59 PJK 70). In his 
subsequent career, he is determined to “pass them for a nobler life, / Where I 
may find the agonies, the strife / Of human hearts” (123-124 PJK 72). After 
Endymion, Keats’s 1820 volume Lamia, Isabella, The Eve of St. Agnes, and 
Other Poems fulfils the promise made in “Sleep and Poetry” by exploring the 
darker aspects of erotic love. As Jeffrey N. Cox comments, in the three 
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narrative poems highlighted in the volume’s title, despite their forms as 
romances, Keats “created a kind of anti-romance capable of confronting the 
sorrows of life beyond the wish-fulfilling enchantments offered by 
conventional romances” (KPP 410). What Keats represents is not the 
pleasure derived from fulfilment of desire, but the pain begot by the 
obstruction and deprivation of such fulfilment, and the twisted, abnormal, and 
pathological alternative of it, from which emerges the negative pleasure of 
self-annihilation that is inherent in Keats’s idea of poetic creation itself.  
    As one of the “anti-romances,” “Isabella; or, the Pot of Basil” is Keats’s 
versified retelling of the fifth story of the fourth night from Boccaccio’s 
Decameron, possibly inspired by William Hazlitt’s lecture “On Dryden and 
Pope” on 3 February 1818, in which he encourages translations of 
Boccaccio’s and Chaucer’s works (KPP 429). Following Boccaccio’s story, 
Keats continues the theme of innocent love between two youths being ruined 
by capitalist calculation, which, along with an undertone of class struggle, 
forms the basis of mainstream critical discussion of the poem. Louise Z. 
Smith observes in the poem that “the heart-easing love of Isabella and 
Lorenzo contends with the jostling world” and “impassioned sensibility must 
yield to the damnation of the real world’s fierce destruction” (311). Diana 
Long Hoeveler deems the tragedy of Isabella and Lorenzo the embodiment 
of “Keats’s worst fears about his class origin . . . and his own anxieties about 
his identity and future as a poet” (322). Stillinger considers the plot of 
“Isabella” a degenerating process from romance to realism (“Keats and 
Romance” 603-604) and Michael LaGory regards the poems as Keats’s 
“awareness of the insufficiency of naïve sentiment” (322). In addition, Cox 
reads it as Keats’s attempt “to explore the privatization of love in a world 
dominated by the money-getting private enterprise of Isabella’s brother” (KPP 
430). In a more recent essay, he reaffirms that that “Isabella” is about “the 
‘iron chains’ that men with ‘hearts of stone’ impose on those who dream of 
something beyond the commercial world” (“John Keats, Medicine, and the 
Young Men on the Make” 121). Nicholas Roe also suggests that in the poem, 
“An obvious ‘reality’ would be to recognise how the brothers’ greedy, 
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bourgeois principles are destructive of romance” (John Keats: A New Life 
226-227). Most recently, R.S. White approaches the poem from a Freudian 
perspective, reading “Isabella” as “a detailed analysis of loss, grief, 
mourning, and melancholia” (139). Nevertheless, White’s examination of 
Isabella’s negative emotions and pathological symptoms still focuses on the 
events after Lorenzo’s murder. The dualism in “Isabella”—between 
Isabella/Lorenzo and her brothers, love and commerce, naivety and 
calculation, passion and reality—has been assumed in major critical 
discussions of this poem.85 However, as I have proposed before, for Keats, 
erotic love and poetic imagination are in essence negative experiences of 
self-annihilation. The very destructiveness of the love between Isabella and 
Lorenzo is not only brought forth by her brothers’ violent interference, but is 
already present and keeps growing in their relationship. In other words, what 
Keats accentuates more than the conflict between “the heart easing love” 
and “the jostling world,” but the innate negativity of the erotic love between 
Isabella and Lorenzo. For Keats, the power of erotic love does not lie in the 
fulfilment of desire and its liberation from moral restraints and class barriers, 
nor does it reinforce human subjectivity and individuality. On the contrary, it is 
demonstrated in the violent, disruptive, abnormal, and self-destructive 
aspects of human psyche. In “Isabella,” Keats presents this phenomenon of 
negativity through a form of pathological poetics.  
     Such pathological poetics emerges in the very beginning of “Isabella,” 
which is better highlighted if juxtaposed with his source from Decameron.86 
In Boccaccio’s story, the initial relationship between Isabella and Lorenzo is 
simple and filled with sheer happiness: 
          This Lorenzo being of comely personage, affable, and excellent 
          in his behaviour, grew so gracious in the eyes of Isabella, that she  
                                                
85 In Keats, Modesty, and Masturbation, Rachel Schulkins also discerns this dualism in 
existing studies of “Isabella.” Her argument, however, focuses more on the negative effects 
of excessive desire and “private fantasies of self-fulfilment” in the form of Isabella’s “female 
masturbation” (73). 
86 The English translation of Decameron here is John Florio’s 1620 version, the first English 
translation printed and published by Isaac Laggard in London, whose 1680 edition was read 
by Keats in his time. See Cox’s introduction in Poetry and Prose, p. 430. In my discussion, 
while I am quoting from Decameron, the English translation will be referenced in footnotes 
as “Florio page number,” while the original Italian text “Boccaccio page number.” 
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          affoorded him many very respective looks, yea, kindness of no  
          common quality. Which Lorenzo taking notice of, and observing  
          by degrees from time to time, gave over all other beauties in  
          the City, which might allure any affection from him, and onely  
          fixed his heart on her, so that their love grew to a mutuall  
          embracing, both equally respecting one another, and entertaining 
          kindnesses, as occasion gave leave. (Florio 159). 
In this passage, from falling in love with each other to potential sexual 
contact, the couple does not encounter any obstruction. Their interaction is 
based on mutual affection, corresponding to what Richard Sha calls 
“idealized as a form of consent and of liberation” (2), with both spiritual and 
bodily fulfilments. In the first stanza of “Isabella,” however, we see a more 
complicated representation of this romantic relationship: 
          Fair Isabel, poor simple Isabel! 
               Lorenzo, a young palmer in Love’s eye! 
          They could not in the self-same mansion dwell 
               Without some stir of heart, some malady; 
          They could not sit at meals but feel how well 
               It soothed each to be the other by; 
          They could not, sure, beneath the same roof sleep 
          But to each other dream, and nightly weep. (1.1-8) 
Differing vastly from Boccaccio’s positive and swift progression of love, Keats 
transforms it into a long process of lingering struggles. The word “malady” 
establishes the idea of love as pathological and anti-living, echoing with the 
phrases of “sick longing,” “sad plight,” “cheeks paler,” “sick” and “Fever’d” in 
later stanzas. Here Keats inherits the theme of love as “rig’rous torment” and 
the idea that “Lovers should nobly suffer pain” in Petrarchan tradition 
(Petrarch 12, 49), in which the language of love is replete with unfulfilled 
desire and the mental and bodily suffering it entails. Critics have noted 
Petrarch’s influence on Keats, in terms of both poetic forms and thematic 
ideas (Myers 101). Petrarchan love, though starting from the poet’s agonised 
longing for Laura’s affection, will finally attain consolation by incorporating 
itself into religious devotion. This is illustrated in I Trionfi, which, as A. J. 
Smith observes, shows a progress from “the miserable frailty and inevitable 
disillusionment of sexual love to eternal bliss,” because for Petrarch, only 
“love of God gives them a secure expectation of enduring beauty, lasting love 
and bliss” (150). While adopting Petrarchan language of love as “sweet 
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burden, and sweet ill” (Petrarch 125), in “Isabella” Keats exacerbates the 
physical illness, which does not lead to spiritual consolation at the end of the 
poem. Furthermore, unlike Petrarchan lovesickness, which is caused by 
Laura’s unresponsiveness and lack of reciprocity, Keatstian pathology in 
“Isabella” retains its potency even in the couple’s mutual affection. It then 
reminds us of Keats’s avid reading of Robert Burton’s The Anatomy of 
Melancholy, which describes the bodily symptoms of love-melancholy: 
“paleness, leanness, dryness” and “the body bloodless and pale, a lean 
body, hollow eyes” (146). In his letter to George and Georgiana in September 
1819, Keats cites an entire passage about the blindness of love in Partition 3 
“Love-Melancholy” of the Anatomy (LK 2.191). In the same section, Burton 
postulates that “the symptoms of the mind in lovers are almost infinite, and 
so diverse that no art can comprehend them” and “love is a plague, a torture, 
an hell” (155). In the first stanza of “Isabella,” Keats reiterates such 
incomprehensibility and pathology of love in the Anatomy not only by 
employing the word “malady,” but also by repeating the negative expression 
of “could not” three times, which generates a sense of uncertainty, the 
oscillation between truth and untruth, indicating the malignant and oppressive 
nature of love that is not only beyond the control of human subjectivity, but 
also threatens it. Such indeterminacy of love has vicious effects on the 
couple’s daily life: they “could not . . . dwell,” “could not sit at meal,” and 
“could not . . . sleep.” The negative phrase of “could not” insinuates that love 
endangers and deactivates human functions of basic biological needs: 
habitation, food, and sleep. Moreover, the negative undertone of love 
encompasses the sphere of labours, which construct and fortify their social 
identities. Thus, because “their love grew tenderer,” Lorenzo abandons his 
position in “house, field, or garden,” and Isabella “spoilt her half-done 
broidery” (2.9-16). This depiction suggests that erotic love is the opposite of 
the secular order of working, which aims to boost production, accumulate 
resources, and sustain living, resonating with Bataille’s three-fold idea of 
eroticism, sacredness, and art as heterogeneous experiences of violent 
consumption of lives and resources. The opposition also resounds with 
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Burton’s proposition of “labour, slender and sparing diet, with continual 
business” as the cure for love-melancholy, as “love retires before business; 
be busy and you will be safe” (211-2). 
    To aggravate this problematic nature of erotic love, Keats transforms the 
prompt sexual union in Boccaccio to a trial of self-doubt and self-affliction 
before the consummation. Their nameless fear of sex is not caused by a 
sense of shame imposed by religious or social conventions, as in the cases 
of other Romantic espousals of sexual passion, but is engendered by a 
prescience of destruction, as Lorenzo perceives in Stanza 8: “Believe how I 
love thee, believe how near / My soul is to its doom” (8.60-61). Their 
hesitation is interwoven by confirmations and doubts; Lorenzo’s affirmation of 
“will I” in his two lines “To-morrow will I bow to my delight, / To-morrow will I 
ask my lady’s boon” is intercepted by Isabella’s anxiety expressed by the 
doubtful “may” and “if” in her following lines: “O may I never see another 
night, / Lorenzo, if thy lips breathe not love’s tune” (4.27-30). The fluctuation 
between restraint and fulfilment of erotic love once again brings forth 
pathological symptoms, as Isabella “Fell sick within the rose’s just domain, / 
Fell thin as a young mother’s, who doth seek / By every lull to cool her 
infant’s pain” (5.34-35). The image of a young mother worried about her child 
seems a bizarre simile for Isabella’s sickness, which is caused by her 
ungratified desire for sexual contact with Lorenzo. Keats will again cast 
Isabella as a mother figure in the digging scene from Stanza 44 to 48 as a 
symbolic process of childbirth. Keats seems to suggest a problematic 
relationship between eroticism and reproduction that for women, sexual 
enjoyment is usually repressed and hindered by the social obligations of 
propagation and maternal cares.   
     Seeing Isabella’s sickness, Lorenzo expresses his ignorance of its 
origin, but is again determined to reveal his love for her, and to “drink her 
tears” and “startle off her cares” (5.39-40). The image of drinking one’s tears 
as love object contains the symbolic meanings of eating and the bodily fluid 
issued from orifices. We know from Maggie Kilgour’s theorisation of 
cannibalism that eating constitutes the fortification or dissolution of the 
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somatic boundary between interiority and exteriority. Eating also symbolises 
the subject’s desire to assimilate and incorporate the other. Tears may not 
have the same taboo qualities as excrements, but like the latter, which are 
excluded from the body to maintain its physical health, they are ejected from 
eyes to sustain mental stability. The negative connotations of these two kinds 
of bodily waste are equivalent. By employing this image of “I will drink her 
tears” Keats again suggests that erotic love is in essence a negative 
experience of violent consumption and incorporation. 
     The scene of the couple’s consummation started in Stanza 7 is a 
manifestation of mutual attraction and affection, but even in this positive 
depiction of erotic love, certain tinges of self-annihilation can be observed. 
Keats’s revision of this stanza particularly marks this negative undertone. The 
two original lines that conclude Stanza 7 present Isabella’s utterance of 
active will for this sexual union in a complete sentence: “Lorenzo I would clip 
my ringlet hair / To make thee laugh again & debonair—” (PJK 247). In the 
final version, however, Keats replaces them with another two lines: 
“‘Lorenzo!’—here she ceas’d her timid quest, / But in her tone and look he 
read the rest” (7.55-56). Isabella’s complete sentence is reduced to a single 
word “Lorenzo,” as she “lisped tenderly” and “ceas’d her timid quest” (7.54-
56). The very word “lisped” signifies Isabella’s aphasic status, her loss of 
language ability, in the ensuing sexual interaction. Keats’s revision deprives 
Isabella of her original active voice and action; she becomes an object of 
Lorenzo’s masculine gaze, subject to his power of arbitrary interpretation—“in 
her tone and look he read the rest.” But even as an active suitor, Lorenzo is 
“anguished” and “very pale and dead,” once again insinuating Keatian 
pathology of erotic love. Though he still retains his language ability, 
compared to Isabella’s lisping, what he articulates with words is the 
prescience of self-destruction in erotic love: “Believe how I love thee, believe 
how near / My soul is to its doom” (8.60-61). In this apparently positive scene 
of mutual affection, we can still perceive potential negativity of erotic love, 
which not only affects physicality, but also disables language. Moreover, it 
threatens the very internal selfhood—“My soul”—that is the centre of human 
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autonomy and individuality.  
     Keats’s depiction of the actual sexual contact is in the final four lines of 
Stanza 9, with only two lines describing the bodily actions:  
          So said, his erewhile timid lips grew bold, 
               And poesied with hers in dewy rhyme: 
          Great bliss was with them, and great happiness 
          Grew, like a lusty flower in June’s caress. (9.69-72) 
Keats restrains his narration by reducing the contact to a mere gesture of 
kiss, leaving what is left for the reader’s imagination. The last two lines of this 
stanza about the couple’s “Great bliss” and “great happiness” seem to 
redirect the previous course of amorous struggles to its supposed romance 
end of fulfilment, but this does not annul the ambiguity and the violent 
undercurrents in the erotic relationship between Isabella and Lorenzo in the 
previous stanzas. The most significant part in this passage is the verb 
“poesied,” which means “to produce poetry,” according the Oxford English 
Dictionary (“poesy, v”) with this usage of Keats as the only example. His 
unique and exclusive coinage of this verb as an equivalent of kissing reflects 
again his idea of the “material sublime” that emphasises the crucial status of 
the body in artistic creation. The word “poesied,” therefore, also represents 
his equation of poetic creation and eroticism.   
     The ominous Stanza 12 and Stanza 13 pave the way for the upcoming 
tragedy brought forth by Isabella’s two brothers. Keats raises a question 
about the couple’s happiness: “Were they unhappy then?” followed by an 
immediate answer “—It cannot be—” with a strong sense of doubt with those 
two dashes. The reason that Isabella and Lorenzo must be happy is because 
               Too many tears for lovers have been shed, 
          Too many sighs give we to them in fee, 
               Too much of pity after they are dead, 
          Too many doleful stories do we see (12.90-93) 
In these lines, Keats alludes bitterly to the sensational effects of romance 
tradition. Readers of romance, alongside the protagonists with whom they 
identify, suffer all these “Too many” and “Too much” in exchange for the final 
happy conclusion of romance. All the excessive “tears,” “sighs,” “pity” and 
“doleful stories” are the price to pay for the final wish-fulfilment. The more 
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intense the suffering is, the sweeter the outcome will be. In “Isabella,” 
however, Keats counters this tradition and breaks the economy of emotional 
exchange that it represents, in order to “find the agonies, the strife / Of 
human hearts,” as he declares in “Sleep and Poetry.” In Keats’s “alternative 
romance,” pain is not the price for or foil of pleasure, but itself the very 
source of alternative pleasure, as he affirms this “truth” in Stanza 13 that 
“Even bees, the little almsmen of spring-bowers, / Know there is richest juice 
in poison-flowers” (13.103-104), echoing Blake’s line “Sweetest the fruit that 
the worm feeds on & the soul prey’d on by woe” (CPPB 47) in Visions of the 
Daughters of Albion. Both poets indicate the sadomasochist pleasure 
generated and intensified by bodily and mental sufferings.   
     The Greco-Roman counterparts of Isabella—Ariadne and Dido—that 
Keats employs in these two stanzas further complicates the romantic love 
between her and Lorenzo. The tragic outcomes of Ariadne’s and Dido’s loves 
for Theseus and Aeneas are not caused by exterior interference such as 
Isabella’s brothers, but by the two heroes’ own decisions to abandon their 
lovers. It seems strange, therefore, if Ariadne/Dido corresponds to Isabella 
and Theseus/Aeneas corresponds to Lorenzo, because in terms of the plot, 
the relationship between Isabella and Lorenzo is ultimately ruined by an 
outer force. The reference to the two superficially unfitting tragic heroines not 
only reinforces Keats’s challenge of the wish-fulfilling romance tradition, but 
also implies that the love between Isabella and Lorenzo is already 
problematic before the brothers’ violent intervention. In addition, unlike 
Boccaccio, who opens the story with “In Messina there dwelt three young 
men, Brethren, and Merchants by their common profession, who becoming 
very rich by the death of their Father, lived in very good fame and repute” 
(Florio 160), not until Stanza 14 does Keats introduce Isabella’s two brothers 
and their wealth and enterprise. This arrangement suggests that though the 
brothers’ intervention physically separates Isabella and Lorenzo and 
intensifies the heroine’s deterioration, the pre-existing pathology within the 
couple’s romantic relationship is equally significant.   
     Keats’s depiction of the two brothers from Stanza 14 to Stanza 17 
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evokes George Bernard Shaw’s famous remark: “If Karl Marx can be 
imagined as writing a poem instead of a treatise on Capital, he would have 
written ‘Isabella’” (175). Wolfson regards these “capitalist stanzas” as Keats’s 
deliberate digression, through which “literary and commercial riches, literary 
taste and commercial venture, wind up on the same axis of imagery” 
(Reading John Keats 257). Kurt Heinzelman stresses Keats’s innovation in 
these stanzas, as the “institutionalized capitalism described in ‘Isabella’ is 
foreign to Boccaccio’s Italy” (162), Keats’s modification of the number of 
Isabella’s brothers from three to two is also noted, as LaGory argues that it 
intensifies “the contrast between brothers and lovers” and the former are of a 
“barren relationship” that “brings forth only money” (325). However, despite 
the apparent dichotomy between the sophisticated and ruthless 
commercialism and the “naïve sentiment/innocent love,” which is rather 
problematic before being obstructed by the brothers, Keats eroticises the 
brothers’ reaction to the relationship between Isabella and Lorenzo:  
          How was it these same ledger-men could spy  
               Fair Isabella in her downy nest? 
          How could they find out in Lorenzo’s eye 
               A straying from his toil? (18.137-140) 
Deviating from Boccaccio’s story, in which the eldest brother accidentally 
sees Isabella sneaking to Lorenzo’s place, Keats subtly replaces this 
decisive and concrete incident with ambiguous speculations. The disclosure 
of the amorous affair does not, as in Boccaccio, result from Isabella’s 
coincidental recklessness, but is the necessary outcome of the brothers’ 
habitual voyeurism on their sister, and with a homoerotic hint, on Lorenzo. 
After two stanzas of digression apologising to Boccaccio, Keats resumes his 
narrative of the brothers’ action. They confide to each other their “bitter 
thoughts” that are “well nigh mad” over the fact that Lorenzo “Should in their 
sister’s love be blithe and glad” (21.164-166). Indeed, Keats makes it clear 
that the brothers’ “bitter thoughts” originate from their “plan to coax her by 
degrees / To some high noble and his olive-trees” (21.167-168). However, in 
the next stanza, he suggests that in addition to the pragmatic reason of 
seeing Isabella as a commodity to propel their economic exchanges, the 
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brothers’ frustration and anger result from their erotic attachment to both 
Isabella and Lorenzo, as “many a jealous [emphasis added] conference had 
they” (22.169). With the brothers’ voyeurism and jealousy, fixing upon both 
Isabella and Lorenzo, Keats perplexes their murderous motive and subtly 
undermines the dualism between erotic love and capitalist calculation 
assumed by many critics.   
     Keats’s pathological poetics of eroticism continues in the murder scene. 
As they walk deep into the forest, “Sick and wan / The brothers’ faces in the 
ford did seem” (27.213-214). The brothers’ “Sick and wan” complexions 
resound with the “sick longing” and “cheeks paler” of Isabella and Lorenzo in 
the prime of their love. After they slay Lorenzo, the brothers “dipp’d their 
swords in the water” and ride homeward “with convulsed spur” (28.222-223). 
The image of phallic swords penetrating into the soft and receptive water is a 
metaphorical picture of sexual violence, and the ecstatic state of “convulsed 
spur” overlaps sexual pleasure with murder and death. Keats’s eroticisation 
of the murder scene, extended from the simple description in Boccaccio’s 
story—“they ran sodainly upon Lorenzo, slew him, and afterward enterred his 
body, where hardly it could be discovered by anyone” (Florio 160)—
corresponds to the brothers’ ambiguous complex for Isabella and Lorenzo 
that is engendered by Keats’s deliberate designs of voyeurism and jealousy. 
Again, we can observe that Keats connects erotic love with sickness, 
violence, and even death.  
     Isabella’s reaction to the ill news of Lorenzo’s disappearance also 
highlights Keats’s deviation from Boccaccio. In Boccaccio’s story, Isabella 
“fell into abundance of tears, where-among she mingled many sighes and 
groanes, such as were able to overthrow a farre stronger constitution: so 
that, being full of feare and dismay” (Florio 160). The pathological effects of 
erotic love appear for the first time in Boccaccio’s Isabella because of the 
absence of her love object. Keats, however, apart from continuing the pre-
existing pathological poetics, presents a double-layered structure of pain and 
pleasure in Stanza 30: 
          She weeps alone for pleasures not to be; 
               Sorely she wept until the night came on, 
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          And then, instead of love, O misery! 
               She brooded o’er the luxury alone: 
          His image in the dusk she seem’d to see, 
               And to the silence made a gentle moan, 
          Spreading her perfect arms upon the air, 
          And on her couch low murmuring “Where? O where?”  
                                             (30.233-240) 
R. S. White interprets this passage as a typical Freudian pattern of grief and 
mourning (143). But I also observe Keats’s deliberate indication of 
autoeroticism. After enduring sheer sorrow for the absent love in the day, in 
the night Isabella indulges in “luxury.” In this context, “luxury” does not mean 
extravagant dress, furniture, or food. It also differs from Keats’s earlier usage 
of the word in “I stood tip-toe upon a little hill”—“a posey, / Of luxuries bright, 
milky, soft and rosy” (27-28 PJK 80)—that represents “the qualities of 
whiteness, elegance, brightness, daintiness, gentleness,” as Jean H. 
Hagstrum points out (43). Tontiplaphol regards Keats’s “luscious poem” as 
the embodiment of the nineteenth-century “poetics of luxury,” which focuses 
on “tactile and oral experiences,” “rich indulgences nourished by the 
proximity that attends touching and tasting,” and “circumscribed spaces 
crowded with sensory stimuli” (Poetics of Luxury 7-8). Stemming from such 
somatic and sensory connotations, “luxury” here goes beyond mere 
extravagant dress, furniture, or food, and denotes lasciviousness and lust, as 
Rachel Schulkins also agrees that “luxury” represents “her dream of sexual 
consummation with Lorenzo’s image” (81). The association between 
autoeroticism and Keats can be traced as early as Byron’s derogatory 
comment on his works as “the Onanism of poetry” and “a sort of mental 
masturbation” and Keats himself a “miserable Self-polluter of the human 
Mind” (Byron and Moore 217, 225). Marjorie Levinson proposes that Byron’s 
remarks suggest “the subjective vacancy of Keats’s writing,” the internal 
emptiness beneath the latter’s poetic language of “finery” (16). In her 
discussion of “La Belle Dame Sans Merci,” Levinson further points out that 
the age’s fear of masturbation lies in its “image of productive self-alienation” 
(46). Though she does not take this passage in “Isabella” into consideration, 
Isabella’s autoerotic “luxury” conforms to Levinson’s observation of the 
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poem’s sentiment as “the self-conscious feeling of having a feeling: a 
reflexive address to a fetishized feeling” (144). It also evokes Marianne 
Dashwood’s painful disorder after being abandoned by John Willoughby in 
Jane Austen’s Sense and Sensibility, published a few years before Keats’s 
volume that contains “Isabella.” In Marianne’s similar traumatic experience of 
her love object’s absence, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick discerns her erotic 
identity as “the masturbating girl,” which is beyond the conventional 
categorisation of heterosexual and homosexual relationships (395). This 
heterogeneous identity of autoeroticism, in her agitation and “excessive 
affliction,” finds a violent outlet in literary creation, a sort of imaginary 
interaction with her lost love object: “writing as fast as a continual flow of 
tears would permit her . . . for the last time to Willoughby” (Austen 127). In 
Stanza 30, Keats has the heroine call for the feeling for her love object’s 
absence and picture Lorenzo’s image, in order to have an imaginary 
consummation with it, as she “made a gentle moan, / Spreading her perfect 
arms upon the air” (30.238-239). Her autoerotic complex, confirmed by the 
capitalised “Selfishness” in the opening line of the next stanza, is produced 
by poetic imagination, echoing Marianne’s hysterical writing to Willoughby. In 
this typical Keatsian trance, Isabella undergoes a process of self-
disintegration, splits her subject into two to form an image of her lover for the 
masturbatory “luxury alone.” Isabella’s sorrow in the day, which is a justified 
emotion that constitutes positive romantic love, contrasts with her obscene 
pleasure in the night, which is pathological, autoerotic, anti-social, and 
unnameable. 
     Isabella’s dream vision of Lorenzo’s ghost is “a thing more deadly dark 
than all” that “came like a fierce potion, drunk by chance, / Which saves a 
sick man from the feather’d pall / For some few gasping moments” (34.266-
269). In these lines, Keats has already predicted the eventual state that 
Isabella will be in, which is a liminal limbo between the living and the dead. 
Lorenzo’s appearance is exactly a representation of this liminality. At 
Isabella’s first glance, his once “glossy hair” is marred by “the forest tomb,” 
his limb is covered by “cold doom,” and his voice is no longer “soft lute” 
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(35.275-278). But “there was striving, in its piteous tongue” (36.282) when 
the ghost speaks, and it is still “music” that reminds Isabella of Lorenzo when 
he is still “on earth.” Keats depicts this “music” with double similes:  
          Langour there was in it, and tremulous shake, 
               As in a palsied Druid’s harp unstrung; 
          And through it moan’d a ghostly under-song, 
          Like hoarse night-gusts sepulchral briars among. (36.285-288) 
The words “languor” and “palsied Druid’s harp” evoke a sense of pagan 
erotic rituals. Lorenzo’s voice, the “music” heard by Isabella, is a moaning 
“ghostly under-song” that flows among “sepulchral briars.” In these lines, 
Keats weaves together eroticism and death, presenting Lorenzo’s ghost as a 
liminal figure fluctuating between the lingering desire, which is the affirmation 
of life, and the insensibility and decadence of death: “Its eyes, though wild, 
were still all dewy bright / With love, and kept all phantom fear aloof” (37.289-
290). Such liminality is confirmed by Lorenzo’s self-lamentation in Stanza 39, 
revealing that he is now a “shadow” dwelling on “the skirts of human-nature” 
and seeing Isabella “distant in Humanity” (39.305, 312). Lorenzo’s ghost 
reminds us of the “Ditch water, and the fever-stricken flesh” in The Cenci, as 
they all share the propensity of “half-identity” that blends attraction and 
repulsion, pleasure and pain, desire and horror, inclusion and exclusion, what 
Tilottama Rajan defines as “emotional indeterminacy” (101).  
     In Stanza 40, after disclosing the murder, Lorenzo’s ghost takes heed 
of Isabella’s decaying outward features, which is another deviation from 
Boccaccio’s account. Her suffering, surprisingly, pleases him: “That paleness 
warms my grave . . . thy paleness makes me glad; / Thy beauty grows upon 
me, and I feel / A greater love through all my essence steal” (40.316-320). 
Lorenzo feels comforted and satisfied to see Isabella pining away because of 
him. Remembering Keats’s remark of “Selfishness” on Isabella’s nightly 
autoeroticism, we can observe here another manifestation of selfishness. 
Instead of an ideal depiction of love as self-sacrificing affection for the other, 
Keats through an unreal dream vision presents a realistic observation of 
erotic love as selfish and possessive. Daniel P. Watkins notes that in this 
dream, by learning the cause of Lorenzo’s death, Isabella “is ‘school’d’ in the 
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harsh reality of human crime, in the way politics controls even the most 
private experience and commitments (40). But at the same time, she and the 
reader is “school’d” by the complicated reality of erotic love, which is far from 
the naïve sentiment of mutual affection. Once again Keats insinuates that 
although the physical separation and the deprivation of love are caused by 
the brothers’ violent interference, there is innate negativity in such a romantic 
relationship.  
     In the digging scene from Stanza 44 to 48, Keats’s unique design again 
deviates from Boccaccio’s story. This design is based on two modifications. 
First, in Florio’s translation, the one who accompanies Isabella to the forest is 
“her trusty Nurse, who long time had attended on her in the house, and knew 
the secret passages of her love” (Florio 161). In Boccaccio’s original Italian, 
she is only una (Boccaccio 750)—a woman, or “a female one”—without any 
other physical descriptions. Keats takes liberty, as Florio does, to make una 
“an aged nurse” (43.343). Second, in Florio’s translation and Boccaccio’s 
original account, the whole process of digging does not take much time and 
effort, as “they digged not farre”—né ebbe guari cavato (Boccaccio 750)—
“but they found the body of murthered Lorenzo” (Florio 161). However, in 
Keats’s version, it is a long and strenuous trial that lasts for three hours: 
“Three hours they labour’d at this travail sore” (48.382). Watkins interprets 
Keats’s design in Stanza 48 as a representation of “manual labour under 
oppressive condition” and “caricature of the relations of production” (41). 
Louise Z. Smith notes that “her eager digging” reminds readers of the 
brothers’ greed (309). Kurt Heinzelman sees in Isabella an image of “a miser 
prodigiously digging up his hoard” (165). In addition to these readings, the 
entire digging scene has a symbolic meaning. Keats’s modification of “trusty 
Nurse” and “a woman (una)” to “an aged nurse” evokes an image of midwife, 
noted by LaGory as the “descendent of Juliet’s Nurse and Spenser’s Glause” 
(329). Moreover, his usage of the words “labour” and “travail”—“a dismal 
labouring” and “Three hours they labour’d at this travail sore”—reinforces this 
implication. That is, Keats presents Isabella excavating Lorenzo’s corpse with 
the help of a nurse/midwife as a potential process of childbirth. That Isabella 
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is both love object and mother figure for Lorenzo seems to predate the 
Oedipal familial procedure. And the eroticism of latent mother-son incest is 
suggested strongly by Keats in Stanza 47, where Isabella kisses the corpse  
          . . . with a lip more chill than stone, 
                And put it in her bosom, where it dries 
          And freezes utterly unto the bone 
                Those dainties made to still an infant’s cries (47.371-374) 
Douglas Bush notes that for earlier critics these lines “embodied all the 
poignancy of thwarted motherhood” but Keats’s “amatory falsetto of 
‘dainties’” spoils this idea (78). Similarly, critics such as C. L. Finney and Amy 
Lowell consider the word “dainties” infelicitous, vulgar, and inappropriate in 
the context of a tragic death (Finney 377). LaGory reads this quasi-
breastfeeding scene as not only “thwarted motherhood” but also “thwarted 
sexual love” and the destined failure of “sexual love unperplexed from marital 
love and parenthood” (328). What Keats presents through this scene from 
Stanza 43 to 48 is how erotic love generates the affinity between life and 
death, as Hoeveler perceives correctly that the scene “might have been 
written by someone who could only imagine birth as a form of death” (333), 
and how it dissolves the social boundary constructed by incest taboo. 
Through the metaphorical images of childbirth and breastfeeding, Keats 
defies the maternal obligation of reproduction, mixing delivery throes with the 
perverse pleasure of oral eroticism on Isabella’s breasts. In Stanza 47, her 
breasts do not produce milk, the necessary, nonsexual, socially approved 
subsistence for infants, which are the fruits of reproduction and the 
guarantee of human existence. As the bodily zone of mutually exclusive 
maternity and eroticism, the image of Isabella’s breasts responds to the 
social antithesis stemming from the eighteenth-century “Cult of Domesticity,” 
an ideology that ideal motherhood and successful propagation must exclude 
any trace of female sexual desire (Nussbaum 24-25). Isabella’s milk-less 
“dainties” thus subverts this ideal, and signify the idea of unnecessary, anti-
living, and excessive consumption of erotic love, so intimate to “the horrid 
thing” and approximating to the experience of death.  
     In Stanza 49, Keats digresses to a personal reflection on the disparity 
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between “this wormy circumstance” of Isabella and “the gentleness of old 
Romance, / the simple plaining of a minstrel’s song!” (49.387-388). A similar 
disparity can be seen in “Sleep and Poetry,” as discussed previously, and in 
“On Sitting Down to Read King Lear Once Again.” In both poems, Keats 
aspires to dismiss romance; he says farewell to “flowery bays” and 
“o’erwhelming sweet” in the former, and bids “golden-tongue romance” to 
“Shut up thine olden pages, and be mute” in the latter (PJK 225). In 
“Isabella,” this stanza of digression once again distances the poem from the 
genre of romance. Furthermore, unlike “a nobler life” and more than “the 
fierce dispute / Betwixt damnation and impassion’d clay,” it is a “wormy 
circumstance” displayed in “Isabella.” Despite the sudden stop of narrative, 
Keats’s word choice of “wormy” duly sums up the previous digging scene and 
Isabella’s following actions. “Wormy” means not only “resembling a worm, 
worm-like” (“wormy, adj4”) but also “of earth, soil, the grave” and “infested 
with worms, full of worms” (“wormy, adj3”) as defined in the Oxford English 
Dictionary. On the one hand, the word alludes to the calculation and cruelty 
of Isabella’s brothers. On the other hand, it reflects the sensuousness of 
decadence and death and the eroticism generated by Isabella’s intimacy with 
Lorenzo’s corpse. Though aiming to “find the agonies, the strife / Of human 
hearts,” Keats displays darker aspects, a less “nobler life” of human suffering. 
He reveals the often obscene/off-stage reality of tragedy, which is the 
abjectness and decadence of physical death, and eroticises this 
unsightliness, “this wormy circumstance,” to represent again the alternative 
pleasure of endangered subjectivity and disintegrated self. Furthermore, in 
the last line of Stanza 49, Keats invites the “Fair reader” to relish this 
alternative pleasure, to “taste the music of that vision pale” (49.391), by 
combining three somatic sensations—gustatory, auditory, and visual. As in 
Stanza 9 where Lorenzo’s lips “poesied” Isabella’s “in dewy rhyme” (9.70), in 
Stanza 49 Keats manifests the intense correlation between poetic 
imagination and erotic love, and how its “intensity”—a word for Keats 
signifying the artistic drive moving constantly away from “that is fundamental 
to our general awareness of life” (Sperry, “The Epistle” 588) and “a power to 
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generate in an audience a strong and comprehensive response, which 
sometimes includes erotic overtones” (Radcliffe 257)—becomes highest 
when dealing with the obscene human experiences that are pathological, 
anti-living, and self-destructive.           
     After unearthing Lorenzo’s body, Isabella severs its head with “duller 
steel than the Perséan sword” (50.393). There has been ample critical 
discussion about the decapitation’s significance, especially about Keats’s 
replacement of the omitted phrase “no foul Medusa’s head” with “no formless 
monster’s head” (50.394). Louise Z. Smith argues that the change 
“complements the ‘duller steel’ by emphasising that these are real people, 
not mythical fantasies (309). Hoeveler reads the decapitation as still a 
variation of castration reflecting Keats’s own anxiety, despite the deletion of 
“foul Medusa’s head” (332). Aside from these interpretations, I would 
highlight a minute and unnoticed, but subtle omission of Boccaccio’s original 
description. In Florio’s translation of this passage, despite such a profound 
distress, 
          Wisedome and government so much prevailed with her, as  
          to instruct her soule, that her teares spent there, were meerley  
          fruitless and in vaine, neither did the time require any longer  
          tarrying there. Gladly would she have carried the whole body  
          with her, secretly to bestow honourable enterment on it, but it  
          exceeded the compasse of her ability (Florio 161). 
In Keats’s source, Isabella’s decision to decapitate Lorenzo’s corpse is based 
on concrete reasons. She acknowledges that her excessive grief in this 
moment provides no practical help, and she is fully aware of her inability to 
carry her lover’s entire body away. This highly functional reasoning is 
supported by her “Wisedome and government.”87 In other words, Isabella 
severs Lorenzo’s head because she has to, because it is necessary, in a 
context of reality and pragmatism. By disregarding this original account, and 
                                                
87 “Wisedome and government” in Florio’s translation has no corresponding phrase in 
Boccaccio’s original Italian, which, nevertheless, accounts for Isabella’s reasons for 
decapitating Lorenzo’s corpse, as she “conoscendo che quivi non era da piagnere, se 
avesse potuto volentieri tutto il corpo n’avrebbe portato per dargli più convenevole sepoltura; 
ma, veggendo che ciò esser non poteva” (Boccaccio 750)—“she was aware that tears were 
not helpful here. If she was able to, she wished to bring the whole body back for a more 
proper burial, but she saw that could not be done” (my translation).  
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by directly presenting the decapitation without any reasons, Keats deprives 
Isabella of her “Wisedome and government.” In “Isabella,” the decapitation is 
no longer a practical and necessary resort reached by Isabella’s reasoning, 
but only a manifestation of her sheer erotic obsession that follows her 
pathological signs and leads to her eventual madness. In terms of this 
omission, the transition from Boccaccio’s story/Florio’s translation to 
“Isabella” the poem indicates that for Keats, versification, or poetical creation, 
is an erotic process of forsaking “Wisedome and government”—instrumental 
reason and self-control—and deteriorating into madness and oblivion.  
     The subsequent scene focuses on Isabella’s interactions with the 
severed head, “whose gentleness did well accord / With death, as life” 
(50.395-396). She cleans the head, places it in the pot of “Sweet Basil,” and 
nourishes it with her tears. This series of necrophiliac actions, as the central 
part of “Isabella,” has already generated abundant critical interpretations. 
Louise Z. Smith reads Isabella’s tears here as “regenerative grief” that 
“prevents Isabella from being destroyed” and her cleaning as “artistic 
devotion” (310). She concludes that the basil’s flourishing represents, to 
some extent, the eternity of love, and “Isabella and her plant are 
immortalized in legend” (311). Watkins views Isabella’s actions as 
“abstractions which stand above the injustice and contradictions of social life” 
that achieve “spiritual truth” (41). Radcliffe observes another form of the 
“deep desire for idealized objects” and highlights the danger of worshiping 
them blindly (257). Referring to Hélène Cixous and Julia Kristeva, Hoeveler 
regards the head as a “partial object . . . the essence of fetishism” and as “a 
seed in a pod, a child in a perpetually growing womb,” signifying that 
“Isabella has eroticized her abjection” (334). White maintains that Isabella’s 
behaviours attest to Freudian melancholia, as Lorenzo’s head functions as a 
“substitute object” for her lost lover (144). According to the above 
interpretations, except perhaps Hoeveler’s, Isabella’s actions constitute a 
form of artistic creation that revives and preserves her romantic love in an 
alternative and psychotic manner. Isabella’s “work” of the pot of basil as a 
piece of art transcends the social context of her misery, as well as time and 
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space, and eternalises itself in both Boccaccio’s and Keats’s literary texts. 
Agreeing that Isabella’s actions represent a form of “artistic devotion,” I would 
further propose that they embody Keats’s notion of writing poetry, and 
exemplify his idea of the “material sublime,” and thus corroborating to my 
major argument of this chapter—for Keats, poetic imagination is in essence 
an erotic process of self-annihilation.  
     In my reading of “Epistle to John Hamilton Reynolds,” I have argued 
that the phrase “material sublime” evokes Keats’s possible medical construal 
of the word “material” as pertaining to corporeal disease, which then 
symbolises general human suffering, especially in a somatic sense. 
Furthermore, that poetic imagination is “yet still confin’d, / Lost in a sort of 
Purgatory blind” points to Keats’s understanding that poetry does not stands 
for an alternative epistemological order other than reason and science to 
redeem human suffering. Poetry, on the contrary, aestheticises and eroticises 
them to generate “obscene” and negative pleasures. In Isabella’s case, her 
treatments of Lorenzo’s head not only stand for an idealisation of love object 
that preaches a superficial motto: “Love never dies, but lives, immortal Lord” 
(50.397). Lorenzo’s head is the raw material for the poet Isabella/Keats, 
representing the ultimate outcome of human suffering, the primitive source of 
the sublime—death. Isabella/Keats beautifies death, “the horrid thing,” with 
bodily and “material” poetics. In this exact embodiment of the “material 
sublime,” she “kiss’d it, and low moan’d” (50.399), tidies up its hairs “with a 
golden comb” (51.403), and 
          Then in a silken scarf,—sweet with the dews 
               Of precious flowers pluck’d in Araby, 
          And divine liquids come with odorous ooze 
               Through the cold serpent-pipe refreshfully,— 
          She wrapp’d it up; and for its tomb did choose 
               A garden-pot, wherein she laid it by, 
          And cover’d it with mould, and o’er it set 
          Sweet basil, which her tears kept ever wet. (52.409-416) 
Isabella/Keats’s versification of death as a poetic subject is based on erotic 
contacts, bodily fluid, and material luxuries, contradicting what Watkins 
regards as “her very dearest hope and sincerest spirituality” (41). 
Conceptually, Keats is anticipating the last stanza of “Ode on Melancholy,” in 
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which Beauty must die, Joy is forever bidding adieu, Pleasure comes with 
poison, and “him whose strenuous tongue / Can burst Joy’s grape against his 
palate fine” (21-23, 27-28). For Isabella, Lorenzo (Beauty) is dead and her 
desire (Joy and Pleasure) is mingled with poisonous madness. She, as a 
“poet,” “writes a poem” on Lorenzo’s head with somatic fluid and contacts, 
echoing the “strenuous tongue” that bursts Joy’s grape, a potential image of 
laceration of flesh and its overflowing fluid.  
     As Isabella falls into utter oblivion of space and time, forgetting “the 
stars, the moon, and sun,” “the blue above the trees,” “the dells where waters 
run,” and “the chilly autumn breeze,” and fails to recognise “when the day 
was done” (53.417-421). Such a symptom is Keats’s self-awareness of and 
fear for poetic creation as a descent into the realm of “uncertainties, 
Mysteries, doubts” (LK 1.193), where “I am in a very little time annihilated” 
(LK 1.387). Moreover, the symptom of oblivion and self-annihilation extends 
from the mental to the physical. The poetic images of Isabella’s erotic 
contacts with Lorenzo’s head, her bodily fluid and material luxuries are all 
images of excessive consumption. Exploiting them means the self-wasting of 
bodily energy and resources. Consequently, Isabella as a poet “is soon to be 
/ Among the dead: She withers, like a palm / Cut by an Indian for its juicy 
balm” (56.446-448). Her artistic creation of “the pot of basil” attests to my 
argument that for Keats, writing poetry is itself a pathological and erotic 
process of self-annihilation, mentally and physically. Echoing Keats’s 
confession to Reynolds that “never will the prize, / High reason, and the lore 
of good and ill / Be my award” (LK 1.262), the line “And then the prize was all 
for Isabel” (51.502) suggests that what a poet can achieve through poetry is 
poetry itself, not an alternative “spiritual truth” complementing the rationalist, 
scientific, and moral truths. For Keats, poetry does not aim to signify a 
timeless epistemological order that transcends history, or to reflect the 
historical context of his time. Poetry itself is both signifier and its signified; it 
opens a disruptive cavity in the very moment of writing, deviating from the 
linear process of narrative. In such a heterogeneous space the poet 
relinquishes his previous identity and indulges in a ceaseless cycle of erotic 
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desire—from lingering pursuit, temporary fulfilment, to ultimate denial, and 
over again, and again—as in Isabella’s creation of “the pot of basil” and 
Keats’s creation of “Isabella.”   
     In this section, I have postulated how Isabella embodies Keats’s 
equation of erotic love and poetic imagination as both self-annihilating 
experiences. Keats himself is perhaps aware of the highly heterogeneous 
nature of this poem, as he describes it as “mawkish” (LK. 2.162) and “too 
smokable” (LK 2.174). The word “mawkish,” meaning the inclination to 
sickness and feeble sentiments, reflects Keats’s awareness of the 
pathological poetics that is vulnerable to ridicule for its apparent “effeminacy.” 
But by insinuating a series of unhealthy and malignant signs imbued in the 
“romantic” relationship between Isabella and Lorenzo with such pathological 
poetics, Keats downplays the brothers’ exterior interference and underlines 
the innate negativity in erotic love, as well as poetic imagination. In the later 
part of the poem, Isabella’s necrophiliac treatments of Lorenzo’s head also 
epitomise Keats’s idea of the “material sublime” and represent a somatic 
form of poetic creation. My examination of “Isabella” demonstrates the 
“obscene” phenomenon of self-annihilation in Romantic eroticism, and in 
Keats’s ideas and works, such “obscenity” is entailed in writing poetry itself.  
 
“THE EVE OF ST. AGNES” AND KEATSIAN SACREDNESS OF EROTIC LOVE 
      
     In his letter to John Taylor in September 1819, Richard Woodhouse 
expresses his concerns for Keats’s revisions of “The Eve of St. Agnes,” which 
he calls “trifling alterations” (LK 2.162). The negative effects of such 
alterations, however, are indeed not trivial for Woodhouse. In this letter, he 
first identifies in the inclusion of Angela’s grotesque death, which generates 
“a sense of pettish disgust,” a mischievous design of “mingling up sentiment 
& sneering” to “play with his reader” (LK 2.162-163). He then targets Keats’s 
treatment of Porphyro’s final encounter with the sleeping Madeline, criticising 
the poet for suggesting a premarital consummation between the couple, 
which renders the poem “unfit for ladies” (LK 2.163). Woodhouse observes 
that even without direct sexual depiction, Keats entices the reader’s indecent 
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imagination. He refers to Keats’s own words that “he does not want ladies to 
read his poetry: that he writes for men” and that “he should despise a man 
who would be such a eunuch in sentiment as to leave a <Girl> maid, with 
that Character about her, in such a situation” (LK 2.163). If Woodhouse’s 
record of Keats’s words is true, through “The Eve of St. Agnes” the poet not 
only espouses sexual fulfilment by deriding “He who desires, but acts not” 
(CPPB 35), in Blake’s words, but also promotes a male-centred form of such 
fulfilment, an issue that engenders the subsequent divided readings of this 
poem.  
     In the earlier stages of modern Keats studies, the interpretations of 
“The Eve of St. Agnes” are divided into two categories, based on the critical 
judgment of sexual fulfilment between Porphyro and Madeline, especially the 
former’s actions. First, there is the so-called “idealist” reading that holds 
positive evaluation of the sexual union between Porphyro and Madeline, as a 
form of typical Romantic mutual affection that prevails over social restrictions 
represented by the two hostile families. The idealist reading is developed by 
Earl R. Wasserman in his 1953 monograph The Finer Tone: Keats’s Major 
Poems. In his interpretation, Porphyro’s venture into Madeline’s house 
stands as a pilgrimage, a quest for “heaven’s bourne, where the intensities of 
mortal life are repeated in a finer tone and divested of their mutability” (120). 
Basing his argument on Keats’s reference to Adam’s dream in Paradise Lost, 
Wasserman equalises dreams with imagination, and regards Madeline’s 
awakening to meet and elope with Porphyro as an actualisation of Romantic 
imagination that leads them into “where the human and ethereal, beauty and 
truth, are one” (123). That is, Wasserman does not distinguish the real 
Porphyro and the Porphyro in Madeline’s dream; the two “should fuse 
mystically into an immortality of passionate experience, as warmly human as 
the one yet as immutable as the other” (123). The second category of 
interpretations of “The Eve of St. Agnes,” contrary to the idealist reading, is 
the sceptical reading led by Jack Stillinger’s influential essay “The 
Hoodwinking of Madeline: Scepticism in ‘The Eve of St. Agnes.’” Stillinger 
deems the apparently Romantic fulfilment of erotic love a potential rape, 
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orchestrated by Porphyro with his opportunist “stratagem,” which is “a ruse, 
an artifice, a trick of deceiving” (“The Hoodwinking” 539). Rejecting 
Wasserman’s metaphysical reading, Stillinger brings the plot back to 
Madeline’s realistic condition, in which “Porphyro is cruel; Angela is a traitor; 
and Madeline is a ‘deceived thing’” (546). He accentuates Keats’s 
juxtaposition of Porphyro with villainous characters such as Tereus who 
rapes Philomel, Milton’s Satan, and Iachimo in Cymberline, maintaining that 
Porphyro’s venture is not a form of spiritual pilgrimage, but a morally 
depraved action that, to some extent, embodies Keats’s own male sexual 
desire, expressed in his letter to Bailey—“When I am among Women I have 
evil thoughts, malice spleen” (LK 1.341). The studies of “The Eve of St. 
Agnes” following this division between idealism and scepticism, as Stillinger 
observes in his later book Reading “the Eve of St. Agnes”: The Multiples of 
Complex Literary Transaction, all attempt to find a middle ground somewhere 
between Wasserman’s and Stillinger’s polarised arguments. 
     Instead of attempting another moral judgment of Porphyro’s action, the 
analysis of “The Eve of St. Agnes” in this section continues my major 
argument established in the preceding section. I approach Keatsian 
“obscenity” in this poem through a different angle, namely, Keats’ synthesis of 
the religious and the erotic. In Keats studies, the interrelationship between 
sexual love and religion in “The Eve of St. Agnes” has been noted and 
discussed. Some critics affirm the sexual union in the poem as a celebration 
of Christian marriage. For example, Katharine Garvin argues that St. Agnes 
represents “a mythical marriage” free from mundane contamination, and 
Madeline is a “humanized Agnes” whose sexual union with Porphyro 
confirms a realisation of heavenly bliss in the corporeal world. (360). David 
Wiener reads the elopement as a secular version of felix culpa, which leads 
the couple away from an innocent but inert paradise to a harsher but 
enlightened world of experience. From a similar perspective, James Boulger 
interprets Madeline’s ritual as a secular version of the Eucharist, with which 
Romantic love is fulfilled through Keats’s handling of religious images. 
Conversely, other critics consider the sexual love a countermeasure against 
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the ascetic tradition and the concept of purity in Christianity. Instead of 
actualising the idea of Christian marriage, Keats’s allusions to paganism and 
“old religion” in the couple’s interaction challenge and surpass Christianity. 
For instance, Judith Arcana observes in the poem an embodiment of early 
Celtic sacred ritual by identifying certain archetypal figures: Madeline as the 
mother-to-be maiden, Angela as the crone, the guiding priestess, Porphyro 
as the young god of love, and the Beadsman as the powerless 
representation of Christianity (43). Marcia Gilbreath traces the etymology of 
Porphyro’s name and finds his counterpart Porphyrion in Joseph Spence’s 
Polymetis, Abbé Banier’s Mythology and Fables of the Ancients, and Robert 
Burton’s The Anatomy of Melancholy. Combining the characterisations in 
these documents, Gilbreath deems Porphyro “a young pagan ravisher with 
no regard for the religious taboo he is breaking” against “the barren religious 
ideal of sexual purity” in Christianity (25).88  
     Departing from the dichotomy between Christianity and paganism 
assumed in the existing studies, I propose that Keats does not stress the 
antithesis between Christianity and paganism in the poem. In contrast, he 
construes religious sacredness as a heterogeneous experience of eroticism 
in both Christian and non-Christian contexts. First, the ritual of St. Agnes’s 
Eve signifies Keats’s eroticisation of Christian images, which reincorporates 
sexual desire into the concepts of resurrection and the second coming of 
Jesus. This is particularly manifested by the image of “no weeping Magdalen” 
in the deleted stanza between Stanza 6 and 7, a biblical reference neglected 
by most critics who discuss the poem from Christian perspectives, such as 
Garvin, Wiener, and Boulger. By eroticising Christian images, Keats aspires 
to an alternative divine experience of sexual vitality, opposite to the weak and 
sterile state represented by the Beadsman’s asceticism. Second, with pagan 
images such as Merlin, the mermaid, and Medusa in the later part of the 
poem Keats complicates the interaction between Madeline and Porphyro, 
which is more than an embodiment of typical romantic love or a potential 
                                                
88 For more details of the existing studies based on the division between Christianity and 
paganism, see Stillinger’s summary in Reading of “the Eve of St. Agnes”, p. 42-65. 
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rape. It dissolves the power relationship between the two protagonists 
maintained in the sceptical reading. There is not differentiation between the 
active male subject (Porphyro) and the passive female object (Madeline) or 
the boundary between the victimiser and the victim. Both parties relieve the 
control of their bodies and transcend their pre-existing identities in this erotic 
state accessed via a religious ritual. “The Eve of St. Agnes” shows a unique 
aspect of Keats’s idea of religious sacredness, which is essentially sensual 
and erotic, and offers an alternative angle to approach the poet’s 
understanding of religion and its connection to poetic creation. With this 
poem, Keats postulates his idea of the sacred as a heterogeneous 
experience of self-annihilation, which shares the same root and mechanism 
of eroticism and poetic imagination.  
     Before starting my analysis of the narrative poem, in which a religious, 
and specifically Christian, motif is the prominent impetus of the entire plot, it 
is necessary to review the possible construction of Keats’s religious views of 
Christianity. What influenced Keats’s notion on religion before he embarked 
on his major poetic composition is traced by Robert M. Ryan in his 
monograph Keats: The Religious Sense. The household of his grandmother 
offered Keats basic understandings of the Bible and Christian doctrines, and 
developed his early attachment to religious imagery. In the academy of John 
Clarke at Enfield, he acquainted himself with protestant thinking, especially 
the Calvinist doctrines. Ryan notes that at Enfield Keats learned French from 
priest Abbé Béliard, who provided religious instructions that were “in a spirit 
of tolerance and open-mindedness” (35). During this period, Keats had not 
showed signs of hostility and rebelliousness against Christianity, and as Ryan 
deduces, Keats deepened his knowledge of the Bible to meet school’s 
requirement of Catechism, familiarising himself with the rituals of baptism, 
sacrament, and the Eucharist. Ryan then identifies a certain moment 
between 1809 and 1810, in which Keats’s scepticism toward organised 
religion began to sprout. Leigh Hunt’s Examiner and Bishop Gilbert Burnet’s 
The History of My Own Time formed the major impact on the young poet’s 
religious thinking, as Ryan points out (41). Keats’s scepticism developed 
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after he started his medical apprenticeship under the surgeon Thomas 
Hammond at Edmonton in 1811 and later professional medical career at 
Guy’s Hospital in 1815. During these medical years, Keats was exposed to 
the newest trend of empiricist science that valued observation and 
experience above any “metaphysical subtlety and immaterial abstractions” 
that cannot be concretely perceived by human senses (Ryan 55). The 
lectures given by William Lawrence, Professor of Anatomy and Physiology at 
the Royal Academy, might stimulate Keats’s critical reflection on his 
understanding of Christian religion, as Lawrence highlights the illogical and 
unscientific accounts of the Creation in the Old Testament: “Why should we 
embrace an hypothesis so full of contradictions?” (qtd. in Ryan 57) and 
declares that “Experience is our only safe guide, and inductions from 
numerous facts the only sure support of our reasoning” (qtd. in Ryan 63). 
Ryan observes that in such a medical milieu, “scientific empiricism went hand 
in hand with religious scepticism” (63) and proposes that Keats’s later idea of 
“Negative Capability” might derive from his medical training experience, 
which endowed him “a willingness to accept uncertainty” and “patience with 
incomplete knowledge” (65). Ryan concludes that Keats’s contact with and 
study in contemporary scientific and medical knowledge helped him cultivate 
“an attitude closely resembling what would call agnosticism” (67).  
     The subsequent influence Keats received in terms of religion, as Ryan 
discusses, is from the poet’s participation in the literary circle centred on 
Leigh Hunt. Hunt’s literary impact on Keats’s early career is manifested in his 
1817 collection Poems, with an opening poem dedicated to Hunt and 
constant references to Hunt’s Story of Rimini. Apart from poetic appreciation 
and encouragement, Ryan acknowledges also the influence of Hunt’s 
religious thinking on Keats. Hunt’s religious view is somewhat conflicting, as 
Ryan notes, as he refuses concrete doctrines of organised religion such as 
Methodism and Catholicism, but is reluctant to renounce Christianity 
completely. He respects Jesus Christ, not as a semi-god who performs 
miracles and ordains laws, but as a great man of human passion, 
“represented to us through his affection for John and Mary Magdalen, and 
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through the amiable religion of the apostle” (Ryan 74). In his 1819 poetic 
collection Foliage, Hunt also expresses his espousal of “natural impulses” to 
counter the “authorized selfishness of religion and law,” as Nicholas Roe 
records in his article on Hunt in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 
These thoughts propelled Hunt to seek a middle ground between downright 
atheism and orthodox Christianity, which he achieved in his much later 1853 
book The Religion of the Heart. In its introduction, he states that “God has 
written his religion in the heart” (1) and “Doctrines revolting to the heart are 
not made to endure, however mixed up they may be with lessons the most 
divine” (2). In “the religion of heart,” as Hunt elaborates, God is “the Great 
Beneficence,” whose power and benevolence are manifested in the beauty 
and sublimity of his creation. And through their “hearts/feelings,” instead of 
“heads/reason,” human beings are able to perceive the presence and work of 
God. Hunt further proposes that “the holders of the Religion of the Heart” 
believe that the creation of God, the very material world human beings dwell 
in, is undergoing constant improvement, moving towards an ultimate perfect 
state: “his divine occupation is to work ends befitting his goodness, out of 
different forms of matter, and out of transient, qualified, and unmalignant 
evils;—probably to the endless multiplication of heavens” (4).             
     From the discussion above, we can see that Keats received various 
ideological inputs in terms of religion, from the basic ecclesiastical teachings 
in his childhood, the scientific empiricism in his years of studying and 
practicing medicine, to the “religion of the heart” in Hunt’s literary circle. All 
these elements contribute to the formation of Keats’s complicated and 
conflicting views of religion, especially Christianity. Keats’s ambivalent 
attitude toward religion can be observed as early as his 1816 sonnet “Written 
in Disgust of Vulgar Superstition,” in which his preference for Greco-Roman 
paganism over Christianity is demonstrated. In this poem, the contrast 
between Christianity and paganism is stressed by the former’s “melancholy 
round,” “gloominess, more dreadful cares,” and “sermon’s horrid sound,” and 
the latter’s “fireside joys, and Lydian airs” (PJK 88). Institutionalised 
Christianity imposes upon human beings an inert state of lifelessness, “A chill 
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as from a tomb” that is “dying like an outburnt lamp,” while its pagan 
counterpart provides artistic beauty, “that fresh flowers” and “many glories of 
immortal stamp” (88), which boosts life-affirmation and exuberant energy. 
Apart from his contrast between Christianity and paganism, Keats also 
differentiates Jesus Christ, whom he reveres as other Romantic poets do, 
from the Church that dominated the English people’s religious faith in his 
time. Jesus, for Keats, is “so great as man that though he transmitted no 
writing of his own to posterity, we have his Mind and his sayings and his 
greatness handed to us by others,” but his teachings are twisted and 
corrupted by “Men interested in the pious frauds of Religion” (LK 2.80). Here 
Keats echoes Hunt’s notion of Christ, and also echoes Blake, who declares 
that “no virtue can exist without breaking these ten commandments; Jesus 
was all virtue, and acted from impulse, not from rules” in The Marriage of 
Heaven and Hell (CPPB 43). Furthermore, an eroticised version of Jesus is 
one of Keats’s designs in “The Eve of St. Agnes,” as I will discuss extensively 
later. 
     In the letter to George and Georgiana, in April 1819, Keats has an 
elaboration of his religion views of orthodox Christianity. Differing from Hunt’s 
belief in “the Great Beneficence” and his optimist aspiration to a better world-
to-come, Keats reckons that “Man is originally ‘a poor forked creature’ subject 
to the same mischances as the beasts of the forest, destined to hardships 
and disquietude of some kind or other” (LK 2.101). For Keats, philosophical 
reasoning—“the persevering endeavours of a seldom appearing Socrates”—
which is supposed to guide human beings to earthly happiness, is powerless 
in the face of death. Instead of appreciating God’s work as the representation 
of divine beauty and goodness, as Hunt’s “religion of the heart” assumes, 
Keats perceives more keenly the cruel indifference and immense malice of 
nature: “Look at the Poles and at the sands of Africa, Whirlpools and 
volcanoes—Let men exterminate them and I will say that they may arrive at 
earthly Happiness” (LK 2.101). As a rose that will inevitably be blighted by “a 
cold wind, a hot sun,” “no more can man be happy in spite, the worldly 
elements will prey upon his nature” (LK 2.101). Religion, especially 
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Christianity, ought to redeem human beings from the afflicting world, “a vale 
of tears,” but Keats dismisses it as “certain arbitrary interposition of God” and 
implies that under its sway men are “the misguided and superstitious” (LK 
2.101-102). To salvage human beings from this predicament, Keats’s ideal 
replacement of Christian religion is a construal of this “vale of tears” as “The 
vale of Soul-making” that is “a grander system of salvation than the 
chryst<e>ain religion, or rather it is a system of Spirit-creation” (LK 2.102).  
     This Keatsian system consists of three materials: the Intelligence, the 
human heart, and the World. Intelligence is begot by the affliction that the 
World, or Elemental space, imposes upon the human heart, thus forming the 
Soul and “the sense of Identity”: “Do you not see how necessary a World of 
Pains and troubles is to school an Intelligence and make it a soul? A Place 
where the heart must feel and suffer in a thousand diverse ways!” (LK 2.102). 
By acknowledging, enduring, and learning from the cruelty, ugliness, and 
caprice of God’s creation, instead of blindly identifying only the agreeable 
aspects of the world and yearning for an improved world-to-come, human 
beings can thus establish their identity and subjectivity. Such is an alternative 
procedure espoused by Keats in lieu of Christian religion, “a system of 
Salvation which does not affront our reason and humanity” (LK 2.103). In this 
letter, as Daniel P. Watkins discerns, Keats shows that “identity is not pre-
given but rather emerges from situations of conflict and difficulty,” and 
presents “a view of identity as the happy influence of painful circumstantial 
pressures in forming a spiritually meaningful essence: identity becomes 
synonymous with salvation. . . a modified version of the Christian idealism to 
which Keats objects” (Watkins 96). In this letter, Keats does recognise a 
Jehovah-like Supreme Being who creates the world, but he refuses to 
believe that God’s intention is absolutely good, concerning the negativities of 
human life: fear, worry, sorrow, malice, pain, and death. Keats perceives 
“how man was formed by circumstances” and equalling “circumstances” with 
“touchstones of his heart,” “proovings of his heart,” “fortifiers or alterers of his 
nature,” and finally, “soul” and “intelligence” (LK 2.103). These elements are 
“the medium of the Heart,” through which human beings establish and 
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possess “the sense of Identity” (LK 2.102). Therefore, he regards human 
salvation as a personal matter, a process of individual struggle with these 
earthly plights, to secure a life of self-sufficiency and intelligence, which has 
nothing to do with God and any religious agencies. Thus, Watkins remarks 
correctly that the letter “helps to elucidate Keats’s strong drive to situate 
himself as a stable identity in a turbulent world” (97). Keats expresses his 
aspiration to a stable social identity, whose establishment and fortification are 
based on an individual’s perception of and response to the material world, in 
the absence of God and Christian religion. At the end of this discussion of 
“Soul-making,” Keats ponders over “how is the heart to become this Medium 
but in a world of Circumstance?” and he leaves an incomplete answer before 
a sudden change of topic: “There now I think what with Poetry and Theology 
you may thank your Stars that my pen is not very long winded” (LK 2.104). 
The position of poetry in this process of “Soul-making” and possessing “the 
sense of Identity” is an issue that Keats seems to intend to say more about. 
But it is abruptly discontinued by the sentence “Yesterday I received two 
Letters from your Mother and Henry which I shall send by young Birkbeck 
with this—” (LK 2.104).  
     This issue reminds us of his previous letter written to Woodhouse on 27 
October 1818, in which Keats highlights the phenomenon of self-annihilation 
by asserting that “As to the poetical Character itself . . . it is not itself—it has 
no self” and “A Poet is the most unpoetical of any thing in existence; because 
he has no Identity” (LK 1.386-387). I have discussed this Keatsian paradox in 
the preceding section: Keats is the most poetical because he is the most 
unpoetical. If we compare the 1818 Woodhouse letter with the 1819 “Soul-
making” letter, a contradiction in Keats’s thinking emerges. In the latter, Keats 
renounces Christianity from worldly experience and replaces it with the 
system of “Soul-making” to establish and stabilise a social identity. However, 
artistic imagination and poetic creation, as he asserts in the former, annihilate 
his individual character and identity. In terms of religion and artistic creation, 
what exact role does poetry play in human experience for Keats, whose 
social identity is both secured and destroyed by being a poet? The Keatsian 
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paradox seems to linger in this conflicting issue about establishing identity in 
Keats’s understanding of religious experience and poetic creation.   
     Christian religion and its earthly representative institutions, for Keats, 
spread misguidance and superstition and prevent human beings from 
establishing their own identities. And under the influences of empiricist 
philosophies and the newest scientific knowledge of his time, as well as “the 
religion of the heart,” from key figures such as Voltaire, Jeremy Bentham, 
William Lawrence, Leigh Hunt, and William Hazlitt, Keats formulates a path 
to self-sufficiency and self-reliance without seeking God’s supposed benign 
interference. Rejecting the blindness to worldly negativities and unthoughtful 
optimism for a promised better future, this path is dependent on human 
experience in perceiving the material world and learning from the inevitable 
sorrow and pain it imposes on human beings. However, as a poet, Keats 
aims to represent such negative phenomenon in life—“the agonies, the strife 
/ Of human hearts”—with poetic imagination. Such is a process of self-
annihilation that endangers the social identity Keats has established by 
distancing himself from God and Christianity, because an effectual poetical 
representation of “the agonies and strife” and “a fierce dispute / Betwix 
damnation and impassioned clay” necessitates the decentralisation of 
individuality, the renouncement of subjectivity.  
     On the level of reality, Keats’s social identity as a poet is assaulted by 
harsh criticism for writing poetry of “effeminacy” and “masturbation,” which 
decentralises and degrades cultural masculinity in the nineteenth century. To 
some extent, not only his social identity is threatened in this way, but also his 
physical existence is destroyed for writing poetry, if we believe Shelley’s 
accusation of the Quarterly Review, whose “savage criticism” on Keats 
“produced the most violent effect on his susceptible mind; the agitation thus 
originated ended in the rupture of a blood-vessel in the lungs; a rapid 
consumption ensued” (MW 529).89 For Keats, poetic creation, on several 
                                                
89 Byron expresses his pity, which is mixed with lingering sleight, on Keats’s death and its 
alleged cause of harsh criticism both in his letter to John Murray—“He who would die of an 
article in a review—would probably have died of something else equally trivial” (Byron and 
Moore 163)—and in Canto 11 of Don Juan: “John Keats, who was kill’d off by one 
critique . . . ’Tis strange the mind, that very fiery particle, / Should let itself be snuff’d out by 
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levels, signifies the poet’s self-destruction of his social identity and even 
physical well-being, a notion that I have discussed through my reading of 
“Isabella.” Through an analysis of “The Eve of St. Agnes,” I would take my 
argument further by proposing that in this poem, poetic creation is a return to 
the lost sacredness, a religious experience that replaces God with eroticism. 
Keats’s idea of religious sacredness in “The Eve of St. Agnes” rebels against 
his own formulations of “forming the Soul or Intelligence destined to possess 
the sense of Identity” (LK 2.102). Keats’s latent equalisation of the sacred 
and the erotic runs counter to his own ideas of “a sense of Identity” and 
“Sould-making,” which are achieved through the anti-Christian “Intelligence” 
of empiricism offered by his medical education and “the religion of the heart” 
from the Leigh Hunt circle. This return to sacredness is not a reconversion to 
orthodox Christianity, undoubtedly, but a similar phenomenon we observe in 
Blake’s works, which is the re-inclusion of heterogeneous sexual desires into 
religious experiences, both Christian and pagan.  
     In “The Eve of St. Agnes,” Keatsian sacredness epitomises the double-
layered meaning of the very word “sacred,” which is derived from the Latin 
word sacer, as Mary Douglas points out, meaning both “desecration and 
consecration” (10). That is, as Douglas puts it, “Holiness and unholiness after 
all need not always be absolute opposites” (10); sacredness does not 
necessarily entail or result from purity, continuity, and completeness, but 
more significantly, it pertains to impurity, disruption, abjectness, and 
obscenity, elements that decentralise self, break identity, and annihilate 
subjectivity. In the following discussion, I will examine Keats’s employment of 
religious images and motifs, especially the Beadsman, Mary Magdalene and 
the ritual of St. Agnes itself, by exploring his possible sources of inspiration of 
this saint and her ritual. I will then analyse the interaction between Madeline 
and Porphyro. My analysis will demonstrate how Keatsian sacredness in this 
poem is achieved through the eroticisation of Christianity, the re-inclusion of 
the violent, disrupted, and obscene aspects of humanity into religious 
experiences.  
                                                
an article” (Poetical Works 716). 
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     “The Eve of St. Agnes” begins with the perspective of the Beadsman, 
who represents the orthodox Christianity, to survey the material world, the 
“world of Circumstances” in Keats’s own words. The material world is in the 
“bitter chill” of St. Agnes’s Eve, the 21th of January,90 in which all living 
beings are rendered inert and mute, lifeless and senseless, including the owl, 
the hare, the flock, and the Beadsman himself, whose fingers are numb.  
With this opening, Keats presents the struggle of religious people, who seek 
comfort from an exterior and abstract divine power to cope with the bleak 
reality. In vain is this struggle, as Keats indicates with a tone of indeterminacy 
that the Beadsman’s “frosted breath, / Like pious incense from a censer old, / 
Seem’d taking flight for heaven, without a death, / Past the sweet Virgin’s 
picture, while his prayer he saith” (1.6-9).  
     The image of ascending incense is worth noticing. In his analysis of the 
Bible in Words with Power, Northrop Frye detects a “up and down vertical 
pattern,” which he terms axis mundi (151). The pattern consists of two 
opposite movements of human beings in the material world, a vertically 
middle sphere: the ascent and the descent. The former signifies an aspiration 
to and reunion with God and the once lost paradise, while the latter a further 
alienation from God and an approximation to eternal death, or Hell. While 
axis mundi is a “vertical dimension of cosmos” that represents space, time is 
the horizontal dimension. The two cross each other at the very point of true 
salvation, where spatial and temporal limits are conquered: “the point where 
the axis mundi crosses time, the moment of incarnation, is we saw ‘the still 
point of the turning world,’ and the centre of axis” (176). The image of the 
Beadsman’s incense-like “frosted breath” that floats upward to heaven is an 
image of “ascent” in the pattern of axis mundi in the Christian context, 
according to Frye’s formulation. But for Keats, such an aspiration is 
ineffectual and futile, as the very word “Seem’d” suggests a sense of fictional 
appearance, a blindly optimist semblance, and an illusion that religion can 
provide an existence “without a death.” The past tense of “Seem’d” 
contradicts to the present tense of “his prayer he saith” in the next line. That 
                                                
90 See Alban Butler’s 1800 work Lives of the Saints, p. 20.  
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is, in the Beadsman’s case, the vertical line of axis mundi fails to cross the 
horizontal line of time, thus denying him any chance of true salvation.91  
     Michael Ragussis also considers the Beadsman a victim of time’s 
power. He accentuates Keats’s “fluctuation between past tense and present 
tense throughout the poem” that generates a sense of oscillation between “a 
fiction of long ago . . . and a present reality” (382). The past tense of 
“Seem’d” not only obscures the boundary between the fictional and the real, 
but also signals the invalidity and inability of the Christian faith to bring forth 
salvation. The present tense of the Beadsman’s actual actions —“His prayer 
he saith” repeated in the first line of Stanza 2, and “takes his lamp, and riseth 
from his knees, / And back returneth” (2.1-3)—represents a disparity between 
religious performances in reality and spiritual comfort that religious people 
aim to achieve through these practices; the former does not lead to the latter. 
In Stanza 2, the Beadsman is “meagre, barefoot, wan” and of “weak spirit,” 
walking through the chapel aisle, where “The sculpture’d dead . . . / 
Emprison’d in black, purgatorial rails” already foreshadows his doom, as well 
as the doom of other religious people: the “Knights, ladies,” who pray “in 
dumb orat’ries” (2.12, 15-17) and Angela, who dies a gruesome death at the 
end of the poem. 
     In Stanza 3, Keats presents a malignant consequence of religious 
practice. The Beadsman is tempted by material and sensual enjoyments, 
when “Music’s golden tongue / Flatter’d to tears this aged man and poor” 
(3.20-21). The narrator coldly declares his detachment from them: “already 
had his deathbell rung; / The joys of all his life were said and sung: / His was 
harsh penance on St. Agnes’ Eve” (3.23-24). The Beadsman then turns away 
to his penance, which is originally followed by a deleted stanza that depicts 
an alluring picture of sensual pleasures: 
          But there are ears may not hear sweet melodies, 
          And there are eyes to brighten festivals, 
                                                
91 The ascending image of incense also appears in Keats’s dedication poem to Leigh Hunt 
in his 1817 collection. In this poem, Keats shows a blissful state of Greco-Roman paganism 
in the past, where axis mundi and time do cross each other: “wreathed incense do we see 
upborne / Into the east, to meet the smiling day” (emphasis added, PJK 93). Ironically, the 
moment of salvation is denied in the Beadsman’s Christian practice, but granted in a pagan 
ceremony of long-lost past. 
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          And there are feet for nimble minstrelsies, 
          And many a lip that for the red wine calls.—  
          Follow, then follow to the illumined halls, 
          Follow me youth—and leave the Eremite—  
          Give him a tear—then trophied banneral, 
          And many a brilliant tasseling of light, 
        Shall droop from arched ways this high Baronial night. (PJK 300) 
In this discarded stanza, Keats casts doubt on religious asceticism, which is 
practiced in exchange for spiritual peace in this life and eternal happiness in 
the afterlife. The better afterlife has been indicated as false and illusory in the 
past-tense “Seem’d” in Stanza 1, and the spiritual peace in this life is now 
proven futile and invalid, as the Beadsman obtains no internal peace by 
practicing his religious penance. He is still tormented by the temptation of 
material luxuries and sensual pleasures, as Robert Kern also observes that 
his “ability to alter or ignore reality is shown to be an inability, a failure if 
nerve, a turning away from possibilities and feelings to which he is vulnerable 
but which he has long repressed” (182). As Frye further elaborates in Words 
with Power, a successful ascent marks the return to the prelapsarian 
paradise, which is “associated with sunshine, youth and fertility and form[s] a 
locus amoenus or pleasant place where it is always spring and autumn at 
once,” a primary state exemplified by the Garden of Adonis in Spenser’s The 
Faerie Queene, a symbolic image of Mother Nature’s womb that represents 
sexual vitality (180). Frye’s formulation of axis mundi and time accentuates 
the original sexual undercurrents in the biblical context, which is later toned 
down and excluded by institutionalised Christianity. Keats observes the 
deprivation of sexual vitality in the contemporary Church, as his 1816 sonnet 
“Written in Disgust of Vulgar Superstition” demonstrates. In this poem, 
institutionalised Christianity puts human beings in an inert state of 
lifelessness: “The church bells toll a melancholy round” with “Some other 
gloominess, more dreadful cares” and “the sermon’s horrid sound” (1-4 PJK 
88). What remains in Christianity is “A chill as from a tomb” that is “dying like 
an outburnt lamp” (10-11), and its lost sexual vitality can only be found in 
paganism—the “fireside joys, and Lydian air,” “fresh flowers,” and “many 
glories of immortal stamp” (7, 13-14)—that promotes exuberant energy of 
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sexuality. The Beadsman’s penance and asceticism thus represent the sterile 
status of contemporary Christians, who are denied a successful ascent and 
alienated from the primary paradise. Therefore, Keats’s characterisation of 
the Beadsman suggests that it is impossible to utterly renounce earthly 
desires by means of asceticism. On the contrary, the true meaning of 
religious sacredness in Christianity lies in the reincorporation of erotic desire, 
as the ritual of St. Agnes and the interaction between Madeline and Porphyro 
will attest to in the poem.  
     After criticising the Christian tradition of sacredness, Keats initiates his 
presentation of an alternative sacredness of eroticism, which, instead of 
forsaking material and sensual experiences, reincorporates sexual desire 
into its operation. And such an operation of sacredness relies upon the figure 
of St. Agnes and the ritual this Catholic saint represents. Considering Keats’s 
source materials in composing this poem, critics often merely focus on 
literary influences such as Spenser, Shakespeare, Anne Radcliff, Walter 
Scott, and Coleridge (KPP 445). Few of them consider why Keats chooses 
St. Agnes’s Eve as the major motif in the poem, from what source he 
acquaints himself with St. Agnes’s story, and what influence these source 
materials might have on his composition of the poem. Dealing with these 
questions, I would propose that in terms of St. Agnes’s Eve, Keats not only 
draws ideas from John Brand’s Observations on Popular Antiquities and 
Robert Burton’s The Anatomy of Melancholy,92 but also St. Agnes’s personal 
biography, such as the one written by L. Sherling in 1677. The story of St. 
Agnes itself, though appearing as a typical hagiographical account, as 
recorded in Sherling’s The Life of the Blessed St. Agnes: Virgin and Martyr in 
Prose and Verse, in fact demonstrates an erotic struggle of desire and 
jealousy, in which Agnes is caught between two male suitors, namely Jesus 
                                                
92 In his letter to Benjamin Bailey, Keats mentions that he has written two poems in the past 
two months, and one of them is “call’d St Agnes’ Eve on a popular superstition” (LK 2.139). 
In terms of Keats’s sources, Jeffrey N. Cox notes that Keats might have read about the 
superstition from Brand’s 1777 book Observations on Popular Antiquities, which was 
reprinted in 1813 (KPP 445). And in Burton’s The Anatomy of Melancholy, which Keats read 
avidly, the ritual is also mentioned: “or by fasting on St. Agnes’ Eve or Night, to know who 
shall be their first husband” (181).  
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Christ and a Roman young man. The eroticised devotion to God, as I will 
show, might inspire Keats’s poetic designs of Madeline’s ritual and 
Porphyro’s action. Under the cover of a Christian saint, Keats reclaims the 
lost sacredness in orthodox Christianity represented by the Beadsman, and 
presents Keats’s idea of sacredness that synthesises religious and sexual 
experiences.  
      In the two sources acknowledged by critics, namely Brand’s and 
Burton’s works, both authors describe the ritual itself, but give no account of 
St. Agnes’s life and how her martyrdom is related to this specific superstition. 
Keats’s choice of St. Agnes’s Eve as an agent of his poem about erotic love 
is not only because of its element of dreaming future husband, but also 
because he is aware of the story of St. Agnes herself. As mentioned above, a 
possible source of St. Agnes’s life is L. Sherling’s The Life of the Blessed St. 
Agnes: Virgin and Martyr in Prose and Verse published in 1677. To support 
my argument, I would briefly summarise Sherling’s work, and highlight the 
possible factors in it that might inspire Keats’s poetic designs in “The Eve of 
St. Agnes.”  
     The Life of the Blessed St. Agnes is a detailed and vivid narrative that 
relates the saint’s life, struggle, and death. According to Sherling, St. Agnes 
was born in a noble family in late third-century Rome, at a time when 
Christianity was forbidden and oppressed in the Roman Empire. 
Nevertheless, in her youth, Agnes “had dedicated her Virginity to her sweet 
Redeemer, and made a formal Vow of perpetual Chrastitie” (4) and “fix’d thy 
thoughts on Heaven, and wast engag’d in the contemplation of the Holy 
Jesus” (5). The major event happened when Agnes was thirteen; a young 
man, who is the son of the Prefect Symbronius, the Governor of the city, 
attempted to woo her: “He saw her, he admir’d her, he lov’d her, all in an 
instant: That crowd of Beauties that Heaven had endow’d her with” (6). 
Agnes refused her suitor adamantly, indicating that her heart was already 
taken by someone else: “my Soul is prepossess’d, and being engaged 
elsewhere cannot comply with your desires” (12). The person Agnes spoke 
about, is Jesus Christ. However, the suitor believed that he had a strong rival 
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in contesting for Agnes’s love and was tortured by jealousy and fury. He was 
determined to find Agnes’s lover and carry out his vengeance, but as there 
was no such a man, his search was fruitless. After his efforts failed, the 
young man believed that Agnes cheated him into believing the existence of 
such a rival, and attempted a second pursuit. Agnes again refused him and 
assured him that “thou hast a Rival; Know I Love him, and prefer him to all 
the World; and when thou know’st this, if thou wilt still pursue a fruitless 
passion, never expect any thing from me but scorn and contempt” (25). The 
suitor retreated again in despair and anger, accusing Agnes of unfeeling 
cruelty. His health deteriorated with his mental distress. The Governor 
Symbronius discerned his son’s pining away, and persuaded the latter to 
confide the cause of such misery. Symbronius then met with Agnes’s father, 
who was fully aware of his daughter’s religious devotion, and requested him 
to command Agnes to accept the proposal and thus tie the two noble families 
with marriage. Agnes’s father pretended to agree with Symbronius’s 
proposition, as he actually supported his daughter’s decision. After the final 
failed attempt to win Agnes for his son, Symbronius in frustration and fury 
accidentally found out Agnes’s secret identity as a Christian, and arrested her 
with accusation of blasphemy. During the trial, Agnes refused Symbronius’s 
offer of pardon on the conditions of renouncing her Christian faith and 
marrying his son, which eventually led to her martyrdom, after she was 
stripped naked and dragged to a brothel as a mocking punishment of her 
virginity preserved for Jesus Christ. 
     Although there is no direct evident showing Keats did read this 
seventeenth-century document, the uniqueness of St. Agnes’s story 
associated with Keats’s poem, especially in Sherling’s narrative, lies in the 
following three elements. First, Agnes’s religious devotion to Jesus is tinged 
with sexual undertones. Even when Sherling is writing about her spiritual 
piety, he accentuates Agnes’s physical beauty by comparing her “Beauties, 
Charms, and Graces” to “all our worldly pleasures” and “earthly enjoyments” 
(4). Such a presentation allures readers to imagine what exceptional sexual 
attraction Agnes possesses to surpass other material and bodily enjoyments. 
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Juxtaposed with Agnes’s prayer, in which she devotes her pure body of 
virginity to Jesus, such an erotic imagination is enhanced with a sense of 
sacred unattainability of sexual fulfilment, as well as a potential fantasy of 
transgressing this sacred prohibition. Second, Sherling’s description of the 
suitor’s depression after his second failed attempt echoes Burton’s earlier 
discourse of melancholy, which Keats is very familiar with. The young man 
suffered psychologically and physically: “In so miserable a distraction as his 
Soul then was, his Body could not chuse but partake of the common 
miseries. Their was as great Revolutions in his humours as in his thoughts, 
and that profound Melancholie that had seis’d his Soul, gave but too dismal 
Effects not to be discovered” (29). Keats reprised such physical and mental 
deterioration in the pathological poetics in “Isabella,” as I have analysed in 
the previous section. Third, Agnes’s story bears a resemblance to Romeo 
and Juliet, and even “The Eve of St. Agnes” itself. There is also the conflict 
between patriarchal oppression and the heroine’s love choice. Resonating 
with Shakespeare’s and Keats’s stories, St. Agnes faces coercion and threat, 
which compel her to forsake her true lover, though a spiritual one, and to love 
and marry another man she does not love. These three elements—the 
eroticisation of religious devotion, the pathological symptoms of erotic love, 
and the romance-like pattern of Agnes’s life and martyrdom—are all 
recapitulated in Keats’s poem, aptly explicating his choice of this particular 
saint as the central motif of “The Eve of St. Agnes.” 
     In Stanza 5, after showing the Beadsman’s futile asceticism, Keats 
introduces Madeline with an exhibition of material luxuries—“At length burst 
in the argent revelry, / With plume, tiara, and all rich array”—that epitomises 
the “triumphs gay / Of old romance” (5.37-41). He then excludes his heroine 
from this “old romance” by turning the reader away from the above 
pompousness: “There let us wish away, / And turn, sole-thoughted, to one 
Lady there” (5.42). In her first appearance, Madeline’s pensive image, 
“Whose heart had brooded, all that wintry day, / On love” (5.43-44), is a sharp 
contrast to the revelling bustle in the previous lines, indicating her spiritual 
love superior to the material and sensual pleasures of other people in the 
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hall. But this spiritual superiority over materiality and corporeality is merely a 
semblance that Keats will subvert in the later parts of the poem. Keats also 
invites the reader to consider “wing’d St. Agnes’ saintly care,” indicating St. 
Agnes’s role as the patron saint of various female identities: girls, virgins, 
betrothed women, and rape victims (Trüeb 98). By implying Agnes’s 
patronage of these female identities, Keats gives the character of Madeline a 
potential sense of ambiguity. Madeline is a girl and a virgin at this point, and 
she can be a betrothed woman to Porphyro, as scholars who hold idealist 
interpretations argue. She can also be a rape victim of Porphyro, a sceptical 
reading insisted by critics such as Stillinger. That is, prior to Porphyro’s 
actions, Keats already complicates Madeline’s identity with the hidden 
meanings of the figure of St. Agnes.  
In Stanza 6, Keats presents his version of the ritual of St. Agnes’s Eve: 
     As, supperless to bed they must retire, 
     And couch supine their beauties, lily white; 
     Nor look behind, nor sideways, but require 
     Of heaven with upward eyes for all that they desire. (6.51-54) 
Compared with Brand’s and Burton’s documents, Keats’s version retains the 
common element of fasting in both sources, excluding the “Groaning 
Cheese” under pillow in the former. In addition, Keats includes a specific 
practice that is unseen in both Brand’s and Burton’s documents: nakedness. 
Both fasting and nakedness are significant for Keats’s reconstruction of the 
ritual, as he retains the former and includes the latter. Burton discusses 
fasting in the part of “Religious Melancholy” in The Anatomy of Melancholy, 
rejecting the practice in pagan religions of “Turks, Chinese, Gentiles, 
Abyssinians, Greeks, Latins” (342). But he then argues that “Not that fasting 
is a thing to be discommended” and describes the advantages of fasting in 
the Christian context. In his own copy of the Anatomy, it is on the margin of 
this passage about fasting that Keats writes his one-word comment “good”— 
“for it is an excellent means to keep the body in subjection, a preparative to 
devotion, the physic of the soul, by which chaste thoughts are engendered, 
true zeal, a divine spirit, whence wholesome counsels do proceed, 
concupiscence is restrained, vicious and predominant lusts and humours are 
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expelled” (342).93 We cannot be certain about to what extent does Keats’s 
“good” signify his agreement with Burton’s discourse. Considering Keats’s 
general hostility to Christianity and affinity to Greco-Roman mythology, as 
postulated in the sonnet “Written in Disgust of Vulgar Superstition” discussed 
previously, I suggest that what Keats deems “good” is not Burton’s 
differentiation between pagan fasting and Christian fasting (as the line 
marking Keats’s “good” only includes the passage quoted above).94 For 
Keats, what is significant is Burton’s idea that the practice of fasting, the 
prohibition of one bodily desire, opens a door to another form of desire. For 
Burton, this latter form of desire is religious devotion, “chaste thoughts,” “true 
zeal,” and “divine spirit,” but for Keats, being “supperless” enables Madeline 
to “have visions of delight . . . Upon the honey’d middle of the night” (6.47-
49), to aspire to sexual fulfilment. In this sense, Keats is potentially 
equalising sacred experience with erotic experience. Also, Keats takes heed 
of Burton’s concept that fasting positions “the body in subjection,” as he 
recognises that both sacred and erotic experiences require the subject to 
relieve his/her individuality and subjectivity, forsaking the control of his/her 
own body. Keats’s design of Madeline’s nakedness also reflects this concept 
of “the body in subjection.” Being naked in St. Agnes’s ritual evokes Agnes’s 
famous humiliating punishment before her martyrdom. As Sherling’s 
hagiography records, Symbronius “commanded her to be stript of all her 
Cloths, and then to be led to be Naked to the common Bordelli, and there to 
be exposed to the lust of all comers” (85). This episode explains why St. 
                                                
93 The image of page 510 of Keats’s own copy of the Anatomy, which shows his one-word 
comment “good,” is reproduced in Janice Sinson’s John Keats and The Anatomy of 
Melancholy, p.1.  
94 In addition, in the dedication poem to Leigh Hunt “Glory and loveliness have passed 
away” of his 1817 collection, Keats again shows nostalgic sentiments for the classical “Glory 
and loveliness” of “crowd of nymphs” and “The shrine of Flora” (PJK 93). His preference for 
Greco-Roman mythology can also be reflected in several contemporary criticisms of his 
poetry. For example, as already referred to in the previous section, Lockhart’s 1818 article 
“On the Cockney School of Poetry” in Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine attacks Keats’s 
“profane and vulgarised” adaptation of Greek mythology (530). Also, it is reflected by 
Wordsworth’s famous remark: “a Very pretty piece of Paganism” (Roe 196). Moreover, as 
Anthony John Harding’s study shows, Keats might have followed the contemporary trend of 
interest in the ancient classical world and its religion, promoted by the new archaeological 
discoveries and “late-Enlightenment speculation about the origins of religious belief in the 
response of early human societies to the natural world” (137).   
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Agnes has become the patron saint of rape victims. Agnes’s humiliation of 
being naked and “exposed to the lust” of men prefigures Madeline’s naked 
subjection to Porphyro’s lustful gaze and reinforces the undertone of 
voyeurism and rape. Aware of his source materials, Keats draws the element 
of fasting from Brand and Burton, and includes the element of nakedness 
that is possibly extracted from Agnes’s own story recorded in Sherling’s 
document. By combining fasting and nakedness, Keats’s unique design of St. 
Agnes’s ritual delineates his idea of sacredness as an experience of 
annihilating individuality and forsaking the control of the body. For Keats, “the 
body in subjection” in St. Agnes’s ritual is the very condition of accessing the 
state of sacredness, corresponding to the phenomenon of “obscene” self-
annihilation in the Romantic erotic subject I have observed and discussed in 
Blake’s and Shelley’s works.  
     In the earlier version of the poem in Richard Woodhouse’s transcription, 
there is a deleted stanza between Stanza 6 and Stanza 7, in which Keats 
gives a further depiction of Madeline’s vision, which is “the sweetest of the 
year” (7.63). In the dream of the maiden who performs the ritual, her future 
husband not only appears, but also 
          Offering, as sacrifice—all in the dream— 
      Delicious food, even to her lips brought near, 
          Viands, and wine, and fruit, and sugar’d cream, 
          To touch her palate with the fine extreme 
          Of relish: then soft music heard, and then 
          More pleasures follow’d in a dizzy stream 
          Palpable almost: then to wake again 
        Warm in the virgin morn, no weeping Magdalen. (PJK 301) 
According to Stillinger’s study, Keats wrote the first draft of “The Eve of St. 
Agnes” in January 1819, and revised the poem and produced its fair copy in 
early September (“The Text of ‘The Eve of St. Agnes’” 208). This stanza was 
inserted between Stanza 6 and Stanza 7, which, along with other 
modifications, both Woodhouse and John Taylor strongly disagreed. As 
referred to in the beginning of this section, in his letter to Taylor written on 19 
September, Woodhouse mentioned that Keats “has made trifling alterations, 
inserted an additional stanza early in the poem to make the legend more 
intelligible . . . he retains the name of Porphyro—has altered the last 3 lines 
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to leave on the reader a sense of pettish disgust, by bringing Old Angela in 
(only) dead stiff & ugly” (LK 2.162-163). Woodhouse even felt that Keats took 
pleasure in his objections, “trying his hand at an attempt to play with his 
reader, & fling him off at last” (LK 2.163). Taylor responded to Woodhouse on 
25 September, agreeing the latter’s negative view of Keats’s revisions: “I 
cannot but confess to you that it excites in me the Strongest Sentiments of 
Disapprobation” (LK 2.183). In the final version published in the 1820 Lamia 
collection, Keats complied with Woodhouse’s and Taylor’s suggestions and 
removed the added stanza between Stanza 6 and Stanza 7. The sexual 
connotations in this deleted stanza render the poem “unfit for ladies” (LK 
2.163) and “unfit for publications” (LK 2.183), in both Woodhouse’s and 
Taylor’s words, thus resulting its deletion from the final version in the Lamia 
collection. Stillinger argues for the restoration of this deleted stanza, because 
it supports his sceptical reading of Madeline as a “hoodwinked” young 
woman in dream and a rape victim of Porphyro in reality. Keats’s additional 
lines, as he contends, “heighten the irony of Madeline’s self-deception and 
clarify Keats’s condemnation of ‘dreaming’” and “Madeline’s engrossment in 
superstitious ritual to the point of losing touch with reality” (“The Text” 211). I 
also propose a reconsideration of this discarded stanza, because it provides 
an example of Keats’s erotic appropriation of a Christian image, namely Mary 
Magdalene, and help us better understand his unique idea of religious 
sacredness, which entails the reincorporation of sexual desire. 
     In this stanza, the vision of Madeline features material and sensual 
enjoyments; it is a ritual of “sacrifice” but also a feast of “Delicious food . . . / 
Viands, and wine, and fruit, and sugar’d cream” and “soft music” (PJK 301). 
All these material luxuries are brought to Madeline in a highly erotic manner 
by the envisioned husband, who originally represents Jesus Christ as a 
spiritual lover in Agnes’s hagiography. Keats interweaves the spiritual with 
the corporeal, emphasising Madeline’s lips and palate, “with the fine extreme 
/ Of relish” and even suggests that “More pleasures follow’d in a dizzy stream 
/ Palpable almost” (301). Titillating Madeline’s senses of tasting and hearing, 
Keats invites the reader to imagine another sense that is “Palpable almost,” 
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the bodily sense of erotic touching that can bring forth “More pleasures” and 
make Madeline “wake again / Warm in the virgin morn, no weeping 
Magdalen” (301). The “no weeping Magdalen” in this dropped stanza rarely 
draws critical attention; it seems a strange reference unrelated to the plot, 
like the line in Stanza 19 that has Porphyro oddly parallel the wizard Merlin in 
the Arthurian tales. Nevertheless, the “no weeping Magdalen” in this deleted 
stanza can be interpreted from two perspectives: the cultural image of 
reformed prostitute and the biblical figure of Jesus’s follower. 
     Mary Magdalene has been traditionally conflated with Mary of Bethany 
and the unnamed sinful woman in the Gospel of Luke since the Middle Age, 
a widespread but inaccurate identification that, as the Oxford English 
Dictionary suggests, leads to the later usage of the noun “Magdalene” to 
mean a prostitute or a reformed prostitute (“Magdalene, n1”). This is also 
reflected by the naming of the famous asylum for fallen women founded in 
London in 1758 as the “Magdalen Hospital,” which is “a charitable foundation 
established to provide a reformative refuge for distressed women who were 
either prostitutes or who had no recourse except prostitution” (Ellis and Lewis 
11-12). As many historians have noted, there is a significant change of the 
cultural image of prostitutes in the eighteenth century. Before mid-eighteenth 
century, prostitutes were the embodiment of insatiable sexual desire of 
women, who actively sought customers for excessive pleasure. As Sophie 
Carter points out, “the archetypal prostitute was as greedy, opportunistic and 
utterly devoid of moral conscience as she was guileful and alluring” and 
“represented an incontrovertible transgression not only of the moral code but, 
more specifically, of the very order of femininity itself” (21). However, towards 
the end of the eighteenth century, prostitutes began to be viewed in the 
context of labour and marketplace. Instead of the siren-like image of 
lustfulness, they were seen as workers and represented “the disturbing 
intersection of the economic and the personal” (Rosenthal 4), thus 
generating the cultural sympathy for the women who were “faced with a 
choice between remunerated sexual activity and abject poverty” (7). The 
establishment of the Magdalen Hospital certainly reflected this new image of 
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prostitutes. As Mary Peace observes, the institute shaped the social view that 
“[f]rom vilified agent of moral and social contamination, the prostitute had 
become a virtuous and recuperable victim of circumstance” (141). Read from 
the above perspective, Keats’s adoption of the phrase “no weeping 
Magdalen” and the parallel between this image and Madeline seem to 
suggest that the castle where Madeline resides is the very “circumstance” 
that will force her into sexual activities against her will, the similar distress St. 
Agnes had undergone. That the “Baron” who rules the castle might marry 
Madeline to one of his “warrior-guests” as a commodity in exchange for 
political or financial gains echoes the plan of Isabella’s brothers to “coax her 
by degrees / To some high noble and his olive-trees” (21.167-168). Only 
through the ritual of St. Agnes, in which “her future lord would there appear,” 
can Madeline be liberated from the marketplace of political marriage, which is 
analogous to the loveless sex in prostitution, and become “no weeping 
Magdalen,” reformed and recuperated by her union with Porphyro. To some 
extent, this interpretation based on the cultural image of reformed prostitute 
conforms to the idealist readings led by Wasserman. Apart from this 
interpretation, I will then analyse the “no weeping Magdalen” from the second 
perspective: the biblical figure of Mary Magdalene as Jesus’s follower. This 
reading sheds light on how Keats subtly synthesises sexual experience and 
sacredness by eroticising Christian figures.         
     Mary Magdalene appears in several episodes of the New Testament, 
including Jesus’s exorcism on her to expel the seven demons, her presence 
at the crucifixion and Jesus’s empty tomb, and her witness of the 
resurrection. The “weeping Magdalen” appears in the Gospel of John, when 
she and other disciples cannot find Jesus’s body in the tomb: “But Mary 
stood without at the sepulchre weeping” (20: 11).95 And when asked by the 
two angels about the reason for her weeping, Mary replies: “Because they 
have taken away my LORD, and I know not where they have laid him” (20: 
15). Mary Magdalene is weeping because she loses sight of the corporeal 
                                                
95 All the biblical quotations are from The Bible: Authorized King James Version with 
Apocrypha edited by Robert Carroll and Stephen Prickett.   
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existence of Jesus, and also because at that moment she is ignorant of the 
spiritual return of her Lord: “For as yet they knew not the scripture, that he 
must rise again from the dead” (20: 9). In Madeline’s case, after her dream of 
St. Agnes’s Eve, which is imbued with bodily pleasures, Madeline is no 
longer a “weeping Magdalen” because she has already embraced the 
corporeal existence of her envisioned husband, based on Agnes’s lover as 
Jesus Christ, within a spiritual sphere of religious vision. In the Gospel of 
John, Mary Magdalen ceases weeping after she witnesses Jesus’s 
resurrection, another crucial image of ascent in Frye’s formulation: “I ascend 
unto my Father, and your Father; and to my God, and your God” (20: 17). In 
this deleted stanza of “The Eve of St. Agnes,” Madeline is “no weeping 
Magdalen” after the sexual interaction with her future love, a Jesus-figure 
who gratifies her with material and bodily pleasures, thus integrating the 
concept of resurrection and sexual love. In Words with Power, Frye 
examines the male-female imagery in the New Testament, noting that “the 
imagery of bridegroom and bride” is associated with “the second coming and 
the Apocalypse” (203). The conjugal union, which is termed agape and 
presented with highly erotic poetics in The Song of Songs, is sublimated and 
elevated to Jesus’s love for human beings and the Church in the New 
Testament. Such a phenomenon, as Frye further postulates, indicates “a 
spectrum extending from complete sublimation, where all sexual imagery 
‘means’ or points away from sex to religious experience, to a more directly 
erotic form where sexual experience is the central focus” (205). Paralleling 
Madeline with Mary Magdalene in the sensual vision of the hour of St. Agnes, 
who has Jesus as her spiritual lover, Keats subtly reverses the process of 
sublimation in Frye’s formulation by restoring Jesus’s role as a bridegroom to 
the sexual end of the spectrum. That is, with the reference to Mary 
Magdalene in this vision of somatic and material pleasures, Keats erotises 
the Christian concepts of resurrection and the second coming, pointing to a 
state of divine intimacy, which is accessed via sexual fulfilment brought forth 
by Jesus Christ not only as a spiritual leader, but also as a sexual lover. The 
true essence of religious rituals, even in the Christian context, is not about 
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temperance or asceticism, but is about violent consumption of material and 
bodily desires. Keats’s design of “no weeping Magdalen” activates the 
reader’s imagination of Jesus as a sexual being, thus uniting the religious 
and the erotic. Revisiting this deleted stanza, we see that it not only supports 
Stillinger’s sceptical reading. More crucially, it exemplifies Keats’s unique 
construal of religious sacredness, a heterogeneous phenomenon of eroticism 
and poetic imagination that sexually revises and eroticises Christian images 
and motifs.   
     Harbouring this belief in St. Agnes’s ritual for sexual fulfilment, Madeline 
is “Full of whim” and “thoughtful” (7.55). Keats’s deliberate oxymoronic 
juxtaposition of “whim” and “thoughtful” blurs the boundary between fantasy 
and reason, generating a sense of ambiguity in both erotic and religious 
experiences. In Stanza 7, Keats re-presents a picture of St. Agnes’s story, by 
portraying Madeline’s disregard of “many a sweeping train” and “many a 
tiptoe, amorous cavalier” (7.58, 60) that echoes Agnes’s rejection of 
Symbronius’s son. Madeline’s apparent detachment from earthly sounds and 
colours is infused with a trancelike and sleepwalking air. As she wonders 
through other guests, she “scarcely heard,” “heeded not at all, “saw not,” and 
“her heart was otherwhere” (7.57-62). From Stanza 7 to Stanza 8, Madeline 
constantly “sigh’d” and “sighs,” and Keats’s shift from past tense to present 
tense not only serves the rhyme scheme, but also suggests her state of 
mind, whose approximation to “The hallow’d hour”—erotic and sacred 
experiences—renders her unaware of the confinements of time and space. 
When this “hallow’d hour was near at hand,” Madeline sighs, “Anxious her 
lips, her breathing quick and short” (8.65-66). The proximity between the 
erotic undertone of her bodily reactions and her awareness of the hallowed 
hour’s coming corresponds to Madeline being full of “whim” and “thoughtful” 
at the same time, and again stresses Keastian sacredness of eroticism.  
     The line “Hoodwink’d with faery fancy” in Stanza 8 has become well-
known in Keats studies after Stillinger takes the word “Hoodwink” into the title 
of his famous essay “The Hoodwinking of Madeline: Scepticism in ‘The Eve 
of St. Agnes’” in 1961. Stillinger equalises “hoodwinking” with deception and 
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connects it to Porphyro’s “stratagem” in Stanza 16, an opportunistic “ruse, an 
artifice, a trick for deceiving” that enables him to commit his “peeping 
Tomism” and rape of Madeline: “she is a maiden innocent and pure, but also 
is about to lose that status through what is in some ways a cruel deception” 
(“The Hoodwinking” 541). Stillinger’s sceptical analysis diversifies the critical 
readings of the poem, which are predominantly idealistic and positive about 
Porphyro’s actions in earlier studies. However, apart from indicating 
Madeline’s deception by Porphyro, Keats’s usage of “Hoodwink’d” also 
contributes to his construction of sacredness. Instead of extending the 
meaning of “hoodwinking” to deception, I would stress the word’s more basic 
and literary explanation: the suspension of sight or the prevention from 
seeing. David Wiener also grasps this aspect of “Hoodwink’d,” pointing out 
that Madeline is “blinded like a hooded falcon as she is blinded from both joy 
and pain, and incapable of either movement or fulfilment” (124). Wiener’s 
interpretation paves the way for his major argument that “Madeline’s world is 
a paradise freed from mortal taint that does not go anywhere, that ultimately 
negates the very joys it seeks to enshrine” and “Porphyro makes possible 
Madeline’s fortunate fall” by taking her into a more enlightened world of 
reality (126). Wiener’s reading of the poem as a variation of felix culpa, 
however, contradicts the fact that Madeline’s world is definitely not a 
“paradise freed from mortal taint,” but a bustling earthly castle peopled by 
“whisperers in anger, or in sport; / ’Mid looks of love, defiance, hate, and 
scorn” (8.68-69). Madeline is born in this very house and lives with, from 
Porphyro’s point of view, “barbarian hordes” and “hot-blooded lords” (10.85-
86). She is perhaps not as sophisticated and malignant as proposed by Mary 
Arseneau, who considers her a “female demon and enchantress” (231), but 
she is neither an entirely naïve girl inhabiting in a Garden of Eden, knowing 
nothing about the outside world.  
     The “hoodwinking” of Madeline, therefore, means more than her 
blindness to “mortal taints” and the prefiguration of Porphyro’s deceptive 
“stratagem,” as Wiener and Stillinger maintain. The “hoodwinking,” as I have 
argued above, signifies the suspension of sight or the prevention from 
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seeing. It shares the same nature of fasting and nakedness in St. Agnes’s 
ritual that Madeline is ready to perform. Fasting suspends the subject’s sense 
of taste and desire of eating, and, as in Burton’s words well-recognised by 
Keats, puts “the body in subjection,” thus opening the door to the sacred/the 
erotic. Madeline’s “hoodwinking” suspends her sense of seeing, which is an 
active projection of sexual desire, as Lorenzo’s “reading” of Isabella’s silence 
in their sexual union and in Porphyro’s voyeuristic gaze of Madeline’s naked 
body in later stanzas. Andrew Bennett also correctly observes that “looking in 
‘St. Agnes’ is represented potentially violent: sight constitutes power—the 
power of seeing and of not being seeing” (99). In other words, “Hoodwinking” 
resembles her fasting and nakedness in St. Agnes’s ritual, in which she will 
relieve her control of her body, forsaking her individuality and subjectivity. In 
the ritual, she seeks this state of passivity, because it requires self-
annihilation to enter the sphere of sacredness and eroticism. Her passivity of 
“not seeing” and “being seen,” however, will constitute another form of power 
that absorbs Porphyro in the ritual, as the poem proceeds. In short, apart 
from indicating Porphyro’s victimisation of the “innocent” Madeline, the 
phrase “Hoodwink’d with faery fancy” corresponds directly to St. Agnes’s 
ritual, reinforcing the idea of Keatsian sacredness. 
     In Stanza 9, Keats introduces Porphyro, who, “with heart on fire / For 
Madeline” (9.75-76), sneaks into the castle, where once he is spotted, “a 
hundred swords / Will storm his heart, Love’s fev’rous citadel” (10.83-84). 
Porphyro’s role has been a centre of critical debates in the studies of “The 
Eve of St. Agnes.” He is interpreted as a typical romantic lover by 
Wasserman, a messenger of the new secularised religion of beauty by 
Ronald Sharp, a lustful, cruel, deceitful, and opportunistic rapist by Stillinger, 
a liberating saviour for Madeline by Wiener, a sly but charismatic hero of 
Gothic tradition by Jerrold Hogle, and even a powerful sorcerer by Karen J. 
Harvey. And more recently, Susan Wolfsan regards him as “a new kind of 
Keatsian hero . . . an artful adventurer . . . hoping to ‘gaze and worship’ 
unseen—or if things go well, ‘Perchance speak, kneel, touch, kiss,’ all 
chastely” (75). In addition to these possibilities, on a symbolic level, Porphyro 
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can also be seen as an executor of sacrifice, in which Madeline has offered 
her naked body in subjection for the advent of her lover, who serves to 
complete the ritual of St. Agnes. In Keats, Hermeticism, and the Secret 
Societies, Jennifer N. Wunder highlights Keats’s keen interest in 
contemporary secret societies such as Rosicrucianism and Freemasonry and 
their initiation rituals. She points out that for Keats, religious rituals signify a 
paradoxical route, through which human beings can “attain a higher state or 
merge with the sublime” by “using ‘Things real’ that constitute the base 
matter of life” (132). In “The Eve of St. Agnes,” the ritual initiated by Madeline 
to aspire for love, to “require / Of heaven with upward eyes” (6.54), has to be 
completed by Porphyro’s body, the “the base matter of life,” the “Things real,” 
which, as Keats writes in his letter to Benjamin Bailey in March 1818, 
constitute “the ardour of the pursuer,” the “Ethereal thing” (KL 1.242). His 
actions upon Madeline, a sacrificial body in total subjection and passivity, will 
make her “no weeping Magdalen” by reuniting the spiritual and the 
corporeal—the eroticisation of the Christian ideas of resurrection and the 
second coming. Accordingly, Porphyro is a potential Jesus Christ stemming 
from Agnes’s story and the Magdalene reference in the discarded stanza. His 
sexual participation in Madeline’s ritual embodies the spiritual love, thus 
exemplifying Keastian sacredness, in which religious devotion and eroticism 
are united. 
     After secretly entering the hostile castle, Porphyro meets Angela, “one 
old beldame, weak in body and in soul” (10.90). The figure of Angela shares 
certain propensities with the Beadsman. Both are deprived of sexual vitality 
and outworn by religious asceticism, pettish morality, and timid prudence. 
She is “the aged creature . . . / Shuffling along with ivory-headed wand” 
(11.91-92), an ostensible contrast to the youthful and energetic Porphyro, as 
well as a potential opposite to the eroticised Christianity represented by St. 
Agnes’s ritual. Upon Porphyro’s enquiry about Madeline, Angela reveals to 
him her intention to perform the ritual of St. Agnes’s Eve: “my lady fair the 
conjuror plays / This very night: good angels her deceive! / But let me laugh 
awhile, I’ve mickle time to grieve” (14.124-126). Keats seems to chastise 
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Madeline’s belief in Agnes’s Eve as sheer superstition through Angela’s 
remarks in these lines. Certainly, we know Keats himself mentions that this 
poem is based “on a popular superstition” in his letter to Bailey (LK 2.139). 
But how much reliability Keats gives to such a character of inconsistent 
morality, whose negativity is certified by a grotesque death in the final stanza, 
is subject to suspicion. Her superficial loyalty to Madeline is marred by her ill 
sense of humour in deriding her hostess’s action: “Feebly she laugheth in the 
languid moon” (15.127), which the reader sees through Porphyro’s point of 
view: “While Porphyro upon her face doth look, / Like puzzled urchin on an 
aged crone” (15.128-129). What Keats conveys through Angela’s view that 
Madeline is deceived by “good angels” has two layers of meaning. First, 
people who commit themselves to orthodox Christianity and religious 
asceticism such as the Beadsman and Angela cannot understand the 
essence of St. Agnes’s ritual, which lies in the synthesis of sacredness and 
eroticism. Second, with Angela’s words, Keats reminds us of the importance 
of Porphyro’s involvement in the ritual; without corporeal actualisation, 
Madeline’s spiritual efforts can only be a self-deception, a futile dream 
doomed to end in a ceaseless whirlpool of ungratified desire, as the one 
tormenting the Beadsman in the beginning stanzas.  
     Porphyro then comes up with a “stratagem,” to which Angela responds 
with an agitated refusal: 
          A cruel man and impious thou art: 
          Sweet lady, let her pray, and sleep, and dream 
          Alone with her good angels, far apart 
          From wicked men like thee. Go, go!—I deem 
          Thou canst not surely be the same that thou didst seem.  
                                                (16.140-144) 
Angela has just said that Madeline is deceived by “good angels” to play “the 
conjuror” in St. Agnes’s ritual. But now she wishes Madeline to stay with the 
deceptive “good angels” and “pray, and sleep, and dream.” After Porphyro 
threatens her with self-destruction by exposing himself to his foes, Angela 
immediately submits and “will do / Whatever he shall wish, betide her weal or 
woe” (18.161-162), becoming an accomplice of what she accuses Porphyro 
of previously: cruelness, impiety, and wickedness. Stillinger is thus correct in 
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observing Angela as a “traitor” to Madeline (“The Hoodwinking of Madeline” 
546). The portrayal of Angela highlights the malicious effects of orthodox 
Christianity on human beings. Physically and mentally weakened, Angela is 
reduced to “a feeble soul” and “A poor, weak, palsy-stricken, churchyard 
thing” (18.154-155). She is restrained by moralised religious doctrines, yet 
her conviction to them is superficial and pretentious, highly susceptible to 
outer circumstances. The base character of Angela corresponds to the 
Beadsman in the first four stanzas; with both figures, Keats exposes the 
malignant consequences of combining religion and morality—how the 
Beadsman futilely alienates himself from material and sensual enjoyments 
and how Angela belies her feeble mentality and moral inconsistency by 
betraying her “Sweet lady” to a man whom she calls cruel, impious and 
wicked. The form of Christian religion represented by the Beadsman and 
Angela is the one deprived of the life-affirming energy of eroticism, thus 
causing its believers’ physical decadence and mental enslavement. On the 
contrary, what Madeline seeks to achieve through the Christian motif of St. 
Agnes’s ritual is a re-affirmation and re-inclusion of sexual desire in the 
experience of sacredness. Ironically, the final sexual embodiment of the ritual 
provided by Porphyro is accomplished through Angela’s weak-minded and 
inconsistent Christian morality. 
     Porphyro’s “stratagem” as Stanza 19 reveals, is  
          . . . to lead him, in close secrecy, 
          Even to Madeline’s chamber, and there hide 
          Him in a closet, of such privacy 
          That he might see her beauty unespied, 
          And win perhaps that night a peerless bride, 
          While legion’d fairies pac’d the coverlet, 
          And pale enchantment held her sleepy-eyed. 
          Never on such a night have lovers met, 
        Since Merlin paid his Demon all the monstrous debt. (19.163-171) 
This stanza presents the theme of voyeurism, or what Stillinger calls 
“peeping Tomism” (“The Hoodwinking of Madeline” 540), and foreshadows 
the final consummation. Keats prefigures the sexual relation and positions 
between Madeline and Porphyro in this stanza. At first look, in both actions of 
“see her beauty unespied” and “win perhaps that night a peerless bride,” 
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Porphyro is the active doer while Madeline is the passive receptor. This 
power relationship seems to conform to Stillinger’s argument that Porphyro is 
a rapist and Madeline is an unconscious and cheated victim. Also, it is a 
religious ritual of “sacrifice,” as Keats himself suggests in the deleted stanza 
between Stanza 6 and Stanza 7. In other words, Porphyro as a sexual lover 
stands as the performer of this ritual with Madeline, who offers her naked 
body in fasting, the “body in subjection” if put in Burton’s words, as the 
sacrificial object in exchange of her lover’s arrival. Hence, Madeline’s role 
appears to be passively awaiting Porphyro’s sexual advance of potential 
violence. The motif of ritualistic sacrifice in Christianity represents a violent 
way to be attached to God, to the sacred experience of divine intimacy, 
through killing, especially in the Old Testament. Abel’s sacrifice of “the 
firstlings of his flock” (Gen. 4: 4) earns him God’s favour, which is 
reinterpreted by Lord Byron in his Cain: A Mystery as “The fumes of 
scorching flesh and smoking blood” (3.1.299). Abraham wins God’s blessing 
by being willing to slay his own son Isaac in sacrifice (Gen 22: 17). Keats is 
probably aware of the concept of ritualistic sacrifice in biblical tradition and its 
potential violence as he weaves latent elements of violence into the ritual of 
St. Agnes’s Eve: the “tongueless nightingale” that “should swell / Her throat in 
vain, and die” (23.206-207) that alludes to Philomel’s rape and mutilation by 
Tereus, and “A shielded scutcheon blush’d with blood of queens and kings” 
(24.216). In the context of Keatsian sacredness, the ritualistic sacrifice of 
Madeline aims no to gain God’s favour or blessing, but to enable a holistic 
experience of the sacred and the erotic through sexual embodiment. Keats 
seemingly presents this embodiment as actively performed by Porphyro upon 
the passive Madeline, who has already forsaken the control of her body. In 
fact, however, he diminishes and even annihilates this dichotomy between 
male/doer and female/receptor. By doing so, Keats demonstrates that in St. 
Agnes’s ritual, there is no difference between the performer of the sacrifice 
and the sacrificial object; both parties precipitate into a violent state of 
sacredness and eroticism, in which the boundary of subject and object, self 
and other, is transgressed. Despite his appearance as an active “gazing” and 
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“winning” performer, Porphyro also puts his body and soul in subjection and 
passivity as Madeline does in the ritual of St. Agnes’s Eve.  
     In the last line of Stanza 19, Keats foreshadows the dissolution of such 
dichotomy between activeness and passivity by juxtaposing Porphyro with 
the wizard Merlin in the Arthurian tales, who “paid his Demon all the 
monstrous debt” (19.171). Cox notes that this reference is puzzling for critics, 
as Leigh Hunt confesses that he does not understand Merlin’s function here 
(KPP 450). In his The Daemonic in the Poetry of John Keats, Charles 
Patterson argues that in “The Eve of St. Agnes,” Keats creates “a sustained 
daemonic atmosphere that adds subtly to the charm of the principals shut 
way from the world” (111), and the reference to Merlin simply serves as one 
of the magical elements to enhance the daemonic atmosphere. Karen J. 
Harvey offers another reading of Keats’s juxtaposition of Porphyro and 
Merlin, which supports my argument of Porphyro’s subjection and passivity in 
St. Agnes’s ritual. Evoking the details of Merlin’s story in documents such as 
Geoffrey of Monmouth’s The History of the Kings of Britain and Thomas 
Malory’s Morte D’Arthur, Harvey proposes that the “Demon” refers to Vivien, 
the Lady of the Lake. She argues that Keats deliberately compares Porphyro 
to Merlin, because both of them woo their lovers “by magic means and is, in 
turn, entrapped by his own magic” (90). Keats’s alignment between Porphyro 
and Merlin prefigures the former’s position in Madeline’s ritual, where, 
despite his apparent sexual initiative and aggressiveness, Porphyro is also 
subject to the self-annihilating Keastian sacredness as Madeline.  
     Keats presents their final encounter in Stanza 23, after Porphyro “gain / 
The maiden’s chamber, silken, hush’d, and chaste; / Where Porphyro took 
covert, pleas’d amain” (21.186-188) and Madeline “clos’d the door, she 
panted, all akin / To spirits of the air, and visions wide” (23.201-202). In this 
most crucial scene that goes across from Stanza 23 to Stanza 39, Keats 
gives both Porphyro and Madeline various and often conflicting propensities 
to construct the heterogeneous experience of Keatsian sacredness. With her 
body already subject to fasting, Madeline initiates the ritual of St. Agnes by 
another self-deprivation of an active potency, speaking: “No uttered syllable, 
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or, woe betide!” (23.203). She is like “a tongueless nightingale” who “should 
swell / Her throat in vain, and die” (23.206-207), an image that alludes to 
Philomel, the rape victim of King Tereus of Thrace in Greek mythology, as 
also noted by Cox and other critics (KPP 451). Philomel’s tongue is cut by 
her violator to prevent her from disclosing the crime96. The reference to 
Philomel accordingly becomes one of the textual evidences for sceptical 
readings that dismiss Porphyro as a cruel and deceitful rapist. From another 
perspective, Wolfson detects in this passage “those anti-Catholic discourses 
of virgin hysteria, which manifests in dream, vision, and suppressed speech” 
(Reading John Keats 75). But Keats complicates the seemingly unilateral 
images with opposite elements. In her silence, Madeline’s “heart was voluble, 
/ Paining with eloquence her balmy side” (23.204-205). In other words, her 
muteness reinforces her body’s power of charm; when verbal words are 
suspended, her somatic performance possesses even higher potency of 
erotic expression. After Stanza 24, which has this ritualistic place filled with 
material luxuries,97 Keats presents Madeline in a picture of Christian purity, 
as “down she knelt for heaven’s grace and boon” (25.219) and  
          . . . on her silver cross soft amethyst, 
          And on her hair a glory, like a saint: 
          She seem’d a splendid angel, newly drest, 
          Save wings, for heaven:—Porphyro grew faint: 
        She knelt, so pure a thing, so free from mortal taint. (25.221-225) 
Gazing Madeline in this sacred phenomenon, where the material, the 
corporeal, and the spiritual are synthesised, Porphyro “grew faint,” even as 
he is actively executing the projection of his desire with an erotic gaze. His 
self-control and subjectivity is corroded in this process of seeing Madeline, 
who is originally a typical image of the Burkean beautiful and is now 
                                                
96 Though tongueless, Philomela weaves a tapestry to reveal the crime to Procne, as 
narrated in Ovid’s Metamorphorses. A similar and perhaps more gruesome characterisation 
can be found in Shakespeare’s early tragedy Titus Andronicus, in which Lavinia’s tongue and 
both hands are severed by Demetrius and Chiron after they rape her. She later reveals the 
atrocity by writing their names in the dirt with a stick held in her mouth.  
97 Analysing the problematic “seeing” of Porphyro and the reader, Bennett argues that 
Stanza 24 presents a “rich, textured and lexically profuse form” that paradoxically detaches 
the reader from verisimilitude: “The gorgeousness of description not only enhances the 
reader’s pleasure but also estranges him or her from an unmediated experience of the 
visual: the very virtuosity makes us wary, its very profusion alienates” (106-107). 
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endowed by Keats with the absorbing power of the sublime.98 In Stanza 26, 
when Madeline begins to undress herself, Keats writes:  
          Of all its wreathed pearls her hair she frees; 
          Unclasps her warmed jewels one by one; 
          Loosens her fragrant boddice; by degrees 
          Her rich attire creeps rustling to her knees: 
          Half-hidden, like a mermaid in sea-weed, 
          Pensive awhile she dreams awake, and sees, 
          In fancy, fair St. Agnes in her bed (26.227-233). 
Considering Keats’s rhetoric strategy in this stanza, Bennett perceives “an 
opaque screen, a teasing veil over the spectacle of Madeline’s body” (108). 
In line with Bennett, I also recognise Keats’s deliberate indirectness. In this 
stanza that displays Madeline’s nakedness, one of the significant elements of 
the ritual, Keats does not describe her body directly, but employs other 
objects to incite erotic imagination. The jewels are “warmed” because they 
are attached to Madeline’s “fragrant boddice” and her “rich attire creeps 
rustling to her knees,” which offers a somatosensory pleasure as if Porphyro 
is really caressing her skin. Such indirect bodily intimacy strengthens 
Madeline’s silent power of erotic enchantment. In line 231, Keats gives 
Madeline another heterogeneous characterisation in this scene—“a mermaid 
in sea-weed.” With this drastic shift from a purely Christian portrayal to a 
simile of magical creature of pagan legends or folklore, Keats further 
complicates and covertly endows Madeline with more power in terms of her 
relationship with Porphyro. Arseneau notes that Keats’s “combination of 
attractiveness with disturbing power is a recurrent pattern in the depiction of 
the feminine in Keats’s poetry” (239), and reads Madeline/mermaid as one of 
the examples of this “disturbing power.” The image of mermaid, as Arseneau 
contends, works with Keats’s later reference to Medusa in Stanza 33, and is 
                                                
98 In Enquiry, Burke defines the beautiful as “that quality or those qualities in bodies by 
which they cause love, or some passion similar to it” (91) and elucidates the idea by 
analysing the female body, especially neck and breasts, parts that are iconic of femininity 
(107-109). As Burke puts it: “we submit to what we admire [the sublime], we love what 
submit to us [the beautiful]” (113), one of the most essential elements of the Burkean 
beautiful is the subject’s passive and dominated status, contrary to the sublime that evokes 
fear and awe, to which the spectators “shrink into the minuteness of our own nature, and 
are, in a manner, annihilated” (68). Madeline, in her apparent subjugated posture of the 
Burkean beautiful, in fact possesses the power of the sublime to ensnare Porphyro and 
annihilate his identity as an active doer in their sexual interaction. 
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deliberately associated with the Christian images of “saint” and “splendid 
angel” in Stanza 25 to enthral Porphyro, to “erase his physical strength and 
his consciousness” (235). I agree to Arseneau’s interpretation of the 
“mermaid in sea-weed” in this stanza as a siren-like, “standard type of female 
demon” (236). Therefore, the mermaid simile blurs the power relationship 
between Porphyro and Madeline, which is often assumed that the former 
dominates the latter. Although Madeline is in a passive position of a sacrificial 
object in the ritual, unconscious, naked, and subject to Porphyro’s gaze, her 
erotic potency is empowered by such passivity to undermine and absorb the 
physicality and mentality of Porphyro, the active “gazer” who seems to hold 
the initiative in this voyeuristic scene.                
     Undressed, Madeline falls into sleep: “In sort of wakeful swoon, 
perplex’d she lay, / Until the poppied warmth of sleep oppress’d / Her 
soothed limbs, and soul fatigued away” (27.236-238). Keats interweaves 
Christian and pagan images with the lines “Clasp’d like a missal where swart 
Paynims pray; / Blinded alike from sunshine and from rain, / As though a rose 
should shut, and be a bud again” (27.241-243). Keats obfuscates the 
distinction between Christianity and paganism by aligning “missal” with 
“Paynims,” suggesting that the entrance into essential sacredness does not 
require identification to any particular religious sects. Once human beings 
can position themselves in subjection, relieving the control of their bodies 
and forsaking individuality and subjectivity, their perception is no longer 
restrained by external circumstances (“Blinded alike from sunshine and rain”) 
and they can even transcend and reverse the sequence of time (“a rose 
should shut, and be a bud again”).  
     Gazing at the naked and sleeping Madeline, Porphyro’s subjectivity is 
continually undermined by her power of passivity and is absorbed into the 
ritualistic phenomenon, as he is “Stol’n to this paradise, and so entranced” 
(28.244). The passive “Stol’n” instead of the active “Stealing” insinuates that 
though Porphyro plays a romantic hero venturing into his lover’s chamber, he 
is potential the one who is “stolen” and “ventured” upon in this bower of erotic 
sacredness. After Porphyro “crept” out from his hiding place and attempts to 
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awake Madeline, Porphyro’s subjugated status is more explicit in Stanza 32: 
“It seem’d he never, never could redeem / From such a stedfast spell his 
lady’s eyes; / So mus’d awhile, entoil’d in woofed phantasies” (32.286-288). 
The words “spell,” “mus’d,” and “entoil’d” all conform to Keats’s previous 
juxtaposition between Porphyro’s “stratagem” and Merlin’s “monstrous debt.” 
As Bennett notes, Porphyro’s desire to visually gaze at Madeline “involves 
bewilderment, astonishment, curiosity: the control and power Porphyro’s 
seeing gives him threaten to be disrupted by this fixed gaze” (100). Keats’s 
design here once again implies that Porphyro’s amorous adventure leads him 
into the enthrallment and imprisonment by female charms.  
     Stanza 33 is another crucial stanza with Keats’s subtle designs of 
Porphyro’s complicated condition:  
          Awakening up, he took her hollow lute,—  
          Tumultuous,—and, in chords that tenderest be,  
          He play’d an ancient ditty, long since mute, 
          In Provence call’d, “La belle dame sans mercy”: 
          Close to her ear touching the melody;— 
          Wherewith disturb’d, she utter’d a soft moan: 
          He ceased—she panted quick—and suddenly 
          Her blue affrayed eyes wide open shone; 
        Upon his knees he sank, pale as smooth-sculptured stone.  
                                                (33.289-297) 
In this stanza, critics have already paid attention to Porphyro’s song “La belle 
dame sans mercy,” which would become the title of another Keats’s famous 
poem months later in April 1819. Daniela Garofalo holds that Porphyro sings 
the song to “play the lover seducing the beloved with . . . a song she does 
not conspicuously appear to hear” (363). Harvey notes that the song 
“suggests strongly the subsequent image Keats will create of the enchanted 
knight ‘alone and palely loitering’ in a later ballad” (91). Countering Stillinger’s 
sceptical and Wasserman’s idealist readings, Heidi Thomson argues that the 
song serves to present a “story of a mutual seduction gone right” and 
“reassesses the relationship between Madeline and Porphyro as one of 
mutual consent as opposed to either rape or a (non-sexual) idealized dream 
illusion” (338-339). With whatever conclusions, critics all assume that “La 
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belle dame sans mercy” is sung by Porphyro to awaken Madeline.99 To offer 
a different interpretation, I would highlight Keats’s careful syntactical structure 
of the first line of this stanza. The fragment “Awakening up” seems to denote 
that Porphyro is waking up Madeline by taking her lute and singing the song, 
but the object of the verb phrase “awakening up,” which should be Madeline, 
is missing. Its absence is not a result of Keats’s recklessness or metrical 
purpose. It is a subtle device to tell readers about Porphyro’s status in the 
ritual. That is, for Porphyro, singing “La belle dame sans mercy” is not a 
means to “awaken” Madeline, but a manifestation of his own self-awakening. 
Singing “La belle dame sans mercy,” which prefigures a knight enthralled by 
a Circe-like femme fatale, “Alone and palely loitering” (1.2 PJK 357), 
insinuates that Porphyro is no longer in control of himself after entering the 
ritual. He is waking from an illusion that he, an active male “gazer” and 
“doer,” holds initiative and a superior position over an apparently receptive 
and passive female body in erotic experience. Porphyro’s chanting of the 
collapse of masculinity while confronting the absorbing power of the feminine 
emphasises the necessity of self-annihilation in sacred/erotic experience 
even for man, who appear to play an aggressive and dominant role in the 
Romantic tradition. Moreover, this “awakening” is ascertained in the last two 
lines of this stanza. Seeing Madeline’s “blue affrayed eyes wide open shone,” 
Porphyro falls on his knees, “pale as smooth-sculptured stone” (33.296-297). 
As Arseneau remarks, the hidden reference to Medusa in this line 
demonstrates “the dissipation in a female presence of the male’s identity and 
autonomy” (233).100 After his “awakening up,” Porphyro is now petrified and 
                                                
99 Mark Sandy also provides a different view, arguing that the song reduces Prophyro “to an 
immovable and silent form, intimating that he and Madeline will be absorbed into a tradition 
of courtly legend” (Poetics of Self and Form 57). 
100 It also reminds us of Keats’s employments of the image of Medusa in the omitted phrase 
“foul Medusa’s head” in “Isabella” (50.394, PJK 259) and the discarded stanza of “Ode on 
Melancholy”—“Your cordage large uprootings from the skull / Of bald Medusa” (PJK 374). 
Both instances categorise the image of Medusa as a representation of death. In “Isabella,” 
the “foul Medusa’s head” aggravates the horror of Lorenzo’s corpse. In “Ode on Melancholy,” 
Medusa is juxtaposed with “dead men’s bones,” “phantom gibbet,” and the poisonous plants 
and insects in Stanza 1, suggesting that true Melancholy cannot be found in the realm of 
death, as Barbara Herrnstein Smith notes (684). The covert reference to Medusa in “The 
Eve of St. Agnes,” if read in light of the above discussion, indicates that the erotic interaction 
between Porphyro and Madeline is an experience that approximates to death. 
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renounces his command of body and soul in the erotic sphere of Keatsian 
sacredness.  
     The final embodiment of Madeline’s dream of St. Agnes’s Eve takes 
place in Stanza 36, after Madeline’s awakening in Stanza 34 and 35. The 
“painful change” from the dreamt Porphyro to the real Porphyro “expell’d / 
The blisses of her dream so pure and deep” and makes her “moan forth 
witless words with many a sigh” (34.300-303). The dreamt Porphyro’s voice 
“was at sweet tremble in mine ear, / Made tuneable with every sweetest vow” 
(35.308-309), but the real Porphyro is “pallid, chill, and drear” (35.311). 
Madeline’s astonishment and disappointment are read as textual evidence 
that she is “hoodwinked”—betrayed by Angela and deceived by Porphyro. 
However, she then implores the real Porphyro to “Give me that voice again, 
my Porphyro, / Those looks immortal, those complainings dear!” (35.311-
312). Keats describes Madeline’s utterance as “voluptuous accents,” which 
allures Porphyro to consummate with her. Though appearing as a powerless 
victim facing a male advancement, Madeline again wields her erotic potency 
of passivity, which is confirmed by Keats’s word choice of “voluptuous.” 
Tempted by her words blended with fear, coyness, half-reluctance and half-
urging, Porphyro consummates with the half-dreaming Madeline: “Into her 
dream he melted, as the rose / Blendeth its odour with the violet,— / Solution 
sweet” (36.320-322). In this culmination of sexual fulfilment, Keats still 
reminds the reader that it is achieved through a religious ritual, as he 
concludes Stanza 36 with the line “St. Agnes’ moon hath set” and has 
Porphyro describe himself as “A famish’d pilgrim,—saved by miracle” 
(38.339), echoing his posture in Stanza 34: “Who knelt, with joined hands 
and piteous eye” (34.305). Ultimately, the sexual union between Madeline 
and Porphyro epitomises Keats’s conception of religious sacredness in both 
Christian and non-Christian contexts, which is the re-inclusion of sexual 
desire. It transcends the lifeless form of Christianity represented by the 
asceticism of the Beadsman, whose “pious incense” and “harsh penance” 
symbolise a failed ascent, in Frye’s words, back to the primary intimacy with 
God. Such sacred intimacy, as Keats suggests through his poetic rendering 
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of St. Agnes and Mary Magdalene, contains sexual desire and erotic 
activities that are excluded in institutionalised and doctrinal Christianity.101  
     The final elopement of Madeline and Porphyro appears to be 
contrasted with the dreadful fate of those in the castle: the Baron’s woeful 
dream, his guests’ lasting nightmares, and the deaths of Angela and the 
Beadsman. However, the line “[t]hese lovers fled away into the storm” 
(42.371, emphasis added) suggests that the elopement does not necessarily 
leads to an ideal future of love free from the confining castle. Ragussis writes 
that “the reader’s surprised awakening in the last stanza from a simple 
romance of happy love resembles Madeline’s own awakening to a cold winter 
storm and the prospect that she has been deceived” (380). Mark Sandy 
further argues that the horrid deaths of Angela and the Beadsman predict the 
couple’s fate, whose “untold future is blighted by the prospect of death, as 
the passage of time will inevitably consign them to a similar deathly state” 
(“Dream Lover and Tragic Romance” 14).102 Despite Keats’s adoption of the 
Christian concept of resurrection by referring to Mary Magdalene, he does 
not deny the inevitability of death. Nor does the sexual fulfilment presented in 
“The Eve of St. Agnes” transcend this inevitability, since Keats has already 
imbued it with potential violence that approximates to death. Madeline’s 
erotic dream, as Tilottama Rajan points out, is “being made real, and 
therefore mortal” (108). But through the ritual of St. Agnes that brings about 
                                                
101 In “The Eve of St. Mark,” another poem with a similar title and a Christian feast motif, 
Keats again presents the sacred experience with poetic imagination, though in a less sexual 
manner. In this poem, Bertha, “a maiden fair / Dwelling in the old Minster Square” (PJK 320) 
indulges herself in “A curious volume” (319) about St. Marks’ life and death. By reading the 
legendary martyrdom written in Middle English, she is thrilled by the saint’s suffering, 
“[r]ejoicing for his many pains” (322) and accesses the imaginary sphere of sacredness that 
borders on erotic ecstasy. Walter E. Houghton proposes that the poem “is built on the 
principle of contrast” (70); Bertha’s reading demonstrates a division between reality and the 
imagination, with the juxtaposition of “the near and familiar, the conventional and 
commonplace, with the strange, curious, and far-off, the visionary and the exotic” (71). Mary 
Rebecca Thayer argues that “The Eve of St. Mark” was supposed to feature the story in 
another poem by Keats, “The Cap and Bells,” in which the fairy emperor Elfinan attempts to 
steal Bertha from her home with a magical book, a theme that echoes Porphyro’s action in 
“The Eve of St. Agnes.” Keats’s idea of the sacred might be further explored by comparing 
these two poems based on the feasts of Catholic saints.   
102 Sandy’s article “Dream Lovers and Tragic Romance: Negative Fictions in Keats’s ‘Lamia,’ 
‘The Eve of St Agnes,’ and ‘Isabella’” is collected in the online journal Romanticism on the 
Net. The numbers in parenthesis indicate the paragraph number shown on its webpage. 
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this embodiment, Madeline and Porphyro are able to access the 
sacred/erotic sphere, in which they are temporarily unbound by the bustling 
castle and the wintry storm. As Patricia A. Parker accurately observes that 
“both wintry circumference and charmed center are frozen, and the ‘solution’ 
seems to be in neither one world nor the other but in the whole poetic 
movement in between” (196). What Keats accentuates poetically is this 
instantaneous interaction of sacredness and eroticism between Madeline and 
Porphyro, which grants them an extraordinary life experience from that of the 
Beadsman and Angela, even though they are destined to the same 
gruesome fate of death. 
     In this section focusing on “The Eve of St. Agnes,” I have first traced 
the influences on and the development of Keats’s idea of religion—how he 
detaches himself from orthodox Christianity under the influence of scientific 
empiricism and “the religion of the Heart” from his medical education and his 
participation in Leigh Hunt’s circle, and how he constructs a religious view of 
“Soul-making” and “a sense of Identity,” “a system of Salvation which does 
not affront our reason and humanity” (LK 2.103). Second, I highlight the 
conflicting situation for Keats when his idea of poetic creation as a process of 
annihilating “character” and “identity” is involved. In “The Eve of St. Agnes,” 
where religious piety, poetic imagination, and erotic love are synthesised, we 
see how Keats presents an alternative experience of sacredness that not 
only rebels against orthodox Christianity, but also differs from his own idea of 
religion as a means of “Soul-making” to establish “a sense of identity.” I trace 
Keats’s possible source of St. Agnes’s Eve, not only its ritualistic practice and 
superstitious effect, but the origin of Agnes’s martyrdom. By exploring 
Agnes’s hagiography, I demonstrate how Keats draws upon several key 
elements from it, as well as from Robert Burton’s The Anatomy of 
Melancholy. This cross-analysis provides novel perspectives to interpret 
Keats’s employments of Christian images and motifs in the poem, such as 
the ideas of sacrifice and fasting, and the enigmatical reference to Mary 
Magdalene. Furthermore, Madeline’s ritual of the Eve of St. Agnes is an 
erotic embodiment of Keatsian sacredness, in which the often-assumed 
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dichotomy between Porphyro/the executor/the rapist and Madeline/the 
sacrificial object/the victim is dissolved. Both Porphyro and Madeline forsake 
the control of their bodies into subjugation and annihilate their senses of self 
and subjectivity. For Keats, in the sphere of poetic creation, religious 
experience is essentially erotic experience. The sacred does not necessitate 
purity or the exclusion of sexual desire, but reincorporates the elements that 
are unpresentable and unnameable in orthodox and institutionalised 
Christianity: the disruption and annihilation of selfhood and subjectivity, the 





     In her discussion of erotic literature such as Bataille’s Story of the Eye 
and the pseudonymous Story of O, Susan Sontag recognises pornography 
not only as a specific form of cultural products for mass consumption, but 
also as “a psychological phenomenon” and a “modality or convention within 
the arts” (“The Pornographic Imagination” 83). The pornographic modality 
explores what Sontag calls “deranged consciousness,” and its mechanism of 
invoking sensual reactions that impact on “the reader’s whole experience of 
his humanity—and his limits as a personality and as a body” (94). The pursuit 
of sexual extremities featured in pornography discloses in the human psyche 
an ever-existing discontent with status quo—the biologically and socially 
constructed identity, the somatic conducts regulated by it, and the 
ordinariness of limited experience derived from it—and the latent will to 
transcend such status quo formed by existing selfhood and subjectivity. 
When Blake exclaims that “More! More! is the cry of a mistaken soul, less 
than All cannot satisfy Man” (CPPB 2), the Romantic poetical aspiration for a 
wholesome experience more than “the ratio of all things” and “the same dull 
round over again” (3) resonates with such a latent will embedded in the 
pursuit of sexual extremities.  
     In The Prelude, Wordsworth acknowledges that in order to establish a 
self-sufficient selfhood, a poet should see “into the depth of human souls— / 
Souls that appear to have no depth at all / To vulgar eyes” (3.165-167 Major 
Works 573), which Andrea K. Henderson terms the “depth model of 
subjectivity” in English Romanticism (2). But as Sontag warns, the more 
deeply a human being looks into his/her inner experience, the more likely 
he/she will encounter the loss of sanity and humanity. Through the poetic 
exploration of the interior and its reflection on the social exterior, Blake 
endeavours to restore “the Poetic and Prophetic character” (CPPB 3) of 
“human form divine” in his revisionist Christianity; Shelley looks forward to a 
future world of constant amelioration, “a happier condition of moral and 
political society” (CPWS 100); Keats, on the other hand, aims to offer a new 
“religion of Beauty,” where human aesthetic feelings are as spontaneous as 
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“the Leaves to a tree” (LK 1.239). The Romantic identities constructed in all 
these poetic attempts, however, are also threatened and dissolved when the 
poets venture deeply into human consciousness, into the realm of the erotic 
and the obscene.  
     The erotic subject in the works of Blake, and Shelley, and Keats, as this 
thesis has demonstrated, constitute an aesthetic phenomenon of self-
annihilation, particularly in the experiences of religious rituals, sexual 
anomalies, and poetic creation itself. Similarly, Bataille observes that “all that 
is sacred is poetic and all that is poetic is sacred” (Literature and Evil 84), 
associating both sacredness and poetry with sexual desire as two forms of 
plethora, the violent exuberance of human energy. That is, religion, art, and 
eroticism form an essential trinity in the human psyche that constantly seeks 
to build, reshape, escape from, and eventually destroy existing identity. It 
also epitomises the desire to go beyond the status quo and the ordinary 
experience of limited selfhood. An examination of this heterogeneous trinity 
provides an alternative angle to approach other canonised literary works of 
English Romanticism and explore within them the elements that are “less 
canonised” and “obscene.” This approach also resonates with the recent 
studies that have highlighted the material and somatic aspects in the 
Romantic poets and their works, such as Anya Taylor’s study of drunkenness 
in her Bacchus in Romantic England, Denise Gigante’s examination of eating 
and food in Taste: a Literary History, the essays collected and edited by 
Tristanne Connolly and Helen P. Bruder in Queer Blake, Sexy Blake and 
mostly recently in 2018, Beastly Blake, as well as Jeremy Davies’s 2017 
monograph Bodily Pain in Romantic Literature.  
Based on the essential correlation between eroticism, religious 
sacredness, and artistic imagination established in this thesis, the research 
presented here, as mentioned above, could be taken further to study the 
“less canonised” themes in the eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century 
literature, for example, the representation of human sacrifice (in both “Druid” 
paganism and Christian tradition) in Blake’s poetry and art, especially 
Jerusalem and the Illustrations of The Book of Job (already partially 
 261 
discussed in Chapter 1), or Byron’s representation of murder and 
cannibalism in his Oriental Tales, Don Juan, and Cain: A Mystery. A study 
such as this might be able to show how these motifs reconceptualise the idea 
of Romantic “passion” as a violent and mobile drive of consumption, 
outwardly against others and inwardly against self. The word passion, 
reinforced by its Latin etymological root of passio (suffering) and its eighth 
definition in Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary as “The last suffering of the 
Redeemer of the world” (282), is most empowered in the manipulating, 
maiming, and consuming of the human body. Therefore, further work remains 
to be done in relation to the motifs that reflects these violent aspects of 
Romantic passion, such as human sacrifice and cannibalism. And it is 
possible to bring forth new interpretations by engaging the contemporary 
thinkers on political economics such as Edmund Burke, William Godwin, and 
Thomas Malthus, and later philosophers such as Friedrich Nietzsche and 
Georges Bataille.  
     I hope this doctoral thesis has contributed to the Romantic studies by 
providing a ground for further critical evaluation of the less explored motifs 
related to violence and eroticism. The future work could in turn illuminate how 
the Romantic passion goes beyond the scopes of individual psychological 
state and interpersonal intercourse of affect, and presents itself as an 
indicator of larger social and cultural configurations: religion, commerce, war, 
and the Romantic construal of cosmological order. At last, I hope, this 
doctoral thesis not only generates new meanings in the Romantic works in 
their historical context, but also offers a dialectical discourse with later 
philosophical thoughts, and furthermore, provides insights into the cultural 
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